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3Abstract
This thesis studies several aspects of the strategy which central banks follow in imple­
menting monetary policy and its implications for the behaviour of exchange rates. The 
first chapter provides an introduction to the thesis and a review of the relevant literature. 
The following two chapters analyse the effects of information releases on the high 
frequency behaviour of the DEM/USD exchange rate, and investigate how these effects 
are related to the central banks’ policy decisions and their strategy for disclosing 
information to the market. Chapter 2 studies the effects of monetary policy signals 
released by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the US Federal Reserve, showing that they 
have a strong impact on exchange rates, and that these effects depend on the channel 
used to release the policy information, and on when the information is released. Chapter 
3 extends this analysis by examining the reaction to publicly announced macroeconomic 
information emanating from Germany and the US, and associates this reaction with 
market expectations regarding future monetary policy decisions and the timing of the 
announcement of those decisions.
Alternative monetary policy frameworks and their implication for the behaviour of ex­
change rates are the topic of the following three chapters. Chapter 4 examines the policy 
framework in 44 developing countries, covering topics such as the choice of price 
stability as the objective for monetary policy, the potential conflicts between achieving 
this objective and other functions of the central bank (in particular the maintenance of 
financial stability), and central bank independence. Chapter 5 analyses the experience of 
seven countries that have adopted a policy strategy centered on inflation targets, and 
investigates how this affected the behaviour of the central banks. Chapter 6 investigates 
the implications of the strategies analysed in the previous chapters for the stability of 
financial markets, using price data for several financial assets from a panel of eighteen 
OECD countries. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the conclusions of the thesis and 
provides suggestions for further work.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis studies several aspects of the strategy which central banks follow in imple­
menting monetary policy and its implications for the behaviour of exchange rates. There 
is an extensive body of literature that seeks to explain exchange rate movements with 
reference to observable macroeconomic variables, including variables directly associated 
with monetary policy, like the money supply or interest rates. The results of those 
studies suggest that the link between exchange rate movements and macroeconomic 
variables is weak. Existing structural models have little explanatory power, and their 
forecasting ability is poor when compared to very simple alternatives. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical argument linking exchange rates and macroeconomic variables, in particular 
the money supply or interest rates, is apparently strong. Since the exchange rate is the 
relative price of two moneys, the monetary policies followed by both central banks and 
the market’s perception of the direction of future policy actions should play an integral 
role in the determination of the exchange rate.
The recent availability of good quality high frequency exchange rate data led some 
researchers to explore the possibility that the failure of previous studies to identify 
significant influences of macroeconomic variables on exchange rates could be a result of 
the low frequency of the data used (usually quarterly or monthly). Analysis of the 
behaviour of exchange rates at daily or intra-daily frequencies might reveal patterns that
19
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are not observable at lower frequencies.1 This thesis brings together a number of studies 
written over the last three years that aim to contribute to this branch of the literature by 
associating the behaviour of exchange rates to the strategy of monetary policy, the 
elaboration of the process through which the policy objectives are to be achieved (Begg, 
1997, p. 4). As described in Section 1.2 below, economists have been interested in many 
aspects of this process. The research described in this thesis focus on the disclosure of 
policy decisions to the markets, and the basic principles and rules guiding those deci­
sions.
This chapter provides a brief review of the existing literature on the topics covered in this 
thesis, and motivates the research contained in subsequent chapters. Section 1.1 reviews 
the literature on the behaviour of exchange rates, while Section 1.2 reviews the literature 
on monetary policy strategy. Section 1.3 describes the structure of the thesis.
1.1 The Behaviour of Exchange Rates
Exchange rate economics has been one of the most active areas of economic research 
over the last three decades, but so far this research has been unable to produce a well 
established theory on what determines exchange rate movements.2 The traditional 
macroeconomic models of exchange rates did not provide satisfactory explanations of 
variations in exchange rate data: estimated equations provide poor fits, exhibit incor­
rectly signed coefficients, and their predictive ability was poor (Meese and Rogoff, 1983, 
Taylor, 1995). In light of these results, some researchers suggested that one should test 
the relevance of economic fundamentals for exchange rate movements through an 
examination of the effect of ‘news’ about fundamentals on unexpected exchange rate 
movements.
1 For a survey of the properties and applications of high-frequency financial data, with particular 
reference to foreign exchange markets, see Goodhart and O’Hara (1997).
2 Recent surveys on exchange rate economics may be found in Frankel and Rose (1995), Isard (1995), 
MacDonald and Taylor (1991), or Taylor (1995).
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1.1.1 Structural exchange rate model in ‘news’ form
An advantage of the ‘news’ approach is that it allows one to test the influence of the 
underlying fundamentals without having to specify a precise functional form for the 
exchange rate equation. One may start from a generic model, where the reduced form 
for the exchange rate is
St = B X t +st 1.1
where St is the spot exchange rate at time t, Xt is a vector of fundamental economic 
variables prevailing at time t, B is a vector of coefficients, and st is an error term. Ra­
tional market agents will act as if they know the (true) underlying exchange rate model, 
and make no systematic forecast errors. Under those conditions, and assuming efficient 
markets,
,_t/,=£ ,.*(s,) = B £,_*(*,) 1.2
where t-k ft  is the forward rate for period t formed at t-k, and E t.k denotes expectations 
formed at t-k. Combining equations 1.1 and 1.2 one gets the structural exchange rate 
model in ‘news’ form:
1.3
Equation 1.3 is simplified in a high-frequency setting, when k is small (1 day or less). 
The structure of the foreign exchange market implies that in that case t_k f t = St_k 3 The 
high-frequency structural exchange rate model in ‘news’ form is then
1.4
i.e., high-frequency changes in the exchange rate should be caused by ‘news’ about the 
fundamentals.
3 Foreign exchange transactions are settled two working days after the deal is arranged. This implies 
that the costs of holding and carrying currency for very short periods of time (inside the business day) 
are non-existent, since both operations are to be settled at the same time. Then, Etj(SJ = St.k, otherwise 
excess returns could be made by buying at t-k and selling at t, or vice-versa. For transactions occurring 
in two consecutive days, there are costs of holding and carrying currency, but in normal circumstances 
these are too small to affect the analysis.
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1.1.2 The impact of announcements on exchange rates
Using the model in equation 1.4, and a variety of choices for the variables in Xt, re­
searchers sought to identify the importance of fundamentals in explaining exchange rate 
movements. The main difficulty in applying equation 1.4 is to identify the expectations 
regarding the fundamentals. Typically, researchers have used either time-series methods 
(Frenkel, 1981, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995) or survey data to form Et_k(X t). In this 
latter case, the market expectation is usually measured by the median of expectations of 
market agents questioned by commercial enterprises that collect and distribute this 
information. Money Market Services, International (MMS) provides the most popular 
survey.
The use of equation 1.4 with survey data is particularly common in studies of the impact 
of announcements of macroeconomic data on exchange rates. One major advantage of 
the studies using announcement data is that one can pinpoint the precise time of day 
when the announcement was made. One can then observe the exchange rate immediately 
before and after the announcement, to see the effect. With such precise timing, one can 
hope to isolate the impact of one particular bit of information, before it is diffused in a 
stream of other information arriving to the market.
The early studies of announcement data concentrated on the reaction of USD exchange 
rates to US money supply announcements. Using daily data, Cornell (1982), Engel and 
Frankel (1984), Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985), and Tandon and Urich (1987) all found 
that positive money surprises were associated with appreciation of the USD. This 
analysis was later extended to other US announcements by Hardouvelis (1988), Harris 
and Zabka (1995), and Edison (1997), also using daily data, and Hakkio and Pearce 
(1985), Hogan, Melvin, and Roberts (1991), and Hogan and Melvin (1994), using data 
sampled 3 or 4 times daily. The results from these studies suggest that the only macro- 
economic announcements that significantly and systematically affect USD exchange rates 
are the money supply, trade balance and employment statistics.
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In principle, the movements in any bilateral exchange rate depend on ‘news’ originating 
from both countries concerned. However, most empirical studies only investigate the 
effect of US news on bilateral USD exchange rates, with Ito and Roley (1987) being the 
major exception.4 Chapter 3 intends to fill this gap by examining the effect on the 
DEM/USD exchange rate of macroeconomic announcements from the US and Ger­
many.5 This chapter also improves on existing literature on US macroeconomic an­
nouncements because it uses exchange rate data sampled at higher frequencies (five 
minutes, instead of several hours). Results show that in a high-frequency setting, several 
US and German releases have significant impacts on the DEM/USD, but for most of 
these announcements the effects are quickly drowned in subsequent exchange rate 
fluctuations. This explains the limited findings of previous studies that used coarser 
exchange rate samplings.
The statistical significance of US money supply ‘news’ suggests that monetary policy is 
one key factor driving exchange rates. Then, a natural extension of the announcement 
studies would be to analyse the effects on exchange rates of announcements by central 
banks regarding the current and future stance of monetary policy. This is done in Chap­
ter 2, where the impact on the DEM/USD exchange rate of monetary policy signals from 
the Deutsche Bundesbank and the US Federal Reserve is analysed. The links between 
central bank’s activities and high frequency exchange rate behaviour are further explored 
on Chapter 3, where it is shown that the impact of macroeconomic announcements on 
the DEM/USD exchange rate is associated with the timing of monetary policy decisions, 
and the expectation regarding those decisions.
4 Ito and Roley (1987) examined the effect on the USD/JPY exchange rate of money supply, producer 
prices, and industrial production innovations from the US and Japan, and found that only the US money 
innovations had a significant effect.
5 This chapter is based on Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998).
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1.1.3 The exchange rate volatility process
Although most of the attention of academics and practioners is usually concentrated on 
the level of the exchange rate, its volatility is also of interest. Higher exchange volatility 
increases the risk and uncertainty in international transactions, which should reduce the 
welfare of risk-averse agents. The evidence on the real costs of exchange rate volatility 
is not clear-cut (see, for example, Grauwe, 1989, ch. 12), but since agents buy costly 
financial instruments to hedge against exchange risk, the amounts involved in these 
transactions are an indication of how costly exchange rate volatility is. It is then impor­
tant to understand the determinants of exchange rate volatility, to be able to propose 
policies that might reduce it.
Equation 1.4 implies that high-frequency exchange rate movements are associated with 
the arrival of new information to the market. Using their Mixture of Distribution Model 
(MODM), Tauchen and Pitts (1983) have shown that assuming a random information 
arrival process, both volume and volatility are directly proportional to the number of 
information events in a given interval of time. Therefore, the MODM predicts that one 
will observe large temporal variations in exchange rate volatility associated with varia­
tions in the arrival of information to the market. This pattern of conditional heterosce- 
dasticity is what is observed in actual exchange rate data, and this topic has become one 
of the most widely researched areas in exchange rate behaviour.
Traditionally, the time-varying volatility in exchange rates has been modelled using the 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) framework introduced by Engle 
(1982), generally under some variation of the GARCH(1,1) model developed by Bollers- 
lev (1986). Examples of applications of this model in modelling exchange rate volatility 
include Hsieh (1989), for daily data, Baillie and Bollerslev (1991), for hourly data, and 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), for high-frequency (five minutes) data.6
6 A survey of applications of the ARCH class of models to financial data can be found in Bollerslev, 
Chou, and Kroner (1992).
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One disadvantage of these models is that they are entirely univariate, i.e., they explain 
volatility only in terms of its own history and not in relation with any exogenous vari­
ables. However, it is clear that some observable exogenous factors may cause significant 
changes in volatility, and some researchers tried to explore this fact. For example, 
DeGennaro and Shrieves (1995) related intra-day volatility to measures of public infor­
mation arrivals, derived from the Reuters news headline pages. The impact on exchange 
rate volatility of announcements of US macroeconomic statistics was analysed by Harvey 
and Huang (1991), Ederington and Lee (1993), and Payne (1996).
Chapter 2 extends their analysis in two ways. First, the announcements covered in the 
chapter refer to monetary policy announcements from the Bundesbank and the Federal 
Reserve, instead of macroeconomic statistics. Second, it uses the GARCH framework, 
while Harvey and Huang (1991) and Ederington and Lee (1993) used variance ratios, 
and Payne’s model was based on the Stochastic Volatility approach. The GARCH-based 
methodology developed in Chapter 2 provides for an easier way of simultaneously 
estimating the impact of the policy announcements and the strong intra-daily seasonality 
in exchange rate volatility, that was also found by Ederington and Lee (1993) and Payne 
(1996).
Another factor that may cause significant changes in exchange rate volatility is the 
monetary policy strategy. Different monetary policy strategies may be associated with 
different degrees of uncertainty regarding future policy. Assuming that monetary policy 
is relevant for exchange rate behaviour, these differences in uncertainty are likely to 
translate into differences in the frequency and magnitude of exchange rate changes. An 
example of this relation has been demonstrated by Lastrapes (1989), using the ARCH 
framework, that has shown that shifts in US monetary policy regimes significantly 
affected the volatility of USD exchange rates. Chapter 6 explores this possible link 
between monetary policy and asset price volatility, using price data for several financial 
assets from a panel of 18 OECD countries.
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1.2 The Strategy of Monetary Policy
1.2.1 Monetary policy objectives
As the monopolist supplier of high-powered money, the central bank has potentially 
considerable power over the economic conditions of the region where its money is used. 
Central banks around the world have always been required to use monetary policy, the 
management of the supply of high-powered money, to achieve a variety of objectives. 
The earliest central banks were set up to finance their governments, and to develop the 
financial system. In the nineteenth century, central banks took on the primary responsi­
bility for protecting the external value of the currency and the stability of the financial 
system. During the 1930s and 1940s central banks were required to promote monetary 
stability, full employment and maximum levels of production.7
Economic research and economic developments in the last thirty years led to a growing 
consensus among economists and central bankers that price stability should be the 
overriding long-term objective of monetary policy. The case for price stability may be 
summarised as the corollary of two basic propositions.8 The first proposition states that 
attempts to reduce unemployment using monetary policy are likely to be unsuccessful. 
As Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) have pointed out, there is no medium (or longer) 
term inflation-output trade-off to exploit. A downward sloping Phillips curve may exist 
in the short run, but attempts to exploit it are likely to be destabilising, since the effects 
of monetary policy on the economy are not known with sufficient precision (Friedman’s, 
1959, Tong and variable lags’), and self-defeating, since they might generate expecta­
tions of higher inflation, and thus higher actual inflation, without any reduction in unem­
ployment (the time-inconsistency problem of Kydland and Prescott, 1977, and Barro and
7 For an historical review of central bank’s functions and mandates see Capie, Goodhart, and Schnadt 
(1994).
8 See, for instance, Mishkin (1997) for an extensive discussion of the case for price stability.
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Gordon, 1983a). The second proposition states that price stability in the long run 
promotes a higher level of economic output and more rapid economic growth. This 
negative relationship between inflation and growth has been documented empirically 
(Barro, 1995, Gregorio, 1996), and is associated with the fact that inflation increases 
uncertainty about relative prices and the future price level, and, when associated with a 
non-indexed tax system, increases the cost of capital, both effects reducing investment 
below its optimal level (Fischer, 1994).9
Still, price stability is not the only objective of monetary policy. For example, in the 
short run monetary policy has real effects, and these short run effects matter. Even those 
central banks that give primacy to medium term price stability have, in most cases, other 
concerns, although these assume a secondary status (Goodhart and Vinals, 1994). The 
objectives of monetary policy have recently been reviewed in Fischer (1994) and Good­
hart (1994), in the context of the largest (G-7) developed economies. Chapter 4 extends 
this analysis for a group of 44 developing countries.10 Central banks in developing 
countries tend to face a different set of economic problems and conditions, that may 
justify diverting monetary policy to a different set of objectives. As it is shown in this 
chapter, the primary objective of most central banks in developing countries is also, in 
principle, price stability. However, these central banks face strong pressures to deliver 
results in other areas (e.g., financing the government, maintaining inappropriate exchange 
rates), that in some cases force them to relegate price stability to a secondary position in 
their list of priorities.
One objective that is common to central banks in developed and developing countries is 
the responsibility for the systemic stability of the financial system (see Fischer, 1994, 
Goodhart, 1994, and Chapter 4 of this thesis). Even those central banks that do not have 
responsibility for the supervision of financial institutions see themselves as safeguards of
9 Fischer (1994) provides an extensive discussion of the costs of inflation. The author identifies other 
channels through which inflation may reduce the level and growth of output (e.g., shoe-leather costs, 
menu costs), but argues that those associated with the tax system and inflation uncertainty are the ones 
that are quantitatively more important.
10 Chapter 4 is based on Fry, Goodhart, and Almeida (1996).
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financial stability (Goodhart and Vinals, 1994, Table 1). In the long run, the pursuit of 
price stability is likely to strengthen the stability of the financial system, since financial 
disruptions and crises are frequently linked to instability of inflation and interest rates. 
However, in special circumstances, the central banks’ acceptance of lender-of-last-resort 
responsibilities might require a monetary policy response that is in conflict with the 
macroeconomic objective, at least in the short run. Substantial increases in interest rates 
may cause liquidity problems in marginal banks, that force the central bank to inject more 
liquidity into the system than the macroeconomic objective would require (Cukierman, 
1994). Concerns about financial stability may also drive central banks to smooth interest 
rates more than it would be desirable from the inflation point of view (Goodhart, 1996).
1.2.2 Strategies for achieving price stability
Achieving price stability without endangering the financial system requires a carefully 
designed strategy. The features of this strategy that have been the focus of most discus­
sions in the literature are the legal and institutional framework of monetary policy, in 
particular the question of whether the central bank should be independent from the 
political power, and the use of rules and intermediary targets. Less discussed, but not a 
less important feature of the policy strategy, is the choice of the operating procedures for 
policy implementation. This subsection reviews the main issues in these discussions.
Central bank independence
One of the strategies that have been suggested by many as being able to deliver low 
inflation is to change the institutional framework of the central bank in order to make it 
more independent from the government.11 The case for an independent central bank is 
based on two arguments. The first is the theoretical literature on the time-inconsistency 
problem. Making the central bank independent, with a clear mandate to achieve price 
stability would remove any incentives to generate surprise inflation, i.e., it would elimi-
11 Discussions on the topic of central bank independence may be found in Cukierman (1992, 1994), 
Fischer (1994), and Goodhart (1993).
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nate the inflation bias. The second is the empirical evidence that suggests that central 
banks that are more independent are able to deliver lower inflation. Some empirical 
research has shown that there is evidence of a negative correlation between various 
proxies for central bank independence and inflation, at least within the group of industrial 
countries (Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini, 1991, Alesina and Summers, 1993). 
Perhaps more relevant for the widespread support for central bank independence, is the 
fact that the central bank with the best anti-inflationary reputation, the Bundesbank, is 
also one of the most independent central banks in the world.
However, the case for central bank independence is not as strong as the widespread 
support it has received might suggest. There is some empirical evidence (e.g., Capie and 
Wood, 1991, Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti, 1992, Eijffinger and de Haan, 1996) 
suggesting that the negative relationship between independence and inflation found in 
some studies is sample specific, and does not hold when other countries are used in the 
analysis. Campillo and Miron (1996), for example, have shown that central bank inde­
pendence has no explanatory power for cross-country variation in average inflation once 
other potential determinants of inflation are included in the analysis. Furthermore, even 
if such negative correlation exists, correlation is not causality. Some authors (e.g., 
Posen, 1995) argue that low inflation and central bank independence may be both pro­
ducts of a strong constituency for low inflation. On another level, the lack of democratic 
accountability of an independent central bank has been criticised. It is argued that such 
an important tool of economic policy, like monetary policy, should be under the control 
of those who are going to be judged by the overall performance of the economy, the 
elected politicians, and not under the control of non-elected central bank officials.
The issue of central bank independence is re-examined in the context of the study of 
monetary policy in 44 developing countries described in Chapter 4. The relevant section 
of this chapter explores whether differences in the constitutional status of the central 
bank have made a significant difference to their behaviour, especially with respect to 
their relative rate of money expansion and inflation, in line with previous work by Cuki­
erman (1992), Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), Cukierman et al. (1993), and 
Gregorio (1996).
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Monetary policy rules and targets
There is a vast academic literature on whether monetary policy should be guided by 
stable rules, or whether central banks should be given the discretion to decide what is 
the optimal policy at each moment in time. A monetary rule specifies policy actions as a 
simple function of economic or monetary conditions, and is selected as the outcome of a 
multiperiod optimisation process. Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon 
(1983a) saw their demonstration of the time-inconsistency problem as making the case 
for a monetary policy rule. By adopting a rule the central bank could precommit to 
avoiding monetary surprises, and the problem of dynamic inconsistency would disappear. 
The problem with a monetary rule is that in an uncertain world, it is impossible to design 
ex-ante a rule that would deliver the optimal response to all possible contingencies. In 
contrast, discretion implies period-by-period reoptimisation on the part of the monetary 
authority, without any prior restrictions on the actions that the central bank can take at 
each date. This led some authors (e.g., Fischer, 1990) to argue that discretion is prefe­
rable to rules, because the benefit of having the flexibility to respond to unanticipated 
contingencies is greater than any advantage gained from pre-commitment to a fixed rule.
As McCallum (1997) points out, the distinction between rules and discretion is straight­
forward in the context of the theoretical models of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and 
subsequent writers, but it is less clear when it comes to practical application to the 
behaviour of actual central banks. Taylor (1993) distinguishes ‘rule-like’ from discre­
tionary behaviour in practice, by describing the former as ‘systematic’ in the sense of 
“methodical, according to a plan”. This is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a 
rule, since the period by period optimisation process of the discretionary central bank of 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) may be presented as a systematic application of a formula. 
The needed additional criterion for a rule, according to McCallum (1997), is that the 
central bank takes account of the private sector’s expectational behaviour, committing 
not to attempt to exploit temporary inflation-output trade-offs. This could be achieved 
by announcing a (preferably quantified) target, and sticking to it. The same line is taken 
by Laidler (1996), when he claims that a target value for a variable is one of the things 
we might signify when we speak of a policy rule.
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Goodhart and Vinals (1994), McCallum (1997), Mishkin (1997), Cottarelli and Giannini 
(1997) and the survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1990) are some 
examples of the vast literature reviewing the issues involved in the choice of a monetary 
policy target. A good policy target should be reliably under the central bank control, 
should have a predictable relationship with the final target, and must be capable of 
affecting the public’s expectations. Although other variables have been proposed (e.g., 
nominal GNP, interest rates), the variables that have been widely used by central banks 
as policy targets are the inflation rate, a monetary aggregate or the exchange rate.12
The choice of the exchange rate as a target depends on what is perhaps the most basic of 
all monetary policy choices, whether or not to adopt a fixed exchange rate.13 The initial 
discussion in this area related to the optimal currency area literature began by Mundell 
(1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), and was widely extended recently by 
research associated with the move towards monetary integration in Europe (see survey in 
Isard, 1995, ch. 11). The main problem of a fixed exchange rate is the loss of an inde­
pendent monetary policy, i.e., the loss of the ability to use monetary policy to achieve the 
desirable levels for the domestic macroeconomic objectives. The key advantage is its 
simplicity and clarity, which makes it easily understood by the public. An exchange rate 
peg anchors price inflation for internationally traded goods, and when the peg is credible, 
this helps bring inflation expectations in line with that of the targeted country. It is also 
easily controllable by the central bank.
The use of monetary aggregates as intermediary targets become very popular among 
central bankers after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate Bretton Woods regime, and 
was the subject of intense discussions in the 1970s and 1980s (see Goodhart, 1989b, for
12 It follows from the previous paragraph that the expression ‘policy target’ is being used in the sense of 
an ‘intermediate’ or ‘final’ target, that the central bank sets for the medium term and commits to stick to 
it. It does not cover ‘operating targets’, which are frequently adjusted. Several central banks have used 
money market interest rates as ‘operating targets’, but not as ‘policy targets’, in the sense being used 
here.
13 Exchange rate targets do not imply fixed exchange rates. A crawling peg in which the currency is 
allowed to depreciate at a steady rate is also a form of exchange rate targeting. Because the implications 
of a crawling peg for the conduct of monetary policy are very similar to that of a fixed exchange rate, at 
least when the depreciation rate is kept unchanged, the discussion in the main text assumes fixed 
exchange rates on the grounds of simplicity.
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a survey). A major advantage of money targets is that they enable a central bank to 
adjust its monetary policy to cope with domestic considerations. Money targets can also 
provide good anchors for inflation expectations, although not as good as exchange rate 
targets: they are less easily understood by the public, and information about monetary 
aggregates is only known with a lag of a couple of weeks, at least. However, money 
aggregates can only be good targets if they can be well controlled by the central bank, 
and if there is a strong and reliable relationship between the final objective and the 
targeted aggregate. These two conditions were seldom verified, and during the 1980s 
most central banks abandoned money targeting.
The interest in inflation targeting is more recent, but it has already been the topic of vast 
economic research, of which the books edited by Leiderman and Svensson (1995) and 
Haldane (1995a), and the works of Ammer and Freeman (1995) and McCallum (1996) 
are some examples. However, most of this work is either theoretical, or concentrates on 
the experience of only one or two countries. Chapter 5 discusses inflation targeting in 
the light of the experience of the seven countries that have adopted this policy strategy. 
The chapter analyses how the adoption of inflation targets has affected the behaviour of 
the central banks, and the credibility of their policies, and compares their inflation record 
with other countries that did not adopt this strategy.14
In the literature on the choice of the optimal policy target, the most popular approach is 
to determine how well the various targets would perform in terms of yielding desirable 
values for macroeconomic variables such as inflation or real GDP relative to trend. 
Recent examples of this kind of approach are Henderson and McKibbin (1993), Feldstein 
and Stock (1994), Haldane and Salmon (1995), and the individual authors in Bryant, 
Hooper, and Mann (1993). Chapter 6 analyses this issue from the perspective of the 
effect of policy targets on the stability of the financial system. Using data for exchange 
rates, interest rates and stock prices from a panel of 18 OECD countries, the chapter 
examines the volatility of these prices under different policy targets, and identifies which
14 Chapter 5 is a slightly revised version of Almeida and Goodhart (1998). An earlier version of this 
study appeared in Almeida and Goodhart (1997).
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targets are more likely to be associated with ‘financial crises’, periods of abrupt and very 
large changes in financial asset prices.
Operating procedures
One aspect of the monetary policy strategy often neglected in academic research is the 
choice of instruments and operating targets of monetary policy. Most of the academic 
interest has been concentrated on the basic choice regarding which variables the central 
bank should directly control, namely the relative weight to give to the quantity of bank 
reserves or market interest rates.15 But other aspects of the operating procedures de­
serve attention. One example is the way central banks disclose to the markets informa­
tion about the current and future stance of monetary policy, the ‘policy signals’.
The choice of policy signals is particularly important for the stability of financial markets. 
For instance, the US Federal Reserve has at times argued that some degree of secrecy in 
the implementation of monetary policy is necessary to avoid abrupt changes in interest 
rates, and thus reduce market risk.16 This argument was formalised by Dotsey (1987) 
and Rudin (1988), that showed that the unconditional variance of the money market rate 
is smaller when the central bank does not provide precise signals about the current stance 
of policy.17
Chapter 2 studies the impact of monetary policy signals on financial markets by looking 
at the reaction of the USD/DEM exchange rate to signals issued by the US Federal 
Reserve and the Deutsche Bundesbank. The chapter analyses the effect on the level and
15 For a discussion of this topic, see Friedman (1990), Goodhart (1994), and McCallum (1997). Borio 
(1997) provides a survey of the operating procedures of monetary policy in industrial countries.
16 This argument was initially made during the hearings of the ‘Merrill vs. FOMC’ case, in the late 
1970s. David R  Merril, a student at Georgetown University, filled a complaint in 1975 charging the 
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of violation of the Freedom of Information Act by deferring 
the public availability of its Records of Policy Action beyond the date of their adoption. The FOMC 
argued that immediate disclosure of its policy decisions would jeopardise the government’s interests. 
After a long legal battle, the US District Court ruled in favour of the FOMC in 1981 (see Goodffiend, 
1986). The argument was repeated in 1993, in a statement by the Chairman of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Alan Greenspan, before the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs, US House of Representatives (Greenspan, 1993, p. 1107-1108).
17 However, this result seems to be model specific, since Tabellini (1987) obtained the opposite result.
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volatility of the exchange rate of different types of policy signals issued by the two 
central banks. The high frequency of the exchange rate data used and the differences in 
the nature of the policy signals concerned allow for the precise identification of the 
exchange rate response pattern. The topic of policy signalling is also covered in Chapter 
3, where it is shown that the reaction of the USD/DEM exchange rate to German macro- 
economic announcements is associated with the timing of the release of Bundesbank’s 
policy signals.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 analyse the effects 
of information releases on intra-daily exchange rate movements, using DEM/USD 
exchange rate quotes sampled at a 5-minute frequency, and investigate how these effects 
are related to the central banks’ policy decisions and their strategy for disclosing infor­
mation to the market.18 Chapter 2 studies the effects of monetary policy signals released 
by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the US Federal Reserve on the level and volatility of 
the DEM/USD exchange rate, and examines how the reaction of the exchange rate 
depends on the channel used to release the policy information, and on when the informa­
tion is released. Chapter 3 extends this analysis by examining the reaction of the ex­
change rate to a wide range of macroeconomic information emanating from Germany 
and the US, and associates this reaction with market expectations regarding future 
monetary policy decisions and the timing of the announcement of those decisions.
The focus of chapters 4 to 6 are the basic principles and rules guiding monetary policy 
decisions, and their implication for the behaviour of exchange rates. Chapter 4 examines 
the policy framework in 44 developing countries. The analysis covers topics such as the
18 I would like to thank MMS International in London and Belmont, CA, for the provision of the 
expectations survey data and Olsen & Associates, in Zurich, for providing the exchange rate data and 
the Reuters’ news headlines file used in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis.
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choice of price stability as the primary objective for monetary policy, the potential 
conflicts between achieving this objective and other functions of the central bank (in 
particular the maintenance of financial stability), and central bank independence. Chapter 
5 is dedicated to inflation targeting. The chapter analyses the experience of seven 
countries that have adopted this policy strategy, and investigates how this affected the 
behaviour of the central banks. Chapter 6 builds on the analysis of the policy strategies 
in the previous chapters, and investigates the implications of these strategies for the 
stability of financial markets, using price data for several financial assets from a panel of 
eighteen OECD countries. Chapter 7 summarises the conclusions of the thesis and 
provides suggestions for further work.
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The Reaction of Exchange Rates 
to Monetary Policy Signals
Monetary policy should be an important factor in the determination of exchange rates, 
since the exchange rate is the relative price of two moneys. Thus, when information 
regarding the current and future stance of monetary policy arrives to the market, agents 
are likely to revise their expectations and desired currency holdings. Agents will then 
trade to rebalance their portfolios accordingly, and that trading process is likely to lead 
to increased volatility and changes in the level of the exchange rate. The purpose of this 
chapter is to test this hypothesis using DEM/USD exchange rate data covering the 
period 1/1/92 to 31/12/94, sampled at a five minute frequency, and a corresponding set 
of monetary policy signals emanating from the US and German Central Banks. This 
analysis improves on previous work in this area in three main respects. First, this is, to 
my knowledge, the first study which covers a broad set of policy interest rates, both from 
Germany and the US, in a unified framework. Previous work in this area has focused 
only on some of these signals, mainly US Discount rate announcements. This allows for 
a more comprehensive understanding of the links between policy signals and high fre­
quency exchange rate behaviour, and for comparisons of the relative importance of the 
different policy signals from each central bank, and the relative influence of the two 
central banks in the DEM/USD. Second, the study is conducted using very high fire-
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quency data, whereas most earlier work has used exchange rate data sampled at a daily 
frequency. One major advantage of such high frequency data is that one can pinpoint the 
time of day when the announcement was made, and thus isolate the impact of one 
particular bit of information. Empirical results show that effects typically diffuse rapidly 
in a stream of other information that the researcher is not able to observe, so that statisti­
cal significance disappears when exchange rates are measured at lower frequencies. 
Third, it covers the effects on both the level and volatility of the exchange rate. This 
allows for more precise characterisation of the exchange rate dynamics.
Most of the earlier work on the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates was on the 
reaction of the exchange rate to money supply surprises.1 However, innovations in key 
interest rates are usually a better measure of shocks to monetary policy than innovations 
in the stock of money, at least relative to the high-order monetary aggregates like Ml 
and M2 that were the object of those studies (as Bemanke and Blinder, 1992, have 
shown for the US). As monopoly suppliers of base money, central banks can control its 
price, at least in the very short run (control the price of this money at the short end of the 
market). So they define their ‘operating targets’ usually in terms of the overnight (day- 
to-day) money market (interbank) rate, and the monetary policy stance can be deter­
mined by the level of some instrument interest rates that exercise a close influence on the 
market rate. In the case of the German Bundesbank these are the Discount, Lombard 
and Repo rates, and for the US Federal Reserve (Fed), these are the Fed Funds rate 
target and the Discount rate (although the importance of each these rates as a policy 
instrument differs significantly, as it is discussed in Section 2.1).
Previous empirical work, based on low frequency (usually monthly) VAR models, has 
provided some evidence supporting the hypothesis that interest rates have a strong 
influence on exchange rates. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) found that US monetary 
policy contractionary shocks, measured by statistical innovations in the Federal Funds 
rate, lead to significant and sharp appreciations in the USD (of around 3.3% for each 100 
b.p. surprise), and that these shocks explain a large proportion (around 25%) of the
1 See Frankel and Rose (1995) for a review of this literature.
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variability of the exchange rate. Copeland (1989) also found that unanticipated increases 
in the German T-bill interest rate led to an appreciation of the DEM, and that these 
changes in T-bill rates explain up to a quarter of the unanticipated movements in the 
DEM/USD exchange rate.
Meanwhile, there is some literature that shows that monetary policy announcements have 
a significant influence on the high frequency behaviour of financial asset prices. Evi­
dence from the 1970s shows that changes in the Fed Funds rate target had a significant 
effect on bond and T-bill rates (Cook and Hahn, 1989) and on stock prices (Thorbecke 
and Alami, 1994). There is also evidence that US Discount rate announcements affect 
T-bill rates (Cook and Hahn, 1988, Thornton, 1994) and stock prices (Smirlock and 
Yawitz, 1985, May, 1992). Neumann and Weidmann (1996) found that unexpected 
changes in the German Discount rate have a significant effect on money market rates.
It is then natural to expect that the high frequency dynamics of exchange rates are 
significantly affected by monetary policy announcements. However, the evidence on this 
hypothesis has been limited to specific policy signals, mainly US Discount rate an­
nouncements. Using daily data from 1975 to 1983, Batten and Thornton (1984) showed 
that non-technical Discount rate increases caused an appreciation of the USD weighted 
index (of around 1% for each 100 b.p. increase).2 Hardouvelis (1988) also found a 
positive effect of unexpected Discount rate increases on USD appreciation, but this 
effect was only significant for two (the French franc and the Italian lira) of the seven 
dollar exchange rates considered. Harvey and Huang (1994) consider the impact of 
Federal Reserve open market operations on financial markets, but do not uncover any 
significant effects of these operations on the level or the volatility of several USD ex­
change rates.
The existing evidence on the reaction of exchange rates to monetary policy signals is
2 The distinction between technical and non-technical Discount rate changes is based on the wording 
of the Fed’s press release announcing the change. Technical changes are those purportedly taken 
entirely to bring the Discount rate in close alignment with money market rates. Non-technical are 
justified with reference to some policy objectives.
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clearly scarce. The objective of this chapter is to extend this line of research to a wide 
range of monetary policy signals, namely those associated with the US Fed Funds target 
and all the German policy signals. The results of this chapter show that these signals 
have a significant influence on the DEM/USD, in particular the US Fed Funds target and 
the German Lombard rate, and thus need to be considered in any characterisation of the 
high frequency exchange rate behaviour.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 describes the policy 
signals used by the two central banks, the German Bundesbank and the US Federal 
Reserve. The effect of monetary policy news in the DEM/USD level is analysed in 
Section 2.2, while in Section 2.3 the focus is on the impact of the policy signals on 
exchange rate volatility. The chapter closes with some concluding remarks which are 
presented in Section 2.4.
2.1 Monetary Policy ‘Signals’ and ‘News’
The monetary policy stance can be defined by the level of the operating target, usually 
the money market overnight rate. However, such operating targets are not always 
announced, and the monetary policy stance has to be inferred from a set of central bank 
actions, consisting of formal statements and market activity. Obviously, not all central 
bank actions have policy implications, and some actions are not informative from a 
monetary policy perspective. In this chapter, any central bank action that potentially 
conveys information to the markets about the stance of current or future monetary policy 
will be classified as a ‘policy signal’. Subsection 2.1.1 describes the policy signals issued 
by the Deutsche Bundesbank, and subsection 2.1.2 the policy signals issued by the Board 
of Governors of the US Federal Reserve System (Fed). Subsection 2.1.3 distinguishes 
policy ‘signals’ from policy ‘news’ and describes the measure of ‘news’ used in this 
chapter.
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2.1.1 Deutsche Bundesbank’s policy signals
The key variable in the daily management of German monetary policy is the day-to-day 
money market rate, that the Bundesbank directly influences by controlling a set of key 
interest rates. The day-to-day money market rate is kept within a band, with the ceiling 
set by the Lombard rate and the floor set by the Discount rate.3 However, the money 
market rate seldom reaches either of the edges of the band, as it tends to follow the rate 
of the most recent weekly securities repurchase agreements (repos) tender, which makes 
the ‘Repo’ rate the key operating rate for the Bundesbank (Clarida and Gertler, 1996, 
p. 12) 4 Usually the weekly repos are sufficient to keep market rates on the desired path, 
but if the rates threat to diverge substantially from that path, the Bundesbank may make 
use of fine-tuning operations: injections of ‘day-to-day’ money under section 17 of the 
Bundesbank act,5 foreign exchange swaps and repurchase agreements, ‘quick tenders’,6 
or liquidity Treasury bills (‘Bulis’).7
3 The Lombard rate is the ceiling for market rates because credit institutions can utilise the Lombard 
loan facility on their own initiative, and the collateral to be deposited is a binding constraint for indivi­
dual institutions in isolated cases only, and never for the banking system as a whole. Most of the times 
the Discount rate acts as a floor to money market rates, but during situations of massive liquidity 
surpluses, the banks are unable to eliminate these surpluses by refraining from discounting further bills. 
In these situations the Bundesbank uses ‘liquidity paper’ (‘Bulis’) to absorb the excess funds, and the 
selling rate for the ‘Bulis’ becomes the floor for money market rates.
4 As a rule, the weekly repo tenders take the form of a variable-rate tender, but sometimes when the 
Bundesbank wants to send an unequivocal policy signal sets fixed-rate tenders. In this latter case, the 
banks can only indicate the quantity they wish to bid for at the interest rate set by the Bundesbank. In 
the variable-rate tenders participants bid in terms of both the amount of funds they require and the rates 
they are prepared to pay, and the Bundesbank allots an amount compatible with the desired interest rate 
level.
5 The injections of ‘day-to-day’ money under section 17 of the Bundesbank act consisted of shifts of 
Federal balances with the banks that were the main counterparts in these transactions. This instrument 
was no longer available from the beginning of 1994 due to the abolition of the Federal and Lander 
governments’ obligation to deposit their liquid funds at the Bundesbank.
6 ‘Quick tenders’ take the form of variable or fixed-rate tenders offered only to banks that are active 
players in the money market, and are settled within about one hour.
7 Changes in minimum reserve requirements may in some circumstances be used as a monetary policy 
instrument. During the 1992/94 period the Bundesbank lowered these requirements twice (March 1993 
and March 1994), but the primary purpose was reducing competitive disadvantages of German banks, 
and not for monetary policy reasons; as such, those changes were coupled with compensatory issues of 
liquidity paper to reduce their impact on market interest rates. For this reason, in this chapter the 
changes in minimum reserve requirements are not included as policy instruments.
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The Repo rate is the key operating rate, but the Lombard and Discount rates are also 
very important, because they highlight the basic stance of the Bundesbank’s monetary 
policy (although policy driven changes in interest rates are usually initiated by open 
market operations). Fine-tuning measures are used on a very limited scale, and only in 
situations when the market conditions threat interest rate fluctuations that are undesirable 
for policy reasons; the main goal of the fine-tuning interventions is to maintain a clearly 
discernible monetary policy stance (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1994, p. 69). Thus, the 
hierarchy of Bundesbank rates may be described as follows: the Repo rate sets the stance 
of German monetary policy, which is highlighted by the Lombard and Discount rates, 
and reaffirmed by the occasional use of the fine-tuning instruments.
Monetary policy decisions are made by the Bundesbank council, composed by the 
Bundesbank Board and the Presidents of the German Lander Central Banks. The council 
meets every fortnight, on Thursdays, usually in the morning.8 Changes in the Lombard 
or Discount rates are announced at a news conference or by press release after the 
council meeting.9 The announcement of the terms of the weekly repo is usually made 
each Tuesday, around 09:00 local time, (or, less frequently, at the end of a previous 
council meeting),10 with the results of the tender being announced on the Wednesday 
(around 10:00 local time).11 Being exceptional measures, fine-tuning operations may be 
announced at any time.
The Bundesbank’s main regular policy signals are the announcement of the outcome of 
the council meetings, the Tuesday announcement of the repo tender terms and the
8 There are some exceptions to this rule: the council does not meet over the Christmas or Easter 
holidays, or in the beginning of August, so there is usually a 3 or 4 weeks interval between meetings at 
those times; also, in those weeks when the Thursday is a public holiday, the meeting is held on other day 
of the week, usually the Wednesday.
9 During the period 1992/94, the only exception to this rule occurred during the September 1992 ERM 
crisis. The Bundesbank announced a 25 b.p. cut in the Lombard rate and a 50 b.p. cut in the Discount 
rate in 13/9/92, a Sunday, at the end of the emergency meetings held between the participants in the 
ERM to avoid the collapse of the system.
10 Sometimes the Bundesbank announces the conditions of the tender after a council meeting, if it 
wants to send a clear signal to the market. For example, in November 1993 the Bundesbank announced 
its intention of offering a fixed-rate tender, and the rate it was going to apply, for several transactions in 
advance.
11 These dates are sometimes shifted to avoid a clash with holidays.
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Wednesday announcement of the repo results. The key pieces of policy information 
included in those announcements are:
- council meeting outcome: changes in the Discount and Lombard rates; occasional­
ly, announcement of fixed-rate tenders, and respective rate;
- Tuesday repo terms: if a fixed-rate tender has not been previously announced, 
whether the tender will be held at a variable or fixed rate (changes from variable to 
fixed-rate, or vice-versa, are usually seen as indicating a policy change) and, in the 
case of fixed-rate tenders, at what rate;
- Wednesday repo results: in the case of variable-rate tenders, the marginal allotment 
rate.
Since the policy information content of the announcement of repo results, when the 
tender is held at a fixed rate, or of the repo terms, when the rate had been fixed at a 
previous council meeting, will be low (as no information on interest rates will be revealed 
in those announcements), in such occasions the Tuesday and Wednesday announcements 
are not considered to be policy signals. All council meeting announcements are assumed 
to be policy signals.
2.1.2 US Federal Reserve’s policy signals
The key variable in US monetary policy is the Federal Funds rate, that the Fed influences 
through direct open market purchases and sales of US government securities. The 
formal operating target for US monetary policy is the level of borrowed reserves, but the 
Fed Funds rate is regarded as the most useful indicator of the stance of Federal Reserve 
policy.12 The Discount rate is also a key interest rate, although its importance has been 
declining over time.13
12 The Fed Funds market is the market for immediately available reserve balances at the Fed, and it is 
particularly sensible to changes in reserve availability caused by open market operations. The policy 
decisions made by the Fed have an implicit target range for the Funds rate (Meulendyke, 1989), and the 
so-called ‘Fed watchers’ and money market participants can usually tell what this target is by observing 
where the funds rate trades in conjunction with the Fed’s market operations. Thus, policy changes are 
usually described by changes in the target for the Fed Funds rate, and not by changes in the ‘degree of 
pressure on reserves’, which is the formal target for US monetary policy. Bemanke and Blinder (1992) 
also propose treating the Funds rate as the operating instrument for US monetary policy.
13 Many analysts view the Discount rate as merely ‘cosmetic’. Others claim the Discount rate is still an
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The Fed’s policy regarding open market operations is decided by the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC), and executed by the domestic trading desk of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. The 7 members of the Board of Governors, the 12 presi­
dents of the regional Reserve Banks (and several staff) attend the 8 meetings per year of 
the FOMC, although only the 7 Governors and 5 of the presidents of the regional Re­
serve Banks are voting members.14 Discount rate changes are initiated by the regional 
Reserve Banks and approved by the Federal Reserve Board. Although the formal 
decision procedures for the two instruments differ slightly, the people involved in the 
process are the same, and thus it is reasonably safe to assume (and market participants 
usually do) that Federal Reserve monetary policy is decided at FOMC meetings.
Since February 1994, FOMC decisions are announced at the end of the meetings through 
formal statements and, since then, these statements represent the fundamental policy 
signal sent by the Fed.15 Any change in the stance of monetary policy, including changes 
between meetings, is announced on the day it is made (usually at the end of the FOMC 
meeting), through a statement that includes the approved change in the Discount rate, if 
any, and the change in the degree of reserve pressure and its implications for the Fed 
Funds rate.16 When no change is made at a meeting, the FOMC will normally just
important indicator of the Fed’s policy intentions: it is the only interest rate the Fed formally admits to 
controlling, and thus changes in the Discount rate are particularly strong statements about the Fed’s 
intentions (Ferris and Jones, 1994, p. 135).
14 Except for the president of the New York Fed, who always has voting power, the presidents of the 
regional Reserve Banks serve 1 year terms as voting members, on a rotating basis.
15 The changes in the procedure for disclosing policy decisions by the FOMC were first introduced on 
February 4, 1994, when the FOMC decided to announce immediately an increase in the degree of 
reserve pressure, which represented a departure from past FOMC practice. At the time this change in 
disclosing policy was justified by the need to avoid any misunderstanding in the FOMC’s intentions, 
since this was the first finning of policy since 1989, but the FOMC made clear that it ‘did not intend this 
announcement to set any precedents or imply any commitments regarding the announcement of its 
decisions in the future’ (Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1994, p. 408). However, the same immediate 
disclosing procedure was adopted for all policy changes throughout 1994. Finally, on February 2,1995, 
the practice of immediate announcement was adopted as the formal procedure for disclosure of FOMC’s 
policy decisions.
16 A typical example is the announcement of March 22, 1994 (Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1994, p. 
393):
“Chairman Alan Greenspan announced on March 22, 1994, that the Federal Open Market 
Committee had decided to increase slightly the degree of pressure on reserve positions. This action 
was expected to be associated with a small increase in short-term money market interest rates.”
The fact that the Fed includes on its formal policy announcements the effect of policy decisions on 
the Funds rate, although without referring explicitly the new target range, highlights the importance of 
the Fed Funds rate as the central element on the Fed’s monetary policy.
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announce when the meeting ended and that there are no further announcements (Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, March 1995, p. 265).17
Until the end of 1993, FOMC decisions were only disclosed formally on the Friday after 
the following meting (a delay of about six weeks). As a posted rate, Discount rate 
changes were formally announced by press release (although not necessarily when the 
decision was made but only when it become effective), but changes in the Funds rate 
target were not. Policy changes would be revealed to market participants by the so- 
called ‘Fed watchers’, who would recognise changes in the Funds rate target by obser­
ving where the funds rate traded in conjunction with the Fed’s money market opera­
tions.18 Thus, the key policy signals were the Fed’s open market operations, especially 
on the days following FOMC meetings. The New York Fed’s open market operations 
usually occur at ‘Fed time’, around 11:30, local time. Although the Fed makes several 
outright purchases or sales, most policy actions consist of temporary purchases 
(repurchase agreements, or repos) or temporary sales (matched sales) of government 
securities. Monetary policy information would be conveyed by open market operations 
inconsistent with the prevailing Fed funds rate. In the 1992/93 period, an easing would 
be usually signalled by an overnight ‘system repo’ when the funds rate is near (or slightly 
below) its previous target, but above the intended target, or a ‘customer repo’ when 
market expectations have already driven the funds rate towards its new target level; a 
tightening could be signalled by overnight matched sales at a rate near the previous 
target, but below the new one, or no action in response to a funds rate well above the 
previous target (Ferris and Jones, 1994, p. 137).19
17 However, in some infrequent circumstances, the Committee might decide to issue a statement even 
when no policy action is taken.
18 The Fed had an informal target for the Funds rate, but deviations of the actual Funds rate from the 
target rate were frequent. The actual Funds rate was a noisy indicator (although a good one) of the 
policy stance, and some degree of expertise was necessary to isolate Fed’s open market operations (and 
rate changes) caused by ‘technical’ factors from ‘policy’ actions. However, under Chairman Alan 
Greenspan policy changes were always signalled sufficiently clearly to avoid any divergence of opinion 
among ‘Fed watchers’ (Ferris and Jones, 1994, p. 137).
19 System repos are temporary purchases (with repurchase agreements attached) of government 
securities conducted for accounts within the Fed; customer repos are purchases made on behalf of 
customers, that is, central banks and supra-nationals. Matched sales are temporary sales of government 
securities (with purchase agreements), usually only for accounts within the Fed.
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The Fed’s policy signals are, thus:
(a) the statements at the end of FOMC meetings;
(b) any occasional statements announcing changes in the Discount rate and/or in the 
‘degree of pressure on reserve positions’;
(c) the daily open market operations, especially on the days following FOMC mee­
tings.
As described above, the relative importance of these signals changed significantly in the 
beginning of 1994. Before 1994, (b) (for the Discount rate changes) and (c) were the 
relevant policy actions;20 from 1994 onwards, (c) conveyed almost no policy information. 
For this reason, on some (but not all) of the exercises performed, it will be considered as 
policy signals the actions included in (a) only after Februaiy 1994, and the actions 
included in (c) only before that date.
2.1.3 Monetary policy ‘news’
Monetary policy ‘news’ are revealed when the content of a policy signal differs from 
what the market had been expecting. The ‘news’ content of policy signal of type i at 
period t, x"Ut is defined as x'tt — x*r - xe where xut is the actual signal andxei>t is a measure of 
the market expectation regarding that signal. Since most of the actions considered in this 
chapter may be associated with setting a value for some interest rate, xut may be seen as the 
actual rate change and xeut as the expected rate change. Exchange rate volatility may be 
affected by any policy signal, but only signals with non zero ‘news’ should have an impact on 
the exchange rate level.21
Market expectations were obtained from surveys conducted by MMS International or 
from the financial press. Available from MMS International were survey data for the US
20 Before 1994, most of the times there were no statements after FOMC meetings.
21 This does not mean that the impact on volatility of expected and unexpected signals is similar. The 
point here is that both may have an impact on volatility, although this effect might be different across 
subsets of signals. See Section 2.3 for a discussion of the impact of policy signals on exchange rate 
volatility.
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Discount and Fed Funds rate, and the Bundesbank’s Wednesday repo tender results 
announcement. The expectations series for the Bundesbank’s council meeting and 
Tuesday announcements were based on information provided in the Financial Times, on 
the day of the announcement. From the FT’s description of market sentiment on the 
previous day, a series of market expectations regarding the changes in the Discount and 
Lombard rates, and the likelihood of announcing a fixed-rate repo tender, were cons­
tructed.
Appendix 2. A describes the expectations series used, and assesses their accordance with 
the rational expectations hypothesis. None of the tests performed reject the null of the 
expectations being rational for the Fed’s Discount (Discfed) and Funds rate, nor for the 
Bundesbank’s Discount (Discbb) and Lombard (Lomb) rates. However, in one of the 
tests the null of rational expectations was rejected for the repo terms (Fix) and Repo 
rates expectations series, and that may cast some doubts on the robustness of the results 
involving these variables. Also, the evidence in Appendix 2. A suggests that the market 
did a poor job at predicting interest rate changes. For the Fed rates, and the Bundes­
bank’s Discbb and Lomb rates, there is a high correlation between the actual changes and 
the news, which implies that it will be difficult to empirically distinguish whether the 
exchange rate is reacting to the actual change or to the news component of the change. 
The efficient markets theory implies that the exchange rate reacts to the news and not to 
the actual change, and this is what it will be assumed throughout this chapter (see section
2.2.4 for a further discussion on this issue).
2.2 The Impact of Interest Rate ‘News’ on the Exchange Rate Level
Under the REEM (Rational Expectations Efficient Markets) hypothesis, asset prices 
should reflect all available information. Therefore, the predominant cause of exchange 
rate movements should be the arrival of new information that has not been anticipated,
i.e., ‘news’ (Hoffman and Schlagenhauf, 1985). If monetary policy is an important
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determinant of exchange rates, monetary policy ‘news’ should have a significant impact 
on the level of the exchange rate. In this section, this hypothesis is analysed. Subsection
2.2.1 describes the methodology used and subsections 2.2.2 to 2.2.5 present the results 
of the analysis.
2.2.1 Methodology
The analysis of the impact of monetary policy news on the exchange rate level was 
performed using data for the period 1/1/92 to 31/12/94. The exchange rate data consisted 
of DEM/USD quotations (gt), posted on the Reuters’ FXFX screen. Exchange rate 
returns, Rh are defined as Rt = qt - qt.j, i.e., the change in the exchange rate over the return 
period. The length of the return period was allowed to vary from 5 minutes to 24 hours. See 
Appendix 2.B for a frill description of the data.
If the REEM hypothesis is true, exchange rate changes should be caused by news about 
the variables that market agents believe are relevant for the determination of the ex­
change rate (see subsection 1.1.1 in the previous chapter). Let X't be a vector of ‘news’ 
(as defined in section 2.1.3) on all the relevant variables, that arrived at the market in the 
return period t. Then, testing for the existence of systematic (linear) effects of the 
variables in A” on the exchange rate entails testing the difference from zero of the elements 
in B in equation 2.1, where % is an error term.22
Rt = B X ? + e t 2.1
The vector A”f includes all monetary policy news from the two central banks (see Appendix
2.B). Note that estimations of the above equation are not strict time-series regressions as the 
observations are not temporally consecutive. An observation for a given series is added at 
every point when a policy ‘news’ event occurs and the associated return is then constructed. 
This allows for estimation by OLS, using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors as 
in White (1980). Also, if each return period includes only signals from one of the central
22 Equation 2.1 is equivalent to equation 1.4 in Chapter 1, with Rt=SrSt.k, and A”, = X rEt.k(Xt).
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banks, the impact of the two sets of signals may be estimated separately, since they will be 
independent. This allows for the impact of the Fed’s and Bundesbank’s news to be estimated 
in two different regressions.
Since the quotes are defined as DEM per 1 USD, a positive return denotes an appreciation of 
the dollar (depreciation of the mark). According to the main structural models of exchange 
rate determination, an increase in interest rates will cause an appreciation of the domestic 
currency. That implies that the expected sign of the B coefficients is positive for the Federal 
Reserve news, and negative for the Bundesbank news (including Fix)23
In section 2.2.2, the regressions use as elements of A”, alternatively the news on the Fed’s 
monetary policy, measured by unexpected signals regarding the Discount (Discfed) and 
Fed Funds (Funds) rates, and the news from the Bundesbank, described by the unex­
pected announcements on the Discount (Discbb) and Lombard (Lomb) rates, the terms 
of the repo tender (Fix), and the results of the repo tender (Repo). There, it is assumed 
that all policy news relative to a given interest rate will have the same effect on the 
exchange rate, regardless of how and when they are signalled, and thus each rate variable 
includes all observations of news on that rate.24 However, the effect of news about a 
given interest rate might differ across some sub samples, defined according to how and 
when a given piece of news is signalled. In section 2.2.3, some hypotheses of different 
behaviour across sub-samples are tested. For this purpose, sub sample variables are 
defined by multiplying the news on the interest rate with a dummy variable taking the 
value 1, if the observation belongs to the sub sample. Sub sample variables are identified
23 Fix is the variable associated with the repo tender terms (see Appendix 2.B for details). A positive 
value for Fix denotes that a fixed-rate repo was set, when a variable-rate repo was expected. In the 
period analysed in this chapter, all the fixed-rate repos were set at a time when there was a clear 
downward trend in German rates. In these conditions, if the Bundesbank announces a fixed-rate repo 
for several weeks in advance, it is signalling the market that the downward trend will be halted during 
that period. This amounts to keeping the interest rates higher than the current downward trend would 
suggest, i.e., it may be interpreted as an unexpected increase in interest rates. Hence, the negative 
expected sign.
24 The regressions for the Bundesbank do not include the interest rate changes announced in 13/9/92, 
the Sunday before ‘Black Wednesday’. Since these changes were announced during the weekend, the 
pattern of response of the exchange rate will necessarily be different from the other announcements 
made during weekdays, when all traders are operating.
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by a specific suffix, the name of the dummy variable used in their construction.25 Test of 
different behaviour in the sub sample consist of tests of the significance of the sub sample 
variable.
An efficient market is one in which prices reflect all available information, such that asset 
prices will be unaffected by the revelation of previously available information. Thus, Rt 
should not be related to any information available before the policy signal was revealed, and 
that includes the market expectation about the signal. It also implies that there should be no 
systematic bias on the reaction of the exchange rate to policy signals. These implications 
supply two (weak) tests of the REEM hypothesis, which are explored in section 2.2.4. First, 
under the REEM exchange rates changes should be random, and thus the average exchange 
rate change after policy signals should not be significantly different from zero 26 Second, 
when equation 2.2 is estimated, the constant a  and the coefficients associated with the market 
expectation (y) should not be significantly different from zero.
Rt = cc + (3 X " + y X* + st 2.2
2.2.2 The impact of policy news on the level of the exchange rate
Table 2.1 presents the results of the estimation of equation 2.1, using several definitions 
of the return period.27 Note that as long as the exchange rate adjustment is quick, then 
the ability to statistically identify the effect of a policy signal will be higher for a shorter 
return interval, since over shorter periods the variance of the returns is smaller but the
25 For example, Lombnor is the vector of news on Lomb in the sub sample ‘normal’ period (to be 
defined below). It is constructed using the dummy variable ‘nor ’, that takes the value 1 for observations 
in the ‘normal’ period, and 0 otherwise: Lombnor=Lomb*nor.
26 If the policy signal was expected, there is no new information conveyed to the market. In this 
situation, there is no reason for the exchange rate to change, so the change should be zero on average. If 
the policy signal was not expected, the exchange rate should change, appreciating if the news are ‘good’ 
and depreciating if the news are ‘bad’. But ‘good’ news are as likely as ‘bad’ news, if expectations are 
rational (i.e., expectations are not biased). Thus, it is as likely that the exchange rate will appreciate as 
it will depreciate, so that the expected exchange rate change should be zero.
27 All the regressions in this section were estimated using the following definitions of the return period: 
5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 and 45 minutes, and 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5, 5.5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 
16, 18, 20, 22 and 24 hours. The tables present only a selection of these regressions. The results for the 
other regressions may be obtained from die author.
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mean effect will be similar.28 Previous work showed that the DEM/USD exchange rate 
fully adjusts in less than 15 minutes to news in scheduled macroeconomic announcements 
(Ederington and Lee, 1993, Payne, 1996), but it may take up to 3 hours to adjust if the 
announcements are unscheduled (see Chapter 3, section 3.5). This evidence suggests 
that the key results will be those for the 15m returns, if the policy signals are scheduled, 
and those for the lh-3h returns if the policy signals are unscheduled.
Table 2.1 Effects of monetary policy news on the DEM/USD rate
Period
FED BUNDESBANK
Discfed Funds R 2 Discbb Lomb Fix Repo R2
5 m 0.00050 0.00825 0.34 -0.00211 -0.00879 -0.00034 -0.00875 0.25
0.41 2.27 -0.70 -1.56 -1.30 -1.43
15 m 0.00176 0.02005 0.53 0.00444 -0.01611 -0.00099 -0.00038 0.38
0.63 3.56 1.33 -3.36 -2.09 -0.06
30 m -0.00347 0.02817 0.53 0.00297 -0.01300 -0.00099 0.00876 0.25
-0.73 3.56 0.77 -3.63 -1.77 1.13
lh -0.00280 0.03433 0.68 0.00471 -0.01160 -0.00168 0.02015 0.10
-0.76 5.01 0.87 -1.49 -2.71 1.82
3 h -0.00433 0.04356 0.59 0.00776 -0.01013 -0.00002 0.02529 0.01
-0.72 4.12 0.80 -0.93 -0.02 2.26
6 h 0.00331 0.03619 0.49 0.01532 -0.01327 -0.00007 0.01132 0.04
0.50 3.14 1.29 -1.03 -0.04 • 0.41
12 h 0.00808 0.03747 0.45 0.02154 -0.01661 -0.00070 0.07325 0.09
1.47 2.61 1.95 -1.32 -0.31 1.49
24 h 0.00436 0.04530 0.25 0.02455 -0.01493 -0.00054 0.07687 0.10
0.26 2.07 1.90 -1.11 -0.20 1.96
# news 4 9' 11 30 28 19 29 74
Notes: Column 1 describes the length of the period over which Rt was measured. The following columns present the coefficients 
and respective t-stalistics (in italics) for each of the news variables. The effect of the news from the Fed and the Bundesbank were 
estimated separately. The critical values for the t-tests are 2.26 (1.83), for the Fed regression, and 2.00 (1.67), for the Bundes­
bank regression, at the 5% (10%) level. The last line of the table describes the number of non-zero observations in the sample, for 
each variable, and the total number of observations in the regression.
In the regressions for the Fed’s news, the Funds coefficient is significant at the conven­
tional significance levels, but Discfed is not. The signs of the Funds coefficients are the 
expected (positive) in all the regressions, but Discfed has the ‘wrong’ sign in the regres­
28 The impact on the power of the tests of increasing the return interval may be severe. For instance, 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, p. 175) show that in event studies ‘there is a substantial payoff in 
terms of increased power from reducing the length of the event window’. This should make the results 
for the regressions using as return interval the shortest period necessary for full adjustment much more 
reliable than the results of the other regressions.
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sions computed using returns between 30m and 3b.29 This result suggests that the 
market agents see the Funds rate as the key indicator of the Fed’s monetary policy, and 
treat the Discount rate as if it contained no relevant information, which is consistent with 
the view of the analysts that consider the Discount rate merely ‘cosmetic’ (see section 
2.1.2). The magnitude of the Funds coefficients suggests that unexpected announce­
ments of a 1 percentage point increase in this interest rate will appreciate the USD by 
almost 4.5 ‘pfennigs’, roughly 3% of the exchange rate. The R2 are sufficiently high 
(above 0.5 for many of the regressions) to suggest that the Fed’s interest rate news are 
the key factor explaining DEM/USD changes on the day of their release.
The results for the very short term regressions (up to 30m) of the Bundesbank’s news 
are somewhat similar to the Fed’s.30 Two types of policy news (Lomb and Fix) have a 
significant effect on the DEM/USD, with the coefficients having the expected (negative) 
sign, and the other two (Discbb and Repo) do not have significant coefficients, with in 
some cases the ‘wrong’ sign. Also, the coefficients for the key interest rates of both 
central banks (Lomb and Funds) are of similar magnitudes, although the Lomb coeffi­
cients tend to be smaller in absolute value: unexpected announcements of a 1 percentage 
point increase in the Lomb rate will appreciate the DEM by about 1% (less than 2 
‘pfennigs’). Similar conclusions are valid for the goodness of fit measure, R2. While the 
non significance of the Discount rate could have been expected,31 it is apparently surpri­
sing that one could not find a significant impact of Repo rate news.32 As described in 
section 2.1.1, the Repo rate is considered by the Bundesbank their key operating rate, 
and thus one would expect it to have a strong effect on the exchange rate. It seems that 
the markets did not share the same view, and paid attention only to the Lombard rate.
29 Note that these should be the key regressions, since the Fed’s signals are not scheduled. This is 
supported by the higher R2 on these regressions.
30 The Bundesbank’s signals included in the regressions are all scheduled, so one should expect that the 
impact of news should be clearer on the 15 to 30 m regressions. Again, this is supported by the higher 
R2 on these regressions.
31 Discount rate changes are announced at the end of the Bundesbank council meetings, as are Lombard 
rate changes. It is likely then that the information contained in each of these rates is very similar, and 
that the markets could concentrate in only one of them.
32 The fact that the variable Fix was found to have a significant (although quantitatively small) impact 
on the DEM/USD is evidence that the market agents do not ignore the information contained in the repo 
tenders.
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However, although the markets reaction might be surprising, the results in Table 2.1 are 
less so, because these differences between the market focus and the Bundesbank’s view 
had already been noticed in some of the press of that period.33
If one accepts that the results for the 1 h and 15 m returns are the most representative for 
the policy signals emanating from the Fed and the Bundesbank, respectively,34 and that 
the sample used is representative of the normal response of the DEM/USD to those 
signals, the conclusion must be that news regarding the key indicators of the monetary 
policy stance have a fundamental impact in the level of exchange rates. The key interest 
rates from both the Fed (Funds rate) and the Bundesbank (Lombard) were found to 
cause a statistically significant change in the DEM/USD, of around 3% (1%) per per­
centage point of unexpected change in the Funds {Lomb) rate, an effect that may be 
considered as very important.35 The quantitatively lower impact of the news from the 
Bundesbank may be explained by the fact that the markets may see this central bank as 
following a more long term approach than the Fed. In this case, each individual interest 
rate change will be less important.
However, these conclusions only apply for the regressions computed using the most 
representative returns, especially in the case of the Bundesbank. The results for periods 
above 1 hour are somewhat different. While for the Fed’s regressions the significance 
levels and R2 increase, for the Bundesbank they drop dramatically. Although the Lomb
33 One example may be found in The Economist of 20/3/93. In the article “Cutting it fine: German 
interest rates”, it is claimed that:
“...the Bundesbank would like to play down the importance of its fortnightly council meetings as 
the occasion for changing policy. It has been trying to encourage the financial markets to look less 
at its headline interest rates and more at the securities repurchase rate - the rate at which it offers 
wholesale funds to banks. For the moment, however, the markets remained obsessed with 
Thursdays.”
In fact, it is possible that the quoted Deutsche Bundesbank (1994) paper that highlights the impor­
tance of the Repo rate may be part of an effort made by the Bundesbank to concentrate the attention of 
market agents on the Repo rate, and away from the Lombard and Discount rates.
34 As explained above, this is consistent both with what other work (Ederington and Lee, 1993, Payne, 
1996, and Chapter 3 of this thesis) would suggest and with the measure of goodness of fit obtained in the 
regressions performed.
35 Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) found that the long run effect of a 100 b.p. surprise in the Fed Funds 
rate was an appreciation of the USD of around 3.3%. Although the results may be not directly compa­
rable, this figure provides a reference to how important the high frequency reaction of the exchange rate 
is.
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and Fix coefficients still have the expected negative sign, they are not significant. The 
Discbb and Repo coefficients are positive, and sometimes significant, which contradicts 
the predictions of the theory. Since the shorter term returns are more likely to accurately 
portray the effects of the policy signals, the differences in the results for the longer term 
regressions suggest that other factors may be affecting the exchange rate. Understanding 
the reasons for these differences might provide interesting insights on the relations 
between monetary policy signals and exchange rate behaviour.
One possible explanation for some of these results is the existence of problems in the 
data used, like multicolinearity and the presence of large outliers. In the data, there is a 
strong correlation between some of the news series, in particular between Discbb and 
Lomb (coefficient of correlation 0.53), and thus including one of these variables in the 
regression might seriously reduce the explanatory power of the other. In order to assess 
the impact of this feature of the data, the effect of each of the variables in the DEM/USD 
was estimated separately, instead of running one single multiple regression for each of 
the central banks. The results, presented in Table 2.2, suggest that multicolinearity is not 
a serious problem, since the overall picture is similar to the one obtained with the multi-
Table 2.2 Effects of monetary policy news (simple regressions)
Period
FED BUNDESBANK
Discfed Funds Discbb Lomb Fix Repo
5 m 0.0024 0.00842 -0.00643 -0.00999 -0.00036 -0.00875
1.52 2.49 -1.69 -1.94 -1.34 -1.43
15 m 0.00638 0.02063 -0.00343 -0.01369 -0.00109 -0.00038
1.17 3.77 -0.67 -3.17 -2.10 -0.06
30 m 0.00303 0.02701 -0.00335 -0.01140 -0.00107 0.00876
0.38 3.73 -0.76 -3.87 -1.83 1.13
lh 0.00512 0.03340 -0.00084 -0.00907 -0.00177 0.02015
0.78 5.23 -0.13 -1.26 -2.68 1.82
3 h 0.00572 0.04212 0.00273 -0.00581 -0.00013 0.02529
0.55 4.39 0.27 -0.59 -0.10 2.26
6 h 0.01166 0.03729 0.00874 -0.00473 -0.00027 0.01132
1.07 3.35 0.65 -0.39 -0.14 0.41
12 h 0.01672 0.04016 0.01339 -0.00464 -0.00096 0.07325
2.08 2.96 0.95 -0.38 -0.41 1.49
24 h 0.01482 0.04675 0.01721 -0.00127 -0.00082 0.07687
1.05 2.38 1.16 -0.10 -0.30 1.96
# news 4 9 30 28 19 29
Notes: See Table 2.1. The critical values for the t-tests are 3.18 (2.35) for Discfed, 2.31 (1.86) for Funds, 2.05 (1.70) for 
Discbb,Lomb andRepo, and 2.10 (1.73) for Fix, at the 5% (10%) level.
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pie regressions. The results improve slightly, with most of the significance levels of the 
coefficients with the right sign being higher, and the ones of the coefficients with the 
wrong sign being lower, but the conclusions to be drawn from Table 2.2 are not quanti­
tatively and qualitatively different from the ones obtained from Table 2.1.
Another potential problem arises from the relatively small sample available. With so few 
observations, each one may potentially have a decisive impact, and some of the results 
may be strongly influenced by one large outlier. Figure 2.1 plots the policy news against 
the 1 h returns associated with the news for all observations in the sample. In some of 
the charts large outliers can be identified, and it would be reasonable to expect that some 
of these could be affecting the results. In order to analyse the sensitivity of the estimates 
in Table 2.1 to the inclusion of each individual observation in the sample, n (11 for the 
Fed and 74 for the Bundesbank) regressions were run using n-1 observations in each, by 
dropping one of the observations at a time. Table 2.3 presents summary statistics of the 
distribution of estimates thus obtained for each of the parameters. The evidence suggests 
that most of the main results of the previous subsection are not affected qualitatively by 
the inclusion in the sample of particular observations, especially the ones regarding the
Table 2.3 Sensitivity of the results to individual observations
5 m 15 m 30 m l h 3 h 6 h 12 h 24 h
FED
Discfed
Max 0.00124 0.00399 0.00184 0.00120 0.00305 0.01001 0.01331 0.01609
Min -0.00021 -0.00045 -0.00744 -0.00520 -0.00727 -0.00286 0.00521 -0.01610
Med 0.00036 0.00148 -0.00364 -0.00294 -0.00466 0.00330 0.00764 0.00571
T-discfed
Max 1.03 1.02 0.45 0.35 0.77 1.43 2.60 0.85
Min -0.14 -0.22 -1.95 -1.29 -1.10 -0.69 0.71 -2.09
Med 0.29 0.54 -0.72 -0.78 -0.76 0.45 1.34 0.33
Funds
Max 0.00996 0.02275 0.03461 0.03914 0.05050 0.04356 0.04550 0.05595
Min 0.00515 0.01556 0.02301 0.03028 0.03502 0.02844 0.02881 0.03184
Med 0.00849 0.01968 0.02819 0.03470 0.04350 0.03570 0.03831 0.04772
T-funds
Max 2.69 3.96 5.67 6.56 5.19 4.04 3.24 2.56
Min 1.79 3.08 3.03 4.33 3.58 2.66 2.10 1.55
Med 2.17 3.35 3.25 4.76 3.82 2.90 2.43 2.04
F2
Max 0.43 0.62 0.75 0.80 0.72 0.63 0.57 0.38
Min 0.23 0.41 0.39 0.54 0.47 0.35 0.25 -0.29
Med 0.33 0.53 0.53 0.68 0.59 0.49 0.46 0.26
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Table 2.3 (continued)
5 m 15 m 30 m l h 3 h 6 h 12 h 24 h
BUNDESBANK
Discbb
Max 0.00002 0.00680 0.00601 0.00794 0.01294 0.02207 0.02920 0.03258
Min -0.00453 0.00203 -0.00003 0.00157 0.00018 0.00562 0.01488 0.01544
Med -0.00211 0.00444 0.00298 0.00471 0.00778 0.01533 0.02160 0.02460
T-discbb
Max 0.01 2.34 1.77 1.78 1.36 2.21 3.39 3.03
Min -1.42 0.57 -0.01 0.24 0.02 0.43 1.08 1.03
Med -0.70 1.33 0.77 0.86 0.80 1.29 1.96 1.90
Lomb
Max -0.00396 -0.01370 -0.01062 -0.00773 -0.00489 -0.00462 -0.00682 -0.00467
Min -0.01222 -0.02067 -0.01539 -0.01894 -0.01975 -0.02387 -0.02572 -0.02148
Med -0.00879 -0.01610 -0.01299 -0.01159 -0.01013 -0.01324 -0.01659 -0.01492
T-lomb
Max -1.04 -2.79 -3.08 -0.93 -0.47 -0.48 -0.92 -0.61
Min -2.10 -6.12 -4.52 -3.72 -2.36 -2.00 -1.94 -1.38
Med -1.56 -3.36 -3.63 -1.48 -0.93 -1.02 -1.31 -1.11
Fix
Max -0.00013 -0.00064 -0.00047 -0.00130 0.00080 0.00052 0.00003 0.00025
Min -0.00042 -0.00120 -0.00115 -0.00185 -0.00084 -0.00155 -0.00241 -0.00270
Med -0.00034 -0.00099 -0.00099 -0.00168 -0.00002 -0.00007 -0.00070 -0.00054
T-fix
Max -0.76 -1.70 -1.43 -2.40 0.76 0.29 0.02 0.09
Min -1.57 -2.64 -1.99 -2.95 -0.83 -1.39 -1.50 -1.53
Med -1.30 -2.09 -1.77 -2.71 -0.02 -0.04 -0.31 -0.20
Repo
Max -0.00519 0.00430 0.01657 0.02654 0.03005 0.02695 0.10484 0.10634
Min -0.01400 -0.00309 0.00633 0.01145 0.01971 -0.00859 0.04986 0.05871
Med -0.00873 -0.00043 0.00871 0.02028 0.02551 0.01180 0.07229 0.07599
T-Repo
Max -1.01 0.79 2.67 2.70 2.70 1.08 2.14 3.87
Min -2.56 -0.55 0.84 1.28 1.65 -0.34 0.91 1.29
Med -1.41 -0.07 1.13 1.81 2.24 0.43 1.46 1.92
R2
Max 0.36 0.52 0.30 0.23 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.17
Min 0.07 0.26 0.14 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.05
Med 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.10
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of the distribution of estimates for the parameters of 11 multiple regressions for the 
Fed and 74 regressions for the Bundesbank, obtained by dropping one observation at a time. For each parameter, the maximum, 
minimum and median values of the estimates are presented.
news from the Fed. The significance of Funds, the non significance of Discfed' and the 
higher R2 on the lh returns regression are all robust to the sample used, and so are the 
significance of Lomb and the higher R2 on the 15 m regression for the Bundesbank. 
However, most of the parameter estimates are quantitatively very sensitive to the inclu­
sion in the sample of particular observations. The range of both the value of the coeffi­
cients and the respective t-statistics is quite large for most of the parameters, including
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those that qualitatively are not affected. For example, the Lomb t-statistic on the 15m 
regression ranges from >2.8 to -6.1, and the Funds coefficient on the 3 h regression 
ranges from 0.035 to 0.050. Even worse, the evidence suggests that some qualitative 
results may depend on specific observations, like the signs of the coefficients and the non 
significance of Discbb or Repo.
2.2.3 Differences in the exchange rate reaction to policy news across sub samples
The dependence of the results on particular observations could be explained by diffe­
rences in the reaction of the exchange rate to different policy signals, or in different 
moments of time. In this subsection, several hypotheses relating different behaviour of 
the exchange rate in response to different policy signals are analysed. First, the hypothe­
sis that the signals from the Bundesbank had a different effect during the troubled period 
of the ERM crisis is tested. Second, a test of the hypothesis that the effect of the Funds 
news signalled through open market operations are different from the same news sig­
nalled by formal statements from the FOMC is performed. The final investigation focus 
on whether the impact of exchange rate changes differ from the impact of no changes, 
even if the news content is the same in both cases. The differences in the reaction of the 
exchange rate in each of these circumstances may be sufficiently large to reduce the 
power of tests based in the whole sample to close to zero. As may be seen in Figure 2.2, 
when the data are separated according to some of these sub samples the patterns of the 
association of the returns and the news become more clear, at least for some of the 
variables.
The impact o f the ERM crisis
The sample used in this chapter includes the period when some European currencies 
were subject to abnormally high instability, the period leading to the de facto  collapse of 
the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). From the third quarter of 1992 to the 
third quarter of 1993, the ERM was subject to several speculative attacks that culmi­
nated on the widening of the fluctuation bands to 15% in August 1993, which virtually
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meant the end of the ERM as a fixed exchange rate system. During that period instability 
surrounding the member currencies was abnormally high, and this instability could have 
affected the way exchange rates, even those outside the ERM like the DEM/USD, 
reacted to news. The hypothesis examined is that the DEM/USD may react differently to 
news from the Bundesbank during the period when there was a risk of a collapse of the 
ERM, and this restricts the abnormal period to the months around August 1993, when 
the bands were widened. Although the speculative attacks on ERM currencies started in 
September 1992, initially these were seen as problems of specific currencies, which could 
be solved by devaluations of these currencies, or in extreme cases their exit from the 
ERM.36 During this period, there is no reason for the DEM/USD to be affected by the 
attacks, since the problems referred to other currencies (GBP, ITL,...). Only in mid 
1993 these attacks started to be seen as a problem of the ERM itself, or of its anchor 
currency, the DEM; it is then that the ERM problems could affect the DEM/USD (see 
below for a more detailed explanation). It is difficult to date precisely this period of 
ERM instability (‘ERM crisis’, from now on), and the period of May to September 1993 
was chosen on somewhat subjective theoretical and empirical grounds.37
The test of the ‘ERM crisis’ hypothesis consisted in estimating regressions similar to 
equation 2.1, but where each interest rate news variable was replaced by two variables, 
each one referring to one of the sub-samples, using the dummy ‘erm\ which takes the 
value 1 for the news during the ‘ERM crisis’ period (May to September 1993), and 0 in 
the ‘normal’ period, and the dummy ‘nor’ (equal to 1-erm). Table 2.4 presents these
36 The speculative attacks in September 1992 were ‘solved’ by the exit of the British pound and the 
Italian lira from the ERM, and by the devaluation of the Spanish peseta. Other speculative attacks were 
also solved by devaluation of the currencies involved: in November 1992, devaluation of the peseta and 
the Portuguese escudo; in February 1993, devaluation of the Irish punt; and in May, new devaluation of 
the peseta and the escudo. All these speculative attacks were seen as caused by the ‘weakness’ of the 
devalued currencies.
37 This is the periodicity that maximises the estimated fit. It can be motivated theoretically by noting 
that May 1993 was the month of the last devaluation of ‘specific’ currencies, and thus the last time the 
speculative attacks were related to marginal currencies. From this date on, the attacks culminated in the 
ERM collapse, and thus could be seen as related to the anchor currency, the DEM. Although the 
widening of the bands occurred in August 1993, it could be argued that the markets needed some time to 
see if this decision actually delivered stability among ERM currencies (since previous ‘solutions’ in the 
ERM did not), before they could decide that the instability was over and thus resume reacting to news 
the ‘normal’ way. This explains the need to include one month (September) after the widening of the 
bands in the ERM crisis period.
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results for regressions estimated using all the variables simultaneously, while Table 2.5 
presents similar results but for regressions that include only one type of policy signals (to 
assess the effects on the results of the possible problems of multicolinearity).
Table 2.4 Effects of Bundesbank’s news and the ERM crisis
Period Discnor Lombnor Fixnor Reponor Discerm Lomb erm Fixerm Repoerm R2
5 m -0.00445 -0.01104 -0.00035 -0.00948 0.00054 0.00320 0.00083 -0.00306 0.38
-1.06 -1.82 -1.12 -1.39 0.16 1.57 1.88 -0.27
15 m -0.00168 -0.01820 -0.00072 -0.00133 0.01072 0.00002 -0.00041 0.00694 0.63
-0.52 -5.60 -1.90 -0.22 5.23 0.01 -0.51 0.33
30 m -0.00296 -0.01308 -0.00067 0.00566 0.00905 -0.00509 -0.00123 0.03278 0.37
-0.70 -3.42 -2.19 0.72 2.12 -1.34 -0.58 2.36
lh 0.00156 -0.01807 -0.00142 0.02022 0.00687 0.01784 -0.00091 0.01958 0.31
0.29 -3.61 -2.62 1.63 0.77 3.21 -0.65 1.34
3 h -0.00385 -0.01540 0.00105 0.01980 0.01738 0.02501 -0.00195 0.06778 0.34
-0.41 -1.96 0.92 1.69 1.43 3.32 -0.99 3.20
6 h 0.00201 -0.01800 0.00090 -0.00246 0.02748 0.02216 -0.00106 0.11806 0.23
0.15 -1.56 0.46 -0.08 1.65 2.21 -0.45 4.98
12 h 0.01399 -0.02300 0.00008 0.05570 0.02715 0.01785 -0.00181 0.20931 0.18
1.00 -1.77 0.03 1.02 1.81 1.98 -0.43 3.07
24 h 0.01817 -0.01922 -0.00031 0.07314 0.03105 0.01027 0.00081 0.10583 0.13
1.01 -1.21 -0.10 1.70 1.83 0.99 0.23 1.21
# news 22 25 16 24 8 3 3 5 74
Notes: See Table 2.1. The critical values for the t-tests are 2.00 (1.67) at the 5% (10%) level. The variables with the ‘erm’ suffix 
refer to the observations in the period from May to September 1993, the variables with the ‘nor’ suffix refer to the other observa­
tions.
When one allows for different reactions of the exchange rate during the ERM crisis, the 
impact of Bundesbank’s policy news becomes more clearly defined. For the ‘normal’ 
periods, the coefficients of Lomb are higher in absolute value and have higher signifi­
cance levels, such that significant impacts (at the 10% level) can be identified up to 12 
hours. The size of the coefficients is smaller than the Funds coefficients, yet the order of 
magnitude is not strikingly different, with unexpected announcements of a 1 percentage 
point increase in Lomb appreciating the DEM by almost 2 ‘pfennigs’ (1.3% of the 
exchange rate). News on the repo tender terms (Fix) also have a significant impact on 
the DEM/USD, but quantitatively this impact is small, with the unexpected announce­
ment of a fixed-rate repo causing a DEM appreciation of around than 0.1 ‘pfennigs’. 
The other two policy signals considered do not seem to have any significant impact on 
the exchange rate. The markets seem to consider that the Lombard rate is the best 
indicator of the Bundesbank's monetary policy, and the Discount and Repo rates do not
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have significant additional information.38
Table 2.5 Effects of Bundesbank’s news and the ERM crisis (individual re­
gressions)
Period Discnor Discerm Lombnor Lomberm Fixnor Fixerm Reponor Repoerm
5 m -0.01152 0.00096 -0.01348 0.00316 -0.00054 0.00063 -0.00948 -0.00306
-2.23 0.37 -2.52 4.41 -1.87 2.96 -1.39 -0.27
15 m -0.01336 0.01099 -0.01924 0.00718 -0.00097 -0.00175 -0.00133 0.00694
-2.36 5.34 -7.48 1.85 -1.96 -0.90 -0.22 0.33
30 m -0.01139 0.00832 -0.01479 0.00137 -0.00087 -0.00215 0.00566 0.03278
-2.45 1.66 -5.37 0.21 -2.23 -0.72 0.72 2.36
lh -0.01021 0.01277 -0.01752 0.02274 -0.00163 -0.00252 0.02022 0.01958
-1.43 1.74 -4.54 5.86 -2.60 -1.02 1.63 1.34
3 h -0.01334 0.02608 -0.01724 0.03723 0.00081 -0.00517 0.01980 0.06778
-1.48 2.63 -2.87 5.10 0.67 -1.20 1.69 3.20
6 h -0.00917 0.03475 -0.01675 0.04052 0.00070 -0.00542 -0.00246 0.11806
-0.62 2.85 -1.63 6.99 0.35 -1.42 -0.08 4.98
12 h -0.00054 0.03362 -0.01552 0.03635 -0.00003 -0.00595 0.05570 0.20931
-0.03 2.90 -1.24 4.01 -0.01 -0.94 1.02 3.07
24 h 0.00594 0.03359 -0.00959 0.03009 -0.00032 -0.00350 0.07314 0.10583
0.29 2.60 -0.68 3.20 -0.10 -0.55 1.70 1.21
# news 22 8 25 3 16 3 24 5
Notes: See Tables 2.1 and 2.4. The t-statistics critical values are 2.0S (1.70) at the 5% (10%) level, for the Discbb, Lomb and 
Repo regressions, and 2.11 (1.74) for the Fix regression.
The reaction of the exchange rate to Bundesbank policy signals during the ERM crisis 
was completely different, although these results have to be taken cautiously, since they 
are based in a very small number of observations. For every rate considered, the signs of 
the significant coefficients are positive, indicating that unexpected increases in the 
interest rates caused a DEM depreciation,39 which is the opposite of what would be 
expected, and the opposite of what happened during the ‘normal’ period. One possible 
explanation for this anomalous behaviour is that the USD was a ‘safe haven’ during the 
times of high instability in the ERM. The main cause of ERM instability was the fact that 
the economic situation in many ERM member countries (in particular France) required
38 In the case of Discbb, note that when the effects of the different rates are considered separately 
(Table 2.5) one could find a significant effect, with the expected negative sign, at least up to 30 minutes. 
This result is consistent with the explanation advanced in footnote 31, suggesting that this was caused by 
the announcement of Discount rate changes simultaneously with Lombard rate changes.
39 During the ‘erm’ period there were no interest rate increases by the Bundesbank. Note, however, 
that if the market is expecting a cut in rates, and the Bundesbank keeps them unchanged, this corres­
ponds to an unexpected increase. It is in this sense that the expression is used in this paragraph.
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lower interest rates than the ones the Bundesbank had set. Thus, any increase in German 
interest rates would increase ERM instability and the risk of the collapse of the system. 
In this context, it seems natural that risk averse investors would switch their investments 
from DEM to a non-ERM currency, like the USD, which would not be directly affected 
by this instability. This transfer of funds from DEM to USD denominated investments 
would increase the demand of, and appreciate, the USD. This kind of reaction would 
imply that German rate increases would be associated with USD appreciation, and the 
coefficients in the regressions would be positive, as it was found in the estimation.40 
Note that it seems that the impact of interest rate changes for the ‘crisis’ period is higher 
than in the ‘normal’ period, either in terms of the size and of the significance level of the 
coefficients, both for the Discbb and Lomb. Also, during this period Repo has a signifi­
cant and quantitatively very large impact, which was not found for the ‘normal’ period. 
This is more in line with the view that the Repo is the key rate.
Open market operations and official statements from the Fed
Until February 1994, the Fed signalled its Funds target only through open market opera­
tions, but since then it announced changes in the Funds target through official statements 
on the day the decision is taken (see Section 2.1). The hypothesis tested in Table 2.6 is 
that this change in the announcement procedure is associated with a change in the 
reaction of the exchange rate. The test consisted of the estimation of a regression for 
policy news emanating from the Fed, where the differential effect of the news signalled 
through open market operations is measured by a sub sample variable (Fundom) cons­
tructed using the dummy lom\ which takes the value 1 if the Funds news are signalled
40 Some press reports of that time used similar arguments to explain the USD behaviour. During the 
peak of the speculative attacks that forced the member countries of the ERM to widen the fluctuation 
bands (29th and 30th July, 1993), the USD (and also the GBP) appreciated against the DEM, even 
though the Bundesbank failed to cut the Discount rate in 29/7, surprising the market According to the 
Financial Times of 30/7/93 and 1/8/93, this happened because these currencies “reaped the benefits of 
being a safe haven in a crisis” (FT, 30/7/93, p. 35). However, similar explanations could not be found 
for the other observations during the 'erm' period, even though the reaction of the USD was similar. For 
example, after the rate cuts of 1/7 and 9/9, the DEM appreciated, and the explanations found in the FT 
referred to ‘profit taking’ and ‘response to initial overreaction’ (even though there was no overreaction 
in the data).
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through open market operations.41 The results show that Fundom is significantly nega­
tive for return horizons up to 3 hours, meaning that news signalled through open market 
operations have a smaller immediate impact on the exchange rate. Note, however, that 
the significance and the size of the coefficient of Fundom are smaller in the longer term 
horizons, suggesting that the long run the effect is the same whatever the form used for 
signalling news.
Table 2.6 Differences in the effects of Fed’s news signalled through open- 
market operations or official statements
Period Discfed Funds Fundom jR2
5 m -0.00155 0.01711 -0.01469 0.64
-0.93 3.26 -2.61
15 m -0.00230 0.03762 -0.02914 0.86
-1.53 5.81 -3.99
30 m -0.00726 0.04460 -0.02724 0.67
-1.88 4.51 -2.03
l h -0.00692 0.05219 -0.02962 0.83
-1.71 9.62 -3.40
3 h -0.00992 0.06779 -0.04018 0.74
-1.60 4.21 -2.18
6 h -0.00035 0.05207 -0.02633 0.56
-0.05 2.48 -1.09
12 h 0.00642 0.04463 -0.01187 0.46
0.92 1.88 -0.40
24 h 0.00855 0.02713 0.03013 0.28
0.46 0.82 0.69
# news 4 9 5 11
Notes: See Table 2.1. The critical values for the t-tests are 2.31 (1.86) at the 5% (10%) level. Fundom includes the observations 
when policy decisions were signalled through open market operations.
This result may be rationalised in the following way. In the long run, there is no reason 
why different forms of signalling the same news should have different effects on the 
exchange rate; what drives the exchange rate is the new level of the Funds rate target, 
and that is independent of the way this level is signalled to the market. However, the 
adjustment path of the exchange rate to the new equilibrium level will depend of the 
chosen form of signalling. When an official statement is issued clearly indicating that the 
Funds rate target has been changed, market agents may only disagree on the new level of 
the exchange rate consistent with the new Funds rate. But when the news is signalled
41 The value 0 corresponds to the observations when the news are revealed through official statements.
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through open market operations there is another possible source of disagreement, 
whether a specific open market action denotes a change in the Funds target or not. ‘Fed 
watchers’ will quickly identify the new Funds target, but this is likely to add a few hours 
to the reaction of the exchange rate. Even in the case of official statements, it takes 
some time (around 3 hours) for a new equilibrium level of the exchange rate to be found. 
Adding to this the time necessary for the market to reach a consensus on the implications 
of a certain market operation for the target rate will mean that the new equilibrium level 
will be reached only after several hours.42 Note that the relatively small number of 
observations used in these regressions limit the scope of these conclusions.
Interest rate changes and no changes
Under the definition of news used, an unexpected 25 b.p. rate cut is equivalent to an 
event in which the central bank keeps rates unchanged when the market was expecting a 
25 b.p. increase. However, it is possible that the reaction of the exchange rate to these 
two events differ. First, because an action (interest rate cut) may provide a better focal 
point for the markets’ view of the policy stance than the absence of action. Second, 
while an interest rate cut is a fa it accompli, the absence of action today does not rule out 
action tomorrow, and so the importance for the future path of interest rates of no change 
could be smaller than the importance of a change.
Table 2.7 presents the results of the tests of this hypothesis, using sub sample variables 
constructed using the dummy lact\ which takes the value 1 if the observation corres­
ponds to an interest rate change. On the Fed regressions, Fundact has a positive coeffi­
cient for returns up to 6 hours, which is significant only on the very short term returns. 
It seems that the short term impact of news with action is significantly higher than the 
impact of news with inaction, but that in the medium run such difference is not signifi­
cant, a result that is consistent with the hypothesis of the action providing a better focal
42 Although the results are not clear, it is possible that the exchange rate will only reach the new 
equilibrium level the following day. Such a result could be the consequence of the market participants 
only reaching a consensus about the new level of the exchange rate after the Fed action on the following 
day confirms that it is in fact targeting a new Funds rate.
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point (that triggers a bigger immediate reaction) than inaction. For the case of the 
Bundesbank, the results are the opposite. Discact and Lombact have positive coeffi­
cients in almost all the regressions, which imply that the change in the exchange rate is 
smaller when the Bundesbank changes interest rates than when it keeps them unchanged. 
However, the coefficients are usually not significant, which suggests that one should not 
draw any strong conclusions from this exercise.
Table 2.7 Differences in the effects of news between interest rate changes and 
no changes
Period Discfed Funds Fundact R2 Discbb Lomb Fix Repo Discact Lombact Ra
5 m -0.00050 0.00065 0.01194 0.53 -0.00838 -0.01106 -0.00022 -0.00875 0.00775 0.00241 0.28
-0.37 0.33 2.41 -2.20 -1.32 -0.73 -1.43 1.55 0.23
15 m 0.00029 0.00887 0.01756 0.65 0.00340 -0.03385 -0.00076 -0.00038 0.00228 0.01932 0.46
0.12 1.65 1.94 1.11 -5.61 -1.82 -0.06 0.47 2.44
30 m -0.00501 0.01646 0.01838 0.60 0.00292 -0.03199 -0.00076 0.00876 0.00114 0.02069 0.32
-1.19 1.14 1.10 0.37 -3.10 -1.44 1.13 0.13 1.87
lh -0.00410 0.02447 0.01548 0.72 -0.00772 -0.01492 -0.00145 0.02015 0.01532 0.00350 0.14
-1.09 2.29 1.16 -0.36 -0.56 -2.51 1.82 0.70 0.13
3 h -0.00684 0.02445 0.03001 0.67 -0.01131 -0.02638 0.00046 0.02529 0.02412 0.01752 0.11
-1.18 1.92 1.65 -0.63 -1.16 0.40 2.26 1.16 0.69
6 h 0.00225 0.02815 0.01263 0.51 -0.00609 -0.02748 0.00042 0.01132 0.02685 0.01528 0.10
0.35 1.52 0.54 -0.19 -0.87 0.25 0.41 0.77 0.45
12 h 0.00908 0.04509 -0.01196 0.46 -0.01572 -0.00812 -0.00025 0.07325 0.04484 -0.00960 0.14
1.50 1.68 -0.38 -0.64 -0.28 -0.12 1.49 1.67 -0.30
24 h 0.01103 0.09599 -0.07957 0.47 -0.02035 0.00599 -0.00013 0.07687 0.05343 -0.02322 0.14
0.66 3.16 -2.12 -0.98 0.22 -0.05 1.96 2.20 -0.77
# news 4 9 5 11 21 18 19 29 9 10 74
Notes: See Table 2.4. The variables with the ‘act’ suffix include the observations when the central banks changed some interest 
rate. The remaining variables include all observations.
2.2.4 Rationality of expectations and market efficiency
The results in Appendix 2.A suggest that the measure of expectations used for the Fix 
and Repo variables might not be appropriate, since they do not meet the restrictions 
imposed by the rational expectations hypothesis. As for the other variables, although the 
rational expectations restrictions are verified, this does not mean that they actually are a 
good measure of the market expectations. In the absence of (better) alternative measu­
res, one can only proceed with these and expect that the results are not significantly 
affected.
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The rationality of expectations may also be assessed in a joint test with the efficient 
markets hypothesis, as described in section 2.2.1. The results for the first test, of zero 
average exchange rate change after policy signals, are presented in Table 2.8. The only 
clear violations of the hypothesis are for the Bundesbank’s ‘Wednesday’ policy signals 
with news and ‘Tuesday’ signals without news. These results are probably caused by the 
non rationality of the expectations for the Repo and Fix variables (see Appendix 2. A), 
which are the ones signalled on those occasions. As such, Table 2.8 does not reveal any 
additional violation of market efficiency.
Tests of the REEM based on equation 2.2 are less favourable for the hypothesis. Al­
though most of the restrictions that the constant and the coefficients associated with the 
expected values of interest rate changes should not be significantly different from zero 
are verified, that is not always the case. From Table 2.9, it can be seen that in the regres­
sions for the signals from the Fed, the expectation of Fed Funds rate changes is signifi­
cant from 15m to 3h, and that in the regressions for the Bundesbank, the constant is 
significant on the regressions up to 3 h, and the coefficients for the expected changes in 
the Discount and Lombard rates are also significant in three of the regressions. The 
constant in the Bundesbank regressions is negative, denoting that the DEM tended to 
appreciate after the Bundesbank issued some policy signal. This result could be inter­
preted as sign of market inefficiency, but it may more likely be a small sample problem, 
an indication of a kind o f‘peso problem’. The majority of the observations in the sample 
correspond to a period when the Bundesbank was cutting the interest rates. The markets 
overestimated the pace of the cuts, and most of the news consisted of expected cuts that 
did not materialise, thus implying that the reaction of the exchange rate to those policy 
signals should be an appreciation of the DEM. Does this overestimation of the pace of 
the cuts mean markets are irrational? Not necessarily. In order to reach any conclusion 
one would need to know if the markets also overestimated the pace of the Bundesbank’s 
rate cuts in other cycles. Observations from one cycle only might be not enough.
The significance of some of the expectations coefficients is not necessarily an indication 
of market inefficiency, either. When significant, the coefficients on the expectations have 
the same sign as the coefficients on news. One possible interpretation of this result is
O n
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Table 2.8 Average exchange rate change after policy signals
Period
FED BUNDESBANK
All
signals
News Expected
All
signals
News Expected
All Discfed Funds All
OM
operations
FOMC
meetings All
Council
meetings Tuesday Wednesd All
Council
meetings Tuesday Wednesd
5 m 0.00021 0.00095 0.00059 0.00132 -0.00002 -0.00020 0.00011 -0.00016 -0.00031 -0.00020 -0.00006 -0.00052 -0.00010 -0.00010 -0.00010 -0.00011
0.78 1.05 0.65 1.24 -0.10 -0.70 0.36 -1.72 -1.00 -0.32 -0.26 -2.81 -1.86 -0.70 -1.25 -1.19
15 m 0.00057 0.00311 0.00415 0.00307 -0.00003 -0.00007 0.00000 -0.00023 -0.00046 -0.00065 0.00017 -0.00044 -0.00014 0.00000 -0.00020 -0.00014
1.12 2.08 1.63 1.49 -0.08 -0.21 0.01 -1.93 -1.27 -0.89 0.57 -1.69 -1.53 0.00 -1.83 -0.83
30 m 0.00062 0.00248 0.00563 0.00248 0.00002 -0.00031 0.00027 -0.00022 -0.00045 -0.00088 0.00040 -0.00024 -0.00013 0.00034 -0.00041 0.00004
0.95 1.44 2.27 0.84 0.05 -0.80 0.44 -1.60 -1.23 -1.21 0.77 -0.76 -1.03 0.90 -2.50 0.20
1 h 0.00119 0.00364 0.00640 0.00374 0.00042 0.00012 0.00064 -0.00030 -0.00076 -0.00128 -0.00028 -0.00030 -0.00013 0.00028 -0.00061 0.00042
1.63 1.42 2.59 1.19 0.84 0.18 0.89 -1.54 -1.43 -1.21 -0.62 -0.69 -0.73 0.89 -2.67 1.08
3 h 0.00152 0.00456 0.00876 0.00452 0.00057 0.00025 0.00081 -0.00039 -0.00110 -0.00165 -0.00090 -0.00052 -0.00013 0.00016 -0.00070 0.00063
1.58 1.31 2.90 1.07 0.91 0.30 0.88 -1.37 -1.66 -1.25 -1.26 -0.92 -0.44 0.23 -1.93 0.97
6 h 0.00114 0.00388 0.00864 0.00412 0.00028 -0.00040 0.00080 -0.00034 -0.00095 -0.00141 -0.00038 -0.00059 -0.00012 0.00105 -0.00092 0.00051
1.16 1.14 2.28 0.99 0.39 -0.33 0.89 -0.81 -1.00 -0.80 -0.37 -0.54 -0.27 0.62 -1.80 0.68
12 h 0.00129 0.00421 0.00858 0.00425 0.00038 0.00065 0.00017 -0.00044 -0.00067 -0.00174 -0.00082 0.00067 -0.00036 -0.00071 -0.00035 -0.00019
1.12 1.07 2.66 0.88 0.43 0.48 0.14 -0.76 -0.58 -0.89 -0.37 0.42 -0.53 -0.38 -0.35 -0.18
24 h 0.00139 0.00608 0.01170 0.00386 -0.00009 0.00083 -0.00078 0.00001 -0.00011 -0.00109 -0.00147 0.00154 0.00005 0.00001 0.00008 0.00003
0.77 1.10 3.17 0.59 -0.06 0.27 -0.50 0.02 -0.09 -0.51 -0.62 0.87 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.03
# obs 46 11 4 9 35 15 20 280 74 35 10 29 206 37 105 64
Notes: The table displays the average exchange rate change after policy signals, for each class of signals and over different periods of time. The numbers in italics are t-statistics under the null that the mean is zero 
(assuming normality of returns). Underlined values are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Chapter 2
Table 2.9 Test of the REEM hypothesis
Period
FED BUNDESBANK
Constant Discfed Funds Exdiscfd Exfunds R2 Constant Discbb Lomb Fix Repo Exdisc Exlomb Exfix Exrepo R2
5 m 0.00000 -0.00181 0.00966 -0.00285 0.00500 0.30 -0.00019 -0.00012 -0.01306 -0.00021 -0.00706 0.01454 -0.01700 0.00027 0.00045 0.31
0.02 -0.66 2.49 -1.02 1.63 -2.32 -0.03 -2.43 -0.73 -1.11 2.05 -2.54 1.22 0.23
15 m 0.00001 -0.00161 0.02094 0.00113 0.01082 0.56 -0.00029 0.00565 -0.01847 -0.00087 0.00269 0.00739 -0.00774 0.00010 -0.00269 0.29
0.03 -0.59 3.61 0.31 2.69 -2.53 1.40 -4.17 -1.90 0.49 1.00 -1.02 0.36 -1.31
30 m -0.00004 -0.00981 0.03129 -0.00415 0.01632 0.57 -0.00028 0.00430 -0.01419 -0.00070 0.01144 0.00239 0.00331 0.00034 -0.00095 0.16
-0.10 -2.08 4.13 -0.57 1.88 -1.89 0.87 -3.13 -1.40 1.43 0.38 0.43 0.93 -0.27
1 h 0.00044 -0.00747 0.03525 0.00039 0.01339 0.63 -0.00044 0.00807 -0.01733 -0.00140 0.02436 0.01902 -0.01690 0.00023 -0.00144 0.12
0.98 -1.80 5.43 0.05 1.98 -2.27 1.55 -2.64 -2.19 2.13 1.31 -1.04 0.43 -0.44
3 h 0.00054 -0.01375 0.04744 -0.00635 0.02291 0.58 -0.00061 0.01282 -0.01888 0.00066 0.03022 0.02713 -0.02395 0.00123 0.00506 0.07
0.90 -2.38 4.52 -0.71 2.57 -2.03 1.28 -1.90 0.52 2.65 1.64 -1.10 1.56 0.84
6 h 0.00023 -0.00199 0.03775 -0.00029 0.01522 0.43 -0.00038 0.02083 -0.02352 0.00037 0.01314 0.03470 -0.03491 0.00082 0.01231 0.05
0.32 -0.26 3.09 -0.03 1.24 -0.76 1.99 -1.90 0.20 0.62 1.46 -1.27 0.76 1.21
12 h 0.00052 0.00820 0.03602 0.00328 0.00075 0.33 -0.00082 0.03011 -0.03176 0.00036 0.07981 0.04821 -0.04457 0.00203 0.00680 0.06
0.55 0.89 2.51 0.26 0.05 -1.23 3.32 -2.56 0.15 1.66 2.51 -2.07 0.88 0.47
24 h 0.00109 0.00768 0.04540 -0.01220 -0.02022 0.25 -0.00010 0.03283 -0.02901 -0.00001 0.07691 0.04986 -0.04519 0.00091 0.00662 0.05
0.70 0.44 2.16 -0.70 -0.87 -0.14 2.99 -1.88 0.00 1.98 2.78 -2.02 0.40 0.46
Notes: See Table 2.1. This table describes the results of estimation of equation 2.2, for all the relevant Fed’s and Bundesbank’s policy signals (46 observations for the Fed and 264 for the Bundesbank). The critical 
values for the t-tests are 2.02 (1.68) for the Fed and 1.97 (1.65) for the Bundesbank, at the 5% (10%) level. The variables with the ‘Ex’ prefix refer to the expected interest rate changes, the other variables refer to 
the news (the unexpected changes).
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that the measure of expectations used overestimates the actual market expectation (i.e., 
the actual news are larger than the measure used), which would mean that markets are 
efficient but one would need a different measure of market expectations. However, 
another possible explanation which would denote some market inefficiency is that the 
exchange rate is reacting to the actual change, not the news, i.e., that the market expec­
tations are not incorporated in the exchange rate before the announcement. The results 
in Table 2.10, of the estimation of equation 2.1, but with the actual interest rate change 
replacing the news measure, are very similar to the results in Table 2.1, suggesting that 
one can not rule out that hypothesis. However, distinguishing these two hypothesis in 
this data set is difficult, because the news and the actual changes are highly correlated 
(see Appendix 2.A, Table 2.19), thus implying that one will get similar results using 
either of the two variables. Although the differences are very small, the fit is slightly 
better when the news variables are used (higher R2 and t-statistics), and this could be 
interpreted as an indication that the markets are reacting to the news and not to the 
actual changes, as the efficient markets hypothesis would imply.
Table 2.10 Effects of actual interest rate changes on the DEM/USD rate
Period
FED BUNDESBANK
Discfed Funds R2 Discbb Lomb Fix Repo R2
5 m -0.00330 0.00795 0.25 0.00147 -0.00896 -0.00025 0.00082 0.16
-0.99 2.07 0.44 -1.81 -1.52 0.47
15 m -0.00284 0.01774 0.51 0.00579 -0.01434 -0.00075 -0.00021 0.20
-0.76 3.62 1.61 -4.03 -2.99 -0.11
30 m -0.01097 0.02665 0.49 0.00401 -0.00942 -0.00060 0.00221 0.07
-2.01 4.53 0.91 -2.31 -1.99 0.67
lh -0.00943 0.02925 0.50 0.00931 -0.01269 -0.00091 0.00425 0.06
-1.72 5.15 1.90 -2.23 -1.88 2.09
3 h -0.01654 0.04064 0.49 0.01441 -0.01437 0.00032 0.01181 0.04
-2.10 4.40 1.58 -1.54 0.41 2.58
6 h -0.00654 0.03054 0.36 0.02242 -0.02133 0.00030 0.01486 0.04
-0.85 3.15 2.24 -1.89 0.27 2.05
12 h -0.00200 0.02420 0.19 0.03224 -0.02765 0.00067 0.02023 0.04
-0.24 2.21 3.82 -2.98 0.35 1.57
24 h -0.01566 0.02252 0.03 0.03480 -0.02762 0.00055 0.01520 0.04
-1.55 1.66 3.39 -2.20 0.28 1.12
# changes 4 8 9 10 9 36 44 99
Notes: See Table 2.1. The variables refer to the actual interest rate changes, not to the ‘news’. The critical values for the t-tests 
are 2.37 (1.90) for the Fed, and 1.99 (1.66) for the Bundesbank, at the 5% (10%) level.
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2.2.5 The time pattern of the response of the exchange rate to policy news
Figure 2.3 presents the evolution across return periods of the size of the coefficients and 
respective t-statistics for the main interest rate each central bank, the Funds rate for the 
Fed and the Lombard rate for the Bundesbank. The data were obtained by running 
regressions similar to the ones used in the previous sections, but using a finer grid of 
return periods: the Funds results are an extension of Table 2.1, and the Lomb results are 
similar to Table 2.4. However, the data actually used for Lomb is an extension of Table 
2.11, which does not include 3 of the observations used in Table 2.4. These 3 observa­
tions correspond to the cases when there was an announcement of some main US 
macroeconomic indicator after the Bundesbank policy news, whose impact on the 
exchange rate could distort the time pattern of the effect of Lomb43
Table 2.11 Effects of Bundesbank’s news, without observations affected by US 
macroeconomic announcements
Period Discnor Lombnor Fixnor Reponor Discerm Lomberm Fixerm Repoerm R2
5 m 0.00006 -0.01376 -0.00037 -0.00948 0.00093 0.00323 0.00060 -0.00306 0.39
0.02 -2.18 -1.23 -1.39 0.25 1.72 1.89 -0.27
15 m 0.00183 -0.01999 -0.00074 -0.00133 0.00903 -0.00015 0.00063 0.00694 0.64
0.66 -6.11 -1.93 -0.22 3.57 -0.12 35.36 0.33
30 m 0.00141 -0.01593 -0.00069 0.00566 0.00454 -0.00554 0.00153 0.03278 0.39
0.42 -4.34 -2.22 0.72 1.48 -3.28 12.32 2.36
l h 0.00452 -0.02211 -0.00141 0.02022 0.00460 0.01762 0.00048 0.01958 0.38
0.86 -4.09 -2.62 1.63 0.42 3.21 1.17 1.34
3 h 0.00371 -0.02034 0.00102 0.01980 0.01398 0.02467 0.00013 0.06778 0.30
0.38 -2.46 0.89 1.69 0.92 3.22 0.54 3.20
6 h 0.00358 -0.01808 0.00088 -0.00246 0.02759 0.02217 -0.00113 0.11806 0.20
0.18 -1.24 0.45 -0.08 1.43 2.28 -0.49 4.98
12 h 0.01246 -0.01982 0.00006 0.05570 0.02303 0.01744 0.00070 0.20931 0.13
0.57 -1.26 0.03 1.02 1.26 1.87 0.15 3.07
24 h 0.02038 -0.01820 -0.00035 0.07314 0.02582 0.00976 0.00400 0.10583 0.10
0.76 -0.94 -0.11 1.70 1.23 0.92 1.49 1.21
# news 20 23 14 24 7 2 2 5 71
Notes: See Table 2.4.
43 In Chapter 3, it is shown that some US macroeconomic data announcements have a significant 
impact on the DEM/USD exchange rate. To eliminate possible distortions from these announcements, 
the observations including US macro data announcements inside the 24 hour return period were 
excluded. The observations excluded were from 2/10/92, when the US Employment Report was an­
nounced 30m after the end of the Bundesbank council meeting, from 1/7/93 (NAPM, 3h after meeting) 
and from 17/2/94 (CPI, 30m after meeting).
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The time pattern of the size of the coefficients and significance levels of the key interest 
rates, exhibits an interesting difference between the exchange rate reactions to news 
originating from the Fed and the Bundesbank. The evidence suggests that the market 
reaction to Bundesbank’s news is much quicker than the reaction to the Fed’s news. The 
exchange rate adjusts almost immediately to Lombard rate news: after 10 minutes the 
coefficient is already close to its maximum value. However, the adjustment to Fed Funds 
news is slower and more gradual. Instead of jumping almost immediately to its maxi­
mum value, the size of the coefficient increases gradually; after 10 minutes it is less than 
half of its maximum level, it takes almost 1 hour to reach two thirds of its maximum 
level, and the full impact is only felt after 3 hours. Similar differences may be observed 
for the evolution across time of the t-statistics. This kind of adjustment pattern creates 
significant profit opportunities, and thus might lead one to question the efficiency of the 
market. The puzzle is why this only occurs for the Fed news, but not for the Bundes­
bank news. Two differences between US and German announcements might be origina­
ting this result. First, Lombard rate signals are clearer than Fed Funds rate signals. 
While the Bundesbank clearly states the new level of the Lombard rate (‘Lombard rate is 
9%’, for instance), the Fed only announces changes in the ‘degree of reserve pressure’; it 
requires some interpretation from the ‘Fed watchers’ to translate this wording into the 
new target for the Funds rate, and this kind of analysis will probably take some time. 
Second, Lombard rate policy signals are scheduled, while Funds rate signals are not (at 
least in most of the sample). The Lombard rate is only changed at the Bundesbank 
council meeting, and the dates of the meeting are well known; also, most of the times the 
outcome of the meeting is announced at a press conference, whose precise time has been 
previously announced. This is not necessarily the case for the Funds signals (at least 
until February 1994). There are no precise dates when the Funds rate might be changed. 
Note that this explanation is consistent with the results of Chapter 3, where similar 
differences in the adjustment pattern to US and German macroeconomic announcements 
were found: the adjustment to the scheduled (US) announcements is much faster than the 
adjustment to the unscheduled (German) announcements.
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2.3 The Impact of Policy Signals on Exchange Rate Volatility
2.3.1 Methodology
Even if a policy signal does not affect the exchange rate level (because it was expected, 
for instance) it still might have an impact on the exchange rate volatility. The analysis of 
the impact of monetary policy signals on exchange rate volatility is based on the estima­
tion of a time series model, inspired on the ARCH methodology. The large number of 
parameters to estimate (see below), and the large number of observations in the sample 
(225180) rule out the use of the iterative methods usually applied for the estimation of 
non-linear time series models. To overcome this problem, an alternative estimation 
procedure was developed, which requires much less time and computing resources than 
iterative methods, and still provides consistent estimates, although it might imply some 
loss of efficiency.44
The basic data consist of five-minute returns (Rt ’), computed as the first differences of 
the logarithm of the DEM/USD exchange rate quotes (qt)45
Rt ’ = 100 (log qt - log qt.\) 2.3
corresponding approximately to the (continuously compounded) percentage nominal 
return on the USD obtained from period t-1 to period t. In the first stage, a small but 
positive mean, and a small MA term, are filtered from the return series Rt\  and the 
residuals from this model, rt (the filtered returns), were then used as the basis for the 
second step of the estimation. Table 2.12 presents the results of the filtering procedure.
Table 2,12 Estimation of filtered returns
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat
Constant 0.00019 0.00016 1.17
MA{1} -0.07725 0.00364 -21.24
44 However, with such a large number of observations in the sample, efficiency should not be a serious 
concern.
45 See Appendix 2.B for a description of qt.
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The second stage consists of modelling rt as a GARCH(1,1) process. A substantial body 
of literature has now accumulated showing that the behaviour of foreign exchange rates 
can be reasonably described under Engle’s (1982) Autoregressive Conditional Heteros- 
cedasticity (ARCH) framework. In particular, some derivation of Bollerslev’s (1986) 
GARCH(1,1) model has been widely used to model the behaviour of foreign exchange 
rates.46 Applying the general specification of GARCH(1,1) to describe the behaviour of 
the filtered 5 minute returns on the DEM/USD exchange rate, rh yields
rt /  y/t-i ~ N  ( 0, ht)  2.4
ht = Gt + a r t. 2 + p h t.i 2.5
where Gt is some function of exogenous variables. The GARCH(1,1) model can be 
expressed as an ARMA(1,1) in squared returns (Bollerslev, 1986, p. 310)
r? = Gt + (a+fi) rt. 2 - p  vt.} + v, 2.6
where
v, = r 2 - ht = ( t j 2 - 1) ht
and
Tjt ~ i.i.d N  (0,1)
Notice that vt is a Martingale difference and can be thought of as a white-noise sequence. 
Thus equation 2.6 can be used to estimate the model with standard time-series tech­
niques (Engle, 1995, p.xiii). Since any ARMA process can be approximated by an AR(p) 
model, withp  sufficiently large (Harvey, 1993, p. 133), equation 2.6 can be rewritten as
r} = G, + 2  <k rl, + v, 2.7
i= l
Applying OLS to equation 2.7 will yield biased estimates of the coefficients. Also, given 
the heteroscedasticity present in vf, inference using OLS standard deviations would not 
be valid. However, OLS estimators are consistent. Furthermore, computing the covari­
ance matrix allowing for heteroscedasticity as in White (1980) will yield asymptotically 
valid tests of hypothesis about the coefficients (Hamilton, 1994, p. 215-220).
Estimating the model in squared returns form is generally inefficient and the original
46 For references, see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992, p.37).
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GARCH specification is usually preferred. However, the fact that there are 225180 
observations in the sample is simultaneously a motive and a justification for estimating 
the model in the form of equation 2.7. The motive is the impracticable computational 
costs of estimating a model with more than 150 parameters (as described below) and 
such a large number of observations, using any kind of iterative process. An autoregres­
sion makes the model easier to specify and estimate. The justification is that with such a 
large number of observations efficiency should not be an important problem. Also, the 
large number of observations provides the justification for applying asymptotic results 
that allow for the estimation of some variant of equation 2.7 using OLS.
In the estimations performed p  was chosen to be 30, an arbitrarily large number. The 
function of exogenous variables Gt has two main sets of terms (apart from the constant 
fc), policy signals (and their lags) At, and intra-day seasonal terms Sh
Gt =  k  + St + At 2.8
The policy signals, and their lags, included in the models are described in Appendix 2.B. 
Intra-day seasonality was modelled using a set of deterministic trigonometric compo­
nents (as in Payne, 1996), with some additional dummies to account for specific spikes in 
volatility that the smooth seasonal cannot cope with, and accounting for the daylight 
savings time problem.47 The daylight savings time problem implies that there are 3 
different sets of seasonal terms, according to the period of the year:48 & f  during Winter 
time, S? during Summer time and S? during the (pooled) transition periods, such that
47 The time stamp on Reuters’ quotes and news data is expressed in terms of GMT. The volatility 
patterns are associated with the trading activity in the main financial centres. Daylight savings time 
changes will change the local time relative to GMT, and thus the intra-day volatility pattern in reference 
to GMT. This implies that estimation of the seasonal pattern must accommodate different patterns for 
different periods of the year.
48 Daylight savings time changes occurred in Germany (and other European countries) in the last 
weekend of March and September. In the US, changes occurred in the first weekend of April and last 
weekend of October. (Japan did not have daylight savings time changes.) These changes define 4 
different seasonal patterns according to the possible combinations of local time relative to GMT in US 
and Europe: between the last weekends of October and March, both the US and Europe are on Winter 
time; from the first weekend in April, to the last weekend in September, both the US and Europe are in 
Summer time; between the last weekends of September and October, the US is still in Summer time, but 
Europe is already in Winter time; and in the week before the first weekend in April, the US is still in 
Winter time but Europe is already in Summer time. Given that the transition periods only last for 5 
weeks (1+4), they were pooled, and only one set of seasonal parameters was estimated for the two 
periods.
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St = S?t + S?t + Sft 2.9
The basic structure of these sets of seasonal terms is similar. For example, Sw is of the
form
2.10
where nwt takes the value (from 1 to 288) of the corresponding number of the intra-day 5 
minute interval, if t is between the last weekend of October and the last weekend of 
March, and takes the value 0 if / corresponds to a different period in the year. After 
experimenting different values for X (between 4 and 12), X was chosen to be 6, since this 
number of parameters provided an estimated seasonal that fitted reasonable well the 
sample average volatility. Two sets of dummy variables were considered, the first one 
accounting for a spike in volatility at the opening of the Tokyo market (intervals 1 and 
2), and the other corresponding to the 15 minutes after the time of the announcement of 
the majority of the US macroeconomic data, 8:30 EST (intervals 163 to 165 in Winter 
and 151 to 153 in the other periods).49
2.3.2 Empirical results for the whole sample
Initially, the time series model was estimated using all observations for each of the policy 
signals described in Appendix 2.B: for the Fed, the open market operations (Fedom), and 
the official statements either at the end of the FOMC meeting (Fedmb and Fedma, 
depending on whether it was before or after January 1994) or in other occasions (Fedst)\ 
and for the Bundesbank, the statements at the end of the council meetings (Bbmeet), and 
the announcement of the repo tender terms (Bbtues) and results (Bbwedn). Table 2.13 
presents the results of the estimation of the model using leads and lags covering the 
period from 15m before up to 30m after the policy signal. The evidence suggests that 
policy signals have a significant impact in exchange rate volatility, since for most of the
49 See Payne (1996) for an analysis of the effects of US macroeconomic announcements on DEM/USD 
volatility.
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policy signals the coefficients for all lags are jointly significant.
The expected immediate effect of a policy signal is an increase in volatility. Market 
agents will use the information incorporated in the signal to update their beliefs, and 
consequently their desired portfolio positions. The subsequent trading necessary to 
achieve the desired portfolio positions will induce an increase in volatility. The evidence 
in Table 2.13 is consistent with this hypothesis. The sum of the coefficients across all 
lags is positive for all policy signals (except Fedmb) and significantly different from zero 
in most of them. The total increase in volatility, as measured by the long term multiplier 
of the policy signal variable, is quite large, compared to the average level of volatility in 
days without policy signals. For instance, for Fedma the total increase in volatility is 
0.402, a figure 176 times larger than the normal level of volatility at the comparable time 
of day. Corresponding figures for Bbmeet are 0.115 and 75.
Table 2.13 Effect of policy signals on DEM/USD volatility
Policy Signal
Lag
FED BUNDESBANK
Fedst Fedmb Fedma Fedom Bbmeet Bbtues Bbwedn
t-15m -0.00642 -0.00065 0.02403 -0.00140 0.00040 0.00080 -0.00072
-2.41 -1.08 1.06 -0.97 0.39 1.30 -2.26
MOm -0.00444 -0.00088 0.00836 0.00037 0.00387 0.00054 -0.00015
-1.96 -3.70 0.87 0.18 1.87 1.06 -0.28
t-5m -0.00593 -0.00093 0.00540 0.00896 0.00269 0.00256 0.00131
-2.32 -3.11 0.84 1.40 2.11 1.12 0.96
t 0.02824 0.00189 0.01335 0.00032 0.02481 -0.00001 0.00067
1.13 0.62 1.45 0.15 2.02 -10.03 1.10
t+5m 0.02139 -0.00048 0.04023 -0.00111 0.01319 -0.00011 -0.00026
4.12 -0.72 1.51 -1.03 3.31 -0.23 -0.48
t+lOm -0.00504 -0.00084 0.01654 0.00403 0.00509 -0.00053 0.00021
-1.42 -2.81 1.40 0.86 2.17 -1.58 0.47
t+15m -0.00527 0.00081 0.06071 0.01441 0.00460 -0.00040 0.00029
-2.41 0.71 1.57 1.51 1.92 -1.19 0.46
t+20m -0.00524 -0.00029 0.02237 0.00189 0.00517 0.00060 -0.00068
-3.85 -0.71 1.11 0.46 1.65 1.01 -2.45
t+25m 0.04688 -0.00147 -0.00296 0.00028 0.00058 0.00009 0.00095
1.46 -2.33 -0.95 0.16 0.72 0.23 0.67
t+30m 0.00886 -0.00093 0.03217 -0.00262 0.00255 0.00080 0.00072
1.96 -3.36 1.10 -4.66 1.31 1.47 0.75
XdO) 61.5 44.2 14.9 29.4 33.4 11.1 15.1
Sum of all lags 0.07303 -0.00378 0.22021 0.02512 0.06294 0.00432 0.00235
1.75 -1.06 3.33 1.83 4.36 1.60 0.89
Total effect 0.13167 -0.00690 0.40228 0.04596 0.11550 0.00799 0.00423
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Table 2.13 (continued)
Autoregressive terms
1-7 0.04114 0.02396 0.01534 0.01401 0.01587 0.01064 0.01057
1.46 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.52 1.36 1.52
8-14 0.01086 0.01136 0.00906 0.00801 0.00687 0.00735 0.00727
3.40 2.41 2.92 1.31 1.52 1.74 1.48
15-21 0.00484 0.00649 0.00674 0.01027 0.00479 0.00406 0.00582
1.30 1.32 1.34 3.16 1.22 1.22 1.23
22-28 0.00505 0.00468 0.00423 0.00482 0.00343 0.00429 0.00919
1.29 1.24 1.25 1.44 1.44 1.39 1.94
29-30 0.00648 0.00728 Constant 0.00136
1.35 1.27 21.00
Seasonal terms
Trig terms 1 2 3 4 5 6
Winter cos -0.00083 -0.00023 0.00062 -0.00007 0.00023 0.00000
-11.51 -5.56 9.15 -0.80 3.10 0.00
sin -0.00060 0.00064 -0.00004 0.00014 -0.00005 -0.00003
-7.82 7.10 -0.56 3.00 -0.79 -0.42
Summer cos -0.00088 -0.00004 0.00045 -0.00016 0.00009 -0.00008
-10.74 -1.20 6.61 -1.76 1.19 -2.14
sin -0.00036 0.00056 -0.00045 0.00035 0.00006 0.00005
-5.28 5.78 -5.93 8.67 0.92 0.55
Transition cos -0.00101 -0.00009 0.00076 -0.00021 -0.00008 -0.00011
-7.95 -1.24 6.06 -1.30 -0.61 -1.39
sin -0.00058 0.00072 -0.00042 0.00033 0.00019 0.00009
-4.46 4.50 -3.28 3.83 1.62 0.54
Dummies Tokvo US macro announcements
Winter 0.00070 0.00117 0.00478 0.00987 0.00307
1.56 2.06 2.75 3.32 1.25
Summer 0.00086 0.00117 0.00762 0.01136 0.00274
2.69 3.43 3.10 2.69 2.58
Transition 0.00040 0.00017 0.01552 0.00453 0.00211
1.22 0.50 1.05 1.51 1.02
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients for the time series model of volatility, using 30 autoregressive terms, and for 
the seasonal, X=6 and dummies for the Tokyo opening and US macro announcements. Values in italics are asymptotic t-stalistics. 
X(10) are Wald statistics for the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all the 10 lags are zero. The critical values for this test are 
18.3 (16.0) at the 5% (10%) level. The ‘total effect’ corresponds to the long term multiplier of the policy signal, given by the sum 
of the coefficients for all lags divided by 1 minus the sum of all autoregressive terms.
The estimated reaction of the exchange rate suggests that for the foreign exchange 
market the relevant policy signals are Bbmeet for the Bundesbank and Fedma for the 
Fed. For these signals, the sum of the coefficients across all lags is significantly positive 
at the 1% level. Other policy signals from the Fed (Fedst and Fedorri) also have a 
significantly positive impact on volatility, at the 5% level. The results for the Bundes­
bank’s signals are consistent with the evidence in section 2.2, where it was found that the 
Lombard rate was the key German interest rate. Exchange rate volatility was affected by
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those signals revealing information related to the fortnightly council meetings (Bbmeet), 
when decisions regarding the Lombard rate were taken, but did not seem to be affected 
by signals regarding the Repo rate (Bbtues and Bbwedn). Again, this is not consistent 
with the official rhetoric of the Bundesbank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1994) that stresses 
that the Repo rate is the key rate in German monetary policy (see discussion in Section 
2.2). The results for the Fed highlight the differences in the announcement policy before 
and after February 1994 described in subsection 2.1.2. The statements issued at the end 
of the FOMC meetings before that date (Fedmb) do not cause a significant increase in 
volatility; if anything, they reduce it, although this effect is not significantly different from 
zero. On the contrary, those statements after February 1994 (Fedma) cause large 
increases in volatility. Before that date, it was the Fed’s open market operations 
(Fedom) that provided the markets with the relevant monetaiy policy information, 
judging from the exchange rate reaction.
One common feature of the policy signals that have the largest impacts on volatility is the 
fact that they refer to official statements of the central banks, not to open market opera­
tions. The market-based signals (Fedom and Bbwed) have a much lower impact on 
volatility, as may be seen in Figure 2.4. The most interesting result refers to the diffe­
rences between Fedom and Fedma. These two policy signals convey to the market 
information about the same interest rate, the Fed Funds target. In 1992 and 1993 the 
Fed used open market operations (Fedom) to signal changes in that target, but in Febru­
ary 1994 adopted the practice of making official statements (Fedma) to announce those 
changes. Given that these two variables convey the same type of information, the 
reaction of the exchange rate should be similar, but this is not what was found. The 
impact on volatility of Fedma is 9 times larger than the impact of Fedom. This result 
suggests that different announcement procedures will have different implications for 
foreign exchange market instability. An official statement captures the attention of 
market agents more effectively than a market operation. The clearer official statement 
forces all market participants to immediately update their beliefs, and immediately trade 
on the new beliefs; whilst the market operation is only slowly revealed to the market, and 
thus the updating process is more gradual, causing a much smaller increase in volatility.
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Figure 2.4 may also be used to analyse the impact on volatility across time, for each 
policy signal. The largest effects are immediate; for most of the signals, the largest 
coefficients are for lags t to t+J5m. These coefficients tend to be individually signifi­
cantly different from zero, and are big relative to the normal volatility levels. For ins­
tance, for Fedma the volatility response at lag t+15m is 28 times the normal level of 
volatility at the comparable time of day. The volatility response to Bbmeet at lag t is 15 
times the normal level of volatility. However, the significance of the coefficients disap­
pears in 20 minutes, at most. Although the autoregressive structure of the model implies 
that the increase in volatility is rather ‘long lived’ (in an high frequency setting), after 20 
minutes the size of these effects is small. For the two variables above (Fedma and 
Bbmeet), after 1 hour volatility is only 110% and 40% higher than normal, respectively.
The variables Fedst, Fedmb and Bbmeet have significant coefficients on the period 
before the actual signal is released. However, for Fedst and Fedmb these coefficients are 
negative, while for Bbmeet they are positive. Negative coefficients suggest that the 
agents stop trading while waiting for the policy signal to be released. Although neither 
of the two signals is scheduled, it is possible that a few minutes beforehand the market 
may know that the Fed is going to issue a statement, and agents might not want to trade 
before they know the outcome of the statement. A different reaction is found for 
Bbmeet, with volatility increasing before the actual announcement time. This result 
suggests that some market agents may have faster access to the information from the 
Bundesbank, and start trading on it before Reuters’ actually reports it. However, the 
relatively small size of the coefficients suggest that this is not widespread.
2.3.3 Differences in the impact on volatility across sub sets of policy signals
In this subsection, differences in the effect on volatility across sub samples are explored. 
The first division of the sample is between signals whose contents had been anticipated 
by the market (expected signals) and those that do not conform with the market expec­
tations (unexpected signals). The second division is between signals that reveal that the 
central bank has acted to change some interest rate (action signals), and signals that 
reveal that interest rates are kept unchanged (inaction signals).
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Expected and unexpected signals
Table 2.14 presents the results of the estimation of the time series model, dividing the 
policy signals between expected and unexpected. Expected signals were defined as those 
with news equal to zero. The evidence suggests that most of the impact of policy signals 
on volatility originates in the unexpected signals. All the unexpected policy signals have 
coefficients that are jointly significant, while for the expected signals this only occurs for 
Fedom and Fedmt50 The long term effect of unexpected signals is significantly positive 
(except for Bbtues), but significant increases in volatility caused by expected signals can 
only be found for Bbmeet. Even in this case, the impact on volatility of the expected 
signals is 7 times smaller than the impact of unexpected signals. The differences in the 
reaction of the exchange rate to these two classes of signals are evident when one com­
pares Figures 2.5 and 2.6. The effects of expected signals in Figure 2.6 are dwarfed by 
the effects of unexpected signals in Figure 2.5.
If the excess volatility associated with policy signals is caused by agents trading on 
revised beliefs, then the impact on volatility of unexpected signals should be higher than 
that of expected signals. Unexpected signals will induce the market as a whole to revise 
their beliefs, and the associated trading could lead to large increases in volatility. As long 
as there is some heterogeneity in beliefs, even expected signals will induce some agents 
to revise their beliefs (those whose expectations differed from the market’s), but the 
impact of those agents trading should be smaller than for the unexpected signals. The 
positive but small values for the sum of the coefficients for the expected signals support 
this view.
Isolating the policy signals that are responsible for the bulk of the increase in volatility 
allows for a more precise characterisation of this effect. When one considers only the 
unexpected policy signals, three major differences arise relative to the results of the
50 Due to the small number of observations involved, the 3 types of signals consisting of official 
statements by the Fed {Fedmb, Fedma and Fedst) were aggregated in one single variable, Fedmt.
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Table 2.14 Impact on volatility of expected and unexpected signals
Policy Signal FED BUNDESBANK
Lag Fedmt Fedom Bbmeet Bbtues Bbwedn
Unexpected
t-15m 0.03011 -0.00365 0.00218 -0.00102 0.00003
1.00 -1.62 0.62 -2.82 0.04
t-lOm 0.01058 -0.00471 0.00330 0.00273 0.00454
0.83 -3.90 1.50 0.91 1.25
t-5m 0.00493 0.03559 0.00416 0.00023 0.01186
0.56 1.72 1.65 0.19 1.07
t 0.01346 0.00130 0.07908 -0.00051 0.00239
1.33 0.25 1.91 -0.52 0.88
t+5m 0.06191 0.00283 0.03376 -0.00156 -0.00179
1.94 1.01 3.49 -4.10 -3.32
t+lOm -0.00542 0.01687 0.01377 0.00108 0.00350
-2.25 1.00 1.94 0.74 1.11
t+15m 0.07255 0.05485 0.01388 -0.00040 0.00026
1.44 1.75 1.88 -0.62 0.21
t+20m 0.02756 0.00974 0.00590 0.00368 -0.00094
1.04 0.63 1.57 0.96 -1.93
t+25m 0.01197 0.00557 0.00227 0.00004 -0.00024
0.79 0.90 0.96 0.11 -0.29
t+30m 0.04435 -0.00362 0.00883 -0.00020 0.00326
1.17 -2.11 1.38 -0.28 0.81
JC(10) 18.7 33.7 31.5 27.2 19.9
Sum of all lags 0.27199 0.11476 0.16712 0.00407 0.02287
3.20 2.54 3.71 0.74 1.73
Total effect 0.49344 0.20820 0.30485 0.00737 0.04196
Expected
t-15m -0.00060 -0.00064 -0.00032 0.00096 -0.00080
-1.16 -0.37 -1.09 1.44 -2.34
t-lOm -0.00099 0.00208 0.00406 0.00033 -0.00070
-4.01 0.81 1.48 0.69 -2.14
t-5m -0.00067 0.00010 0.00210 0.00278 0.00005
-2.20 0.05 1.44 1.11 0.08
t 0.00562 0.00001 0.00392 0.00004 0.00047
1.26 0.01 1.71 0.08 0.81
t+5m -0.00074 -0.00241 0.00528 0.00003 -0.00005
-1.28 -2.78 1.52 0.05 -0.09
t+lOm 0.00705 -0.00024 0.00175 -0.00069 -0.00017
1.41 -0.15 1.21 -2.03 -0.55
t+15m 0.00264 0.00093 0.00105 -0.00040 0.00031
1.12 0.49 0.73 -1.09 0.45
t+20m -0.00008 -0.00070 0.00489 0.00031 -0.00063
-0.16 -0.71 1.20 0.59 -2.08
t+25m -0.00129 -0.00146 -0.00006 0.00010 0.00111
-1.67 -1.88 -0.11 0.24 0.69
t+30m -0.00030 -0.00228 0.00015 0.00091 0.00043
-0.54 -5.84 0.16 1.54 0.45
x(io) 29.6 44.7 14.3 11.7 15.3
Sum of all lags 0.01064 -0.00460 0.02281 0.00437 0.00003
1.47 -0.85 3.22 1.51 0.01
Total effect 0.01934 -0.00818 0.04164 0.00804 -0.00006
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Autoregressive Terms
1-7 0.04079 0.02366 0.01503 0.01397 0.01583 0.01041 0.01038
1.45 1.44 1.43 1.44 1.52 1.36 1.52
8-14 0.01082 0.01144 0.00885 0.00803 0.00649 0.00721 0.00747
3.42 2.40 2.98 1.32 1.52 1.75 1.48
15-21 0.00470 0.00644 0.00672 0.01028 0.00475 0.00405 0.00578
1.30 1.32 1.34 3.16 1.22 1.22 1.23
22-28 0.00507 0.00467 0.00425 0.00482 0.00342 0.00428 0.00916
1.29 1.24 1.25 1.44 1.44 1.39 1.94
29-30 0.00652 0.00720 Constant 0.00137
1.35 1.26 21.19
Seasonal Terms
Trie terms I 2 3 4 5 6
Winter cos -0.00083 -0.00023 0.00061 -0.00007 0.00023 0.00001
-11.49 -5.73 9.10 -0.78 3.13 0.20
sin -0.00061 0.00064 -0.00003 0.00014 -0.00004 -0.00004
-7.93 7.04 -0.47 3.02 -0.64 -0.52
Summer cos -0.00087 -0.00005 0.00045 -0.00015 0.00010 -0.00008
-10.73 -1.42 6.57 -1.70 1.22 -2.16
sin -0.00036 0.00054 -0.00043 0.00034 0.00007 0.00003
-5.27 5.64 -5.68 8.52 1.12 0.33
Transition cos -0.00103 -0.00010 0.00077 -0.00017 -0.00006 -0.00014
-8.11 -1.36 6.14 -1.06 -0.43 -1.80
sin -0.00057 0.00073 -0.00038 0.00032 0.00017 0.00004
-4.41 4.53 -2.97 3.79 1.44 0.23
Dummies Tokyo US macro announcements
Winter 0.00069 0.00116 0.00480 0.00998 0.00327
1.55 2.05 2.77 3.37 1.33
Summer 0.00086 0.00117 0.00760 0.01142 0.00279
2.68 3.43 3.09 2.70 2.63
Transition 0.00039 0.00017 0.01556 0.00451 0.00220
1.19 0.50 1.05 1.50 1.06
Notes: See Table 2.13.
previous section. First, the signals regarding the Bundesbank’s Repo rate (Bbwedn) now 
have a significant positive impact on volatility, although this is still quantitatively small. 
This suggests that the foreign exchange market did not ignore the Repo rate, although its 
importance was marginal relative to the Lombard rate. Second, the increase in volatility 
is even larger than previously estimated (as one would expect given that the expected 
signals only add noise to the estimation), with Fedmt and Bbmeet causing increases of 
220 and 108 times the normal volatility levels, respectively. Finally, although the diffe­
rences between the effects of the Fed’s market operations (Fedom) and statement
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(Fedmt) signals are less pronounced than in the previous section,51 there is still a clearly 
larger impact of the latter.
Interest rate changes and no changes
Similar results arise when the sample is divided between action signals (those reporting 
interest rate changes) and inaction signals (those reflecting unchanged rates), as reported 
in Table 2.15. Action signals have a much higher impact on volatility than inaction 
signals, as may be distinctly observed in Figure 2.7, and this impact for the inaction 
signals is only significant for Bbmeet. The reason why the effect in volatility of action 
signals might be higher than the effect of inaction signals is that the action of changing 
interest rates may provide a better focal point for the updating of beliefs than the absence 
of action. The interest rate change is the confirmation of an action that was not certain, 
even if it was expected. If expectations were heterogeneous, there would be some 
traders with expectations different than the average and for those the action causes a 
revision of their beliefs, and thus a change in their optimum portfolio. They will then 
trade to achieve this new optimum portfolio, and this trading generates volatility. With 
no interest rate change, there is still the possibility that it will be changed in the next 
opportunity. This renders the convergence of beliefs only partial, and thus the revision 
of portfolios will also be only partial, requiring a smaller amount of trading, and thus 
lower volatility.
Note that there is a strong correlation between unexpected signals and interest rate 
changes, so the differences in Table 2.15 could be a consequence of the differences 
between expected and unexpected signals and not caused by different reactions of the 
exchange rate to action or inaction by the central bank. The model can not be estimated 
using a classification of the policy signals according to both criteria simultaneously, 
because this would produce too few observations in two categories, ‘unexpected inac-
51 Note that the results are not directly comparable, since the definition of the variables is different in 
the two tables. In Table 2.13 the observations corresponding to Fedmt were divided into three variables, 
Fedst, Fedma and Fedmb.
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Table 2.15 Impact on volatility of interest rate changes and no changes
POLICY SIGNAL FED BUNDESBANK
Lag Fedmt Fedom Bbmeet Bbtues Bbwedn
Rate change
t-15m 0.02552 -0.00219 0.00482 0.00079 -0.00071
0.98 -2.00 0.77 1.29 -2.24
t-lOm 0.00882 -0.00506 0.00515 0.00053 -0.00014
0.80 -2.99 1.34 1.05 -0.27
t-5m 0.00423 0.03725 0.00688 0.00256 0.00132
0.56 1.27 1.60 1.12 0.97
t 0.01250 0.00487 0.09813 -0.00001 0.00068
1.44 0.64 1.46 -0.03 1.12
t+5m 0.05250 0.00038 0.04300 -0.00011 -0.00024
1.83 0.11 2.69 -0.22 -0.46
t+lOm 0.00774 -0.00288 0.02305 -0.00053 0.00023
0.68 -2.01 1.99 -1.58 0.50
t+15m 0.06188 0.01121 0.02579 -0.00040 0.00031
1.40 1.08 2.11 -1.18 0.48
t+20m 0.02316 0.02454 0.01039 0.00060 -0.00066
1.00 1.12 1.64 1.01 -2.40
t+25m 0.01108 0.00705 0.00019 0.00010 0.00096
0.85 1.01 0.06 0.24 0.67
t+30m 0.03923 -0.00479 0.00534 0.00081 0.00073
1.20 -2.32 1.30 1.49 0.76
XdO) 12.8 27.6 25.9 11.1 14.9
Sum of all lags 0.24666 0.07039 0.22274 0.00434 0.00246
3.28 1.77 3.07 1.61 0.93
Total effect 0.44786 0.12807 0.40697 0.00797 0.00443
No rate change
t-15m -0.00051 -0.00126 -0.00044
-0.97 -0.75 -1.70
t-lOm -0.00094 0.00133 0.00360
-3.70 0.57 1.54
t-5m -0.00069 0.00397 0.00190
-2.16 0.88 1.51
t 0.00557 -0.00048 0.01157
1.19 -0.22 1.75
t+5m -0.00055 -0.00137 0.00780
-0.92 -1.25 2.42
t+lOm 0.00287 0.00524 0.00184
0.82 0.96 1.32
t+15m 0.00290 0.01497 0.00078
1.18 1.35 0.63
t+20m 0.00010 -0.00210 0.00422
0.19 -1.53 1.21
t+25m -0.00164 -0.00091 0.00064
-2.92 -0.59 0.87
t+30m -0.00076 -0.00224 0.00205
-2.10 -4.98 0.95
x(io) 32.1 33.6 22.1
Sum of all lags 0.00635 0.01716 0.03396
0.98 1.24 3.72
Total effect 0.01159 0.03127 0.06199
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Table 2.15 (continued)
Autoregressive Terms
1-7 0.04072 0.02363 0.01507 0.01399 0.01586 0.01051 0.01051
1.45 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.52 1.36 1.52
8-14 0.01084 0.01146 0.00891 0.00797 0.00655 0.00722 0.00745
3.41 2.40 2.96 1.31 1.52 1.75 1.48
15-21 0.00472 0.00642 0.00670 0.01027 0.00476 0.00406 0.00581
1.30 1.32 1.34 3.16 1.22 1.22 1.23
22-28 0.00508 0.00470 0.00426 0.00484 0.00341 0.00431 0.00919
1.29 1.24 1.25 1.44 1.44 1.39 1.94
29-30 0.00649 0.00719 Constant 0.00137
1.35 1.26 21.19
Seasonal terms
Trig terms I 2 3 4 5 6
Winter cos -0.00084 -0.00022 0.00061 -0.00006 0.00022 0.00001
-11.65 -5.48 9.04 -0.68 2.99 0.27
sin -0.00060 0.00064 -0.00004 0.00014 -0.00005 -0.00004
-7.86 7.06 -0.50 3.01 -0.75 -0.43
Summer cos -0.00087 -0.00005 0.00045 -0.00016 0.00009 -0.00008
-10.66 -1.45 6.64 -1.75 1.19 -2.13
sin -0.00036 0.00055 -0.00043 0.00034 0.00007 0.00004
-5.25 5.69 -5.74 8.45 1.11 0.41
Transition cos -0.00102 -0.00010 0.00075 -0.00019 -0.00008 -0.00012
-8.06 -1.39 6.01 -1.20 -0.55 -1.53
sin -0.00059 0.00071 -0.00040 0.00032 0.00019 0.00006
-4.59 4.44 -3.09 3.80 1.63 0.37
Dummies Tokyo US macro announcements
Winter 0.00069 0.00117 0.00480 0.00994 0.00321
1.55 2.05 2.77 3.35 1.30
Summer 0.00086 0.00117 0.00753 0.01139 0.00280
2.67 3.42 3.07 2.69 2.64
Transition 0.00041 0.00018 0.01541 0.00438 0.00217
1.25 0.55 1.04 1.45 1.05
Notes: See Table 2.13.
tion’ and ‘expected action’. Table 2.16 presents the results of an (not very successful) 
attempt to overcome this problem, by pooling all Fed signals together and analysing only 
the difference between unexpected action and inaction, just for these Fed signals and for 
Bbmeet. Even though these results may be not very robust, since both ‘unexpected 
inaction’ categories have less than 10 observations, they suggest that an ‘unexpected 
action’ does indeed have a larger impact on volatility than ‘unexpected inaction’. For 
both Fed and Bbmeet, the total increase in volatility is more than double for the former 
than for the latter.
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Table 2.16 Impact on volatility of unexpected rate changes and no changes
POLICY SIGNAL FED BUNDESBANK
Lag Bbmeet
Unexpected Change No change Change No change
t-15m 0.02556 -0.00411 0.00482 -0.00107
0.98 -1.55 0.77 -5.65
t-lOm 0.00754 -0.00317 0.00516 0.00101
0.67 -3.04 1.34 1.10
t-5m 0.01876 0.01906 0.00689 0.00081
1.19 1.24 1.60 0.65
t 0.01393 -0.00254 0.09813 0.05578
1.54 -1.46 1.46 1.40
t+5m 0.05344 0.00291 0.04301 0.02247
1.88 1.16 2.69 3.41
t+lOm -0.00535 0.02232 0.02306 0.00244
-2.54 1.10 1.99 0.59
t+15m 0.06686 0.06040 0.02580 -0.00066
1.54 1.57 2.11 -0.65
t+20m 0.03397 -0.00590 0.01040 0.00042
1.42 -1.52 1.65 0.25
t+25m 0.00996 0.00751 0.00020 0.00478
0.76 1.04 0.07 1.43
t+30m 0.03707 -0.00287 0.00536 0.01306
1.12 -1.56 1.31 1.00
XdO) 22.9 26.7 25.9 52.3
Sum of all lags 0.26173 0.09361 0.22282 0.09903
3.46 1.98 3.07 2.32
Total effect 0.47441 0.16926 0.40618 0.18008
Expected Fed Bbmeet Bbtues Bbwedn
t-15m -0.00061 -0.00033 0.00079 -0.00071
-0.76 -1.12 1.29 -2.22
t-lOm 0.00033 0.00405 0.00053 -0.00013
0.29 1.48 1.05 -0.26
t-5m -0.00033 0.00209 0.00256 0.00132
-0.37 1.43 1.12 0.97
t 0.00322 0.00392 -0.00001 0.00068
1.16 1.71 -0.02 1.13
t+5m -0.00145 0.00527 -0.00011 -0.00024
-2.82 1.52 -0.22 -0.45
t+lOm 0.00393 0.00175 -0.00053 0.00023
1.32 1.20 -1.57 0.52
t+15m 0.00191 0.00104 -0.00039 0.00031
1.21 0.72 -1.17 0.49
t+20m -0.00034 0.00488 0.00061 -0.00066
-0.66 1.20 1.02 -2.38
t+25m -0.00136 -0.00007 0.00010 0.00097
-2.46 -0.12 0.25 0.68
t+30m -0.00115 0.00015 0.00081 0.00074
-2.90 0.16 1.50 0.77
XdO) 25.1 14.3 11.1 14.8
Sum of all lags 0.00415 0.02274 0.00436 0.00252
0.86 3.21 1.62 0.95
Total effect 0.00762 0.04145 0.00800 0.00451
86 Chapter 2
Table 2.16 (continued)
Autoregressive Terms
1-7 0.04067 0.02354 0.01500 0.01396 0.01586 0.01044 0.01036
1.45 1.44 1.43 1.44 1.52 1.36 1.52
8-14 0.01078 0.01146 0.00891 0.00801 0.00652 0.00715 0.00747
3.44 2.40 2.96 1.32 1.52 1.75 1.48
15-21 0.00472 0.00645 0.00667 0.01023 0.00476 0.00399 0.00575
1.30 1.32 1.34 3.18 1.22 1.21 1.23
22-28 0.00509 0.00460 0.00428 0.00481 0.00336 0.00434 0.00907
1.29 1.24 1.26 1.44 1.44 1.39 1.94
29-30 0.00644 0.00727 Constant 0.00137
1.35 1.27 21.25
Seasonal terms
Trie terms 1 2 3 4 5 6
Winter cos -0.00084 -0.00023 0.00060 -0.00006 0.00022 0.00002
-11.61 -5.68 9.05 -0.72 3.08 0.32
sin -0.00061 0.00063 -0.00003 0.00014 -0.00004 -0.00004
-7.94 7.01 -0.46 3.07 -0.67 -0.49
Summer cos -0.00087 -0.00005 0.00044 -0.00015 0.00010 -0.00009
-10.65 -1.43 6.50 -1.67 1.28 -2.32
sin -0.00036 0.00054 -0.00043 0.00034 0.00006 0.00003
-5.23 5.59 -5.66 8.63 1.03 0.33
Transition cos -0.00102 -0.00010 0.00075 -0.00018 -0.00007 -0.00013
-8.09 -1.36 6.04 -1.14 -0.48 -1.70
sin -0.00059 0.00071 -0.00039 0.00032 0.00018 0.00005
-4.52 4.44 -3.02 3.82 1.57 0.30
Dummies Tokyo US macro announcements
Winter 0.00069 0.00116 0.00481 0.00998 0.00328
1.54 2.05 2.78 3.37 1.33
Summer 0.00086 0.00117 0.00753 0.01139 0.00280
2.68 3.43 3.07 2.69 2.63
Transition 0.00041 0.00018 0.01546 0.00439 0.00218
1.24 0.54 1.04 1.45 1.05
Notes: See Table 2.13.
2.4 Conclusions
The evidence provided in this chapter, based on high frequency data on the DEM/USD 
exchange rate, suggests that news about monetary policy have a strong impact on ex­
change rates. Large and significant changes in the exchange rate level and increases in its 
volatility were found to be associated with some specific information releases regarding 
US and German monetary policy. From the point of view of the foreign exchange
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market, the key indicators of the monetary policy stance were the Fed Funds rate for the 
US and the Lombard rate for Germany. Unexpected 1 percentage point increases in 
these rates were found to cause a statistically significant appreciation of the domestic 
currency of around 3% and 1.3%, respectively. Also, exchange rate volatility increased 
more than 100 times when the central banks released information regarding these key 
interest rates. Such large high frequency effects create the scope for significant capital 
gains or losses in holding currency. Changes in expectations about future monetary 
policy would appear to be one of the main factors (if not the main factor) driving ex­
change rates, even when no information from the central banks is being released.52
The effect of monetary policy news on the DEM/USD varies across time. The same 
piece of news might have a different impact in the exchange rate at different moments in 
time, in some cases even implying opposite reactions. One such case was found to be the 
reaction of the exchange rate to Bundesbank policy news during the ERM crisis, in the 
Summer of 1993. While in the rest of the sample unexpected increases in the German 
interest rates caused a DEM appreciation, during that period the effect of the same news 
was a DEM depreciation, most likely because the USD played the role of a safe haven 
during these troubled periods.
The exchange rate reaction was also found to differ according to the channel used to 
release the information to the market. For the Fed, news signalled through open market 
operations were found to have a smaller immediate impact on the exchange rate level, 
and were associated with smaller increases in volatility, than news announced through 
official statements, even though the long run effect in the level of the exchange rate is the 
same whatever the form used for signalling news. On the other side, the market reaction 
to Bundesbank’s news is much quicker than the reaction to the Fed’s news, probably 
because the signals from the Bundesbank are scheduled and the ones from the Fed are 
not, and because the Bundesbank relies more on official statements and less on market 
operations than the Fed. The impact on volatility was also found to be much smaller
52 This topic is not covered in this chapter, but some evidence supporting this hypothesis is provided in 
Chapter 3, where it is shown that the effect on the DEM/USD of some German macroeconomic data 
releases was higher when these releases were likely to influence policy decisions by the Bundesbank.
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(and not significant) when the policy signals contained only information that was ex­
pected.
If central banks are concerned with high volatility in the foreign exchange market, the 
results in this chapter suggest two possible solutions to reduce it. The first is to make 
more use of market operations to reveal information about monetary policy, instead of 
relying on official statements. However, the recent trend in many central banks (namely 
the Fed) has been in the other direction, i.e., more use of official statements. These 
moves are usually justified by the need to increase transparency and accountability in 
monetary policy. If these principles are thought to be sufficiently important to justify 
that official statements remain the main channel for monetary policy information revela­
tion, then the central bank may use a second solution to reduce exchange rate volatility. 
Since expected signals do not increase volatility significantly, this alternative implies 
providing markets with sufficient information such that the outcome of the monetary 
policy committees may be widely anticipated by market agents. However, this informa­
tion has to be sufficiently noisy such that each piece of information does not contain a 
significant amount of news.
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Appendix 2.A: Market Expectations 
2.A.1 Sources of the expectations data
FED
Discount (Discfed) and Fed Funds rate: the market expectation is the median of 
forecasts from a MMS International survey; the survey is conducted every Friday, and 
leading practitioners and academics are asked to forecast the Discount and Federal Funds 
interest rates for the end of the current and next two week reserve maintenance periods; 
for each Fed signal, the forecast for the end of the current period, made on the previous 
Friday was used.
BUNDESBANK
Discount (Discbb) and Lombard (Lonib) rate: the market expectation series were 
constructed from the information provided in the Financial Times’ ‘Currencies and 
Money Markets Report’ and ‘European stock markets - Frankfurt’ sections, on the day 
of the announcement; the FT’s description of market sentiment on the day before each 
council meeting was taken to be the market expectation; when this description was 
qualitative, it was transformed into a quantitative expectation according to the following 
criteria:
- amount of change: when not explicitly stated in the FT, it was assumed to be 25 
b.p. (the minimum change observed in the sample period);
- likelihood of rate changes: when the FT report denoted no consensus in the 
market, the expected rate change was adjusted as follows - if the market was split on the 
likelihood of change, the expected change was reduced by 50%; if only a few dealers 
expected change, or if most thought changes were possible but unlikely, the expected 
change was reduced by 80%.53
53 For example, if the report said ‘opinion was divided on whether the Bundesbank will cut rates’ it was 
assumed that the expected cut was of 25 b.p., but since opinion was divided it was reduced by 50%. 
Thus, the market expectation was taken to be of a cut of 12.5 b.p. on both the Discount and Lombard 
rates.
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Repo terms (fixed/variable-rate) (Fix): the market expectation was taken to be the one 
reported in the Financial Times’ ‘Currencies and Money Markets Report’ and ‘European 
stock markets - Frankfurt’ sections, on the day of the announcement (Tuesday or council 
meeting day).
Repo results (Repo rate): median of forecasts, MMS International survey; the survey is 
usually conducted on the Tuesday before the repo tender, after the tender terms have 
been announced; thus, this source of data is only relevant when the Wednesday an­
nouncement is a policy signal, i.e., for the case of variable-rate tenders. No expectations 
were available for the fixed rate tenders.
2.A.2 Rationality of the market expectations
Table 2.17 describes some of the properties of the ‘news’ series. Under rational expec­
tations, the forecast errors (i.e., the ‘news’) should be uncorrelated and have mean zero, 
and these properties do not seem to be violated by any of the series used. The mean is 
smaller than two standard deviations for all series. None of the sample autocorrelations 
up to four lags are significantly different from zero, either individually or jointly as 
described by the Ljung-Box Q statistic, thus suggesting that the series are white noise.
Another form of testing the rationality of expectations is by regressing the actual interest 
rate changes (xr) on the expectation about those changes (xet\
xt = a  + p  x \ + et 2.11
Under rational expectations, there should be no systematic bias, and thus the expected 
values for the parameters on equation 2.11 are a=0 and 0=1. The evidence on Table 
2.18 suggests that these restrictions are not violated for the Fed’s rates, nor for the 
Bundesbank’s Dischh and Lomb rates, but casts some doubt on the rationality of the 
expectations for the Fix and Repo series. Since in most of the sample period the trend in 
the Repo was downward, it seems that the market was systematically expecting that the 
Bundesbank would lower the Repo rate more than it actually did. This bias could either
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Table 2.17 Properties of the ‘news’ series
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FED BUNDESBANK
Discfed Funds Discbb Lomb Fix Repo
# signals 46 46 72 72 182 80
Mean 0.0163 0.0055 -0.0021 -0.0146 0.0275 0.0036
Std. deviation
of mean 0.0197 0.0198 0.0168 0.0157 0.0239 0.0022
Autocorrelations
1 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.10 0.00
2 0.15 0.08 -0.19 -0.02 -0.11 0.03
3 -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.09
4 0.00 0.08 -0.12 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04
(2 T 'a) 0.29 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.15 0.22
Ljung-Box Q-Statistics 
Q(l) 0.01 0.30 0.03 0.30 1.80 0.00
Q(2) 1.07 0.60 2.69 0.35 4.20 0.07
Q(3) 1.08 0.90 2.70 0.79 4.21 0.69
0(4) 1.08 1.24 3.83 0.86 4.22 0.81
Notes: The statistics in the table were computed using all the policy signals relevant for the variable in question; e.g., for the 
Discbb variable die signals used were all the Bundesbank council meeting signals. (2 T 5*) is an approximation for the critical 
value for rejecting the null that an individual autocorrelation coefficient is zero. The critical values for the Q statistics at the 5% 
significance level are 3.8,6.0,7.8 and 9.5, for 1 to 4 degrees of freedom, respectively.
be caused by non rationality in the market agents’ expectations formation process, or by 
poor quality of the expectations series used, that do not accurately reflect the market’s 
expectation. It is assumed throughout the chapter that the series used is a good measure 
of market expectations, but nevertheless the robustness of the results based on these 
series is put into question.
Table 2.18 Regression of actual on expected interest rate changes
Constant $ II Expected t:fi= l DW
FED
Discfed 0.018 0.91 0.821 -0.52 0.39 2.04
Funds 0.006 0.29 0.988 -0.04 0.42 2.15
BUNDESBANK
Discbb -0.016 -1.06 0.680 -0.97 0.18 2.16
Lomb -0.024 -1.46 0.717 -1.29 0.16 2.00
Fix 0.074 3.45 0.744 -3.10 0.47 1.67
Repo 0.005 2.28 1.062 0.66 0.89 1.99
Notes: Underlined entries denote rejection of the null at the 5% significance level.
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Further evidence supporting the rationality of the expectations series used may be found 
on Table 2.19. Under rational expectations the ‘news’ must be uncorrelated with any 
available information at the time of the expectations formation, including the expectation 
itself. The low correlation coefficients between the expectation and the news seem to 
support that restriction.
Table 2.19 Correlation coefficients between the actual, expected and ‘news’ on 
interest rate changes
FED BUNDESBANK
Correlations Discfed Funds Discbb Lomb Fix Repo
Expected/news -0.17 -0.01 -0.20 -0.12 -0.28 0.08
Expected/actual 0.63 0.65 0.48 0.45 0.71 0.95
News/actual 0.66 0.75 0.77 0.83 0.48 0.39
A different question is how well the markets predict central bank actions. The low R2 in 
Table 2.18 and the high correlation coefficients between actual changes and news (in 
Table 2.19), for most of the series, suggest that central banks have regularly deceived the 
market, at least during the sample period. According to the expectations series used, the 
market has correctly predicted (i.e., both the timing and the amount) only 1 out of 4 
Discfed and 2 out of 9 Funds changes. The picture is similar for the Bundesbank rate 
changes, with only 1 out 10 Discfed and 1 out of 8 Lomb rate changes being correctly 
predicted. The market seems to be able to better predict the Repo rate, since not only 
the correlation coefficient is higher but also the market had a higher proportion of 
correct predictions (12 out of 44).
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Appendix 2,B: Data
Exchange Rate Quotes
The exchange rate data were originally received as an irregularly spaced, continuous­
time set of DEM/USD quotations with time stamps, published on the screens of Reuters’ 
information system, for the period 1/1/92 to 31/12/94. The properties and limitations of 
this type of data are described in Goodhart (1989a), Muller et al. (1990) and Goodhart 
and O’Hara (1997). The data were then converted to an equally spaced, calendar time- 
series by imposing each five minute observation grid, taking the last quotation in a five 
minute period as effective. Weekends, defined as the period from 21:00 on Friday to 
21:00 on Sunday (GMT), were excluded because during that period quote activity is 
sparse and not significant (see Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997). Finally, the average of 
bid and ask quotations was taken as the basic quotation variable (qt).
Policy Signals
The official publications of the two central banks (Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report 
and Federal Reserve Bulletin) provided the basic information on the type of signals and 
their usual date (and sometimes time). Then, a data set consisting of reports on the 
Reuters Money Market Headline News screen, with the corresponding date and time 
stamp, provided by Olsen & Associates, was used to determine the exact date and time 
of the signal. It was assumed that the time of a policy signal was the time of its an­
nouncement on Reuters screens. The policy signals considered in the analysis (see 
Section 2.1 for details) were, for the Bundesbank:
- Bbmeet. the news conference or press release at the end of the council meetings;
- Bbtues: the announcement of the repo tender terms;
- Bbwedn: the announcement of the repo tender results; 
and for the Fed:
- Fedom: the daily open market operations, but only when some policy signalling 
might occur, mainly in the days after FOMC meetings;
- Fomcb: the end of FOMC meetings, in 1992 and 1993;
- Fomca: statements at the end of FOMC meetings, in 1994;
- Fedst: press releases announcing rate changes, not at the end of FOMC meetings.
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Table 2.20 provides a brief description of the policy signals, their usual date and time, 
and the number of observations in the sample. The full data set may be obtained from 
the author.
Table 2.20 Monetary policy signals
POLICY SIGNAL Day
(usual)
Local Time 
(approx.)
# o f  
signals
BUNDESBANK
Bbmeet Alternate Thursdays Midday 72
Bbtues Tuesday 9:00 am 115
Bbwedn Wednesday 10:00 am 93
FEDERAL RESERVE
Fedom Every day * 11:30 am 20
Fomcb 8 times a year Midday 16
Fomca 8 times a year Midday 8
Fedst Any 2
* the open market operations considered refer only to the days when some policy signalling might occur, mainly in the days after
FOMC meetings.
‘News ’ Events
A ‘news’ event is a policy signal with a non-zero information content. The ‘news’ 
content of policy signal of type i at period t, y?,:t is given by x?iit = xut - x \h where xut is the 
actual action and xeut is the measure of the market expectation regarding that action, as 
described in Appendix 2. A. Almost all the actions are expressed in terms of an interest rate 
change, the exception being the announcement by the Bundesbank of the repo tender terms, 
which was defined as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a fixed-rate repo is announced. 
Table 2.21 provides summary statistics for the news events included in the sample. The 
complete set of ‘news’ events may be obtained from the author. The definition of the vari­
ables is:
- Discfed. news on the Fed’s Discount rate;
- Funds: news on the Fed Funds rate;
- Discbb: news on the Bundesbank’s Discount rate;
- Lomb: news on the Bundesbank’s Lombard rate;
- Fix\ news on the repo tender terms announcement; a value of 1 means that a 
fixed-rate tender was announced when a variable-rate tender was expected; vice-versa
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for a value of -1;
- Repo: news on the Repo rate (on Bbwedn signals only).
Table 2.21 ‘News’ events - summary statistics
# o f news events 
Total joint Maximum Minimum Average
Average
absolute
news
FED
Discfed 4 2 0.5 -0.5 0.1875 0.43
Funds 10 2 0.25 -0.5 0.0253 0.28
BUNDESBANK
Discbb 30 25 0.5 -0.5 0.0075 0.19
Lomb 28 25 0.125 -0.5 -0.0375 0.15
Fix 19 7 1 -1 0.2632 1
Repo 29 0 0.08 -0.08 0.0100 0.03
NEWS EVENTS PER FED BUNDESBANK
TYPE OF POLICY SIGNAL Fedom 4 Bbmeet 35
Fomcb 0 Bbtues 10
Fomca 6 Bbwedn 29
Fedst 2
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Figure 2.1\ Plots of interest rate news and 1 h DEM/USD returns (full sample)
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Figure 2.2: Plots of interest rate news and 1 h DEM/USD returns (sub samples)
0.5 -r
- 0.02
0.5 T
FED FUNDS 
(open market operations)
-0.5 -L
BB DISCOUNT 0.5 x  
(normal)
- 0.02
♦  ♦
-0.5 -L
0.5 -r
I-----H
- 0.02
BB LOMBARD 
(normal)
-0.5 -L ♦  ♦  ♦
0.02
0 . 1 0  "T
-0.008 ♦  ♦  ♦  ♦
- 0 .1 0  -L
♦  ♦  ♦
0.008
BB REPO 
(normal)
FED FUNDS 
(statements)
♦  ♦ ♦  ♦
-0.02 0.02
-0.5 -
0.5 -r ♦
♦ ♦
♦1 1 1 1 ♦
-0.02 0.02
♦
a. BB DISCOUNT♦ (erm)
-0.5 -
BB LOMBARD 0.5 n
(erm)
♦
-0.02 0.02♦
♦  -0.5 -
0.10 n BB REPO
(erm)
♦  .
♦
-0.008 * 0.008
♦
-0.10 -
Notes: See Figure 2.1.
t-s
ta
tis
tic
 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
98 Chapter 2
Figure 2.3: Time pattern of the exchange rate reaction 
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Figure 2.4\ Impact of policy signals on volatility across time
0.07  
0.05 |  
0.03 -  
0.01 
- 0.01
FEDST
M l o  "ft" 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
0.07 T FEDMA
0.05 -
0.03 --
0.01
30 60 75 90 105 120
-0.01 i
0.07 j  
0.05 -  
0.03  
0.01 
- 0.01
BBMEET
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.01
- 0.01
FEDMB
15 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
15 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
0.07  
0.05 
0.03 
0.01 
- 0.01
0.07 j  
0.05 -  
0.03  
0.01 
- 0.01
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.01
- 0.01
FEDOM
X
15 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
BBTUES
15 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
BBWEDN
15 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
Notes: The horizontal axis measures the time relative to the signal release, in minutes. The 
vertical axis measures the change in volatility at each interval.
100 Chapter 2
Figure 2.5: Impact of unexpected policy signals on volatility across time
0.07 j  
0.05 -  
0.03  
0.01 
- 0.01
I a
FEDMT
IS 0 IS 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.01
- 0.01
FEDOM
ufF
0.07 T BBMEET
0.05 -
0.03 -
0.01 -
30 60 75 90 105 120
- 0.01 1
0.05 - 
0.03 - 
0.01 - -  
- 0.01
0 IS 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
BBTUES
0.07 j  
0.05 -- 
0.03 - 
0.01 
- 0.01
15 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
BBWEDN
A ,B„
15 0 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120
Notes: See Figure 2.4.
Reaction o f exchange rates to monetary policy signals
Figure 2.6: Impact of expected policy signals on volatility across time
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Figure 2 .7: Impact of action and inaction signals on volatility across time
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Macroeconomic ‘News’ 
on High Frequency Exchange Rate 
Behaviour
3.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the high-frequency reaction of the DEM/USD exchange rate to 
macroeconomic information emanating from Germany and the US. Specifically, we utili­
se exchange rate data covering the period 1/1/92 to 31/12/94, sampled at a five minute 
frequency, to investigate how the major monthly macroeconomic releases from these two 
countries impact the DEM/USD. The information contained in announcements over this 
three year period is extracted via a set of market expectation series supplied by Money 
Market Services International (MMS). Our analysis improves on previous work in this 
area in two main respects. First, our study is conducted using very high-frequency data, 
whereas most earlier work has used exchange rate data sampled at a frequency of a 
number of hours or more. This allows us to construct a very precise characterisation of 
the reaction of the exchange rate to macroeconomic information. Second, this is, to our 
knowledge, the first study which includes German data releases. Most work in this area 
has focused on US (and to a lesser extent Japanese) macroeconomic announcements.
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The major issue under examination is whether one can trace systematic effects of eco­
nomic ‘news’ on the evolution of the exchange rate. The direction in which ‘news’ will 
move the exchange rate is, however, a priori uncertain. It will depend on the market’s 
belief about both the model of exchange rate determination and the manner in which 
monetary authorities will respond to new information. Take an unexpected increase in 
US real activity, for example. A Monetarist model of exchange rate determination would 
imply that the dollar should appreciate as domestic money demand rises, whilst a 
Keynesian model would predict the opposite due to increased import demand by US 
citizens. These two mechanisms do not, however, factor in the possibility of a reaction 
to ‘news’ by the US monetary authority. Assuming the Fed to have a preference for low 
inflation, they should raise short term interest rates in order to cool the inflationary 
pressures in the economy, implying US dollar appreciation. We label this latter mecha­
nism the ‘reaction function’ effect. Which of the above mechanisms pertain to the 
determination of the DEM/USD and which dominates will determine the sign of the 
exchange rate response to ‘news’.1
The impact of macroeconomic ‘news’ on exchange rates has previously been the subject 
of extensive research, but most of the work has concentrated solely on announcements of 
US economic data. Research based on several USD exchange rates sampled at a daily 
frequency (Hardouvelis, 1988, Aggarwal and Schirm, 1992, Harris and Zabka, 1995, 
Edison, 1997) finds significant positive relationships between dollar appreciation and US 
Ml and non-farm employment (and in some cases also the merchandise trade balance) 
news, but no impact from any other macroeconomic news. Other papers utilising spot 
quotations from the opening and closing of the main regional foreign exchange (FX) 
markets (these being North America, the Pacific, Tokyo and Europe), reach similar 
conclusions. Hakkio and Pearce (1985), Ito and Roley (1987), Hogan, Melvin, and 
Roberts (1991) and Hogan and Melvin (1994) demonstrate that USD exchange rates 
respond quite rapidly to US money supply and trade balance surprises, but not to other 
types of US news. Ito and Roley (1987) also find that the JPY/USD does not respond to
1 See Hofiman and Schlagenhauf (1985) for a more complete treatment of the alternative theories of 
exchange rate determination and an empirical test of these theories.
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macroeconomic news from Japan. Hence, a general result from these studies is that few 
economic announcements have systematic impacts on exchange rates when rates are 
sampled at relatively coarse frequencies. We conjecture that other announcements may 
have discernible impacts on exchange rates when examined in a higher frequency setting, 
with the disappearance of the effects at lower frequencies due to their being drowned in 
subsequent exchange rate fluctuations. By examining the impact of US and German 
news on exchange rate changes measured over different time horizons (from 5 minutes to 
12 hours post-announcement), we are able to test this conjecture.2
We extend our analysis by also considering a number of other issues. Following Hakkio 
and Pearce (1985) we examine the efficiency of the intra-day FX market via the tradi­
tional equation linking exchange rate changes to anticipated and unanticipated macro- 
economic data. We also examine the temporal stability of our results, since most of the 
previous literature finds that there are significant structural breaks in the response of 
exchange rates to news (usually associated with shifts in the Fed’s policy).
Lastly, the use of German announcement data allows us to address two further interes­
ting questions. This is due to the fact that, unlike US announcements, German releases 
do not have pre-set and pre-advertised release dates and times. Hence first we can 
examine how pre-scheduling of announcements affects the impact of ‘news’ on the 
DEM/USD by comparing the dynamic responses to US and German data. A hypothesis 
relevant here is that the response to scheduled announcements is completed more quickly 
than that associated with a non-scheduled release. Using the German data we can also 
examine how the proximity of the announcement to other events, specifically the bi­
weekly Bundesbank council meeting, affects the reaction of the exchange rate. We 
hypothesise that announcements which occur closer to Bundesbank council meetings
2 Previous research on the reaction of exchange rate volatility to economic announcements (Ederington 
and Lee, 1993, Payne, 1996, and the study described in Chapter 2 of this thesis) has shown that large 
increases in volatility are apparent at the times of these announcements, but this lasts only a few' 
minutes. Using high frequency data from the foreign currency futures market, Ederington and Lee 
(1995) also demonstrate that transaction prices react very swiftly (i.e., within a couple of minutes) to the 
announcement of US economic data. This evidence suggests that the impact of macroeconomic announce­
ments may be identified best using exchange rate returns over periods of a few minutes.
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have a larger exchange rate impact due to the belief that they will carry more weight in 
Bundesbank policy deliberations.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 describes our data and methodo­
logy. We then turn to a discussion of our empirical findings, first for US news, Section 
3.3, and then German news, Section 3.4. We have a Section reporting some compara­
tive results, Section 3.5, and the chapter closes with some concluding remarks in Section 
3.6.
3.2 Data and Methodology
3.2.1 The data
Our exchange rate data covers the period 1/1/92-31/12/94. The data were originally 
received as an irregularly spaced, continuous-time set of DEM/USD quotations, pu­
blished on the screens of Reuters’ information system. We then converted the data to an 
equally spaced, calendar time-series by imposing a five minute observation grid, taking 
the last quotation in a five minute period as effective. Finally, the average of bid and ask 
quotations was taken as our basic quotation variable.
The other portion of our data set consists of US and German macroeconomic an­
nouncements covering the same period, plus a market expectation series for each type of 
announcement obtained from MMS.3 The US macroeconomic announcements object of 
our ‘news’ analysis are the Employment Report, the Trade Report, and the Producer 
Price Index (PPI), Consumer Price Index (CPI), Retail Sales, Durable Goods Orders, 
Consumer Confidence, Leading Indicators, the NAPM survey, and the Industrial Pro-
3 To determine the time of the German announcements, a data set consisting of news headlines 
published on the screens of Reuters’ information systems, with the corresponding date and time stamp, 
was also used.
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duction and Capacity Utilisation announcements. For Germany, the series used are the 
CPI, Industrial Output, Money (M3), Industrial Orders, PPI, Retail Sales, the Trade 
Balance, Unemployment rate and the Wholesale Price Index (WPI). Appendix 3.A 
provides a list of the definitions of these announcements along with their usual release 
timing and the identifiers assigned to each series. Since all of these announcements are 
monthly, for each series we have a maximum of 36 observations, although irregularity in 
some of the releases and missing expectations data reduce the number of available 
observations in some cases (see Appendix 3.A).
The MMS expectations we employ are calculated as the median from a survey of fore­
casts made by leading practitioners and academics. The surveys cover between 30 and 
40 respondents and are conducted on the Friday immediately preceding each announce­
ment.4 These data allow us to separate the series relevant to each type of announcement 
into an unexpected and expected portion. In fine with efficient markets theory, only the 
unexpected part of an announcement should have any impact on the DEM/USD, the 
expected portion having already been impounded into quotations. The adequacy of the 
MMS expectations series is an issue which has been examined in previous work. Utili­
sing a simple test of rational expectations our analysis of these data suggested that, 
overall, the MMS expectations series are unbiased.5 Some indications of systematic 
biases in expectations were present but these were relatively scarce. Hence, whilst other 
authors have cast doubt on the rationality of the MMS expectations series (notably 
Aggarwal, Mohanty, and Song, 1995) our pre-testing supports the use of these data, in 
line with the results of Pearce and Roley (1985).
4 This implies that there is at most a seven day lag between the survey and corresponding announce­
ment. Note that this is true for both the scheduled US announcements and the unscheduled German 
releases.
5 In order to save space the tests of rational expectations are omitted. The testing methodology was, in 
most cases, a simple regression of forecasts on realised values. For those series where the forecasts and 
announced data proved to be 1(1), a cointegrating representation was estimated via the Engle-Granger 
two-step procedure. Results are available from the authors upon request.
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3.2.2 Methodology
Define qt to be our 5 minute quotation series for the DEM/USD. Define xut to be the 
actual announced value for series i at moment t, xei>t to be the correspondent expected 
value from the MMS data, and xniit = xIit - xeiit the unexpected part of the announcement. 
The basic equation which underlies most of our empirical analysis, equation 3.1, is 
derived from the REEM (rational expectations efficient markets hypothesis),
where R i,t+k is defined as q t+k - q t  and e iit is an error term. Equation 3.1 relates the change 
in the DEM/USD in the k  minutes immediately following an announcement to the unex­
pected portion of that announcement (the ‘news’), as implied by the structural exchange 
rate model in ‘news’ form described in Chapter 1, subsection 1.1.1. Impacts from the 
‘news’ contained in announcements on the evolution of the DEM/USD will show up as 
significant coefficients on the unexpected portion of the release.
To test for the existence of systematic effects of each type of ‘news’ on the DEM/USD, 
we estimate equation 3.1 for each series /, and test the difference of p from zero.6 Note 
that, as argued in Section 3.1, the signs of the coefficients are a priori uncertain, depen­
ding on which of the fundamental or reaction function responses dominates for a given 
release. We employ the return in the fifteen minutes immediately post-announcement as 
the dependent variable (i.e., we took &=15m), the fifteen minute window chosen with 
reference to earlier studies (Ederington and Lee, 1993 and 1995, and Payne, 1996) which 
suggest that the major impacts on both prices and volatility occur within a fifteen minute 
span post-announcement. These tests are described in subsections 3.3.1 and 3.4.1.
Note that estimations of the above equation are not strict time-series regressions as the 
observations are not temporally consecutive. An observation for a given series is added
6 All the tests in this chapter were computed using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors for the 
OLS estimates, as in White (1980). In most cases the effect of this adjustment was very marginal and in 
no case was the qualitative nature of the results altered.
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at every point when a new release of data occurs and the associated return is then cons­
tructed. This implies that, as we focus on monthly macroeconomic announcements 
observed over a three year period, our estimations of equation 3.1 will be based on at 
most 36 observations of a given US or German macroeconomic release. Furthermore, in 
order to validate the specification of equation 3.1 we also performed an explicit test of 
market efficiency, by estimating an unrestricted version that equation, which included a 
constant term and the expected part of the announcement, xei)t, as regressor. Departures 
from efficiency were very slight for both the US and German releases and hence, in order 
to save space, the results are omitted.7
Our next estimations concern the persistence of the impact from announcements on the 
DEM/USD. If the ‘news’ contained in these macroeconomic data is considered 
‘fundamental’ for the determination of the DEM/USD exchange rate then there should 
not only be a significant impact in the fifteen minutes post-release, but also, for example, 
in the twelve hours immediately after announcements. This is tested in subsections 3.3.2 
and 3.4.2 by varying the window over which the return variable is calculated, i.e., esti­
mating equations similar to equation 3.2, but with k assuming values from 5 minutes to 
12 hours.
In the exercises above, we have assumed that the response to macroeconomic ‘news’ is 
invariant over our sample. In subsections 3.3.3 and 3.4.3 we test this hypothesis expli­
citly. To this end we employ three dummy variables: the first taking the value unity only 
in the first year of our sample and zero otherwise, the second being unity in the second 
year of the sample and zero everywhere else and the final dummy taking the value unity 
in the last sample year only. These dummies were then interacted with the forecast error 
series, giving three regressors in the basic ‘news’ impact regressions, x92niit, x93niit and 
x94nitt. Hence, our structural stability test consisted of the estimation of equation 3.2 for
7 The market efficiency tests performed are similar to those described in Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.4, 
which are based on equation 2.2. The results for these tests are available from the authors upon request. 
We further examined whether there was any systematic impact of each announcement on the exchange 
rate in the minutes before the official announcement time. The results derived were largely insignificant, 
implying a lack of information leakage and validating our use of the Reuters reporting time as the time 
when German announcements hit the market.
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each series /,
=&  + A  x9Ki + A  x94h +«■,., 3.2
Significant differences in the estimated coefficients from this regression will indicate that 
the exchange rate response to ‘news’ is not invariant across our sample. This is formally 
tested by computing a Wald statistic that has a %2(2) distribution under the null hypothe­
sis lh=P3=p4-
3.3 Analysis of US Macroeconomic Announcements
In this section we present the results from testing the impact of US data releases on the 
DEM/USD rate. As detailed in subsection 3.2.1, our analysis concentrates on the 
following monthly US data: the statistics contained in the Employment Report (Payroll 
Employment and Unemployment rate), and the Mercantile Trade Report (Trade Ba­
lance), and the figures for PPI, CPI, Retail Sales, Durable Goods, Consumer Confidence, 
Leading Indicators, the NAPM survey and the Industrial Production/Capacity Utilisation 
announcement.8
3.3.1 The impact of ‘news’
The first question we address in our empirical analysis of the US data is do markets react 
systematically to good (and bad) news about the state of the economy? Given the list of 
announcements above, one would expect the coefficients on the forecast error series for 
all real activity indicators to have the same sign aside from that on the unemployment
8 Note that in our empirical analysis of individual announcements we can decompose the Employment 
Report responses into the effects due to its two principal components, the Unemployment rate and 
Payroll employment via their forecast errors. For the analysis of this pair of announcements, and for the 
simultaneously released Industrial Production and Capacity Utilisation figures, we use a multiple 
regression version of equation 3.1.
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series. The actual sign which the coefficients take will depend on which of the funda­
mental or reaction effects outlined in Section 3.1 dominate. A priori, the signs of the 
price indices and their relationship with those of the real indicators is unknown. The 
results from estimations of equation 3.1 are given in Table 3.1.9
Table 3.1 The impact of US announcements on DEM/USD returns
Series Coefficient T-stat Scaled
Payroll Employment 0.00004 5.77 0.44 0.00310
Durable Goods 0.00090 5.39 0.44 0.00170
NAPM 0.00087 4.94 0.35 0.00140
Retail Sales 0.00385 3.48 0.23 0.00160
Trade Balance 0.00110 3.41 0.24 0.00130
Consumer Confidence 0.00030 2.74 0.20 0.00130
Unemployment rate -0.00730 -1.77 0.44 -0.00100
CPI 0.00450 1.48 0.06 0.00046
PPI 0.00290 1.29 0.04 0.00057
Industrial Production 0.00280 0.76 0.03 0.00037
Capacity Utilization 0.00046 0.28 0.03 0.00010
Leading Indicators 0.00060 0.25 0.01 0.00007
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation 3.1. Each announcement regression is based on a sample of at most 36 forecast 
errors and associated exchange rate changes, covering the period 1/1/92 to 31/12/94. The second column displays the estimated 
coefficients on the forecast error series. T-values relating to the hypothesis that the coefficients are zero are given in third column.
The critical values for the t-values are 2.04 at 3% and 1.70 at 10%. The final column displays the product of the coefficient with 
the average absolute forecast error.
A first point to note is that the coefficients on all indicators have the sign predicted by 
the reaction function response to news. Unexpected Retail Sales growth, for example, 
entails an appreciation in the dollar whereas unexpected Unemployment shocks have the 
opposite effect. The coefficients on announcements of real activity also conform with a 
Monetarist model of exchange rates. However, there is marginal evidence that price 
shocks tend to cause dollar appreciations also, an effect which is inconsistent with the 
Monetarist model. Hence our preferred interpretation of these results is that the response 
of exchange rates to macroeconomic ‘news’ is indicative of expected Federal Reserve 
reactions in domestic money markets.
9 The results presented here and throughout the chapter are based on separate estimations of equation 
3.1 for each announcement, except for those mentioned in the previous footnote. We also estimated a 
multiple regression version of equation 3.1 which yielded the ‘news’ impacts for all US or German 
announcements simultaneously. The results from the multiple regression formulation were qualitatively 
and quantitatively very similar to those presented here.
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Moving to the inference on these coefficients, the 7-values demonstrate that most are 
significant at, at least, 10%. Exceptions to this are the coefficients associated with PPI, 
CPI, Leading Indicators, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilisation figures. Whilst 
one might expect these results for the final three of this group, due to their being fairly 
unimportant indicators, the lack of impact from the price series is a notable result.10 In 
the final column of Table 3.1 we give a common scale to the results by forming the 
product of the estimated coefficient and the average absolute forecast error. These 
figures yield a ranking of announcements, in terms of the mean impact on the 
DEMAJSD, as follows. The Payroll Employment data is clearly most influential, entai­
ling in excess of a 30 b.p. revision on average. There is then a group of indicators, 
comprising the Unemployment Rate, Trade Balance, Retail Sales, Durable Goods, 
Consumer Confidence and the NAPM survey, which give, on average, at least a 10 b.p. 
impulse to the DEM/USD. A low impact group of indicators includes the PPI, CPI, 
Leading Indicators, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilisation. The dominance of 
the Employment Report statistics links with the comments in Harris and Zabka (1995) 
who expound the view that they are regarded as the key indicator of US performance by 
the markets. Also, the strong influence of the Trade Balance on exchange rates is 
unsurprising.
3.3.2 How important is this 4news’ in the longer run?
In this subsection we test the persistence of the effect of ‘news’ on the exchange rate by 
examining the impact of the unanticipated information on exchange rate changes mea­
sured over intervals of various length from the announcement instant. Table 3.2 presents 
the results from estimation of equation 3.1 using returns from 5 minutes to 12 hours, 
while Figure 3.1 plots the average of the scaled impact of the ‘news’ effects, and Figure
3.2 the average value for the t-statistic, over the different post-announcement horizons.
10 Closer examination of the PPI data reveals that a single observation, associated with the release of 
the September 1994 figure, greatly influences the results. Removal of this observation yields a regression 
coefficient on PPI forecast errors of 0.0044 with a 7-value of 2.20. Hence, the earlier assertion, that the 
exchange rate reaction to the price series is inconsistent with a Monetarist model, is strengthened.
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Table 3.2 The persistence of the effect of US ‘news’ on the DEM/USD
Series 5m 15m 30m 45m lh 1.5h 2h 2.5h 3h 6h 12h
Consumer Conf 0.8 2.9 2.7 2.9 3.6 3.4 4.2 4.1 4.1 3.1 4.4
CPI 29.0 45.0 -16.0 -24.0 -8.8 -20.0 -51.0 -66.0 -58.0 32.0 28.0
Capacity Util 1.6 4.6 2.8 16.0 11.0 -2.1 -19.0 -24.0 -21.0 -30.0 -12.0
Durable Goods 6.5 9.1 8.3 7.5 7.7 8.9 5.3 4.3 6.8 4.3 6.0
Industrial Prod 5.8 29.0 -2.1 -18.0 -14.7 -1.5 -2.3 34.0 43.0 123.5 178.3
Leading Indie 24.0 5.8 4.9 -4.8 51.0 15.0 2.0 100.0 127.0 59.7 135.0
NAPM 4.4 8.7 8.7 5.6 8.0 4.8 2.5 -0.6 2.9 1.2 0.8
Payroll Emp 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
PPI 4.2 29M 21.0 12.0 21.0 -4.3 -22.0 -32.0 -36.0 -29.0 -8.8
Retail Sales 11.0 39.0 28.0 22.0 22.0 24.0 24.0 33.0 21.0 10.0 34.0
Trade Balance 7.8 11.0 9.7 12.0 14.0 12.0 13.0 4.8 5.5 1.8 -2.2
Unemployment -26.0 -73.0 -85.0 -57.0 -58.0 -27.0 -10.0 29.0 12.0 -1.0 -30.0
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation 3.1 for differing post-announcement return intervals. Each announcement regres­
sion is based on a sample of at most 36 forecast errors and associated exchange rate changes, covering the period 1/1/92 to 
31/12/94. Each cell gives the slope coefficient, multiplied by 104, from a linear regression of the return over the period displayed 
in the first row of the given column on the forecast errors from the series in the first cell of the given row. Coefficients in italics 
underlined are significantly different from zero at a 5% level.
As Table 3.2 demonstrates, the general picture that emerges is that the impact of these 
macroeconomic releases on the DEM/USD is a very short run phenomenon. Examining 
first the group of seven announcements which were found to be fairly influential in the 
previous subsection,11 the following results emerge. An encouraging result is that of the 
77 regressions over differing horizons, more or less all yield a correctly signed coefficient 
(only 4 of the 77 coefficients are ‘wrongly’ signed).12 The pattern of significance, 
however, is not strong. In general the impacts are significant only until around 2 hours 
after release, after which, it seems, the effect of unanticipated macroeconomic informa­
tion is drowned in the subsequent random fluctuations of the exchange rate. The only 
exceptions to this picture are the patterns for the Payroll Employment and Consumer 
Confidence figures. These retain significance until the 12 hour horizon, confirming the 
earlier results and, with regard to the former, in line with the earlier remarks that these 
figures are by far the most influential in the market.
The persistence patterns associated with the less important announcements are, unsur­
11 These being the Employment Report statistics, and the Trade Balance, Retail Sales, Consumer 
Confidence, Durable Goods and NAPM figures.
12 By ‘correctly’ signed we mean that the signs of the coefficients agree with those from Table 3.1 and 
our inference that exchange rates follow a ‘reaction fimction’ response to ‘news’.
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prisingly, even less impressive. Only 29 of the 55 estimated coefficients are correctly 
signed and there is no consistent impact of ‘news’ on returns from any of the individual 
announcements.
Hence our results suggest that, aside from the Payroll Employment and Consumer 
Confidence figures, one can trace very little long-term effect of ‘news’ on quotations. 
This indicates that the very short-term reaction to ‘news’ is drowned very rapidly in 
subsequent ‘noise’.
3.3.3 Structural stability
Finally we perform the structural stability tests described in subsection 3.2.2. In exami­
ning these results, presented in Table 3.3, we again split the announcements into two 
groups, the first consisting of those series with significant results from the basic ‘news’ 
regression and the second containing all other series. With regard to the first group, all 
coefficients are of the sign implied by the reaction function response to news, in line with 
the results of Table 3.1. A regularity in the results, excepting the Unemployment rate 
and Consumer Confidence coefficients, is that the absolute value and significance of the 
coefficients declines over the three years, suggesting a greater impact of these news 
variables in 1992 relative to 1994. This diminution of the size of the coefficients is 
significant for the Retail Sales and Trade data and especially marked for the Durable 
Goods news. A possible explanation for this is the fact that global FX markets were far 
more turbulent in 1992, perhaps leading to greater emphasis being placed on macro- 
economic announcements than in the relatively quiet times of 1994. Overall, for these 
six announcements there are strong patterns in significance and sign which confirm their, 
at least short-term, importance in FX markets.
The picture for the latter group is quite different. Only the coefficients associated with 
the CPI figures are all of the sign predicted by the reaction function response. Results 
for the Leading Indicators, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilisation news, in 
particular, are very erratic. One point to note is the correct sign and significance of the
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PPI news in 1992 and 1993, with coefficients that are significantly greater than their 
1994 counterpart (see also footnote 10). Hence, in line with our earlier results, there is 
robust evidence that news associated with the Unemployment rate, Payroll Employment, 
Trade Balance, Retail Sales, Durable Goods, Consumer Confidence and the NAPM 
survey have a strong short-term impact on the DEM/USD spot rate. The direction of 
these impacts corresponds to a ‘reaction function’ response to ‘news’.
Table 3.3 Structural stability tests - US announcements
Series 1992 1993 1994 3?P)
Consumer Confidence 0.00025 0.00052 0.00005 14.02
1.01 4.71 0.91
Durable Goods 0.00144 0.00095 0.00019 21.87
5.32 4.64 1.47
NAPM 0.00103 0.00071 0.00034 2.26
5.49 2.08 0.73
Payroll Employment 0.00005 0.00003 0.00002 3.88
5.49 3.8 2.12
Retail Sales 0.00737 0.00327 0.00303 8.96
1.68 1.72 4.19
Trade Balance 0.00221 0.00129 0.00020 7.62
3.86 3.75 0.43
Unemployment rate -0.00939 -0.00371 -0.00720 0.45
-1.40 -0.67 -1.18
CPI 0.00855 0.00145 0.00494 1.37
1.01 0.58 2.02
Capacity Utilisation -0.00674 0.00150 -0.01100 6.45
-1.07 1.81 -1.96
Industrial Production 0.02075 -0.00423 0.00897 12.31
2.34 -3.05 1.56
Leading Indicators -0.00314 0.00663 -0.00469 15.88
-1.07 3.61 -1.79
PPI 0.00960 0.00593 -0.00182 5.10
1.97 2.67 -0.55
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation 3.2. Each announcement regression is based on a sample of at most 36 forecast 
errors and associated exchange rate changes, covering the period 1/1/92 to 31/12/94. The columns with number headings give the 
coefficients on the series created from interacting the forecast error series with that year’s dummy. T-values relevant to the test 
that the coefficient on the forecast error is zero in a given year are given in italics. The final column gives a Chi-squared test sta­
tistic relevant to the hypothesis that the regression slope is identical in each of the three sample years. The Chi-squared statistic has 
two degrees of freedom and a 5% critical value of S.99. Chi-square values in italics underlined denote the null is rejected at the 
5% level.
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3.4 Analysis of German Macroeconomic Announcements
In this section we present the results obtained for the German macroeconomic an­
nouncements. Our analysis concentrates on the following monthly German macro- 
economic series: CPI, Industrial Production, M3, Manufacturing Orders, PPI, Retail 
Sales, Trade Balance, Unemployment, and WPI.
3.4.1 The impact of ‘ news’
The results from estimations of equation 3.1 for the German announcements are given in 
Table 3.4. Note that a positive coefficient in these regressions implies that a positive 
surprise in the announcement is associated with a depreciation of the DEM (i.e., the 
USD appreciates). Of the 9 series analysed, only 3 (Unemployment, Industrial Produc­
tion and CPI) have a significant impact at the 10% level. The R2 is small in all the 
regressions, including those with significant coefficients. These results suggest that 
German macroeconomic announcements have low explanatory power for exchange rate 
changes in the 15 minutes after their release.
Table 3.4 The impact of German announcements on DEM/USD returns
Series Coefficient T-stat R2 Scaled
Unemployment -0.00003 -3.06 0.16 -0.00029
Industrial Production -0.00023 -2.07 0.05 -0.00034
CPI 0.00261 2.00 0.08 0.00020
Retail Sales -0.00006 -1.35 0.01 -0.00018
Manufacturing Orders 0.00006 1.15 0.01 0.00010
PPI -0.00113 -0.81 -0.08 -0.00014
M3 -0.00017 -0.75 -0.19 -0.00022
Trade Balance -0.00004 -0.41 0.01 -0.00008
WPI 0.00017 0.35 -0.01 0.00005
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation 3.1. Each announcement regression is based on a sample of at most 36 forecast 
errors and associated exchange rate changes, covering the period 1/1/92 to 31/12/94. The second column displays the estimated 
coefficients on the forecast error series. T-values relating to the hypothesis that the coefficients are zero are given in the third co­
lumn. The critical values for the t-values are 2.04 at 5% and 1.70 at 10%. The final column displays the product of the coefficient 
with the average absolute forecast error.
Effects o f macroeconomic ‘news ’ on exchange rates 117
As in the previous analysis of US data, in the final column of Table 3.4 we give a com­
mon scale to the results by forming the product of the estimated coefficient and the 
average absolute forecast error. These figures show that Industrial Production and 
Unemployment are the series causing the largest response (each announcement entails a 
3 b.p. revision, on average), followed by M3, CPI and Retail Sales (which entail a 2 b.p. 
revision, on average). Comparison with the relevant figures from the US results indi­
cates that, at this point, it seems that the effects of German ‘news’ on DEM/USD evolu­
tion is very slight.
The impact o f 'news ’ and Bundesbank council meetings
Previous work on the reaction of DEM/USD exchange rate volatility to central bank 
actions, described in Chapter 2, has shown that the DEM/USD exchange rate is very 
sensitive to statements issued after Bundesbank council meetings. These results suggest 
the possibility that Bundesbank decisions, and expectations about those decisions, are the 
key German factor driving the DEM/USD exchange rate. If this is true, then the impor­
tance of German macroeconomic announcements should be a function of the extent to 
which they can influence the outcome of the Bundesbank council meetings. Our hypo­
thesis is that this is a function of the period of time between the release and the meeting: 
if an announcement is made just after a Bundesbank council meeting (long before the 
next) the markets will not pay much attention to it; the Bundesbank will not act on that 
information for two weeks,13 and during that period new information may arrive that 
could be more relevant for their decision.
13 The Bundesbank meets every other Thursday, with some exceptions: it did not meet over the 
Christmas or Easter holidays or at the beginning of August. Hence there was a 3 or 4 week interval 
between meetings at those times. Also, on the 4 times when the Thursday was a public holiday, the 
meeting was held on the Wednesday (3 times), or the Friday (once). As such, there is a weekly regula­
rity to Bundesbank meetings. The macroeconomic data are announced monthly, but there is no precise 
monthly regularity to these announcements. The combination of these two facts implies that for a 
particular series, the proximity to the next Bundesbank meeting varies considerably across announce­
ments. Overall the average number of days to the next Bundesbank meeting is 7.9, with a standard 
deviation of 5.7, and these results hold roughly for each individual series. Note that in order not to have 
a number of days to the next announcement equal to zero, we included both the day of the announce­
ment and the day of the meeting in the difference. Thus a figure of 1 means the announcement occurred 
on the day of a Bundesbank meeting, and each meeting is 15 days before the next.
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This hypothesis implies that an announcement will be more important the closer it is to 
the next Bundesbank council meeting, so we weighted our observations according to 
this. The test consisted of running regressions similar to the ones used in Table 3.4 but 
with each observation weighted by the inverse of the number of days to the next meeting, 
i.e., we ran cross-section regressions of the form
r , ,H t  = 5  z”, + e u , 3.3
where rt= Rt /d, = x?j/d, and d  is the number of days to the next Bundesbank council
meeting (including the day of the announcement).
The results for these regressions, presented in Table 3.5, support our hypothesis, since 
there is an increase in the significance of the coefficient on ‘news’ (and in the R2) for 
most of the announcements (the only exceptions being WPI and Manufacturing Orders). 
When the proximity to Bundesbank council meetings is considered, 6 of our 9 series 
have coefficients significant at the 10% level. The scaled impact is, on average, doubled 
and at least for M3, Unemployment, Industrial Production and PPI, the R2 is relatively 
high. These results suggest that, in contrast to those in Table 3.4, the German macro- 
economic announcements may indeed have an important impact on the behaviour of the 
exchange rate, at least over the short term.
Table 3.5 The impact of German announcements on DEM/USD returns
weighted by proximity to the next Bundesbank council meeting
Series Coefficient T-stat R2 Scaled
M3 -0.00046 -5.02 0.35 -0.00060
Unemployment -0.00002 -3.43 0.29 -0.00027
Industrial Production -0.00029 -2.80 0.24 -0.00043
CPI 0.00540 2.72 0.08 0.00042
PPI -0.00358 -2.00 0.33 -0.00044
Retail Sales -0.00007 -1.84 0.03 -0.00020
Trade Balance -0.00014 -1.30 0.05 -0.00025
WPI 0.00012 0.23 -0.03 0.00003
Manufacturing Orders 0.00000 0.08 0.00 0.00001
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation 3.3. Each announcement regression is based on a sample of at most 36 forecast 
errors and associated exchange rate changes, covering the period 1/1/92 to 31/12/94. The second column displays the estimated 
coefficients on the forecast error series. T-values relating to the hypothesis that the coefficients are zero are given in the third co­
lumn. The critical values for the t-values are 2.04 at 5% and 1.70 at 10%. The final column displays the product of the coefficient 
with the average absolute forecast error.
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The interpretation o f the sign o f the coefficients
As described in Section 3.1, the sign of the coefficient on ‘news’ depends on the mar­
ket’s belief about both the appropriate model of exchange rate determination and the 
likely reaction of the monetary authorities. Here we try to identify those beliefs based on 
the results presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Note that the signs of the coefficients are the 
same in both tables (although the significance of the coefficients changes when we 
weight by the proximity to Bundesbank council meetings): negative for Industrial Pro­
duction, M3, PPI, Retail Sales, Trade Balance and Unemployment (i.e., a positive 
surprise in these announcements causes a DEM appreciation), positive for CPI, Manufac­
turing Orders and WPI.14 As explained below, these results suggest that the markets 
believe the DEM behaves according to a model where international capital flows domi­
nate trade flows, i.e., the key variable for exchange rate determination is the interest rate 
differential, and where the monetary authorities set interest rates according to their 
expectations of future inflation (and eventually growth).
The negative sign on M3 is not consistent with the direct effects of any of the 
‘fundamentals’ models, but is consistent with a ‘reaction function’ interpretation: faced 
with higher than expected monetary growth, the Bundesbank will raise interest rates to 
reduce M3 growth; higher interest rates will cause an appreciation of the DEM. The 
signs on Industrial Production, PPI and Retail Sales are also consistent with a ‘reaction 
function’ interpretation:15 higher than expected producer prices or real activity may be 
seen as indicators of future inflation; to curb these inflationary pressures, the Bundesbank 
will raise interest rates, causing an appreciation of the DEM. However, the signs on CPI 
and Unemployment are not consistent with a ‘reaction function’ interpretation, whilst 
they are consistent with the Keynesian model: lower unemployment will increase con­
sumer spending and increase imports; higher domestic prices should also increase im­
14 In the following analysis, we will ignore the variables that do not have significant coefficients in 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5, i.e., Manufacturing Orders, Trade Balance and WPI.
15 Note that the negative sign on these three variables is not consistent with the direct effects of a 
Keynesian model, but the signs on Industrial Production and Retail Sales (although not on PPI) are 
consistent with the direct effects in the Monetarist model.
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ports and reduce exports; in both cases, the balance of payments will deteriorate, causing 
a depreciation of the DEM.
The Bundesbank is usually described as a ‘money targeting’ central bank. Each year the 
Bundesbank council sets a (band) target for M3 growth, and monetary policy actions are 
justified with reference to the attainment of this target. A strict interpretation of this 
framework would imply that the Bundesbank should only react to unexpected changes in 
M3, and not to any other information. However, some authors claim that in practice the 
Bundesbank does not follow money targets strictly. Von Hagen (1995) claims that the 
Bundesbank follows an inflation target framework, with expected future inflation being 
the main factor driving policy actions, and M3 growth just an (important) indicator of 
future inflation. Clarida and Gertler (1996) estimate a policy reaction function for the 
Bundesbank, and conclude that German monetary policy is conditioned on inflationary 
pressures and the state of real economy, but since the Bundesbank behaves in a forward- 
looking manner, it only reacts to future (consumer price) inflation and growth. In 
particular, they show that the Bundesbank reacts first of all to M3 shocks, but also to 
past growth as measured by Industrial Production, or to past commodity price shocks, 
but they do not react to past consumer price inflation. Although the variables used by 
Clarida and Gertler (1996) do not match exactly the variables used in this chapter, their 
results suggest that the Bundesbank should react to unexpected changes in M3, Indus­
trial Production, Retail Sales (as indicators of current and future growth), or PPI (as 
proxy for commodity prices), but not to unexpected changes in CPI or Unemployment.16 
Our results are consistent with this.
This interpretation is also consistent with the results of the weighting procedure. Scaling 
by the proximity to the next Bundesbank council meeting will only make a significant 
difference if the market believes that the Bundesbank will react to the information re­
leased, i.e., if the reaction effect is dominant. The significance and magnitude of the
16 Note that Clarida and Gertler (1996) do not include an unemployment variable in their study. 
However, current unemployment may be seen more as a consequence of low growth in the past, than as 
an indicator of future growth, i.e., it is more a backward-looking variable that should not enter the 
reaction function of a forward-looking central bank.
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coefficients (and also the B2) for M3, Industrial Production, PPI, and Retail Sales are all 
increased, the biggest increase being for M3, the main variable in the Bundesbank’s 
reaction function (according to Clarida and Gertler, 1996). However, although there is 
some increase in the significance of both coefficients, the effects seem to be quantita­
tively smaller for the CPI and Unemployment and some measures of importance actually 
deteriorate (the size of the coefficient for Unemployment and the R 2 for CPI). These 
results suggest that M3, Industrial Production, PPI, and Retail Sales affect the 
DEMAJSD exchange rate through their effects on Bundesbank policy decisions, whereas 
the effects of CPI and Unemployment may be felt through other channels.
Since the ‘reaction function’ effect dominates for the majority of the variables, it seems 
that expectations about future interest rates are the main factor driving the DEM/USD 
reaction to German macroeconomic news. The effect of backward-looking variables 
(like the CPI and Unemployment) suggest that the markets see the DEM behaving 
according to a model in which the elasticity of the exchange rate to the current account is 
small relative to the elasticity of the exchange rate to interest rate differentials.
3.4.2 The Hong run’ effects of German announcements
In this subsection, we extend our analysis to assess if and how the effect of German 
macroeconomic announcements is felt over longer periods of time. Table 3.6 presents 
the results from estimation of equation 3.1 (the ‘original’ data) using returns over diffe­
rent periods of time, from 5 minutes to 12 hours, while Table 3.7 presents similar results 
for regressions of the type of equation 3.4 (the ‘weighted’ data). Figure 3.3 plots the 
average of the scaled impact of the ‘news’ effects, and Figure 3.4 the average value for 
the t-statistic, over the different post-announcement horizons.
For periods longer than the 15 minute interval already considered, the significance levels 
of the forecast error variables tend to be lower, although for the ‘weighted’ data the 
significance levels are relatively high even after 3 hours. For the ‘original’ data only PPI
122 Chapter 3
Table 3.6 The persistence of the effect of German ‘news’ on DEM/USD returns
(‘original’ data)
Series 5m 15m 30m 45m lh 1.5h 2h 2.5h 3h 6h 12h
CPI 1.0 26.1 2.3 14.9 7.3 19.2 10.1 15.9 23.0 75.1 -12.3
Industrial Prod -0.8 -,2.5 -0.5 -0.4 -1.2 -3.5 -2.2 -2.9 -4.6 -4.1 -8.0
M3 0.8 -L7 -1.4 -0.8 -2.0 -2.1 -2.9 -2.1 -4.2 -5.9 -5.2
Manuf Orders 0.7 0.6 1.0 1.2 2.1 0.5 0.4 -1.2 1.4 4.0 2.7
PPI -0.5 -11.3 -34.3 -34.3 -67.2 -78.6 -117.5 -145.9 -150.0 -84.0 -102.7
Retail Sales -0.2 -0.6 -0.8 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -1.7 2.1 2.8
Trade Balance 0.3 -0.4 1.0 -1.8 -0.8 -3.4 -4.1 -1.6 -3.1 -1.7 -1.3
Unemployment -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.4 -0.9
WPI -0.6 . L7 -6.2 -2.8 0.4 -6.0 4.7 -9.7 -0.3 -0.7 -10.1
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation 3.1 for differing post-announcement return intervals. Each announcement regres­
sion is based on a sample of at most 36 forecast errors and associated exchange rate changes, covering the period 1/1/92 to 
31/12/94. Each cell gives the slope coefficient, multiplied by 104, from a linear regression of the return over the period displayed 
in the first row of the given column on the series of forecast errors from the series in the first cell of the given row. Coefficients in 
italics (underlined) are significantly different from zero at a 10% (5%) level.
has consistently significant coefficients up to 3 hours, and of the 3 series identified as 
significant in Table 3.4, only Unemployment extends its significance to the 30 minute 
interval. For the ‘weighted’ data the significant effects extend up to 6 hours for some 
series. However, the full impact of the announcement (measured by the highest value of 
the coefficient) is, on average, only felt after 3 hours, for the ‘original’ and ‘weighted’ 
data, although the pattern is more clearly defined for the latter. The relatively long 
period that the market takes to adjust is probably associated with the fact that the Ger­
man announcements are not scheduled. This also explains the relatively small scaled
Table 3.7 The persistence of the effect of German ‘news’ on DEM/USD returns 
(‘weighted’ data)
Series 5m 15m 30m 45m lh 1.5h 2h 2.5h 3h 6h 12h
CPI 43.7 54.0 57.4 81.2 97.8 90.3 113.2 161.3 200.3 142.3 82.4
Indust Prod -1.1 -2.9 -2.5 -2.2 -3.7 -6.6 -3.2 -6.2 -7.7 1.5 -15.0
M3 -1.0 -4.6 -4.9 -5.1 -8.5 -9.9 -9.5 -9.9 -9.5 -9.9 -2.3
Manuf Orders 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 0.9 -1.2 -0.4 -2.7 -3.9 -12.4 -7.5
PPI -2.7 -35.8 -20.7 -24.4 -38.0 -46.7 -88.6 -71.9 -69.7 136.2 216.7
Retail Sales -0.7 -0.7 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.0 -1.1 -0.8 -2.2 0.5 1.6
Trade Bal 0.1 -1.4 2.2 -2.6 -1.0 -3.3 -3.9 -3.5 -8.9 -1.0 -7.1
Unemploym 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3
WPI 3.7 1.2 -1.6 -4.3 1.2 -2.5 -0.1 -7.1 -5.8 -34.4 -0.1
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation 3.3 for differing post-announcement return intervals. Each announcement regres­
sion is based on a sample of at most 36 forecast errors and associated exchange rate changes, covering the period 1/1/92 to 
31/12/94. Each cell gives the slope coefficient, multiplied by 104, from a linear regression of the return over the period displayed 
in the first row of the given column on the series of forecast errors from the series in the first cell of the given row. Coefficients in 
italics (underlined) are significantly different from zero at a 10% (5%) level.
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effect found in subsection 3.4.1. If one takes the 3 hour instead of the 15 minute return, 
then the impact of German announcements on the DEM/USD exchange rate becomes 
higher, as shown in Table 3.8. For the ‘original’ data, the scaled response reaches an 
exceptional 19 b.p. for PPI, but is lower than 7 b.p. for the other series. For most of the 
series, the scaled response is even higher for the ‘weighted’ data, reaching 16 b.p. for 
Trade and CPI, 12 b.p. for M3 and 11 b.p. for Industrial Production.
Table 3.8 The impact of German announcements on DEM/USD 3 hour returns
Series
Coefficient
Original
Scaled Coefficient
Weighted
Scaled
Trade Balance -0.00031 0.00055 -0.00089 0.00159
-0.88 -2.85
CPI 0.00230 0.00018 0.02003 0.00156
0.45 2.25
M3 -0.00042 0.00054 -0.00095 0.00123
-1.11 -3.13
Industrial Production -0.00046 0.00067 -0.00077 0.00112
-1.45 -0.82
PPI -0.01500 0.00186 -0.00697 0.00087
-2.46 -1.27
Manufacturing Orders 0.00014 0.00025 -0.00039 0.00067
0.43 -2.33
Retail Sales -0.00017 0.00050 -0.00022 0.00066
-1.84 -1.28
WPI -0.00003 0.00001 -0.00058 0.00016
-0.02 -0.33
Unemployment 0.00000 0.00004 0.00001 0.00015
-0.15 0.29
Notes: The table presents estimates of equations 3.1 and 3.3. Each regression is based on a sample of at most 36 forecast errors 
and associated exchange rate changes, covering 1/1/92 to 31/12/94. The second and fourth columns display the estimated coeffi­
cients on the forecast error series. T-values relating to the hypothesis that the coefficients are zero are given in italics. The critical 
values for the t-values are 2.04 at 5% and 1.70 at 10%. The third and fifth columns display the product of the coefficient with the 
average absolute forecast error.
3.4.3 Structural stability
The results of the structural stability tests for both the ‘original’ and ‘weighted’ German 
data are presented in Table 3.9. The main feature of the results in Table 3.9 is the 
consistency of the signs of the coefficients across time. For all the series with significant 
coefficients in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, the signs of the coefficients in the weighted data
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regressions are the same in all 3 years. However, the size of the coefficient varies across 
the sample, and in several cases the differences across periods are statistically significant. 
Given the small number of observations in each subsample (12), it is not surprising that 
the significance levels vary considerably across years. The consistency of the signs of the 
coefficients strongly suggests that the results are not spurious, and that there is strong 
evidence that some German macroeconomic announcements have a significant (although 
small) impact on the DEM/USD exchange rate.
Table 3.9 Structural stability tests - German announcements
Series
1992
Original Data 
1993 1994 / w 1992
Weighted Data 
1993 1994 >?(2)
CPI 0.00136 0.00736 0.00150 4.00 0.00197 0.00855 0.00604 5.60
0.96 2.65 0.96 1.22 1.69 7.78
Indust Prod -0.00013 -0.00027 -0.00035 2.80 -0.00023 -0.00047 -0.00050 8.58
-1.90 -0.70 -3.26 -3.08 -1.01 -9.66
M3 -0.00131 0.00036 -0.00034 7.83 -0.00131 -0.00071 -0.00036 21.04
-2.47 1.10 -5.53 -0.68 -10.60 -9.17
PPI -0.00206 -0.00252 0.00027 1.05 -0.00545 -0.00472 -0.00106 17.32
-0.72 -0.72 0.25 -5.75 -0.96 -2.17
Retail Sales -0.00013 -0.00001 -0.00003 1.70 -0.00013 -0.00004 -0.00010 1.26
-1.75 -0.16 -0.77 -1.58 -0.83 -1.29
Unemploym -0.00003 -0.00004 0.00000 6.33 -0.00002 -0.00003 -0.00001 1.44
-2.44 -3.33 -0.16 -4.67 -1.61 -1.09
Manuf Orders 0.00015 0.00001 0.00006 1.00 0.00006 0.00000 -0.00028 2.35
1.04 0.18 0.42 1.45 0.08 -1.07
Trade Bal 0.00015 -0.00020 -0.00003 3.46 0.00014 -0.00033 -0.00022 7.84
0.77 -2.33 -0.27 0.88 -6.43 -2.37
WPI -0.00065 0.00171 0.00003 6.37 -0.00097 0.00168 -0.00014 9.88
-1.27 2.18 0.05 -2.31 2.29 -0.18
Notes: The table presents estimates of equation 3.2. Each announcement regression is based on a sample of at most 36 forecast 
errors and associated exchange rate changes, covering the period 1/1/92 to 31/12/94. The columns with number headings give the 
coefficients on the series created from interacting the forecast error series with that year’s dummy. T-values relevant to the test 
that the coefficient on the forecast error is zero in a given year are given in italics. The columns headed x*(2) give a Chi-squared 
test statistic relevant to the hypothesis that the regression slope is identical in each of the three sample years. The Chi-squared sta­
tistic has two degrees of freedom and a 5% critical value of 5.99. Chi-square values in italics underlined denote the null is re­
jected at the 5% level.
Effects o f macroeconomic ‘news ’ on exchange rates 125
3.5 Are the Impacts of German and US Announcements Similar?
In this section we compare the results obtained for the German and US announcements 
and try to extract some general conclusions. The main feature of the results is that the 
FX markets’ primary concern is with the future likely reaction of the monetary authori­
ties, both in Germany and the US. The results for Germany are somewhat mixed, since 
they suggest that the exchange rate reacts to news on CPI and Unemployment according 
to the Keynesian model, but the effects of other variables follow the ‘reaction function’ 
hypothesis. However, the quantitative effects of the latter variables dominate the effects 
of the former, which lead us to prefer the reaction function hypothesis as the main force 
driving the DEM/USD reaction to German macroeconomic news. The reaction of the 
DEM/USD exchange rate to US macroeconomic announcements is less ambiguous as all 
series have the sign predicted by the reaction function hypothesis, with the announce­
ments with the largest and most significant impact on the USD being related to the real 
economy, in particular with employment.
In both countries the implied reaction function has, however, some curious and interes­
ting features. In Germany, for example, the Bundesbank has been usually described as 
basing its policy on monetary targets, whereas von Hagen (1995) and Clarida and Gertler 
(1996) have recently argued that the Bundesbank seldom complies with its M3 targets, 
and actually reacts to divergences of inflation and output from their desired values using 
a modified Taylor (1993) rule. Our results suggest that the FX market does not believe 
that the Bundesbank will only react to monetary shocks, but that it will also react to 
other macroeconomic variables. However, the market still sees the Bundesbank reacting 
primarily to monetary surprises. Does the former result mean that the market places 
more belief in the Bundesbank’s rhetoric than is actually justified?
By contrast, in the US the FX market primarily reacts to unexpected shocks emanating 
from the real economy. How does this square with the greater weight which central
126 Chapter 3
banks, including the Fed, are supposedly now giving ta  the primacy of price stability as 
an objective? One, perhaps slightly cynical, answer is that the switch to awarding price 
stability much greater weight as an objective has been much more pronounced in central 
bank rhetoric than in their actions; there is an emerging academic literature (Taylor, 
1993, Goodhart, 1996, Muscatelli and Tirelli, 1996, and Chapter 5 in this thesis), docu­
menting how much continuity there has been in central bank actions in recent years, and 
how little these have altered in response to supposed regime changes, e.g., independence, 
inflation targets, etc. A kindlier interpretation is that the FX market’s stronger reaction 
to (US) data on real shocks (than on price shocks) is that real shocks provide a better 
guide to future inflationary pressures than do price shocks (which may be more back­
wards looking).17
If the main determinant of the FX market’s response to news is their view of how the 
authorities will react to such news, as we suggest here, these effects are likely to shift 
over time. Specifically, changes in the policy priorities of monetary authorities and the 
market’s perceptions of those priorities will imply that the coefficients derived from our 
‘news’ regressions will alter over time. The results from our structural stability regres­
sions corroborate the above intuition. These results also suggest one reason why stable 
relationships between FX rates and economic ‘news’ have been hard to uncover. 
Moreover, as detailed earlier, most economic news items can be interpreted in different 
ways. A stronger real economy can, under the Keynesian model, be regarded as bad 
news for the exchange rate, since imports and future inflation will rise, but good news if 
the authorities react by raising domestic interest rates. We find that the reaction function 
effect tends to dominate but this does not imply that all market participants favour a 
reaction function interpretation. If some follow a Keynesian model, this will also weaken 
the discernible impact of ‘news’ on exchange rates.
Although most of the macroeconomic announcements considered in this chapter have a
17 One should also note that our sample period (1992-94) is mostly a period of low inflation and 
accelerating growth in the US. In such circumstances, primacy of price stability may be consistent with 
the Fed focusing on growth indicators: if inflation is thought to be under control, then the Fed will react 
mostly to the state of the real economy.
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significant (short term) impact On the DEM/USD exchange rate, this impact might be 
seen as quantitatively small. For the series with the largest impact, the US Payroll 
Employment figures, the exchange rate change caused by the average announcement is 
31 b.p., a mere 0.2% change. Apparently, the DEM/USD is driven more by US than 
German announcements, since the impact of the former is much larger, even taking the 
results of the weighted regressions for Germany. For the series with significant coeffi­
cients, the average revisions after 15 minutes caused by the US announcements are 
between 10 and 17 b.p., whereas for the German announcements the average revisions 
are between 2 and 6 b.p. However, this difference could be caused by the different time 
pattern of response for the US and German announcements:18 if instead of taking the 15 
minute returns, one compares the periods with the maximum average revisions, then the 
impact for most of the significant German series is of similar magnitude to those for the 
US series.
One of the major differences between US and German announcements of economic data 
is that the US data are announced at regular pre-arranged times, fixed to the minute, 
whereas German releases are unscheduled and irregular. Prearranged announcements are 
likely to encourage contingency planning beforehand, in terms of consultation with 
support staff, economists and technical analysts. In contrast, the variation of German 
announcement times will potentially discourage concentrated pre-planning of reactions. 
Hence it is plausible that there will be longer lags in the exchange rate assimilating 
German information, relative to that from the US.
Our results support this view. As shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.3, the maximum impact (as 
measured by the average scaled response across announcements) is reached after 15 
minutes for the US announcements, but only after 3 hours for the German announce­
ments. Note, however, that the evidence in Figures 3.2 and 3.4 suggests that the signifi­
cance levels are maximum at the 15 minute period, for both the German and US an­
18 As is described below, the maximum impact (measured by the size of the coefficient) of the German 
announcements is only reflected in the DEM/USD after 3 hours, whereas the maximum impact of the 
US announcements is felt after 15 minutes.
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nouncements.19 Hence, market reaction can be seen to be concentrated in a short post­
announcement period for the US, with the response to German ‘news’ being far more 
protracted. Like the German data, the majority of public news, e.g., on political events, 
market developments, arrives at unexpected times. The timing differences found bet­
ween responses to the US and German announcements suggest that the response of 
exchange rates to these events is likely to be somewhat slower than earlier studies which 
concentrate on scheduled US announcements have suggested, and hence there may be 
some profit opportunities available to those agents that are able to respond more quickly 
to such unpredictable events.
A priori, one might have thought that the data we examine incorporates a significant 
number of releases which are ‘fundamental’ to the DEM/USD. However, although there 
is a clear effect on very high frequency DEM/USD returns from most of our ‘news’ 
series, their influence on lower frequency returns is surprisingly weak. On average, US 
‘news’ is only significant for at most a couple of hours. German ‘news’ releases retain 
significance for a marginally longer period after which subsequent exchange rate fluctua­
tions drown their effects. Hence, our results suggest that, whilst announcements have a 
significant impact on short-run DEM/USD determination, they cannot be considered the 
key factor driving exchange rates.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have studied the impact of macroeconomic news on exchange rates, 
using high frequency data for the DEM/USD. As described in the previous section, the 
overall picture is one of a strong, quick impact of macroeconomic ‘news’, with the 
exchange rate reflecting the anticipated policy reaction by the monetary authorities to the 
piece of news just released. However, this impact may be seen as quantitatively small, 
and the overall effect of the macroeconomic news on lower frequency exchange rate 
changes decays quite rapidly towards insignificance.
19 This vindicates our use of the 15 minute exchange rate change as the basis for our analysis.
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Although the main features of the ‘news’ effects are common to German and US an­
nouncements, there are some peculiarities and interesting features in the former group. 
First, the ‘news’ from German announcements tend to be incorporated in the exchange 
rate more slowly than the ‘news’ emanating from the US, due to differences in timing 
arrangements. Second, the impact on the exchange rate is, on average, quantitatively 
smaller for the German announcements. Finally, the effect of German announcements 
depends on the proximity to the next Bundesbank council meeting: when the observa­
tions were weighted by this proximity, the impact of the variables seen to be entering the 
Bundesbank’s reaction function (especially M3) was significantly increased.
We have argued above that the most sensible explanation of the set of coefficients 
showing the markets’ response to unexpected news is that these are, primarily, driven by 
their interpretation of the monetary authorities’ reactions. Those reactions, when trig­
gered, affect short-term money market interest rates. Consequently the finding of a 
dominant response from a reaction function model would seem to suggest that exchange 
rates would in turn predominantly respond to unexpected changes in such interest rates. 
This is consistent with the results of the study presented in Chapter 2.
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Appendix 3.A: US and German Macroeconomic Data
Table 3.10 US macroeconomic announcements
Identifier Announcement type Reported as Time Week Obs.
Consumer Conf Consumer Confidence level 10:00EST 4 36
CPI Consumer Price Index m/m % change 8:30EST 2/3 36
Capacity Util Capacity Utilisation % 9:15EST 3 36
Durable Goods Durable Goods Orders m/m % change 8:30EST 4 36
Industrial Prod Industrial Production m/m % change 9:15EST 3 36
Leading Indie Index of Leading Indicators m/m % change 8:30EST 1 35
NAPM US N.A.P.M. survey % level 10:00EST 1 36
Payroll Emp Nonfarm Payrolls thousands 8:30EST 1 36
PPI Producer Price Index m/m % change 8:30EST 2 36
Retail Sales Advance Retail Sales m/m % change 8:30EST 2 36
Trade Balance Merchandise Trade Balance $ billions 8:30EST 3 33
Unemployment Civilian Unemployment rate m/m % change 8:30EST 1 36
Table 3.11 German macroeconomic announcements
Identifier Announcement type Reported as Week Obs.
CPI Consumer Prices, prelimin. release m/m % change 4 36
Indust Prod Industrial Production m/m % change 1 35
M3 Money Stock M3, monthly average % change from previous year Q4 4 33
Manuf Orders Manufacturing Orders m/m % change 2 35
PPI Producer Prices m/m % change 4 33
Retail Sales Retail Sales, volume y/y % change 3 34
Trade Bal Trade Balance DEM billions 29
Unemploym Number of unemployed, s/a m/m change, thousands 1 35
WPI Wholesale Price index m/m % change 3 35
NOTES:
week refers to the usual trading week of each month within which the given announcement is usually released, e.g., the US 
PPI figures are generally published in the second trading week of the month;
the German data refer only to Western Germany (Federal Republic of Germany before the unification), except for M3 and 
Trade Balance which refer to unified Germany,
the timing of the German announcements is not regular, but they usually occur between 7:00 and 13:00 GMT; in the absence 
of other sources of information, we take the time of a German announcement to be the time of its report by Reuters' news service; 
since the majority of the market participants receive their information through Reuters’ or similar news services, it is reasonable to 
assume that the time of the Reuters’ report is the time the information reaches the market; this would not be true if the other news 
services reported the announcement before Reuters’, but given the periodicity of our data (3 minutes) it is not likely that this is a 
serious problem;
the regularity in the week of the month of the German releases is not precise; there is no regularity for the Trade Balance an­
nouncements, due to the fact that during our sample period the German Federal Statistics Office was implementing the transition 
from Western German to unified German data; until the end of 1992 the emphasis was on data for Western Germany only, al­
though data for unified Germany was also published, but with some delay, from January 1993, the emphasis shifted to unified 
Germany data, which was the first to be announced; this shift led to irregular data releases;
we have a maximum of 36 observations for each announcement series; however, as the publication of the US Mercantile 
Trade figure was discontinued in late 1994 there are only 33 data points for this announcement and within this 3 year span there 
are only 35 US Leading Indicators announcements; also, irregularity in the German Trade releases (there are only 33 Trade re­
leases in our data period) and some m issing expectations data reduce the number of usable observations for most of the German 
series.
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Figure 3.1: The persistence of the effect of US ‘news’ on the DEM/USD:
average scaled response
0  -|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------,--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
1 10 100 1000
minutes after announcement (log scale)
Notes: The graph plots the average across all announcements of the scaled response (the absolute value o f the product of the 
regression coefficient on 'news' and the mean absolute forecast error) for different return horizons.
Figure 3.2: The persistence of the effect of US ‘news’ on the DEM/USD:
average t-statistic
3.0 T
0.0 -I----------------------------------------------------1---------------------------------------------------1---------------------------------------------------- 1
1 10 100 1000
minutes after announcement (log scale)
Notes: The graph plots the average across all announcements of the T-statistic on the coefficient on news' for different return
horizons.
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Figure 3.3: The persistence of the effect of German ‘news’ on the DEM/USD:
average scaled response
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Notes: The graph plots the average across all announcements of the scaled response (the absolute value o f the product of the 
regression coefficient on 'news' and the mean absolute forecast error) for different return horizons.
Figure 3.4: The persistence of the effect of German ‘news’ on the DEM/USD:
average t-statistic
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Notes: The graph plots the average across all announcements of the T-statistic on the coefficient on news' for different return
horizons.
Chapter 4
Monetary Policy in Developing 
Countries: Objectives and Independence
This chapter examines the monetary policy framework in 44 developing countries that 
appear to be reasonably representative of central banks in developing countries as a 
whole. The majority of the previous work on monetary policy objectives was motivated 
by the history and circumstances of central banks in the developed countries (e.g., 
Fischer, 1994, Goodhart, 1994), or focused on specific (or small groups of) developing 
countries. Central banks in the developing countries tend to face a different set of 
economic problems and conditions, that changes substantially the nature of the monetary 
policy choices. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the objectives 
of monetary policy in a wide sample of developing countries. The chapter also discusses 
the conflicts that may arise when central banks pursue several objectives, and how the 
legal status of the central bank affects policy outcomes.1
1 This chapter is based on a study on central banking in developing countries sponsored by the Bank of 
England. The results of this study were presented in the Bank of England’s Symposium on Central 
Banking in Developing Countries on 9 June 1995, and published in Fry, Goodhart, and Almeida (1996). 
Only the results that are relevant for this thesis are presented in this chapter, and some of the topics are 
only mentioned briefly here. Extensive discussions of the latter may be found in Fry, Goodhart, and 
Almeida (1996).
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The chapter starts with a description of the data sources and of the countries included in 
the sample analysed. The choice of countries to include in this study was not random, 
and in Section 4.1 we try to assess whether our sample is nevertheless representative of 
the population of developing countries. In Section 4.2 we note that the primary objec­
tive of central banks, in both developing and developed countries, has generally moved 
towards the attainment of price stability. Considering that growth is negatively associ­
ated with inflation (Barro, 1995, Gregorio, 1996, Fischer, 1994) and inflation is disliked 
for its own sake, the achievement of price stability would seem, subject to the transitional 
costs of getting there, self-evidently desirable. Since inflation is a monetary phenome­
non, as we document once more, and central banks should be able to control monetary 
conditions, why is inflation still so high in so many countries?
One reason may be that central banks have been pursuing other objectives. In Section
4.3 we point out that short-sighted governments have in many cases effectively used their 
central bank as an alternative source of revenue, and that external constraints may affect 
the ability of central banks to conduct monetary policy. We then analyse the role of the 
central bank in promoting the development and stability of the financial system, in 
Section 4.4. In Section 4.5, we explore whether the differing constitutional status of 
central banks has made a significant difference to their behaviour, especially with respect 
to their relative inflation performance. The subject matter of this section falls mainly 
within the rapidly expanding field of central bank independence and covers much the 
same ground as Cukierman (1992, chs. 18-23), Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), 
Cukierman et al. (1993) and Gregorio (1996). Section 4.6 provides some concluding 
remarks.
4.1 Sample Countries and Data Sources
This study relies on several sources of information. Most of the quantitative work is 
based on data from the International Financial Statistics and the World Bank’s Socio-
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economic Time-series Access and Retrieval System: World Tables. In addition to pu­
blicly available data from the IFS and World Tables, we supplemented the factual basis 
for this chapter through responses to a questionnaire on a variety of central banking 
topics sent to a sample of central banks. The questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 
4.A, and the countries to which it was sent are listed in Table 4.1.2 These countries, 
referred to hereafter as the BoE group, were not randomly selected, but consisted of 
those whose governors had been invited to the Bank of England’s Symposium on Central 
Banking in Developing Countries on 9 June 1995. For this reason, the group consists 
predominantly of Commonwealth countries and under-represents Francophone and East 
Asian countries.
Table 4.1 Sample countries - the BoE Group
Africa Asia Middle East 
and Europe
Western
Hemisphere
Botswana Bangladesh Cyprus Argentina
Gambia Brunei Israel Chile
Ghana Fiji Jordan Bahamas
Kenya Hong Kong Kuwait Barbados
Lesotho India Malta Belize
Malawi Malaysia Saudi Arabia Guyana
Mauritius Pakistan United Arab Emirates Jamaica
Namibia Papua New Guinea Mexico
Nigeria Singapore St. Lucia
Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Trinidad & Tobago
South Africa Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Nevertheless, the BoE group possesses most of the features that characterise the deve­
loping country population as a whole. Table 4.2 compares some salient variables across
2 The questionnaire partially reproduced in Appendix 4. A was the basis for the study published in Fiy, 
Goodhart, and Almeida (1996). The questionnaire included some questions that are not presented in 
Appendix 4. A, because they refer to topics that are outside the scope of this chapter. The aggregated 
raw data on which our analysis is based can be obtained from the authors. However, the individual 
questionnaire responses are confidential and could be released only with each central bank’s agreement. 
Although the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank is located on St. Kitts, we use St. Lucia in our quantita­
tive analysis because it is the largest country served by this central bank. Unfortunately, data deficien­
cies prevented the inclusion of Brunei in the quantitative analysis presented here.
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developing and OECD countries.3 The sample consists of 122 developing countries and 
20 OECD countries, all countries for which reasonably comprehensive data sets are 
available from IFS and World Tables.4 The 122 developing countries are split into two 
groups: a control group of 79 countries and 43 countries of the BoE group.5
Table 4.2 Some macroeconomic and monetary characteristics of developing 
and OECD countries
Variable Developing Countries 
(122)
Control Group 
(79)
BoE Group 
(43)
OECD
Countries
(20)
YG 2.9 2.7 3.3 2.5
INF 29.4 27.7 32.2 7.3
M/Y 38.9 35.7 44.2 67.6
H/M 40.3 44.2 33.2 13.7
R/D 28.6 33.8 19.1 5.7
CBCG 85.0 84.9 85.1 45.3
CGDC 21.2 21.0 21.6 15.9
GS/Y -5.9 -6.4 -5.0 -3.8
GR/Y 25.2 24.2 26.8 32.8
DT/Y 68.6 69.3 67.2 n.a.
PCY $1,149 $1,000 $1,440 $21,083
Notes: the table refers to the average of annual values for the period 1979-1993, in percent, except when indicated. Key: YG, 
Trend growth rate in GDP at constant prices; INF, Consumer price inflation; M/Y, Money (M2)/GNP; H/M, Reserve money/M2; 
R/D, Bank reserves/Bank deposits; CBCG, Central bank net credit to government/Net domestic credit to government; CGDC, Net 
domestic credit to government/Aggregate domestic credit; GS/Y, Government deficit (~)/GDP; GR/Y, Government revenue/GDP; 
DT/Y, Foreign debt/GDP; PCY, 1992 per capita income in US dollars (exchange rate based, geometric averages).
3 The 20 OECD countries used for comparison throughout this chapter are Australia, Austria, Bel­
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
4 Data for Hong Kong were obtained from local sources and Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 
o f Developing Asian and Pacific Countries (annual).
5 The countries in the control group, which consists of all other developing countries for which a 
reasonably complete data set is available, are Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Baibuda, Aruba, 
Bahrain, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Libya, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands 
Antilles, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, 
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Western Samoa and Zaire.
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Table 4.2 shows that developing countries present features that clearly distinguish their 
financial systems from OECD countries. For instance, the ratio of money (M2) to GNP 
(M/Y) in developing countries is barely above one-half of the money/income ratio in 
OECD countries. Also, the data in Table 4.2 suggest that central banks dominate their 
financial systems to a considerably greater extent in developing countries than they do in 
the OECD countries. Specifically, the ratio of central bank liabilities in the form of 
reserve money (currency in circulation plus bank deposits at the central bank) to M2 
(H/M) is almost three times higher in developing countries than in the OECD countries, 
and the ratio of bank reserves to bank deposits (R/D) is five times higher in developing 
countries than in the OECD countries.
While Table 4.2 demonstrates that developing countries differ from OECD countries in 
some important respects, it also suggests the BoE group does not diverge greatly from 
the developing country population as a whole, at least in terms of the variables consi­
dered. For example in the period 1979-1993, in both the BoE group and all other 
developing countries:
- inflation (INF) averaged 30 percent;
- the ratio of M2 to income (M/Y) averaged 40 percent;
- the ratio of reserve money to M2 (H/M) averaged 40 percent;
- the ratio of bank reserves to deposits (R/D) averaged 25 percent;
- Government deficits averaged 6 percent of GDP (-GS/Y);
- foreign debt averaged 70 percent of GDP (DT/Y).
In other words, the BoE group appears to represent developing countries reasonably 
well. We hope, therefore, that our findings from this group apply more broadly to 
developing countries in general. Nevertheless, the BoE group is far from homogeneous, 
another accurate reflection of developing countries as a whole. Average rates of eco­
nomic growth over the period 1979-1993 range from -2.3 percent in Guyana to 10.2 
percent in Botswana. Inflation averaged 0.7 percent in Saudi Arabia compared with 556 
percent in Argentina. Per capita income comparisons also reveal large disparities.
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4.2 Price Stability in the BoE Group
4.2.1 Inflation and growth
In the 1960s, much of the economics profession accepted the finding that a trade-off 
existed between inflation and growth. In the 1970s, more sophisticated expectations- 
augmented Phillips curves became popular. Far from there being any exploitable trade­
off in the medium and longer term between inflation and higher output levels, the ac­
cepted view now is that in the longer term this relationship is negative, i.e., more infla­
tion is associated with lower growth (Barro, 1995, Gregorio, 1996, Fischer, 1994). 
Negative sloping long-run expectations-augmented Phillips curve relationships between 
inflation and growth have been found, particularly in developing countries (Fry, 1995, ch. 
10). This negative relationship between inflation and growth is also what simple biva- 
riate regressions, cross-section and pooled time series, indicate for the BoE group in 
both long and short runs, even though the average inflation-average growth rate relation­
ship portrayed in Figure 4.1 does not seem to exhibit any clear pattern.6
We analysed the relationship between economic growth and nominal variables (inflation, 
Ml, and M2), by regressing average output growth both against average CPI inflation 
and the average growth rates of M l and M2 (measured in percentage points). To assess 
the robustness of the results presented in Table 4.3,7 these averages were computed over 
different periods: a 15-year period (1979-1993); the last five years of that period (1989-
1993); and using annual data for 1991, the latest year for which a complete data set was 
available.
6 Figures 4.1 and 4.3 exclude Argentina because it is an extreme outlier.
7 The data in Table 4.3 are again exclusive of Argentina, because this country is an anomaly in this 
respect since it combines an extremely high inflation rate with a moderate rate of growth. If Argentina 
was included with the other countries in Table 4.3, all the coefficients would become less negative, and 
none would then be significant. The Argentina case clearly weakens the claim that inflation reduces 
growth, but the experience of this country may be considered an outlier and sui generis.
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Table 4.3 Regression of nominal variables on growth
Explanatory Dependent variable: average GDP growth in
Variable 1979-1993 1989-1993 1991
CPI Inflation -0.023 -0.050 -0.059
-1.17 -2.72 -2.82
Ml -0.018 -0.084 -0.027
-0.76 -2.52 -1.52
M2 -0.005 -0.015 -0.034
-0.30 -1.14 -1.47
Notes: the table presents the coefficient and t-value (in italics) of a regression of the nominal variable on real GDP growth; a cons­
tant term was used in all regressions but is not presented here to save space.
The negative relationship appears to be slightly stronger in the short run, in part because 
of outliers, notably Zambia and Sierra Leone, both with low growth and high inflation. 
Partly to remove cases of (incipient) hyperinflation, where the negative relationship may 
well be stronger, we re-ran the test excluding all countries in which inflation over the 
relevant period exceeded 50 percent. These latter tests reported in Table 4.4 indeed 
suggested, as has been also found elsewhere, that the strength of the negative relation­
ship (between growth and nominal variables) is greater in absolute terms among the 
inflationary outliers. None of the above simple relationships is significantly different 
from zero but, apart from the relationship between the growth of output and nominal 
money in 1991, which may have been influenced by very short-term cyclical factors, all 
the coefficient signs remain negative.
Table 4.4 Regression of nominal variables on growth (excluding outliers)
Explanatory Dependent variable: average GDP growth in
Variable 1979-1993 1989-1993 1991
CPI Inflation -0.074 -0.053 -0.104
-1.25 -1.03 -1.49
Ml -0.063 -0.054 +0.011
-1.17 -1.08 0.18
M2 -0.023 -0.065 +0.068
-0.43 -1.16 1.39
Notes: see Table 4.3.
The deleterious effects of hyper-inflation on growth, with the dislocations caused to 
saving patterns and to the monetary and pricing mechanisms, are fairly obvious. But 
inflation has, so it is claimed, a negative effect on growth even at low or moderate levels.
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In part, this latter effect may be because a higher level of inflation is generally associated 
with a greater variability of inflation and hence a greater riskiness of longer-term unin­
dexed contracts. We find that the correlation between the level and standard deviation of 
inflation averaged over the 1979-1993 period for the BoE group was +0.961; the obser­
vations shown in Figure 4.2 lie closely along the 45° line.8 The variability in inflation is 
also associated within this group with high variability in monetary expansion (correlation 
+0.879) and in both nominal and real exchange rates vis-a-vis the US dollar, with corre­
lations of +0.516 and +0.347 respectively on a cross-country 15-year basis. Similarly, the 
variability in real interest rates (lending rate) was significantly positively correlated with 
the variability in both M2 growth, +0.742, and in inflation, +0.879 (all significant at the 
99 percent confidence level).9 Thus instability in nominal variables, money and inflation, 
is associated with higher variance (and presumably less predictability) in certain key real 
prices, i.e., real exchange and interest rates, another channel whereby inflation may 
depress growth.10
There are a wide variety of potential channels for both negative and positive effects 
running from inflation to growth, and vice versa. In developing countries, fixed nominal 
interest and exchange rates may have been particularly harmful (Fry, 1995, ch. 8). As
8 Whereas the mean and the standard deviation of inflation are strongly positively correlated, there is 
very little correlation between the mean of inflation and its coefficient of variation, i.e., the standard 
deviation divided by the mean. The question of what relative weight we should place on the standard 
deviation or the coefficient of variation can be given a concrete example. Would we regard a move from 
an average inflation of 0.8 percent (or 8 percent) to 1 percent (or 10 percent) as disturbing and disloca­
ting as a move to 100 percent from an average inflation of 80 percent? If we held veiy long term assets, 
the answer could be yes. But once inflation runs at even a moderate level, the length of contracts, asset 
durations, etc., tend to shorten, so that the standard deviation is more relevant. Furthermore, our main 
concern is with real variables, real interest and exchange rates. To estimate the future expected level of 
such real variables, we have to use our best point estimate of future inflation. Hence both the coefficient 
of variation and standard deviation of such real variables will be a positive function of the standard 
deviation (but not of the coefficient of variation) of inflation.
9 The correlations shown in this paragraph were all estimated exclusive of Argentina whose extraordi­
nary average inflation rate makes it an extreme outlier. If Argentinean data are included, all the 
correlations rise, with the exception of those between the variability in inflation and the variability in 
both nominal and real exchange rates. These latter instead fall sharply towards zero and are no longer 
significant
10 Besides the nexus of interrelationships between the variability exhibited in money, inflation and both 
nominal and real exchange and interest rates, there is a second set of such inter-relationships among the 
BoE group between the variability of the government deficit and the variability in real interest rates, 
+0.499, in real (but not nominal) exchange rates, +0.340, and in output growth, +0.313.
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inflation rises, lower real interest rates resulting from fixed nominal rates reduce credit 
availability and distorts resource allocation, while a fixed exchange rate prices exports 
out of world markets. Both effects are growth-reducing. Our results are consistent with 
the present consensus view, that the longer-term effect of inflation on output growth is 
negative, though the strength of the relationship is variable.
4.2.2 Price stability in central bank statutes
With inflation also being disliked for its own sake, the natural implication is that the 
objective of a central bank must be to achieve price stability. This objective has come to 
be widely, if not generally, accepted among central banks in OECD countries. For 
example, the protocol of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) in the Maas­
tricht Treaty makes price stability the primary objective, with support for other govern­
mental objectives only possible when price stability has been attained (a lexicographic 
ordering). The statutes of other European central banks, both in the West, e.g., France, 
Spain and Sweden, and in the East, e.g., the Czech Republic and Hungary (Hochreiter,
1994), have been altered consonantly.
In virtually all cases, the statutory objectives of the central banks in the BoE group 
include the preservation of the (external and internal) value of the currency. This was 
mentioned in 28 out of the 33 responses to question F5 of the questionnaire, where we 
asked for the statutory objectives of the central bank. However, only four countries 
(Argentina, Chile, Cyprus and Mexico) gave it the same priority as the ESCB. Five 
central banks did not answer and four do not have statutory objectives. In Belize the 
statutes relate to functions rather than objectives and do not mention nominal stability. 
In the other 26 cases, nominal stability (external, internal or both) was an objective 
among others. This lack of priority for price stability in part is because central bank 
statutes are amended only at long intervals. Were all the countries in the BoE group to 
revise their central bank statutes today, we surmise that a larger proportion would give
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primacy to the achievement of price stability.11
Whether the priority given to price stability would or would not be taken as absolute, it 
is generally given a high priority by the central banks in the BoE group. Yet the results 
have been mixed in this respect. Although the experience of the BoE group has been 
better than the control group of 79 other developing countries, it has been much worse 
than the developed OECD countries, as shown in Table 4.2. That table shows the 
average mean level of inflation over the 1979-1993 period. Average mean values are, 
however, susceptible to large outliers. A variety of additional data on CPI inflation are 
given in Table 4.5 for the BoE group. These data indicate that the disappointing infla­
tion figures are not just the result of a few very high inflation countries distorting the 
average value. The problem is much more widespread.
Table 4.5 The CPI inflation experience in the BoE Group
Statistic Average 1979—1993 Average 1989-1993
Mean 32.20 43.56
Median 12.36 11.41
Standard Deviation 85.64 171.86
Average in bottom quartile 4.34 3.50
Average in top quartile 103.68 154.12
Maximum 555.84 1,120.19
Minimum 0.68 1.79
Top of Q.1/Q.3 6.57/21.53 5.54 /18.92
Nor is there much evidence that inflationary problems have diminished over time in the 
BoE group. We can compare the same statistical data on inflation for the 5-year period 
1989-1993, with those already shown for 1979-1993 in Table 4.5. The mean inflation 
rate has increased, while the median has diminished slightly. The distribution and stan­
dard deviation have become more dispersed and skewed.
11 Governments, and central banks, in developing countries are more concerned to foster growth than 
those in the OECD countries. Consequently they might be more prepared to adopt policies, which might 
seem to promise higher growth, but which also risk higher inflation, even though such higher inflation 
would have an inimical effect on growth. Indeed, an excessively aggressive push for growth at all costs 
might even lead, counterproductively, to higher inflation and lower growth.
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4.2.3 Money and inflation
Moreover the problem is one of monetary control; inflation is a monetary phenomenon. 
We rehearse once again, here for the BoE group, the familiar strong positive relationship 
between inflation and monetary expansion. In Table 4.6 we present the results of regres­
sing inflation against the growth of Ml and M2 as alternative explanatory variables on a 
cross-country basis over a variety of periods: 15-year average (1979-1993), each of the 
constituent 5-year averages and 1991 taken by itself. A scatter diagram for the 15-year 
average (Ml) is shown in Figure 4.3. The relationship for 1991 is comparatively much 
weaker. As expected, the relationship between inflation and monetary expansion appears 
to be stronger in the medium run.
Table 4.6 Regression of monetary growth on inflation
Explanatory
Variable 1979-1993 1979-1983 1984-1988 1989-1993 1991
Ml 1.059 1.127 1.093 1.038 0.730
74.9 20.9 44.1 64.6 7.0
(0.993) (0.916) (0.980) (0.990) (0.566)
M2 1.258 0.577 1.074 1.456 0.980
30.9 10.2 24.5 20.8 10.1
(0.959) (0.721) (0.937) (0.913) (0.726)
Notes: the table presents the coefficient, t-value (in italics) and adjusted R2 (in parenthesis) o f regressions o f money growth on in­
flation; a  constant term was used in all regressions but is not presented here to save space.
Some might argue, though it is not an argument that we ourselves would support, that 
the responsibility of a central bank for monetary control is less immediate when monetary 
expansion (or variability) is caused by changes in the money multiplier than when it 
derives from changes in the reserve base. In fact, as expected, the correlations between 
cross-country changes in the reserve base and in inflation are also very high (1979-1993, 
+0.971; 1989-1993, +0.990). A decomposition of monetary expansion (Ml and M2) 
into that part caused by increases in the reserve base or in the money multiplier revealed 
no systematic effects (data available on request). Correlations between the variability in 
monetary growth (Ml and M2) and in both the reserve base and the money multiplier 
revealed that the former at +0.998 and +0.913 respectively were much larger than the 
latter (+0.009 and +0.038).
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During the 15 years of our data period, the median level of inflation in the BoE group 
was 12.4 percent, falling to 11.4 percent over the last five year average; this compares 
with 6.4 percent and 3.6 percent for the OECD countries. There is perhaps one encou­
raging feature. Among the worst performers in terms of inflation over the data period 
were the Latin American countries, e.g., Argentina and Chile. In recent years Argentina 
and Chile have shown remarkable progress in reducing inflation, as a result of political 
and economic reforms.
Nevertheless the inflationary experiences of the BoE group have been, at best, patchy. 
Moreover, since inflation is a monetary phenomenon, central banks must bear a consi­
derable share of the responsibility for this state of affairs. Yet, as already noted, most of 
the BoE group had a statutory requirement to maintain the value of the currency. So 
why did most of them fail to meet this requirement? The likely explanation is that central 
banks were under pressure, for a variety of reasons, to help achieve other objectives, like 
supporting weak financial systems, and financing their governments, and those to whom 
their governments wished to provide financial subsidies. The potential conflicts that may 
arise when central banks are required to pursue other objectives than price stability are 
the subject of the two following sections.
4.3 Relations with Government and External Constraints
4.3.1 Quasi-fiscal activities
The previous section has demonstrated a great variety of inflationary and monetary 
experience across the BoE group. Large part of this variation might be due to the 
differing pressures that governments have placed on their central banks, for a variety of 
reasons. In the OECD countries such pressures are often ascribed to the myopic desire 
of governments to engender a short-term feel-good factor for electoral purposes. In 
developing countries such pressures are, perhaps, caused more by the perceived objec-
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tive of filling a fiscal hole. Governments generally expect to benefit financially from the 
monopoly privilege over fiat money that they grant to their central banks. Central banks 
in some of the BoE countries have generated revenue equal to the government’s explicit 
tax revenue. Over the period 1979-1993, seigniorage revenue in the BoE group equalled 
1.7 percent of GDP on average, and was above 4 percent in Argentina, Chile, Israel, and 
Sierra Leone (where it represented two thirds of government revenue). Even though 
central bank profits are usually much lower than our seigniorage estimates, they are still 
sizeable (above 1 percent of GDP in some cases).
Even when they do not transfer large profits to the government explicitly, central banks 
may be performing a range of quasi-fiscal activities, like providing implicit subsidies 
through credit or foreign exchange guarantees, or imposing restrictions on the financial 
system that will benefit the government, such as interest rate controls. From the fiscal 
viewpoint, interest rate ceilings are imposed to stifle competition to public sector fund 
raising from the private sector. Over the period 1979-1993, the implicit tax derived from 
financial repression in the BoE group averaged 2.2 percent of GDP, and was above 5 
percent in Guyana, Israel, Sierra Leone, and Zambia.
A central bank that is obliged to provide an important contribution to government 
financing is likely to have its ability to maintain price stability impaired. Many central 
banks in the BoE group were not well placed to repel such pressures. Of those who 
answered question F7, 72 percent stated that the government could require the central 
bank to finance its deficit. Of those who answered question F8, 41 percent stated that 
central bank financing of that part of the deficit not covered by bond sales was auto­
matic, although there were in all cases some statutory limits.12
12 Fry, Goodhart, and Almeida (1996, ch. 3), present an extensive discussion of the quasi-fiscal acti­
vities of central banks in developing countries, and describe the methodology and the individual country 
estimates of government revenue from seigniorage and financial repression presented in this subsection.
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4.3.2 External activities
Monetary and exchange rate policies are closely related in all countries. In some coun­
tries the foreign exchange rate regime dominates or constrains monetary policy, while in 
others the opposite is true. In a number of countries fiscal exigencies are the overriding 
determinant of the monetary-foreign exchange regime choice: rapid and uncontrollable 
monetary expansion makes a float virtually inevitable. In all countries fiscal stance, 
monetary policy and the foreign exchange rate regime are closely intertwined. In the 
BoE Group, while 20 out of 39 questionnaire respondents indicate that the exchange rate 
regime was decided, at least in part, by the central bank (question C2), it was determined 
by the government in 12 cases. In the other cases, it was a matter of historical accident 
or inheritance.13
There is a wide variety of reasons behind the choice of exchange rate regime. Interes­
tingly, only Israel and Hong Kong appear to use the exchange rate explicitly (although 
Singapore uses it implicitly) as a nominal anchor. Optimum currency area or dominance 
by a large neighbour explains most cases of definitively fixed exchange rates (Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Cyprus, Namibia, St. Lucia and Swaziland). However, its use as a 
nominal anchor lies behind Hong Kong’s choice of a fixed exchange rate and oil exports 
priced in US dollars behind the same choice by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emi­
rates. Argentina adopted its recent fixed exchange rate regime “as the only way to 
guarantee its [the peso’s] use by the public and allow the government to collect seignio­
rage” in the aftermath of hyperinflation and currency substitution in the 1980s.
Various reasons were given for the choice of a managed but not fixed exchange rate. 
Perhaps the greater flexibility it provides lay behind the responses from Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka that the choice was dictated by the liberalisation process. Other reasons 
include balance-of-payments equilibrium (Chile and South Africa), maintaining export 
competitiveness (India and Pakistan), unspecified trade-related advantages (Botswana,
13 For example, Lesotho and Swaziland have their exchange rate regimes determined by South Africa.
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Malaysia, Malta and Solomon Islands), and exchange rate stability (Jordan and Ku­
wait).14 As already pointed out above, Israel uses its managed exchange rate as a nomi­
nal anchor through a crawling peg designed to decelerate domestic inflation towards the 
world average. Floating exchange rates were chosen on the grounds of balance-of- 
payments equilibrium (Gambia), liberalisation (Jamaica, Uganda and Zambia), avoidance 
of speculative attacks (Mexico), avoidance of appreciation in the real exchange rate 
(Nigeria), and consistency with market-based economic policy (Sierra Leone).
Intervention in the foreign exchange market is decided by the central bank in most of the 
BoE group, in three cases after consultation with the government. In Argentina, Hong 
Kong and South Africa, the government takes responsibility for this decision. There was 
however more involvement by governments in the decisions over exchange controls, 
although 18 out of 26 central banks played some role in these decisions. In 12 of the 
BoE group, this question was not applicable since there are no exchange controls.
Perhaps of greatest significance is the fact that the choice of exchange rate regime is 
associated with the size of the government’s deficit. Using average deficits over the 
period 1979-1993, countries with fixed exchange rates posted deficits of 1.6 percent of 
GDP compared with 8.9 percent in countries with floating exchange rates; countries with 
managed exchange rates averaged government deficits of 4.1 percent of GDP.15 The 
exchange rate regime is also associated with a countiy’s foreign debt level: fixed ex­
change rate countries averaged foreign debts equal to 38 percent of GDP compared with 
101 percent of GDP for floating exchange rate countries. Again, managed exchange rate 
countries are between the two, but nearer the fixed rate countries, with debt/GDP ratios 
averaging 47 percent of GDP.
Some central banks in the BoE group are constrained to operate in an external frame­
work that was decided by their governments. It is possible that this decision may be 
determined more by fiscal considerations, than by monetary policy concerns. Given the
14 Presumably in comparison with a floating exchange rate regime.
15 All the differences and associations mentioned in this paragraph are significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level.
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close connection between monetary and exchange rate policy, a central bank that is faced 
with an ‘inappropriate’ exchange rate regime, or has to provide (implicit) subsidies in its 
external activities, will have increased difficulties to achieve price stability.16
4.4 Economic Development and Stability of Financial Systems
Central banks have two main inter-related functions, first the macro-function of maintai­
ning nominal price stability and second the micro-function of ensuring the healthy deve­
lopment of the payments, banking and financial systems. The functions are inter-related 
because the stability of the banking system will be threatened by high and volatile infla­
tion, while the price mechanism in turn is likely to be disturbed by booms and busts, 
especially systemic crises, in the payments and banking systems, and perhaps within the 
wider financial system as well.
4.4.1 Financial development and growth
There is a large literature on the relationship between the growth and development of the 
real economy and of the financial system, with two-way causation (e.g., Cameron, 1972, 
Cameron et al., 1967, Fry, 1995, Gerschenkron, 1962, Goldsmith, 1969, McKinnon, 
1973, Shaw, 1973, World Bank, 1989). In developing countries, commercial banks are 
usually the first, and often remain the most important, financial intermediaries. Channel­
ling saving through such intermediaries, with their specialised ability to assess the value 
of loan projects, should allow both larger and better projects to be financed (than when 
investment is done directly through family and friends). The development of the banking 
habit can encourage both saving and investment, and there is an association between a 
higher bank deposit/income ratio and both the level and rate of growth of output, that
16 For a more detailed analysis of the external activities of central banks in the BoE group, see Fiy, 
Goodhart, and Almeida (1996, ch. 4).
Monetary policy in developing countries 149
has been extensively documented (e.g., Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995, King and Levine, 
1993a and 1993b, Pagano, 1993, World Bank, 1989).
As an illustration of this, albeit in an exceedingly simple format, we examined the rela­
tionship between a number of variables relating to growth, i.e., the level of per capita 
incomes, the growth rate of real GDP, the saving/income and investment/income ratios 
over the whole period (taken as the average of the 15 years, 1979-1993) and a measure 
of the comparative development of bank intermediation, the deposit/income ratio, at the 
beginning of our period (taken as the average of the first five years). In the case of two 
countries, the saving ratio over this period was reported as negative. If these outliers are 
removed, the fit of the relationship with the saving ratio improves considerably; so this 
equation is reported with and without these outliers in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 Regressions of monetisation on growth
Dependent Variable t value ofBD/GDP, 1979-83 R2 Number o f  Countries
GDP per capita 1.77 0.052 40
Real GDP growth 1.06 0.003 36
I/Y 3.75 0.277 35
S/Y 1.45 0.046 24
S/Y without outliers 4.96 0.530 22
Notes: the table presents the t-value of the coefficient of the variable Bank deposits/GDP 1979-1983 average, on regressions of 
this variable and a constant term on the various dependent variables.
In all these regressions the relationship is positive, and with the investment ratio and 
saving ratio, excluding outliers, it is significantly so. Of course, the relationship between 
the increasing use of banks and growth is two-way, which is why we regressed the 
dependent variable over the whole period on the deposit/income ratio at the start of the 
period. If we run the relationship the other way around, in this instance by examining the 
relationship between the deposit income ratio at the end of the period (1989-1993) and 
the growth variables over the whole period (1979-1993), the fit improves for the saving 
ratio and per capita GDP, but not for the investment ratio, as shown in Table 4.8. It is 
perhaps plausible to surmise that the main causal forces run from saving to greater use of 
bank deposits, and from an expansion of financial intermediation through banks to 
investment.
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Table 4.8 Regressions of growth on monetisation
Explanatory
Variable
t value on explanatory variable, 
1989-1993 R2 Number o f Countries
GDP per capita 2.93 0.156 42
Growth in Real GDP 1.44 0.028 38
VY 2.32 0.093 37
S/Y 1.76 0.080 25
S/Y without outliers 5.56 0.576 23
Notes: the table presents the t-value of the explanatory variable (average 1989-1993), on regressions of this variable and a con­
stant term, on Bank deposits/GDP (1979-1993 average).
4.4.2 Central banks as promoters of financial development
Given this association between financial development and growth, it is only natural that 
central banks in all countries have great concern for the health, development and stabi­
lity of their payments, banking and financial systems more broadly, including the deve­
lopment of appropriate financial markets in their countries. But the responsibility of 
central banks in developing countries for the evolution and improvement of such systems 
in their own countries is even stronger because of their more predominant role within 
their own country’s financial system. The central bank is not only the centre of the 
financial system, but in many cases also its architect.
In most cases, the central banks in the BoE group are responsible for running and deve­
loping the payments’ systems, a somewhat mundane but nevertheless vital aspect both of 
their functions and of the proper working of the monetary system. Of the 38 central 
banks that responded to question B3, 26 indicated that they directly run the clearing 
system, while in 3 other cases the central bank runs it ‘partially’ (where it has banking 
offices). Even when it does not, it is almost always intimately involved as a participant 
and/or supervisor. What we found impressive is that 24 out of the 40 central banks 
completing our questionnaire stated that there had been major reforms to the payments’ 
system since 1975, and that in these 24 countries reporting major reforms, 16 central 
banks stated that they had initiated them. Of the others, only in Chile was the initiator 
clearly reported as not being the central bank; in Jamaica ‘some’ of the reforms were
Monetary policy in developing countries 151
initiated by the central bank, and in the other cases (Argentina, India, Pakistan, East 
Caribbean, Solomon Islands and United Arab Emirates) this part of question B6 was not 
answered, or not usably so.
We obtained the impression, from the answers to questions B13 and B14 on financial 
markets and interest rates, that there was now some considerable momentum, at least 
among the BoE group of developing countries, towards financial liberalisation and the 
use of indirect open-market techniques. Of the 40 countries in the BoE group who 
responded to question B16 about the use of indirect open-market operations, 28 (70 
percent) stated that they were already used (and of these two, Malta and Mauritius, 
referred to new financial instruments and liberalisation being introduced). In some cases, 
however, the use of such market mechanisms did not extend much further than the 
introduction of (primary) auctions in treasury bills, or other money market instruments, 
with little secondary market activity. Of the remainder, two, Cyprus and Trinidad and 
Tobago, reported reforms (e.g., removal of interest rate ceilings) that should enable them 
to introduce such techniques soon; Israel only used open-market operations on a limited 
basis, since the volume of treasury bills was too small for monetary management pur­
poses, but recently the Central Bank of Israel started purchasing government bonds to 
inject liquidity. Of the nine further countries reporting that they did not use open-market 
operations, two, Bahamas and Barbados, both noted specifically their participation in 
other respects in financial markets (Bahamas in the government securities market and 
Barbados in the treasury bill tender), and Namibia replied “Not yet”. The other negative 
replies came from the smallest countries, Belize, Brunei, Guyana, Eastern Caribbean, 
Solomon Islands and Swaziland.
The change from direct controls to indirect market mechanisms can only take place if 
developed financial markets exist, and in most cases this requires positive encoura­
gement, by the central bank and other relevant authorities, of financial markets. In order 
to assess progress on this front, we asked two specific questions, B12 on the current 
conditions in the money, bond, and equity markets, and B13 on the difficulties being 
faced in establishing them, in our questionnaire.
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Only two countries (Chile and Mexico) can be classified has having fully developed 
money, bond and equity markets. In four other countries (Hong Kong, India, Singapore 
and South Africa) the money and equity markets are fully developed, but the market for 
private sector bonds is still thin. At the other end of the spectrum, the Bahamas, Belize, 
Eastern Caribbean, Gambia, Guyana, and Sierra Leone do not have any formal money, 
bond or equity markets. Overall, we found that two thirds of the countries that res­
ponded to question B12 had very limited money and bond markets, reduced at most to 
primary issues of treasury bills or government bonds, and a very thin secondary market 
on these securities. The situation was similar for the equity market, with 60 percent of 
the countries having no formal stock market, or where a formally organised stock ex­
change existed, with few placements and low capitalisation and turnover.
One of the points that emerged from the analysis of questions B12 and B13, is that in 
both the money market and the bond market, but especially in the latter, there appears to 
be a need for a market, initially primary and then secondary, to be established in govern­
ment debt, both to provide a benchmark for pricing, an infrastructure of market making, 
a culture of investing and portfolio management, and a pool of liquidity, before there is 
much chance of developing an active market in private sector corporate debentures. 
Thus in Hong Kong, despite the advanced nature of its money and equity markets, its 
bond market was relatively dormant until the recent initiative to issue Exchange Fund 
Bills and Notes. On the other hand the public sector can have such a large appetite for 
longer-term borrowing that it may seem to crowd out private sector debentures, as in 
South Africa, and over some periods Israel. In some countries and at some times, 
moreover, institutional investors have been required to take up government bonds (at 
unfavourable prices), thereby further weakening the private sector bond market. The 
relationship between the roles of the public sector and the private sector in the develop­
ment of the bond market is more complex than in the case of the money and equity 
markets. This may well account for the fact that we have classified many fewer countries 
as having a fully developed bond market than in the other two cases.
We noted the large number of responses that reported developments in progress, and 
that indicated that these were being initiated by the central bank. We also asked what
Monetary policy in developing countries 153
were the three biggest difficulties in establishing these domestic financial markets in 
question B13. The most frequent complaint, mentioned by 15 of the 31 countries that 
responded to this question, related to the activities, or rather lack of activity, of private 
sector participants. You can take the private sector to a liberalised financial sector, but 
you cannot necessarily expect them to develop an investment ‘culture’ immediately. 
Entrepreneurs do not want to go public; investors sometimes seem to prefer a world of 
fixed and administered interest rates to one in which they have to make portfolio choices, 
which can go wrong. One question is whether such attitudes will naturally adjust over 
time; and, if not, what, if anything, the central bank can usefully do to improve the
17investment ‘culture’ among potential private sector participants?
Another obstacle, mentioned by 10 central banks, is the small dimension of domestic 
markets. Relatively few countries reported that the general macro-economic context, or 
explicit taxes on financial markets, were a major problem; and few also reported that the 
costs and expenses of actually running the market were a deterrent. A considerably 
larger number (eight) complained about factors under the general heading of market 
repression, e.g., administered interest rates, exchange controls, statutory requirements to 
hold bonds, but most of these complaints were backwards looking, relating to controls 
and requirements that either had been, or were in the process of being, phased out. The 
problems caused by market repression would seem to be passing into history.
4.4.3 Stability of the banking system
Central banks within the BoE group not only have an important role in developing their 
financial systems, but they are also responsible for the ongoing function of maintaining 
the continuing health of these systems by acting as their regulator and supervisor. Out of 
40 central banks in the BoE group responding to our questionnaire, all of them, except 
Chile, supervised their domestic banks, though the Banco de Mexico did so in conjunc­
17 We suspect, however, that if we had questioned such private sector participants, we would have 
received rather a different slant on the nature of the problems.
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tion with the Comision National Bancaria.18 Among the 39 respondents undertaking 
such supervision, eight countries reported that their supervisory functions were limited to 
the banking system only.19 By contrast, in five countries, Brunei, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Malaysia and Singapore, the central bank was asked to supervise virtually all financial 
institutions. In the remaining 26 countries the central banks were responsible for the 
supervision of a variety of near-bank deposit-taking and credit-giving institutions, buil­
ding societies, etc. In part because of the fuzziness of the dividing line between banks 
and non-bank financial intermediaries, there is no standardised remit for the ambit of the 
central bank’s supervisory function. That fuzziness, and the resulting uncertainty about 
the scale and scope of a central bank’s supervisory responsibilities, is unlikely to dimi­
nish over time.
Whether or not banks (and other financial entities) are supervised, some will make large 
losses and fail. One of the commonest cause of such failure is fraud, which will certainly 
entail trying to dupe the external supervisor (e.g., BCCI), and may often involve subver­
ting internal risk-management controls as well (as may have been the case in Barings). 
Once a bank has prospectively failed, and become potentially insolvent, the question of 
whether it should be rescued or not is contentious and depends, inter alia, on the likeli­
hood of any systemic effect if it is not rescued; on the culpability of the management and 
owners; and on the relative size of loss that would need to be shouldered by the deposi­
tors, if the bank was to fail, and by the central bank, by other commercial banks (if there 
was to be a ‘lifeboat’ rescue party), or taxpayers if a rescue was to be mounted.
Consequently the event and size of bank failure is not a measure of the success, or 
otherwise, of bank supervision. Nevertheless the incidence, resolution and problems 
involved in, such crisis occasions may be of interest in itself. There was a wide range of 
experience. Within the BoE group, fourteen central banks 20 (about one-third of the
18 The Comision National Bancaria is the supervisory authority; the Central Bank monitors transac­
tions and carries out analysis of risk management and efficiency to prevent excessive risk taking.
19 Belize, Gambia, Guyana, Mauritius, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands and South Africa. 
Moreover, in one of these, Guyana, financial legislation has just been enacted giving, in future, the 
central bank responsibility for supervising all institutions engaged in banking and/or financial business.
20 These were Belize, Cyprus, Fiji, Guyana, India, Lesotho, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Namibia, Saudi
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group) reported no failures, or occasions for central bank restructuring, or other re­
ported involvement during our chosen period, 1985-1993, and in six other countries the 
one problem needing resolution had arisen as part of the BCCI debacle, in Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Botswana, Mauritius, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, where in most cases the local 
business of BCCI was merged with another local financial institution (a finance company 
in Barbados, and a bank in Mauritius, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; it was restructured as a 
commercial bank in Bangladesh).
At the other end of the spectrum, in Kuwait, following the Iraqi invasion, the whole 
banking system had to be reorganised and recapitalised at considerable expense to the 
government. In the remaining 17 cases, where we had data, the number of banks (or 
supported financial institutions), and percentage of deposits involved in each country 
were as reported in Table 4.9.
Table 4. 9 Banking failures in the BoE Group
Number o f  financial 1 2 3 4 >5
institutions involved
Number of countries21 7 4 1 3 2
Percentage o f  deposits Neslisible <1 2-5 5-10 10-15
Number of countries22 3 4 4 2 2
Of the methods of dealing with failing banks, nationalisation (or a version of it) was used 
in three countries (in two of these temporarily prior to sale to private sector), mergers 
with another bank (including the BCCI cases) in eleven countries, liquidation in thirteen 
countries and other measures (mostly recapitalisation and restructuring with central bank
Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands and Zimbabwe. Whether there were cases, in these and other 
countries, of commercial bank ‘difficulties’ requiring some remedial action by the central bank, e.g., 
loans at concessionary rates, capital adequacy forbearance, etc., (which did not involve failure or require 
restructuring), we did not ask and do not know. In any case the definition of ‘difficulties’ and of 
‘remedial action’ would be amorphous, so it would not be easy to be confident that one was comparing 
like with like.
21 One country (Jordan) reported the percentage of deposits involved, but not the number of banks.
22 In two countries where there was no bank failure as such, but a commercial bank needed some 
support, no detail of the percentage of deposits in that bank was given.
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assistance) in seven countries. Ten countries used two or more methods generally 
involving the liquidation of some banks, and merging or restructuring others.
Seventeen central banks reported that the support operations had involved them in some 
expense. In those cases where such costs were heavy, e.g., in Chile (largely before 1985) 
and Kuwait, the cost of the exercise was predominantly borne by the government. In 
another case it was reported that there was a public outcry at state funds being used to 
‘bail out’ a private bank. The central bank bore administrative and audit costs, and in 
several cases, especially of smaller banks, was prepared to give loan guarantees in order 
to facilitate a merger between the bank in difficulties and another domestic bank. In 
addition, the central bank in some cases was prepared to make liquidity available on 
concessionary terms. In Malaysia, although the central bank had to apply a significant 
amount of funds in the initial restructuring process, most of the cost was recouped when 
the shares were subsequently resold to the private sector.
Concerns with the stability of the financial system may force central banks to suffer 
financial losses and to undesired monetary expansion. However, the experience of the 
BoE group in this area has been positive. If the BCCI related problems are ignored, 
almost half of the group had no reported difficulties with failing banks. Apart from the 
special case of Kuwait, and of Chile (though at an earlier date) and perhaps Malaysia and 
Zambia, the problems of failures in these countries were relatively mild in comparison 
with those in the OECD countries. Whereas this BoE group of countries compares 
poorly with the OECD countries in terms of inflation control, they compare well in terms 
of maintaining systemic stability. Nor is there any evidence that the inflation problems 
have been systematically caused by measures, e.g., expansionary monetary policy, aimed 
at propping up a fragile banking system, though it may be argued that the financial 
fragility of Chile in the early 1980s may have had macro-monetary consequences.
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4.5 Central Bank Independence
Research on OECD countries has shown a negative relationship between inflation and 
central bank independence, with the latter measured in a variety of ways, but usually 
including various measures of the central bank’s statutory status (Grilli, Masciandaro, 
and Tabellini, 1991, Alesina and Summers, 1993). We sought to explore the same 
general issues by asking for data on a variety of issues related to the constitutional status 
of the central bank in section F of the questionnaire, which might help to elucidate how 
subservient to the government, or alternatively independent, the central bank in each 
country was, together with a question about how independent each central bank assessed 
itself as being. In such exercises there is always a problem of getting the periodicity 
right. The status and independence of a central bank can change, as can its inflation 
experience (Chile and New Zealand represent two good examples). Moreover it may 
take time for any changes in the position of a central bank to become apparent in 
(average) inflation figures. Ideally perhaps we should have sought data for the central 
bank’s status in 1989, and examined whether and how this influenced inflation in 1991 
and over the average of the last five years. In practice, we are running the regressions 
the other way around, comparing the role of the central bank in 1995, with prior infla­
tionary experience in 1991 and over the average of 1989-1993. In particular, this caused 
severe problems in the case of Argentina. During our data period Argentina was the 
most inflationary country in our group. But in October 1992 its central bank, the Banco 
Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA), was given a new Charter, as part of the 
country’s sweeping currency and financial reform process. Following this reform BCRA 
now assesses itself as one of the most independent central banks in our group. To relate 
its current status, vis a vis independence, to inflation in 1991 or the average of 1989-93 
makes no sense at all. Consequently, where relevant, we exclude Argentina as an outlier.
The first four questions of section F of the questionnaire related to the appointment of 
the Governor and directors of the central bank. The answers showed very little diffe­
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rentiation, with the exception of question F4. The appointment of the Governor 
(question FI) was in all cases done within the public sector, by the Head of State, or 
government, or Head of State on the advice of the government. The term of appoint­
ment (question F2) was 5 years in 29 out of 38 cases, usually renewable.23 The govern­
ment, or the Head of State with the government, or some public sector body, was also 
responsible for appointing the directors of the central bank in almost all cases (34 out of 
38) (question F3). Only in four cases did the central bank itself (Bahamas, Hong Kong, 
Solomon Islands) or private sector shareholders (South Africa) play a role. There was, 
however, a much greater diversity of experience on whether a member of the Ministry of 
Finance (minister or permanent secretary) or other member of the government was, ex 
officio, a director (question F4). The results from our 37 responses are in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10 Answers to questions F4, F6, and F9
F4: Government officials No, but may Yes
on Central Bank Board No attend 1 2 3+
Number of Central Banks 11 3 15 5 3
F6: Index o f  decision makins 0 L 2 2K 3
Number of Central Banks 2 9 3 16 3 5
F9: Independence own-ratim 2 m  3 3fi 4 5
Number of Central Banks24 5 1 12 4 7 3
Question F5, where we asked for the statutory objectives of the central bank, was 
discussed in Section 4.2. We then asked in question F6 who decided on (a) interest rate 
changes, (b) changes to administered bank ceilings, ratios, etc., (c) new issues of govern­
ment debt. Decision (b) was almost always done solely by the central bank (28 out of 38 
cases) and jointly with another governmental body in seven more cases. Decision (c) 
was most usually (22 out of 38 cases) done solely by the government. Decision (a) was
23 Of the remainder, Nigeria specified that the 5-year term represented a non-renewable maximum; in 
India the government fixed the duration on appointment with a maximum of 5 years; Pakistan and 
Singapore had a renewable 3-year term, United Arab Emirates a 4-year term, Fiji a 3-5 year term, 
Argentina and Mexico 6 years, and Hong Kong was not fixed. Two central banks did not answer this 
question.
24 Seven central banks declined to classify themselves.
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most frequently shared between the two. Giving a value 1 when the central bank either 
took the decision itself, or took the lead in a joint decision, and V2 where it was consulted 
or the junior partner, provided an index of central bank powers over decision making,25 
with the histogram shown in Table 4.10.
Again there was a wide range of answers in response to question F7, whether the go­
vernment can require the central bank to finance its deficit. In four cases this was not 
answered; of the remaining 36, 26 stated yes that it could, subject to a variety of limita­
tions, and 10 that it could not. There was again a wide range of responses to question 
F8, what happens if government bond sales fail to cover the deficit. Out of the 38 central 
banks responding to this question, six stated that the question was not applicable, in most 
of these cases and certainly in three (Hong Kong, Singapore and United Arab Emirates) 
because there was no deficit to finance. Of the remaining 32, three stated that such 
financing was now prohibited (Argentina, Chile, and Saudi Arabia), 12 that it would 
normally be provided but not automatically, and 13 that it would be provided automati­
cally. Out of the 29 cases where such financing would (normally) be provided, in 25 
cases statutory limits on such borrowing almost always in the form of a percentage on 
government revenue were in place, but the penalty for transgressing these was rarely 
more than the need to report it to Parliament, and to regularise the position quite soon.
Finally we asked central banks, in question F9, how independent they viewed themselves 
as being on a scale of 1 (least) to 5 (most). The distribution of answers is presented in 
Table 4.10. We then investigated whether these differences in the constitutional status 
were associated with differences in the inflation record. First, we regressed the central 
banks’ self-assessment of independence against inflation, in 1991 and over the last five 
years (but not over the longer average for the reason earlier stated). The results, omit­
ting Argentina for the reasons specified, are presented in Table 4.11. The independence 
variable, F9, is significant (at the 95% level for the five year average and at the 90% level 
for 1991) and with the ‘correct’ sign.
25 In quite a number of cases the central bank did not answer, or stated that the question was not 
applicable to itself. So the alternative to a central bank decision should not automatically be assumed to 
be a government decision.
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Table 4,11 Inflation and self-assessment of independence
Dependent variable: inflation in 1991 Average 1989-1993
Coefficient on F9 -9.979 -14.272
t value -1.94 -2.45
R2 (0.09) (0.15)
Number of countries 30 30
Our next step was to examine the simple correlations between the questions F4 to F8 (FI 
to F3 being dropped, since the answers were too similar), and both inflation over the last 
five years and also the self assessment of independence (omitting Argentina in the corre­
lations with inflation). The results are in Table 4.12, where we also indicate our expec­
tation of the sign of the relationship in parenthesis, and emphasise (in italics underlined) 
when the correlation is significant. In these simple correlations only the relationships 
between F7 and F8 (which in any case overlap) and independence are correctly signed 
and significant; the same variables have the correctly signed relationship with inflation, 
but are not significant. Otherwise all the other F variables have an insignificant relation­
ship with inflation or perceived independence, and only the relationships between per­
ceived independence and F5A and F5B have the correct sign. This suggests that it is the 
relationship with government financing that is the key to the role and status of the central 
bank.
Table 4,12 F questions correlations with inflation and independence
Correlation coefficient Inflation (log of) Independence (F9)
F4: Government officials on CB Board -0.163 (+) +0.061 (-)
F5A: Statutory Objective for Price Stability +0.070 (-) +0.212 (+)
F5B: Statutory Objective for Growth -0.110 (+) -0.216 (-)
F6: Index of decision making powers +0.092 (-) -0.188 (+)
F7: Government can require CB financing 0.151 (+) -0.595 (-)
F8: Automatic financing if bond sales fail 0.186 (+) -0.640 (-)
Notes: The answer to F4 was quantified through an index taking the values 0 if no government officials are on the Board, Vi if 
they may attend the Board meetings, and the number participating otherwise. Positive answers to questions F5A, FSB and F7 
take the value 1, negative answers the value 0. The answer to F8 took the value 0 if financing is prohibited or not required, 1 if 
financing is normally provided but not automatic, and 2 if financing is automatically provided.
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This lack of correlation between inflation and the constitutional status of the central bank 
is in line with the results of Cukierman (1992), and Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 
(1992). The authors’ research among their set of developing countries suggested that 
statutory variables were less effective in explaining inflationary differences than a variable 
measuring the turnover rate among central bank governors; the lower the turnover rate, 
the lower inflation. We obtained information on the turnover rate of Governors from 
question A3. An histogram showing the number of central bank governors in each 
country since 1975, after correction for the age of the central bank, if founded after 
1975, is shown in Figure 4.4.
We replicated Cukierman’s exercise regressing the log of the inflation experience over 
our last 5-year period 1989-1993 against the (corrected) number of governors in each 
central bank. We extended the analysis by introducing as potential explanatory variables 
the answers to questions F4 to F8, and by introducing the self-assessment of indepen­
dence as an alternative dependent variable. We began with this full set of variables, and 
then progressively eliminated the most insignificant until we reached our preferred 
equation. The results are shown in Table 4.13. Finally we added the independence 
variable (F9) back into the best inflation equation. We omitted Argentina throughout 
this exercise, due to the unusually high level of inflation and turnover of governors 
before 1992.26 In addition, the results are shown exclusive of two other outliers (Belize 
and Zambia) in the second and third regressions.
Our ability to explain a central bank’s self-assessment of independence using this set of 
variables is reasonably good. Two of these variables are straightforward. The most 
important is the primacy given to price stability in the statutes (F5A), and the second 
most important is the rate of turnover of central bank governors (A3) (though this 
relationship may involve simultaneous causation, and we are unsure how we could 
instrument for this). Although not very significantly, the role of the central bank regar­
ding government financing also affects the self-assessment of independence: this is higher
26 The fit improves dramatically when Argentina is included. For instance, the t-value of A3, in the 
regression with only this variable, rises from 2.37 to 4.99.
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when central banks do not finance the government (F7), and if they do finance it, when 
such financing is not automatic (F8). In contrast to our prior expectations, we also 
found a positive and marginally significant relationship between the self-assessment of 
independence and the number of ex officio government participants on the Board of 
Directors (F4).
Table 4.13 Inflation and the status of the central bank
Dependent Explanatory variables No. o f
Variable A3 F4 F5A F5B F7 F8 F9 R2 Countries
Inflation
1989-1993
0.136
2.37
0.12 35
Inflation
1989-1993
0.134
2.30
-0.263
-2.04
-1.008
-2.17
0.381
1.85
0.35 25
Inflation
1989-1993
0.160
2.51
-0.310
-2.45
-1.028
-1.84
0.247
0.85
-0.142
-0.56
0.40 21
Independence
Assessment
-0.117
-2.02
0.178
1.46
1.191
2.36
-0.623
-1.46
-0.297
-1.20
0.48 23
Notes: the table presents the estimated coefficients and t-values (in italics) of regressions of the explanatory variables on the de­
pendent variables. In all the regressions a constant term was used, but is not presented here to save space. The last two columns 
display the adjusted R2 and the number of observations for each regression.
Our ability to explain inflation using this set of variables is also reasonably good,27 
although we had to exclude two outliers to achieve this result28 The results for A3, F4 
and F8 are consistent with the results for the independence equation. Once again a major 
conclusion is that the relationship between the central bank and its government is an 
important determinant of its role and status in the economy. The negative and significant 
relationship between inflation and F5B (explicit requirement in the central banks’ statutes 
to pursue growth) is hard to believe. It is probably a small sample result, but at least 
suggests that being statutorily constrained to pursue growth does not induce the central 
banks to follow inflationary policies. With independence F9 included in the set, the 
results do not change much, only F8 loses explanatory power.
27 We also tried entering some variables measuring the extent of the government deficit to be financed, 
i.e., both the deficit and the debt ratio as percent of GDP, but the number of usable countries (and 
particularly the degrees of freedom) fell so drastically that we could not pursue this line of enquiry on 
this data set.
28 If we include Belize and Zambia in the regressions, the R2 fells to 17% and 18%, in the equations 
with and without F9, respectively.
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4.6 Conclusion
In developing countries, monetary policy is conducted in an environment substantially 
different from that faced by central banks in more developed economies. We detected 
that there is a general acceptance of the benefits of price stability as the primary central 
bank objective in the BoE group, consistent with our finding that inflation damages 
growth. However, it seems that the average OECD central bank gives a higher priority 
to price stability than the central banks in our sample, judging from their inflation experi­
ence and from their statutes.
The poor results in the inflation front are likely to be caused by pressures on the central 
banks to pursue other objectives. Governments expect their central banks to perform a 
range of quasi-fiscal activities, and may require them to pursue external objectives that 
may be incompatible with the domestic objective of price stability. Given the strong 
association between economic and financial development, central banks in developing 
countries have a special responsibility for the development and stability of financial 
systems in their countries. Concerns with the stability of weak financial systems may 
induce central banks to monetary expansion in excess of what the domestic objective of 
price stability would require.
A central bank that is obliged to carry out a wide range of activities can hardly aspire to 
the same degree of independence from government as one which is only required to 
achieve price stability. The central banks in our sample recognise this in their own 
assessment of independence. This lack of independence and multiplicity if goals jeopar­
dises their ability to achieve their main objective, price stability.
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Appendix 4.A: Relevant Questions from Central Bank Questionnaire
Basic Details
A1. Name of Central Bank:
A2. Date when founded:
A3. Number of Governors since 1975 (or from foundation if later):
(...)
Domestic Role
(1) Payments System
B1. Is there a domestic system(s) for settling payments?
B2. What is its/their daily average turnover?
B3. Is it run by the Central Bank? Please specify relationship of Central Bank to the 
payments system(s).
(...)
B6. Have there been any major reforms to the payments system since 1975? If so, did 
the Central Bank initiate these reforms?
(2) Control over Banking System
B7. What balance sheet ratios are imposed on banks (capital, reserves, liquidity, other)? 
Please give percentages.
B8. What direct controls are imposed on bank loans to the private sector at present?
B9. Do such controls involve selective policies between sectors? If so, please specify.
BIO. Are there different Central Bank rediscount facilities for separate sectors? If so, 
please specify.
B11. Does the Central Bank guarantee any category of domestic loans? If so, which?
(3) Financial Markets
B12. Please specify the dates of development, the form and turnover of the following: 
(a) formal money market; (b) domestic bond market; (c) domestic equity market.
B13. Please list and explain the three biggest difficulties in establishing all or any of these 
domestic financial markets.
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(4) Interest Rates
B14. Please specify the current interest rate on: (a) Central Bank (discount window) 
loans to banks; (b) commercial bank lending (please state type of loan and whether 
the rate is average or prime); (c) Government bonds; (d) commercial bills: (e) 
treasury bills; (f) priority loans under directed credit schemes.
B15. Which of these rates are either administratively set or have administratively set 
ceilings?
B16. Does the Central Bank employ indirect (open) market techniques? If so, in which 
market(s) and how?
External Role
C1. What is the type of exchange rate regime?
C2. Is the exchange rate regime decided by the government, the Central Bank, jointly,
or other?
C3. On what basis was the current exchange rate regime chosen (if known)?
C4. Is intervention on the foreign exchange market decided by the government, the
Central Bank, jointly, or other?
C5. What are the techniques and modalities of intervention on the foreign exchange 
market?
C6. Are foreign exchange controls decided by the government, the Central Bank, 
jointly, or other?
Cl. Who administers foreign exchange controls?
(...)
Supervision and Regulation
Dl. For which financial markets and financial institutions, e.g., banks, mortgage 
houses, insurance companies, etc., is the Central Bank the supervisory authority?
(...)
D4. Please specify the extent of bank failure, 1985-1993, in terms of the percentage of 
total deposits.
D5. Have bank failures been resolved by: (a) nationalisation; (b) merger with another
bank; (c) liquidation; (d) other (please specify). [We would be grateful for the
numbers of banks and total deposits involved in each case.]
D6. Has the resolution/restructuring of problem banks involved a cost to the Central
Bank? If so, did this cause a problem and how was that resolved?
(...)
166 Chapter 4
Central Bank Independence
F1. Who appoints the Governor?
F2. What is the period of the Governor’s appointment?
F3. Who appoints other directors of the Central Bank?
F4. Are any directors members of the government or Ministry of Finance? If so, please 
specify.
F5. Does the Central Bank have statutory objective(s)? If so, please specify.
F6. Who decides on: (a) adjustments of administered interest rates; (b) adjustments of
administered bank ceilings, balance sheet ratios, etc.; (c) the issue of additional 
public sector debt.
F7. Can the government require the Central Bank to finance its deficit
F8. What happens if government bond sales fail to cover the government’s deficit? Is
Central Bank financing automatic? Are there any limits? If so, what happens if the 
limits are exceeded?
F9. On a scale 1-5 (1 is least, 5 most), how independent would you rate your Central 
Bank?
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Figure 4.1: Economic Growth and CPI Inflation 
(average of annual data 1979-1993, percent)
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Figure 4.2\ CPI Inflation and its Standard Deviation 
(annual data, 1979-1993)
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Figure 4.3: CPI Inflation and Ml growth rate 
(average of annual data, 1979-1993)
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Figure 4.4\ Number of Governors since 1975 
(corrected for the age of the Central Bank)
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Chapter 5
Does the Adoption of Inflation Targets 
Affect Central Bank Behaviour?
5.1 Introduction
Perhaps both the most difficult, and the most crucial, decision for a study of how those 
central banks which have adopted inflation targets (IT) have fared, is to decide which 
central banks to include within the chosen set. Nowadays almost all central banks make 
price stability their main objective. Price stability is regarded, for this policy purpose, as 
a low rate of inflation,1 low enough to prevent agents consciously factoring in expecta­
tions of future inflation into their price/wage setting decisions. Consequently virtually 
all central banks have an inflation target, though this may be unquantified and implicit 
rather than quantified and explicit. Our objective in this chapter is not to discuss the 
adoption of price stability as the main objective for monetary policy, but to examine the 
implications of publicly announcing and making this objective explicit and precise. An 
explicitly numerically quantified inflation target is one feature that is common to all IT
1 The alternative, of adopting a target for the price level, has been discussed by economists in several 
theoretical contributions, e.g., Fischer (1994), Goodhart (1994), McCallum (1996), but has not yet been 
considered a serious practical possibility by central banks. See subsection 5.2.2 on this issue.
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countries, but not unique to this group. Several non-IT countries also publicly report a 
numerical value for the inflation rate which they are seeking to achieve at some future 
date (e.g., France, Italy or Portugal).
What does seem to be somewhat more distinct among IT countries is that there is no other 
specified, numerically quantified, intermediate target,2 such as a monetary or an exchange 
rate target, the achievement of which is treated as a means of achieving the inflation target. 
But any dividing lines between IT and non-IT central banks remain fuzzy. For example, as 
we discuss in subsection 5.2.3, the distinction between the role of the concurrent rate of 
monetary expansion on the monetary policy decisions in Spain and Germany is not that large. 
In both countries policy decisions are based on a wide set of indicators, with the growth of a 
money aggregate having a privileged role. The situation is, perhaps, even more indistinct 
with respect to exchange rates. In all the IT countries, variations in the exchange rate are 
perceived as having an important influence on future inflation, as we discuss in subsection 
5.2.4, although it is not regarded as a target in its own right. Nevertheless, given the inflation 
target, comfort zones for the exchange rate can be internally defined, and monetary policy 
could be based on those ‘targets’. By comparison, the central banks in Latin America (e.g., 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico) generally combine both an exchange rate operating target and an 
inflation objective. But in these cases, the key operational decisions are primarily driven by 
the exchange rate target rather than the attempt to achieve a numerically specified inflation 
objective (see Masson, Savastano, and Sharma, 1997).
The most problematical case is that of Israel which combines an intermediate exchange 
rate objective (a crawling peg) with an explicit numerically quantified inflation target. In 
their Conference on experiences with Inflation Targets, which the Bank of England 
hosted in March 1995, the proceedings of which can be found in Haldane (1995a), Israel 
was included as an IT country. We believe, however, that Israel should be included, 
with the Latin American countries, as primarily operating on the basis of an intermediate 
exchange rate target. Although increased importance has been attached to the targeting
The US has no other intermediate targets either, but it is not regarded as an IT country. It has no explicitly 
quantified, numerical target for inflation, and is currently required (by Act of Congress) to take into consi­
deration several other objectives besides price stability.
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of inflation in the last four years, the existence of an announced crawling band may 
sometimes force the central bank to take policy actions which are only triggered by 
exchange rate developments and are not related to inflation concerns, as it would 
happen in a pure IT country, but the distinction is fine.3
Our set of IT countries is the same as that adopted by the Bank of England, apart from 
Israel, which we exclude from our group, and the one adopted by the Bank for Interna­
tional Settlements, and includes Australia, Canada, Finland (until October 1996),4 New 
Zealand, Spain, Sweden and the UK. What distinguishes this group from other coun­
tries where price stability is the sole objective of monetary policy is that there is an 
official commitment from the monetary authorities to achieve a clearly defined, numeri­
cally quantified, target for inflation,5 together with the absence of any other intermediate 
target.6 In the IT countries policy changes are usually explained and justified as caused 
by prospective movements in inflation, for which prior monetary or exchange rate 
movements will often be a prime explanation; whereas in the non-IT countries, policy 
decisions will normally be explained and justified in terms of the rate of growth of some 
intermediate monetary target or some change in the exchange rate, unless there are good 
grounds for believing that these are not giving a reasonable prediction for future infla­
tion.
The existence of an explicit and precise IT, instead of a simple reference to price stabi-
3 The role of the exchange rate targets and inflation targets in the monetary policy of Israel is dis­
cussed in Ben-Bassat (1995).
4 In October 1996 the Finnish Markka joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 
preparation for becoming one of the initial participants in the Euro in January 1999. Although it was 
announced that the inflation target of 2% would not be affected “under favourable conditions”, at that 
time the President of the Central Bank clearly stated that the exchange rate would assume increasing 
importance in the conduct of monetary policy, with precedence over any other objective (Bank of 
Finland Bulletin, December 1996, p. 3-8). So Finland then ceased to meet our definition of an IT 
country.
s Although we chose this sample in part because we thought that these countries had clearly defined 
targets, after investigation we realised that, at least in some of them, the targets are somewhat less 
precise than we had initially believed. Still, the definition of the targets in the sample countries is more 
precise than in non-IT countries, where the policy objective is defined as ‘price stability’ with few 
details of what is meant by that.
6 After completion of the first draft, we came across a paper by Svensson (1997) where the set of 
countries described as having an IT framework is the same as ours, and where the description of the 
characteristics of the IT framework is similar to our own.
172 Chapter 5
lity being the objective of policy, provides an anchor for inflation expectations and helps 
to make the monetary authorities more accountable.7 All of the countries in our sample 
have recently been granted greater independence from government for determining 
interest rates.8 Unless there is an operating exchange rate target (and it is dubious whether 
the wide band ERM in being since August 1993 necessarily represents an operating target), 
or an unusually well-behaved demand-for-money (velocity) function, then the grant to central 
banks of greater independence to vary interest rates (‘instrument independence’ as defined by 
Fischer, 1994), has usually in the last few years been accompanied by the acceptance by the 
central bank of a more transparent, and numerically quantified, inflation target. The excep­
tion to that may be the prospective European Central Bank, though it is still possible that it 
may set such a quantified inflation target for itself. The absence, in the Maastricht Treaty, of 
any requirement for such transparency and hence accountability has been criticized 
(Goodhart, 1991 and 1992b, Kenen, 1992, Cukierman, 1995).
Another difficult choice we had to make regarded the dates of introduction of IT in the 
countries in our sample. It is hard to assign a specific date to changes in policy frame­
works, especially for inflation targeting, given the similarities between inflation targeting 
and other frameworks where price stability is the objective of policy. This is a problem 
similar to the choice of countries to include in the IT set, and the reasons behind our 
choice of dates are the same as for our choice of countries. Our emphasis is on the 
existence of an official explicit commitment from the monetary authorities to achieve a 
precisely defined, numerically quantified, target for inflation. Thus, we took the date of 
introduction of IT to be the date of the official announcement of the commitment to achieve 
a precisely defined target. According to this criterion, the dates of the announcements of 
inflation targets were as follows:
7 The argument for adopting an explicit IT is discussed in subsection 5.2.1.
8 In the UK this occurred in two steps. While there was a move in that direction in 1992/93, the 
formal decision to alter interest rates remained with the Chancellor until May 1997. Then, after the 
election of the Labour Government, the incoming Chancellor transferred autonomy to vary interest rates 
to the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, a committee consisting (after an initial 
transition period) of five Bank officials and four independent outside experts. Briault, Haldane and 
King (1996) discuss why there has been a general move towards more central bank independence in 
recent years.
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Australia 1993 9
Canada 1991, February 26th
Finland 1993, February 2nd
New Zealand 1990, March 2nd11
Spain 1995, January 1st12
Sweden 1993, January 15th
UK 1992, October 8th
Policy frameworks are not changed in one day, and it is likely that some central banks 
were already behaving as IT, even before the official announcement of the target. 
Furthermore, giving the usually long policy lags, some of the observed performance of 
IT countries must reflect monetary policies that were in place before the adoption of IT. 
These problems should be taken into consideration when analysing the results of our 
exercises that involve the use of the announcement dates.
Our chosen set of countries is small, and they have only adopted IT for a short period. Since 
our data period ends in most cases at the end of 1996 (in some cases in 1997), it is far too 
short a period to make any robust claims about the effectiveness of IT, as McCallum (1996)
9
It is difficult to determine precisely the date of the announcement of IT in Australia. Initially the Central 
Bank unilaterally adopted a quantified numerical IT without the involvement or blessing of the Government 
Subsequently, however, Ministers came to speak approvingly of this initiative, and with a Labour Government 
having thus consented to it, and the new Liberal Government also in favour, IT in Australia can be viewed as 
firmly established. For the exercises that require the use of the announcement date, we assumed it to be 
1/1/1993.
10 This is the date of the joint announcement of the inflation-reduction targets by the Government, as 
part of its annual budget presentation, and the Bank of Canada, through a press release. Although the 
Governor of the Bank of Canada, John Crow, had been publicly stressing for some time (at least since 
his Hansen Lecture of 1988) that price stability was the monetary policy objective, we believe these 
statements do not represent the sort of official commitment to a precisely defined target that we take to 
be the characteristic of IT countries.
11 This is the date the first Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) between the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand and the Government was signed. Since April 1988, the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, 
and the Associate Minister of Finance, Peter Neilson (the Ministry of Finance was then responsible for 
monetary policy), had been making several statements stressing the Government’s intention of bringing 
inflation down to very low levels. Again, as in the case of Canada, we believe that these statements do 
not fulfil the characteristics of an IT as we define it, and that only after the signing of the first PTA 
New Zealand had an official commitment to achieve a precisely defined target.
12 In Spain, the IT was announced in December 1994, but was formally adopted as of January 1st, 
1995.
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also emphasized in his recent review article on inflation targeting. Nonetheless such is the 
interest in this subject that we could not resist making such attempts.
One of the major problems is that the last few years have been characterized by a special 
world-wide set of conditions (themselves no doubt partly reflecting the shift of emphasis in 
monetary policies in many countries). Among these conditions have been a rapid decline in 
inflation to low levels, which was generally sharper than forecast either by central banks or 
private sector commentators, and in many, but not all, countries a further increase in unem­
ployment. So, by comparison with their own earlier history, IT countries may be assessed as 
having been, (a) successful with their prime aim of reducing inflation, (b) congenitally likely 
to exaggerate the future likelihood of a resurgent inflation, and (c) having only achieved low 
inflation by higher unemployment. But all these phenomena may result more from the 
international context, rather than from any special particularities resulting from the adoption 
of IT itself.
In order to try to guard against such problems we have, in various exercises, tried to com­
pare the results of the IT countries against those from a set of comparable countries. But 
which countries might be comparable? All our set of IT countries were industrialized OECD 
countries, so we restricted our comparator group to that set. Most of our IT countries 
started with middling inflation rates; so we chose as comparator countries those with roughly 
similar initial inflation rates.13 Nevertheless, such a choice is always problematical so we 
chose four, overlapping, non IT control groups. The first two groups consisted of countries 
with similar inflation levels in the 1980s (one is composed of 5 and the other of 7 countries), 
the third consisted of 5 countries with similar inflation levels in the period 1987/92, and the 
fourth is composed by 7 countries that we subjectively chose as facing similar economic 
environments as the IT countries.
But one cannot make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. Our selected set of IT countries is 
small, and the selection process debatable. So is the selection of a control group. The
13 We regard this as an important criterion. Countries that had low inflation at the outset, e.g., Germany, 
may find it hard to improve on their performance; while the experience of initially high inflation countries 
may be startlingly good, or bad, and in either case bias the conclusions.
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number of years in which the central banks have been applying IT is very small, and these 
years had some special world-wide characteristics. Given the lack of data, the results are 
likely to be sensitive to the empirical methods used. It is far too soon to reach any robust, 
statistically significant conclusions about the effects of that choice on the macro-economic 
outcome.
Where it may be somewhat easier, at least in some matters, to establish whether the adoption 
of IT made a major difference is with respect to its influence on the behaviour of the central 
banks themselves. The adoption of a numerically quantified IT makes the comparative 
success, or failure, of a central bank more transparent. But the lengthy lags in the effect of 
interest rates on nominal incomes and on inflation make it necessary to adjust interest rates 
now to forecast future inflation, if there is to be much hope of controlling inflation to the 
desired degree of accuracy. With the central bank now also having greater responsibility for 
adjusting domestic interest rates, the shift to IT is likely to bring with it the need for revised 
and expanded communications, with both government and public, about both inflation 
forecasts and current actions. Moreover, there are some instances where the upwards shock 
to inflation comes from the supply rather than from the demand side.14 In general the central 
bank should not seek to offset the first-round effect of that. How easily, if at all, can the 
central bank not only follow that precept, but also communicate it to the general public?
Large interest rate changes (especially if upwards) are not only unpopular but may also be 
destabilising to the economy and to the financial system. Moreover, any reversals of direc­
tion of interest rate changes within any short period (e.g., up, then down) may give an 
appearance of vacillation in policy and uncertainty in approach. Whether for these, or other, 
reasons central banks have typically smoothed interest rate adjustments, i.e., they tend to 
make a consecutive series of some six, or so, small adjustments (of about V2V0 each typically) 
in discount (base) rates over a period lasting several quarters, rather than fewer, larger 
adjustments, (see Rudebusch, 1995, Goodhart, 1996). This syndrome has been criticized as 
‘too little, too late’, and resulting in strong auto-correlation in inflation. Since the objectives
14 The existence of continuing supply-side shocks is taken as axiomatic in much of the literature on central 
bank independence. With the important exception of the various oil shocks, it is less clear how large or 
frequent such supply-side shocks have been in practice.
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of IT have been, as we shall demonstrate, demanding both in terms of level and permitted 
range of fluctuation (between the bands), has this caused any difference either to central 
bank’s operating techniques or reaction functions? In particular, is there any evidence among 
IT countries that they have varied interest rates earlier or in larger steps than in the past?
Our main focus is, therefore, on whether and how the adoption of IT may have affected 
the behaviour of those central banks. This will, we believe, represent our main contri­
bution. In order to obtain more information and understanding, especially on this aspect 
of the behaviour of IT central banks, we wrote to them in January 1996, and we re­
ceived full, frank and helpful replies.15 We are particularly grateful to these senior 
officials for being so patient, courteous and helpful. Much of the body of this chapter 
could only have been undertaken with their assistance.
5.2 The Execution of Monetary Policy
5.2.1 Reasons behind the adoption of inflation targets
The adoption of IT has usually followed the recognition of the failure of the previous 
monetary policy strategy. This is obvious in the cases of the UK, Sweden and Finland, 
where IT was adopted just after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regimes.16 The 
adoption of IT in Spain, although it followed the granting of autonomy to the Central 
Bank, also reflected some disappointment with the use of both monetary aggregates and 
the exchange rate as an intermediate target (following the 1992/93 ERM crisis and 
consequent widening of the fluctuation bands). In Canada, New Zealand and Australia, 
the adoption of IT followed a period of discretionary monetary policy, where no explicit
15 In view of subsequent events, e.g., in the UK in May 1997, we have updated this material for some 
countries.
16 The Finnish markka and the British pound were floated in September 1992, and the Swedish krona 
in November 1992, and IT was adopted in October 1992, January 1993 and February 1993, respectively 
in the UK, Sweden and Finland.
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and quantified target was used, a strategy that was generally judged to have been unsa­
tisfactory and was only implemented in the absence of a better alternative.17
Given the differences in the monetary policy strategies previously in place, we should 
expect the observed effects of the adoption of IT in the behaviour of the central banks in 
our sample to be substantially different for European and non-European central banks. 
The transition from a fixed exchange rate regime to a floating exchange rate regime 
implies, by itself, substantial changes in the execution of monetary policy. For the 
European countries in our sample, the adoption of an IT coincided with such a regime 
switch. Thus, we cannot separate empirically the changes in behaviour caused by the 
change in exchange rate regime and the adoption of IT. This is not the case for the non- 
European countries, where the adoption of an IT was not accompanied by any other 
major change in the monetary policy strategy. In the following analysis, such differences 
between the two groups should be kept in mind.
The adoption of IT can be seen, in all the countries in our sample, as an alternative to 
discretionary monetary policy, in an environment where the use of exchange rates or 
money aggregates as intermediate targets is thought to be unsatisfactory. The official 
statements made at the time of the adoption of IT usually advance two arguments for 
the abandonment of a discretionary monetary policy: the need to provide an anchor for 
inflation expectations and the need to make the central bank18 more accountable. The 
private sector cannot understand fully the stance and the consequences of a discretionary 
monetary policy, nor can they anticipate correctly the actions of the central bank. In this 
situation, the formation of inflation expectations becomes a complicated process, and 
uncertainty about future inflation is much higher than with a strategy where a credible IT 
has been previously set. Also, under a discretionary monetary policy it is difficult to 
evaluate the performance of the central bank, since there are no clear and easy to verify
17 New Zealand had abandoned exchange rate targets in 1985. Monetary targets were used in Australia 
(from 1976 to 1985) and Canada (from 1975 to 1982), but were abandoned because they were not 
considered to be reliable indicators of policy.
18 Or, in the UK case, until May 1997, the Chancellor, who was ultimately responsible for monetary 
policy.
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benchmarks against which the performance can be compared. An explicitly and pre­
cisely set IT provides such a benchmark, thus making the central bank more publicly 
accountable.
Where the accountability of the monetary policy decision process was an important 
reason for the adoption of IT, such targets were set as the outcome of an agreement 
between the central bank and the government (in New Zealand and Canada) or by the 
government, acting unilaterally (in the UK). Where the main concern was to provide an 
anchor for inflation expectations, the IT was set unilaterally by the central bank, al­
though in some cases these targets were later endorsed by the government (as happened 
in Australia, Finland and Spain). The fact that the IT is announced jointly by the central 
bank and the government may enhance the credibility of the target, as long as the joint 
announcement implies a commitment by one party, the agent, which is monitored by the 
other, the principal, especially if the agent deciding on monetary policy suffers an 
effective penalty if targets are not met.19
The first reason why a joint commitment could be credibility-enhancing is that in some 
countries budgetary measures may be necessary to help control inflation and inflation 
expectations. Where fiscal problems were one of the main causes of the past inflationary 
pressures, and high stocks of public debt can raise the spectre of the government even­
tually forcing a partial monetization of the debt, low inflation can only be a credible 
target if measures to reduce the budget deficit are put in place. A strong commitment 
from both the government and the central bank to an inflation target reinforces the 
likelihood that the targets will be achieved, if this joint commitment can be interpreted as 
a sign of monetary and fiscal policy coordination.
The other reason one could expect higher credibility from a joint commitment is the fact 
that as long as the right incentives are in place,20 the external monitoring may play the
19 Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) show that an adequate incentive contract for central 
bankers may eliminate any inflationary bias they may have. The monitoring and associated penalties 
could be seen as such an incentive contract.
20 In New Zealand, the Central Bank Governor may be dismissed if the inflation targets defined in the
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role of a ‘precommitment technology’ that could overcome the ‘time-inconsistency’ 
problem of monetary policy, as described in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983a). For central banks who unilaterally set the IT, there are few effective 
sanctions. A central bank governor missing a pre-stated target is unlikely to sanction 
himself, though he might face public obloquy. Even if a government was secretly happy 
with faster monetary expansion (than the target would imply),21 the fact of missing a 
published target to which the government had set its name will give rise to demands for 
it to respond; sacking, or fining, the governor will be relatively painless for the govern­
ment itself (in most cases). Also, a joint announcement is more likely to be realistic: 
knowing that it may be held accountable for missing it, the central bank will not accept 
the over optimistic targets politicians tend to set.
The only incentive to stick to the target central banks who unilaterally set their target 
have, is the effect on their long term reputation of missing (or constantly changing) it.22 
If their track record on inflation, before the adoption of IT, is not very good, their 
current reputation will be low, and losing it would not be a very serious problem. Only
Policy Targets Agreement, signed between the Central Bank and the Government, are not met. Here 
the incentives to achieve the target are apparently high, since there are explicit sanctions for failures. In 
1995 and 1996 the objective, the underlying CPI index, exceeded the target (then 0-2%) and this led the 
Governor to tender his resignation in 1996, but it was refused. Subsequently, following the election of a 
coalition government, the band was widened to 0-3%.
In Canada and the UK there are no pre-set sanctions, but the fact that one party publicly monitors 
the performance of the other may constitute a sufficient incentive. In the UK the Chancellor was 
responsible for monetary policy until May 1997, and the Bank of England then monitored the inflation 
performance: if targets were not met, the Bank of England publicly announced it, and this could have 
harmed the government politically. From May 1997 onwards, the tables were reversed. The Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England became responsible for achieving the inflation target, 
set as 2V*% for RPIX on a continuous basis. If, and when, RPIX diverges from this target by more than 
1% on either side, the MPC is required to write a letter to the Chancellor explaining why this has 
happened and outlining its intentions for restoring inflation to target. As the (then prospective) Deputy 
Governor, Mervyn King, remarked (1997), “Given past experience of inflation volatility, it is likely, 
even allowing for the change in policy regime, that the MPC will have many opportunities to restore the 
lost art of letter-writing to British life.”
In Canada, the fact that an explicit target set by the government is missed may be used as a political 
argument not to reappoint a central bank governor the government dislikes; if  the targets are met, the 
non reappointment of a governor that achieved the targets the government itself has set might be 
politically difficult to explain. The incentives to stick to the target exist in the three countries, although 
it may be argued that they are not strong enough to make the IT fully credible.
21 The inflationary bias of politicians was one of the main arguments the Roll Committee Report 
(1993, Sections 2.5 and 3.3) advanced against joint targets.
22 Reputational solutions for the time-inconsistency problem may be found, for example, in Barro and 
Gordon (1983b).
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after the central bank has established a track record by meeting the targets for a rea­
sonably long period, will the inflation target become credible, since only then will the 
damage to the reputation of reneging the announced targets have a significant cost. 
Rogoff (1985) suggested that if the central bank is independent from the government, 
and the central bank governor is ‘conservative’, i.e., places a higher relative weight upon 
inflation stabilisation, the ‘time-inconsistency’ problem may disappear. Thus, it could be 
argued that an IT announced by an independent central bank could be as credible as a 
joint commitment. The adoption of IT in the countries in our sample has been associ­
ated with changes to, or attempts to change, the legal framework of the central bank to 
make it more independent (although in the case of the UK, the adoption of IT in 1992 
preceded the grant of greater autonomy to the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of 
the Bank of England in May 1997, and the passage of the associated Bank of England 
Art in 1998). However, even in the case of an independent central bank the credibility 
of the IT will not be as high as in the joint announcement with sanctions case:23 first, 
because legal independence does not necessarily mean actual independence; second, 
because an independent central banker is not necessarily the same as a ‘conservative’ 
central banker.24 To repeat, only after a reasonably long period of proving that the 
central bank is actually independent and the governor is ‘conservative’ will the IT 
become credible. Making the central bank independent does not eliminate the need for 
reputation building. Only the existence of external monitoring associated with an 
appropriate incentive scheme may have a short term effect on credibility.
The issue discussed in the paragraphs above refers to what Andersson and Berg (1995) 
call ‘operational credibility’ of IT, i.e., the likelihood that the IT will effectively be met, 
given the current institutional framework, which they distinguish from the ‘political 
credibility’ of IT, i.e., the likelihood of a regime shift, where the current framework may
23 Note that the argument for joint announcements only holds if the central bank is effectively inde­
pendent from the government. If this is not the case, government and central bank are the same entity 
in terms of decision power, and in this case a joint announcement is in fact an unilateral announcement.
24 Mexico provides an example of a central bank to which formal independence has been granted, but 
is perceived to be not completely independent from the government. Russia provides an example of an 
independent central bank that was less ‘conservative’ than the government: under Governor 
Gerashchenko, the monetary policy in Russia was highly inflationary, much more than the Yeltsin 
government desired.
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be replaced by another not favouring price stability. ‘Political credibility’, inter alia, 
depends on the size of public debt and current budget deficits (as incentives to generate 
inflation in the future), but it depends above all on the support given to the IT frame­
work by the political opposition. Any legislative framework favouring price stability 
introduced by one government may be reversed by future governments. If the opposi­
tion political parties are against the IT, the long term credibility of the framework is 
seriously affected.25 Only an IT endorsed by the current government and by all the 
opposition political parties that are likely to become (part of) the government in the 
medium term may be credible, and varying degrees of support by opposition parties is 
likely to be reflected in empirically observed varying degrees of credibility.26
5.2.2 Choice of target
An IT must be credible, to provide a good anchor for inflation expectations. This 
implies that it should be stated in a simple and clear way, and it has to be feasible. It 
must be flexible, in the sense that it should allow for monetary policy to accommodate 
some unexpected (supply) shocks and to adjust to changing economic environments. It 
must be easily verifiable, to make the central bank accountable. These desirable charac­
teristics of an optimal IT restrict the choice of each central bank, but there is still some 
scope for differences. Table 5.1 compares the targets adopted by the countries in our 
sample, and the main trade offs are briefly discussed below.
25 Svensson (1995) and Andersson and Berg (1995) argue that in the case of Sweden the main problem 
was of ‘political credibility’, especially before the elections of September 1994. The opposition social- 
democrats were against the IT, and they were expected to change the Riksbank board (and adopt 
inflationary policies) if they would win the elections, as they eventually did. After the election the 
social-democrats surprised observers by appointing an independent chairman to the board, who rein­
forced the IT as the monetary policy objective. Ammer and Freeman (1995) refer to similar doubts 
about the medium term permanence of the IT before the 1993 elections in Canada. The ‘political 
credibility’ of the New Zealand IT was also affected in 1995 by calls to abandon the PTA framework by 
two opposition parties. After the election there in 1996 there was some uncertainty whether one of the 
parties in the new coalition government (New Zealand First) would accept continuation of IT. In the 
event the regime was extended, subject to a 1% widening of the band, a reform which many had felt to 
be technically desirable in any case. In the UK, the previous Conservative Chancellor, Ken Clarke, 
publicly opposed giving greater autonomy to the Bank in May 1997, but the position of the Conserva­
tive Party, as a whole on this issue has remained (at least at the time of writing at end 1997) unclear 
and probably divided.
26 Evidence regarding the credibility of IT is presented below in Section 5.4.
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Table 5.1 Design of inflation targets
Australia Index:
Caveats:
Target:
Horizon:
underlying CPI (excluding fruit and vegetables, petrol, interest costs,
public sector prices and other volatile prices)
none
2% - 3% on average 
immediate
Canada Index:
Caveats:
Target:
Horizon:
CPI (underlying CPI - excluding food, energy, and first round effects of 
indirect taxes - is used as the base for policy decisions) 
large increases in oil prices, natural disasters 
2%± 1%
1995-98 (new target to be set by 1998)
Finland Index:
Caveats:
Target:
Horizon:
underlying CPI (excluding effects of taxes, subsidies and housing related
capital costs)
none
around 2%
from 1995 (until effectively terminated in October 1996)
New Index: CPI
Zealand Caveats:
Target:
Horizon:
significant changes in indirect taxes or government charges, significant 
changes in import or export prices, interest costs, natural disasters (in 
practice, the target is an underlying CPI index, calculated by the RBNZ as 
the CPI modified by the caveats)
0% - 3% (since December 1996; previously 0-2%) 
to the end of Governor’s term 27
Spain Index:
Caveats:
Target:
Horizon:
CPI
only generic caveats (e.g., role of fiscal policy and wage behaviour) 
2%
from 1998
Sweden Index:
Caveats:
Target:
Horizon:
CPI 
none 
2%± 1% 
from 1995
UK Index:
Caveats:
Target:
Horizon:
RPIX (RPI excluding mortgage interest payments)
effects of indirect taxes and subsidies and interest costs
2.5% (an explanatory letter has to be written when deviation from target
is ±1%)
indefinitely until revised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which 
revision can be made at any time
27 The description of the New Zealand target refers to the situation as of November 1997. Following 
the announcement of the reappointment of the Governor for a further term of office to 31 August 2003, 
a new PTA was signed on 15 December 1997. This PTA extends the 0-3% target out to the expiry of 
the Governor’s next term. It also changes the formal target from the CPI (headline inflation) to the CPI 
excluding the credit services component (CPIX). The RBNZ has subsequently announced that it will 
cease calculating underlying inflation, and instead will use CPIX as the only target measure. It also 
will explain the effects of shocks on the CPIX measure, rather than adjust the target measure itself for 
the effect of those shocks.
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When defining an IT, the first choice to be made is which price index is going to be 
targeted. All central banks in our sample target consumer price inflation. The Con­
sumer Price Index (CPI) is the best known and most commonly used (e.g., in wage 
negotiations) measure of inflation. It also has some technical advantages, like being 
promptly released and seldom revised. The impact on expectations and credibility of 
such a measure of inflation should be greater than alternative measures that rely on 
complex statistical treatment or are released with a considerable lag, like the GDP 
deflator.
However, the headline CPI is affected by a number of shocks that cannot be controlled 
by monetary policy, and do not reflect the underlying inflationary pressures the central 
bank should be worrying about. Changes in indirect taxes or subsidies are not usually 
related to inflationary pressures, but can have a significant (short run) impact in the CPI. 
When the CPI includes interest related costs, it responds perversely to monetary policy 
changes: a tightening of policy in reaction to rising inflation will imply higher interest 
costs, and thus even higher CPI. Some supply side shocks that raise inflation and lower 
output (like large changes in commodity prices or natural disasters) should be accom­
modated, to avoid the adverse implications for real activity of a restrictive monetary 
policy.28 A flexible monetary policy, able to adjust efficiently to these problems, should 
be based on a target expressed in terms of some measure of underlying inflation that 
would exclude the effects of this type of shocks. The problem with the underlying CPI 
is that usually it does not have similar desirable features of statistical simplicity and 
general acceptability as the headline CPI. Thus, a target expressed in terms of underly­
ing CPI tends to have a smaller impact on expectations. The alternative is to set the 
target in terms of headline CPI, but to include some escape clause (or caveats) that 
would justify missing it, in order to allow for some flexibility in monetary policy.
In both solutions mentioned above, transparency and accountability are affected. The
28 Usual references to supply side shocks are to those increasing inflation, such as the oil price 
increases of the 1970s, but there is no reason to rule out supply side shocks of the opposite sign. The 
disinflation process of the 1990s might be partially explained by such shocks, e.g., the increased retail 
competition in the UK or the decline in food prices as a result of Finland’s EU membership.
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performance of the central bank can only be easily verified if the targeted price index is 
calculated by an independent agency. In our sample, targets based on an underlying CPI 
are only used by Australia and Finland, and in both countries the underlying CPI tar­
geted is computed by statistics agencies independent of the central bank, and thus 
accountability is not jeopardised. The problem is that in most countries even when the 
statistics agencies publish some underlying CPI, it seldom excludes all the relevant 
shocks. In this case, the central bank has to choose between calculating its own index 
(with the corresponding loss in transparency and credibility) or using the less adequate 
external index. A similar choice must be made regarding the caveats if the target is set 
in terms of headline CPI. Transparency suggests that the list of caveats must be precise 
and exhaustive, but this reduces flexibility, since some shocks are unpredictable, even in 
nature. It should be stressed, however, that in practice the distinction between headline 
and underlying CPI targets tends to become blurred. In all the countries where the 
formal target is based on headline CPI, monetary policy decisions are based in some 
measure of underlying inflation, not headline inflation. Judging from our sample, it 
seems that there is no effective choice, and ITs have to be set in terms of underlying 
CPI, since this is the price index monetary policy is best able to control.29 The only real 
question arises in the long term, if the two measures exhibit persistent differences.30 
Then, if the target is defined in terms of headline CPI, the operating policy targets for 
underlying CPI have to be changed so that headline CPI comes within the target range. 
If the target is defined in terms of underlying CPI, no change is needed, and headline 
CPI will deviate from the target, but this may have an important impact on inflation 
expectations.
The design of IT in our sample suggests that central banks believe that monetary policy 
is able to control underlying inflation but not in a precise and accurate way. The targets 
are either range targets or point targets that are only supposed to hold on average, and
29 See Section 5.3 on the controllability of inflation.
30 Underlying inflation is supposed to capture the fundamental trends in headline inflation, and 
deviations between the two indices are usually assumed to be temporary, but this is not necessarily true. 
Yates (1995) presents some evidence (although not conclusive) that different price indices in the UK 
are not directly substitutable even in the long term (although they cointegrate).
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in either case this means the inflation rate is not going to be kept constant at some pre­
set level. Some (limited) volatility of the inflation rate will be tolerated since some 
uncontrollable shocks are likely to affect inflation and monetary policy technology is not 
considered to be accurate enough to forecast, or bring about, finely calibrated changes in 
the inflation rate. Where the target range is precisely defined, the usual band width is 2 
or 3 percentage points.31 The optimal band width involves a trade-off between the 
credibility-enhancing effects of choosing a demanding target and achieving it, and the 
credibility-damaging effects of missing it (Goodhart and Vinals, 1994). This would 
suggest that central banks that need to build a reputation should choose narrow range 
targets, whilst more credible central banks may opt for wider bands. A highly credible 
central bank could even set a soft-edged band, similar to Finland’s, where only the mid­
point is defined and no explicit deviation ranges are set.32 The choice of 2 percentage 
point bands seems to reflect a preference for credibility-enhancing narrow bands. If so, 
the question is whether monetary policy is precise enough to achieve an inflation level 
inside such a band. In Section 5.3 we discuss this issue in the light of the outcomes of 
monetary policy prior to the adoption of IT and the ex-post success of the central banks 
in our sample in achieving their targets.
A common feature in our sample is the absence of price level targets. Price level targets 
reduce the uncertainty about the future price level, but are more restrictive since they 
imply that high inflation in one period must be compensated by low inflation next period. 
Also, since price levels are permanently affected by supply side shocks they are less
31 In Finland and Spain the target ranges were not precisely defined. In both countries the 2% target 
should be interpreted as the mid-point of a soft-edged band; the Bank of Finland explicitly stated that 
deviations on both sides would be allowed, but no explicit toleration ranges were specified. The target 
for Australia should be interpreted as a ‘thick’ point rather than a range. In the UK, from May 1997, 
only the mid-point target is defined, and the MPC is required to write an explanatory letter whenever 
RPIX diverges more than 1% from this. However, as King (1997) emphasized, “The inflation target is 
not a range of 1}A% to 31/2%, it is a target of 214% on average. Indeed, one of the main purposes of the 
open letters is to explain why, in some circumstances, it would be wrong to try to bring inflation back to 
target too quickly. In other words, the MPC will be forced to reveal in public its proposed reaction to 
large shocks.”
32 It is arguable, however, whether its high credibility was the reason behind the Bank of Finland’s 
choice, given the country’s inflation history and substantial depreciation of the markka at the time of 
the adoption of their point target. The single figure was preferred since it was considered that it would 
provide a better guide for the formation of inflation expectations (Brunila and Lahdenpera, 1995, p. 
129).
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flexible in accommodating those shocks. Central banks in our sample may have opted 
for price change (i.e., inflation) targets because they prefer to have more policy flexibi­
lity (even at the cost of higher uncertainty), but it could also be that they decided to go 
one step at a time. The new monetary strategy was tried first with the less restrictive 
version of price change targets, instead of going straight to the stronger version of 
targeting price levels. If this was the case, we might expect to see some of them adop­
ting price level targets some time in the future. But although there are no price level 
targets, there are point targets for inflation that should hold on average, as in Australia.33 
This kind of target might be interpreted as (moving) price level targets, since both have 
the same effects in terms of reducing uncertainty about the future price level. Setting an 
average inflation rate of 2%, strictly means setting the future price level at any point in 
time, if ‘average* means that an inflation rate of 3% in one period implies a rate of 1% 
the next period.34 We are doubtful, however, whether average targets should be inter­
preted so strictly. In the event bygone misses are unlikely to be compensated by an 
(over) correction on the other side of the ‘average*.
The adoption of IT reflects the view that price stability should be the only (medium and 
long term) objective of monetary policy. However, price stability does not necessarily
33 Economists at the Bank of England (e.g., King, 1996) also interpreted the UK target, pre May 1997, 
as a point target that should hold on average, together with an indication of the range within which ex­
post inflation might be expected to lie if policy was directed at this point
34 Note that a price level target is not necessarily a constant level target One may set a target for the 
price level that is higher than the current price level. In the short run (over one period), there is no 
fundamental difference between an inflation and a price level target: if the current price level is 100, it 
is equivalent to set an inflation target of 0-2% or a price level target of 100-102. This is not the case 
over several periods, since inflation targets allow for base drift, but price level targets do not. If 
inflation is higher than the inflation target in one period, the price level is permanently affected, since 
the future inflation targets will refer to the current (higher) price level. This is not the case under a 
price level target, since too high inflation in one period must be compensated by lower inflation in the 
following periods. A similar result arises if we use an inflation target that must hold on average, since 
for the average to hold, high inflation in one period must be compensated by low inflation in the 
following periods. For example, assume the current price level is 100, and price stability is defined as 
an inflation rate of 2% per period. If the targets are continuously met, it is (roughly) equivalent to set 
the targets as (i) an inflation target that should hold every period, (ii) an inflation target that should 
hold on average or (iii) a price level target. The price level on the second period will be 
(approximately) 104 in every case. But assume that inflation in the first period is 3%, i.e., the price 
level is 103. Meeting the targets in the second period implies for target (i) an inflation rate of 2%, i.e., 
a price level of 105; for target (ii) an inflation rate of 1% (so that the average is 2%), i.e., a price level 
of 104; for target (iii) a price level of 104, i.e., an inflation rate of 1%. The outcome is the same for 
targets (ii) and (iii), but not for target (i).
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mean a zero inflation rate. In fact, for all the countries in our sample, the target is a 
positive rate of inflation, although small (around 2%). The question of the optimal rate 
of inflation, and the empirical and theoretical arguments that imply that the optimal rate 
of inflation is positive, has been extensively discussed.35 The main theoretical arguments 
against a zero inflation rate refer to the non-negativity of the real interest rates (the 
‘Summers effect’),36 to the existence of downward nominal rigidities in the labour and 
product markets,37 to the optimal inflation tax,38 and to bias in measures of consumer 
price inflation.39 Of these, the only argument that one can find in the official statements 
of (some of) the central banks in our sample is the last one.40 The IT of around 2% is 
said to reflect the average bias in the CPI caused by the introduction of new goods, the 
improvement in the quality of existing goods, and changes in consumer demand in 
response to changes in relative prices for which the measured CPI does not account. 
Estimates of this bias in different countries, however, suggest that the bias is in the 
0.5%-1.5% range.41 Thus, some (or all) of the other arguments may also be behind the 
choice of a 2% target, although not explicitly stated.42 Given the likely differences 
among countries in this statistical bias, and especially in the effects of the other argu­
ments for a positive inflation rate, we find the similarity of the target levels striking. The 
mid point of the ranges is now between 1.5% and 2.5% for all countries, with the
35 Yates (1995) provides a good review of the discussion.
36 Summers (1991a) pointed out that since nominal interest rates are always non-negative, a zero 
inflation rate implies that real interest rates must also be non-negative. Summers’ argument for a 
positive inflation rate is that in some circumstances (like in a deep recession), negative real rates of 
interest might be appropriate. Even if the need for negative real interest rates may be infrequent, they 
could be very important in those rare cases and should not be ruled out by the adoption of a zero 
inflation rate.
37 If there is some downward nominal rigidity in the labour market, short run decreases in the real 
wage cannot be achieved under zero inflation. In countries where the labour market structure is such 
that nominal wage cuts are rare (or ruled out by law), a positive rate of inflation may be the less costly 
way of generating short run real wage decreases.
38 An inflation tax may be part of the optimal mix of revenue-raising methods a government can use, 
and thus should not be ruled out by adopting a zero inflation target.
39 On this, see the Boskin Report (1996).
40 For example, this was the argument used by the Bank of England (1992).
41 Brunila and Lahdenpera (1995) claim that the bias in the CPI might be as high as 1.5-2% in the US, 
but is likely to be smaller in the UK and in Canada (of the order of 0.5-1%).
42 Only for New Zealand, which had a mid-point target of 1% until 1996, might one argue that the 
statistical bias was the only reason behind the choice of a positive inflation target. However, since it is 
likely that in New Zealand the bias in the CPI is smaller than elsewhere (Archer, 1995), i.e., smaller 
than 0.5%, even for this country some of the other arguments were probably (implicitly) behind the 
choice of target.
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majority concentrating on 2%. We are not aware of any studies quantifying the optimal 
rate of inflation in each country, supporting ex-ante the choice of a given target. Per­
haps, central banks just assume that 2% is the small positive number that theoretical 
arguments suggest the optimal rate of inflation should be, or simply chose to target the 
same inflation level other countries were targeting.43
Given the long lags in monetary policy, the target is usually set initially for some future 
date, at least 2 years ahead.44 Where the current inflation was above the target, the 
central banks in our sample set a downward path for inflation, to reap as soon as possi­
ble the benefits of lower inflation expectations the IT is supposed to provide. These 
‘transition targets’ could serve as a benchmark against which the progress towards the 
ultimate objective could be measured, and meeting the ‘transition targets’ would help to 
establish the credibility of the final target,45 since it is likely that the credibility of the 
target, and its impact on expectations, would only be achieved by success in meeting it, 
and not by its simple announcement (see Section 5.4 further below). Table 5.2 describes 
the timing of the targets in our sample. The inflation rate at the time of the announce­
ment was above the final target range in Canada, New Zealand, Spain and the UK, but 
the intermediate targets only demanded a strong deflationary effort in Spain, since 
current inflation was inside the first ‘transition target’ in the other countries. The impact 
on expectations of a less ambitious target will tend to be smaller, although a too ambi­
tious target might not be credible. The differences between less and more ambitious 
targets should be kept in mind when analysing whether inflation outcomes were consis­
tent with the targets (in Section 5.3) and the impact on expectations of the announce­
ment and subsequent inflation performance (in Section 5.4).
43 In Finland and Sweden the 2% target was chosen because this was the level of inflation other 
European countries were seen to be targeting.
44 Note that usually an initial date for the application of targets is set, but not a final date. At first, a 
planned path for a reduction in inflation may be set, but once inflation reaches the final target it should 
stay there indefinitely. The exceptions are Canada and New Zealand, where current targets hold only 
until 1998 and 2003, respectively, and new targets must be set before those dates to hold in subsequent 
periods.
45 The ‘transition targets’ could also be useful as a guideline for policy decisions. Nicholl and Archer 
(1992) claim that was the case in New Zealand, where the ‘transition target’ gave the RBNZ “a clear 
framework for policy decisions, and has provided the motivation to take policy actions that might be 
politically difficult” (p. 322).
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Date o f  
announcement
Current 
inflation46 Target
Target
date Transition path
Australia 1993 1.9% 2 - 3 % 1993 none
Canada Feb 1991 3.9% 1 - 3 % 1995 2-4% Dec 1992; 1.5-3.5%mid 
1994
Finland Feb 1993 2.6% 2% 1995 none
New
Zealand
Mar 1990 3.3% 0 - 2 % 1993 3-5% Dec 1990; 2.5-4.5%Dec 
1991; 1.5-3.5% Dec 199247
Spain Jan 1995 4.3% 2% 1998 3.5-4% early 1996; <3% early 
1997; 2.5% end 1997
Sweden Jan 1993 1.8% 1 - 3 % 1995 underlying inflation not 
increasing
UK Oct 1992 4.0% 1-2.5% 1997 1-4% 48
5.2.3 Reaction function
Under an IT strategy the final objective is targeted directly, and no intermediary targets 
are used. Given the lags in monetary policy, this means that a (explicit or implicit) fore­
cast of future inflation is the intermediary target.49 In principle, the monetary policy 
decision process would start with the computation of a point forecast for inflation X 
periods ahead, with X being the policy lag. Then, monetary conditions would be ad­
46 Current inflation refers to the formal target index on the quarter before the announcement, except 
for Canada and New Zealand where it refers to the underlying inflation index used for policy decisions.
47 The final target in this table refers to the one set in the second and third PTA’s. The targets in New 
Zealand were changed three times before November 1997. The first Policy Targets Agreement (PTA), 
signed in March 1990 set the final target of 0-2% by the end of 1992, and in April the RBNZ an­
nounced the ‘transition targets’ of 3-5% in December 1990 and 1.5-3.5% in December 1991. A new 
PTA was signed in December 1990 extending the final target for the end of 1993, and following this the 
RBNZ announced in February 1991 the new ‘transition targets’ of 2.5-4.5% and 1.5-3.5% in December 
1991 and 1992, respectively. A third PTA was signed in December 1992 where the target was set to 
hold from that moment until the end of the Governor’s term in 1998. Finally, this target was revised to 
0-3% in a fourth PTA signed in December 1996. We took the targets to be the ones set more recently at 
each point in time, that is, the ‘transition targets’ to be 3-5% in December 1990, 2.5-4.5% in December 
1991, 1.5-3.5% in December 1992, the final target of 0-2% to hold from the first quarter of 1993 until 
the fourth quarter of 1996, and the new target of 0-3% to hold from the first quarter of 1997. A fifth 
PTA was subsequently signed on December 1997 (see footnote 28 for details).
48 This transition path refers to the first inflation target announced in October 1992, which determined 
that inflation should be in the 1-4% range from that moment on, and in the lower half of that range “by 
the end of the current Parliament” (1997). This target was revised by the new Labour Government 
elected in May 1997.
49 Svensson (1997) provides a formal analysis of the inflation forecast role under an IT strategy.
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justed according to the relative position of the forecast to the target range: if the fore­
cast is on target, no action is required; if the forecast is above the target, monetary 
conditions should be tightened; if the forecast is below the target, monetary conditions 
should be relaxed. Thus, IT would be different from the money or exchange rate targe­
ting strategies because policy reacts to a quantified inflation forecast, and not to current 
changes in the ex-post, actual data for some financial variable. Also, in principle, IT 
involves a quasi-formalised reaction rule, that distinguishes it from a discretionary 
monetary policy. However, the actual policy decision processes do not always follow 
the simple rules outlined above, and the distinction of IT from other policy strategies is 
less clear than the process outlined above might suggest.
In principle, IT involves the computation of a quantified inflation forecast that is going 
to be compared with the target. As we show in Table 5.3, although quantified inflation 
forecasts are used in all the central banks in our sample, policy decisions are not based 
exclusively on those quantified forecasts, but also on a subjective evaluation of several 
leading indicators. In some countries (e.g., Australia, Finland), quantified inflation 
forecasts are just one of the indicators used for policy decisions. Even in the countries 
where quantified inflation forecasts are the key input in the policy decision process, 
much subjective judgement is put into the forecasts, and furthermore the policy makers 
also look at other indicators, not only the point forecast. This is usually justified on the 
grounds that point inflation forecasts are deemed to be unreliable and subjective judge­
ments of the inflationary pressures in the economy are thought to improve the results. 
Another way of avoiding the limitations of point forecasts is to do some form of ‘risk 
analysis’, by computing different forecasts under alternative scenarios,50 or describing 
the inflation forecasts as a probability distribution and not a point estimate.51 For an 
extended discussion of this issue, see Haldane, Nicoletta, and Whitley (1998).
50 For example, at the Bank of Canada the staff prepares a base forecast and several alternative 
forecasts according to different scenarios for the exogenous variables; the management then will treat 
the different alternatives according to their view of the likelihood of such scenarios (Longworth and 
Freednan, 1995).
51 Fcr example, the Bank of England stresses that the uncertainty surrounding inflation forecasting 
will make the inflation outcome ‘always’ different from the forecast. For this reason, since February 
1996, the inflation forecasts in the Inflation Report are presented as confidence intervals, and not as 
point forecasts.
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A. BASIS FOR POLICY DECISIONS (quantified forecasts or subjective evaluation o f  indicators)
Australia subjective evaluation of several indicators, including inflation forecasts
Canada use econometric model (including judgement) to estimate the time path of monetary con­
ditions necessary to keep future inflation (approximately 2 years ahead) near midpoint 
(monetary aggregates are used as an independent check on the economic projection) 
Finland subjective evaluation of several indicators; since October 1995, also inflation forecast 6 to
S quarters ahead
NZ use econometric model (including judgement) to estimate the time path of monetary con­
ditions necessary to keep future inflation (approximately 2 years ahead) near midpoint 
Spain use of econometric models and subjective evaluation of several indicators
Sweden inflation forecast 1-2 years ahead
UK inflation forecast 2 years ahead
B. MAIN INDICATORS USED AS INPUT FOR POLICY DECISIONS
Australia inflation expectations, wage settlements, output gap
Canada M2+, M l, output gap, wage indicators
Finland wages, inflation expectations, exchange rate, yield curve, money aggregates
NZ exchange rate
Spain ALP (liquid assets held by private sector) growth of not more than 8% is used as a
reference
Sweden output gap, inflation expectations, yield curve
UK output gap, inflation expectations, observed prices, MO, M4
C. OPERATING TARGETS 
Australia money market overnight rate
Canada monetary conditions index (MCI)52, where the 90 day commercial paper rate weighs 75%
and the exchange rate index 25%
Finland evaluation of monetary conditions, where the key interest rate is the one month tender rate
NZ MCI, where the 90 day bank bill rate weighs 1/3 and the exchange rate index 2/3
Spain money market overnight rate
Sweden MCI, where the money market overnight rate weighs 75% and the exchange rate 25%
UK commercial banks’ base rate
D. POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Australia operating target for the overnight money market rate
Canada operating band for the overnight money market rate
Finland tender rate
NZ settlement cash balances at the RBNZ (used to influence the money market overnight rate)
Spain intervention rate (10 day repo rate)
Sweden repo rate
UK money market dealings rate
52 Given that the countries in our sample are medium and small open economies, the operating target 
is usually some combination of a short term interest rate and the (trade-weighted) exchange rate. This 
combination is sometimes expressed in terms of a computed ‘monetary conditions index’. The role of a 
‘monetary conditions index’ in the conduct of monetary policy has been given considerable attention in 
recent research, in particular at the Bank of Canada (see, for example, Freedman, 1995b).
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Another of the distinctive features of the IT strategy is the use of several indicators as 
inputs into the decision process and forecasting procedure, with no indicator having a 
predominant role, as an intermediary target would have. In practice, this distinction is 
less clear, since some central banks in our sample give a large weight to a particular 
variable, like the exchange rate in New Zealand or broad money in Spain (see Table 5.3, 
panel B). It is difficult to see, for instance, where the behaviour of the Banco de Espana 
differs, in this respect, from the behaviour of the central banks who use a monetary 
target strategy, like the Bundesbank. In Spain, the growth of the monetary aggregate 
ALP (liquidity assets held by the private sector) is the main indicator behind policy 
decisions, although other indicators are also considered, and the liquidity growth targets 
are not taken as fixed rules, but just as a mean of achieving price stability. In money 
targeting countries, interest rate changes are said to be conditioned on the movement of 
some monetary aggregate, like the M3 in Germany, but other indicators are also consi­
dered, and the money targets are frequently overruled due to other economic factors.53
Finally, the IT framework differs from a discretionary policy because a quasi-formalised 
reaction rule exists. In practice, the straightforward application of the rule raises several 
problems, whose solution generally involves considerable discretion for the policy 
makers.54 The first question is whether the target is the range or the mid-point of the 
range. In the latter case, the bands may be interpreted as confidence intervals indicating 
where ex-post inflation might be expected to lie if policy is directed at the mid-point, 
and the central bank should act whenever the forecast differs from the mid-point. In 
Canada and the UK (post May 1997), for example, policy actions are directed at kee-
53 Clan da and Gertler (1996) claim that in Germany, the money targets are meant as guidelines and in 
no sense do they define a strict policy rule (p. 2), that the Bundesbank has tolerated deviations from the 
targets as a reaction to the development of economic activity (p. 7), and that moderating market interest 
rate fluctuations takes precedence over monetary targeting (p. 11). Helmut Schlesinger, former 
President of the Bundesbank, quoted in von Hagen (1995, p. 108) said that the Bundesbank has never 
conducted a rigid policy geared at the money supply alone, and all available information about financial 
markets and the economy is analysed regularly. Bemanke and Mihov (1997) claim that the Bundes­
bank is a ‘closet’ inflation targeter.
54 The degree of ongoing discretion may be reduced by describing thoroughly all the details of the 
operation of the targets the moment they are announced. Many central banks have described in some 
detail how they interpret the targets, and this implies that many of the choices discussed in this and the 
following paragraphs were made ex-ante. However, this was not always the case, and some central 
banks still have some degree of discretion in some of the issues discussed.
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ping forecast inflation near the mid-point of the band. Where the target is the band, 
strictly, the rule only demands action when the forecast is outside the target range. 
However, even in this case a prudent central bank might wish to act as long as the 
forecast is close to the boundaries, to minimise the risk of missing the target given the 
uncertainty surrounding any inflation forecast. In New Zealand, where the target is the 
band, the RBNZ initially would not react as long the forecast was inside the band. But, 
after an unexpected and short-lived surge in the price of fresh vegetables that drove 
underlying inflation 0.2% above target in the second quarter of 1995, although all the 
previous forecasts for that quarter were inside the target range, the RBNZ decided to 
adopt the strategy of acting as long as the forecast is close to the boundaries (Mayes and 
Riches, 1996).
The second problem is whether any deviation from target, no matter how small, should 
trigger a reaction, or whether policy should only respond to significant deviations. The 
credibility and accountability of the IT would suggest reactions to any deviation, to 
minimise deviations from target, but some central banks will only react to significant 
deviations. The reason is that small deviations imply small adjustments in monetary 
conditions, and small adjustments might be undesirable.55
The final question is, if the forecast lies off the target in one period, whether the policy 
response should be strong, so that inflation quickly returns to the range, or gradual. 
Again, the credibility and accountability issues would suggest a sharp response, to 
minimise the number of periods the target is going to be missed. However, some central 
banks (e.g., in Sweden and Spain) prefer a gradual approach, because a radical response 
could be destabilising and drive inflation through the other end of the range, since 
forecasts are not precise and the effects of policy are not known exactly.56
The main concern relates to the trade-off that exists in the short-run, given wage/price
55 For instance, until now the Bank of England has only initiated interest rate changes of at least XA 
p.p., although the MPC has recently reaffirmed that it would be prepared to make step changes of 
whatever size that it thought appropriate (see Inflation Report, November 1997, p. 71).
56 Such concern is termed multiplicative, or Brainard, uncertainty (see Brainard, 1967).
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rigidities in that horizon, between output variability and inflation variability. With such 
rigidities in place, there remains a downwards sloping short-run Phillips curve, and thus 
such a trade-off exists. As Haldane, Nicoletta, and Whitley (1998), demonstrate, any 
attempt to use monetary policy aggressively to restore inflation to its target as soon as 
possible will cause avoidable instability in output, whereas a very slow adjustment will 
cause avoidable instability in inflation. Perhaps superficially surprising, the appropriate 
choice of inflation target horizon appears largely able by itself to deliver the best combi­
nation of inflation/output variability without any need to enter an output-gap variable 
into the central bank’s reaction function (Haldane, Nicoletta, and Whitley, 1998, p. 30).
5.2.4 Foreign exchange rates
The IT strategy differs from other policy strategies in terms of the final objectives (a 
quantified level for inflation) and intermediary targets (no single intermediary target). 
There is no apparent reason why the adoption of IT would imply changes in policy 
instruments or operating targets. In fact, no central bank in our sample claimed to have 
made such changes due to the adoption of IT. Panels C and D of Table 5.3 describe the 
policy instruments and operating targets currently in use in the countries in our sample. 
Changes in policy instruments have occurred in the IT period, for instance in Finland, 
Sweden and the UK, but usually for microeconomic reasons. Nevertheless, being a new 
policy strategy, IT should lead to different policy responses, that could be translated into 
a different usage of the policy instruments and in a different behaviour of the operating 
targets. We try to identify any changes the adoption of IT induced in these operating 
targets, by looking at the behaviour of exchange rates, in this subsection, and short term 
interest rates, in the following subsection.
If the sole objective of monetary policy is the control of inflation, then central banks 
must be prepared to accept the level of the exchange rate that is compatible with the 
inflation target, whatever that level is. This does not mean that IT is necessarily incom­
patible with some (loosely defined) desired level for the exchange rate. If inflation levels 
are similar at home and abroad, IT is also a rough mechanism for maintaining the exter­
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nal value of the currency, as long as PPP holds. However, conflicts between external 
and internal objectives may often arise. Under IT this must be resolved by the abandon­
ment of the external objective, which implies that IT countries must be prepared to 
accept larger short and medium term swings in the exchange rate, if necessary.
Obviously, IT is an alternative to, and is different from, a regime of exchange rate 
targets. It could be argued that exchange rates fixed to low inflation currencies and IT 
are not fundamentally different, since they are just different ways of achieving price 
stability, and, if inflation is low at home and abroad, exchange rates will tend to be stable 
even under IT. However, in the presence of significant real shocks, under IT we might 
observe large swings in the nominal exchange rate, with no changes in inflation levels, as 
the real exchange rate adjusts to the new economic conditions.57 This type of adjust­
ment could not occur under exchange rate targeting, at least as long as targets are kept 
unchanged.
Table 5.4 The role of the exchange rate in the policy decision process
Australia exchange rate is only relevant if excessive depreciation threatens future inflation
Canada exchange rate is a component of the ‘monetaiy conditions index’, the operating target
Finland before October 1996, large changes in the exchange rate were allowed, although some
of the actions of the Bank of Finland in early 1993 were motivated by the threat of the 
collapse of the markka and it did occasional interventions on both sides to stop sharp 
intra-day movements (but not affecting the trend)
NZ exchange rate is the key variable in the operation of monetaiy policy due to its strong
and rapid influence on prices, but it is not a target in its own right; given the inflation 
forecasts, comfort zones for the exchange rate are defined, and adjusted as parameters 
are revised; movements of the exchange rate within the zone are normally tolerated 
until the rate approaches the margins; however there is no direct intervention on forex 
markets
Spain there is a formal commitment to keep the peseta within the widened bands of the ERM, 
but only permanent trends (not temporary fluctuations) shape policy decisions and as 
long as it may endanger the inflation target; forex stability is viewed more as a result 
that will come about with price stability than an end in itself
Sweden return to exchange rate targets only when it is compatible with price stability
UK there are no targets for the exchange rate
57 Examples of such an adjustment are the Finnish experience of 1992-94, and the UK experience of 
1996-97.
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Table 5.4 describes the role of foreign exchange rates as policy targets under IT. In the 
countries in our sample, exchange rates have, at least, an informative role in the policy 
decision process. In some cases, exchange rates may act as operating targets, but they 
are not intermediary targets. Medium term control of the exchange rate is only at­
tempted if large changes threaten the IT, and short term control is abandoned. No 
central bank in our sample has tried to stabilise the exchange rate in the short term, 
except the Bank of Finland who occasionally did intervene to avoid sharp intra-day 
movements.
Exchange rate volatility
The abandon of exchange rates as policy targets should imply higher short term volatility 
of the exchange rate for the European countries, who had exchange rate targets before 
the adoption of IT. Figure 5.1 plots the absolute value of the daily changes in the 
exchange rate of the countries in our sample from 3/1/1986 to 11/12/1997.58 Visual 
inspection of Figure 5.1 suggests that the adoption of IT was associated with higher 
short term exchange rate volatility in Finland and Sweden, and with lower short term 
volatility in New Zealand.
To test formally for the existence of such changes in volatility we used the ARCH 
framework, where we allowed the conditional variance to be affected by changes in the 
monetary policy strategy. Following Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) and Hsieh (1989) we 
assumed daily exchange rate returns follow a GARCH(1,1) process of the form:
where riit is the change in exchange rate i in period t, Ditt is a dummy variable, taking the
58 The exchange rate data are US dollar Bankers’ Trust mid-quotes at 3:00 pm EST, available from 
Datastream. The DEM rates were computed from the USD rates. For the Australian, Canadian and 
New Zealand dollar the exchange rates used are US dollar rates; for the Finnish markka, the Spanish 
peseta and the Swedish krona, DEM rates are used; for the British pound both USD and DEM rates are 
presented. The vertical dashed lines indicate the date of the adoption of IT. In some of the charts, large 
outliers were truncated for presentational purposes.
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value 1 before the adoption of IT, and //,, yh au J3h and 5, are parameters. The condi­
tional distribution G() was assumed to be normal. The unconditional variance of the 
model in equations 5.1-5.3 for the IT period, cfiT, and for the non-IT period, c?w, are 
given by
c?tr=Yi /(1-cCi-P)  5.4
c?w = (yi+Sj)/(1 - dj-fi)  5.5
Table 5.5 reports the results of estimations of this model, for the countries in our sam­
ple, over the period 3/1/1986 to 11/12/1997 (t-statistics in italics).59 A simple compari­
son of the exchange rate volatility in the IT and non-IT period, reveals significant 
decreases in the IT period for Australia, Canada, Spain, the UK, and, in particular, New 
Zealand, where average exchange rate volatility fell more than 75% after the adoption of 
IT. On the other hand, volatility increased with IT in Finland and Sweden. For these 
countries (and also for Spain and the UK, to a smaller extent) the non-IT period was 
mainly a period of fixed exchange rates, and that may explain the increase in volatility.
Table 5.5 Volatility of daily exchange rates before and after IT
Dummies definition n(x 10000) CCi Pi
Si
(x 10000)
Australia D: Kl/1/93 0.0673 0.1250 0.7510 0.0213
13.5 11.2 56.9 5.3
Canada D: t<26/2/91 0.0103 0.1000 0.8210 0.0012
15.8 12.7 100.4 2.4
Finland D: t<2/2/93 or 0.4270 0.2580 0.5870 -0.2196
t>12/10/96 16.5 16.9 46.0 -9.9
New Zealand D: t<2/3/90 0.0933 0.1620 0.6680 0.3060
21.1 15.3 53.9 22.7
Spain D: t<l/l/95 76.207 0.2821 0.6515 45.953
14.5 33.9 99.5 9.7
Sweden D: t<15/l/93 2.9959 0.3599 0.3628 -2.3148
17.0 39.9 19.7 -14.6
U K D: t<8/10/92 0.0703 0.1034 0.8605 0.0133
12.9 17.0 166.7 2.7
59 The results reported for Finland were obtained from a model that included 2 dummies taking the 
value of 1 in 14/11/1991 and 9/9/1992, respectively, when major devaluations occurred. Without the 
inclusion of these dummies the variance (conditional on the monetary regime) would not be stationary.
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In order to separate the effects of the adoption of IT and the floating of the currency, we 
estimated a model similar to the one in equations 5.1-5.3, but with equation 5.3 replaced 
by
htf Yi at £ ij-i Pi htf-1 Ftf 5.3
where M lrt is a dummy variable taking the value 1 during the period of discretionary 
monetary policy, and Flft is a dummy variable taking the value 1 during the fixed ex­
change rate period.60 The results of the estimation of this model are reported in Table 
5.6. When we control for the existence of a fixed exchange rate period, then we observe 
that exchange rate volatility in the IT period is significantly higher than in the fixed 
exchange rate period in the 4 countries where such a regime existed, but significantly 
lower than in the discretionary regime for all the countries in our sample.
Table 5.6 Volatility of daily exchange rates during IT and the fixed rate period
Dummies definition Yi(x 10000) Oi P
<Oi 
(x 10000) (x 10000)
Finland M: 8/9/92<t<2/2/93 or 
t>12/10/96 
F:t<=8/9/92
0.5394
16.1
0.2500
15.2
0.5280
33.2
0.5348
3.7
-0.2858
-10.7
Spain M: t< 19/7/89 or
15/9/92<t<l/l/95 
F: 19/7/89<t< 15/9/92
209.303
17.1
0.3669
30.5
0.4052
28.9
179.463
15.1
-85.777
-8.2
Sweden M: 18/1 l/92<t<15/l/93 
F: t<=18/l 1/92
3.4193
16.3
0.2599
14.7
0.3374
12.8
13.5662
10.2
-2.6681
-14.4
UK M: t<5/10/90 or
15/9/92<t<8/l 0/92 
F: 5/10/90< t<15/9/92
0.0919
15.0
0.0962
15.0
0.8500
136.6
0.0582
8.0
-0.0420
-6.6
The evidence in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 supports the hypothesis that exchange rate volatility 
was significantly lower during IT than during the discretionary period, for all the coun­
tries in our sample. Compared to a discretionary monetary policy, IT seems to be able 
to provide more stable foreign exchange rates. This could be explained by a reduction in 
the uncertainty of market participants regarding the future monetary policy, that the 
existence of a clear target for monetary policy could provide. Compared to exchange
60 We chose to include the exchange rate targeting of the ERM participants after the September 1992 
crisis (Spain, Finland after October 1996) in the discretionary period because the exchange rate 
movements allowed under this regime are too large to be compatible with any definition of a fixed 
exchange rate regime.
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rate targets, the adoption of IT leads to a cost in the form of an increase in short and 
medium term exchange rate uncertainty, as would be expected, but allows for easier 
adjustments to real shocks and reduces the probability of speculative crises in the forex 
market.
5.2.5 Short term interest rates
Given that a different policy strategy should imply different policy responses, we inves­
tigated whether the adoption of IT implied a change in the use of the interest rate 
instrument. Our first hypothesis was that central banks would raise interest rates earlier 
than before, relative to observed inflationary pressures. The argument is that under IT, 
central banks can resist pressures not to raise them more easily, since interest rate 
changes can be justified with reference to the inflation forecast and the target. Although 
there is some evidence that could indicate a more forward looking behaviour in the non- 
European countries, we could not find evidence of a systematic change in behaviour in 
the data available so far: the timing of interest rate changes, after the adoption of IT, 
was not unusually early relative to observed inflation, especially for the European 
countries. However, a general change to a more forward-looking attitude might have 
occurred, but the tests performed, presented in Appendix 5.A, were not powerful 
enough to detect it, given the relatively short data series available.
The argument that central banks can justify their actions more easily under IT, would 
also suggest that we would observe less interest rate smoothing, at least in the non- 
European countries. Supported by their inflation forecasts, a central bank could com­
pute the necessary interest rate change to achieve the desired level of inflation, and do 
the change in one move, instead of doing it in a series of small changes of the same 
sign.61 Again, we could not find such a change in behaviour in the data for our sample,
61 It could be argued that with free international capital movements, any interest rate changes are 
conditioned on the interest range changes in the core currency countries. If these countries smooth 
interest rates, then other countries have to smooth them too, and thus we should not expect a significant 
change in behaviour in that respect just due to the adoption of IT.
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although for some countries (e.g., Australia and Canada) there are some indications that 
the adoption of IT might lead to a more vigorous use of the interest rate instrument, as 
we describe in Appendix 5.B. For the European countries, who previously had ex­
change rate targets, it is likely that before IT interest rates would be changed more 
frequently and in larger amounts. When the target is the exchange rate, the effects of 
the policy change are almost immediately observed, and policy must be continuously 
adjusted. Exchange rate targets demand monitoring and policy reactions almost to the 
minute, and it is possible that some of those reactions might have to be quick and 
vigorous, particularly during speculative attacks to the exchange rate. No such emer­
gency policy reactions are needed under IT, and interest rate adjustments can be made 
more gradually, if interest rate smoothing is seen as desirable. The lack of accuracy of 
inflation forecasts and the uncertainty about the nature of shocks and the effects of 
monetary policy might recommend such gradual actions.62
Short term interest rate volatility
Where we did find some differences in the behaviour of interest rates is on short term 
volatility of money market rates. Figure 5.2 plots the absolute value of the daily changes 
in the 3 month market interest rate of the countries in our sample from 3/1/1986 to 
10/12/1997.63 The visual inspection of Figure 5.2 suggests the adoption of IT is asso­
ciated with lower daily volatility of short term interest rates. This pattern can be seen in 
all the countries in our sample, except for Canada, where sufficient data for the period 
before IT were not available.
To test formally for the existence of such changes in volatility we used a version of the 
EGARCH model developed by Nelson (1991), where we allowed the logarithm of the
62 For a detailed analysis on why central banks might prefer to smooth interest rates, see Goodhart 
(1996).
63 The data were provided by Datastream and refer to Treasury bill rates for Australia, Canada, 
Sweden and the UK and interbank rates for Finland, New Zealand, and Spain. For some countries, 
restrictions in data availability reduced the sample period. The vertical dotted lines indicate the date of 
the adoption of IT. In order to keep the scale the same in all charts, large outliers were truncated for 
presentational purposes in some of the charts.
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conditional variance to be affected by changes in the monetary policy strategy. The 
model used was the following:
Ci,t fM fa,t 5.6
sut / ~P(0At) 5.7
In hitt = yi+ at In hi>t.} + f a + faDi>t 5.9
where ciit is the weekly change for interest rate i at period t,64 Dlt is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 before the adoption of IT in country i, and /i;, yh a„ fah fa, and fa are 
parameters. The conditional distribution P () was assumed to be normal. Table 5.7 
reports the results of estimations of this model, for the countries in our sample, over the 
period 3/1/1986 to 10/12/1997 (t-statistics in italics).
Table 5.7 Volatility of weekly interest rates before and after IT
Dummies
definition n
at fa fa fa
Australia D: t<l/l/93 -0.3103 0.9240 0.2009 -0.3410 0.1323
-3.9 50.2 7.9 -5.2 4.0
Finland D: t<2/2/93 or -0.0147 0.9906 0.2093 -0.3963 0.0240
t>12/10/96 -1.4 359.8 10.7 -5.7 3.2
New Zealand D: t<2/3/90 -0.2344 0.9057 0.4382 -0.1273 0.1144
-3.8 46.1 10.2 -2.4 2.3
Spain D: t<l/l/95 -0.1083 0.9664 0.4155 -0.2083 0.0374
-3.9 143.0 11.3 -4.5 2.2
Sweden D: t<15/l/93 -0.3409 0.8815 0.4635 -0.7217 0.2517
-6.2 48.0 14.8 -6.6 8.4
UK65 D: t<8/10/92 -4.9646 -0.2028 0.0008 10.755 1.5526
-5.6 -1.0 0.0 0.0 5.7
A simple comparison of the interest rate volatility in the IT and non-IT period, reveals 
significant decreases in the IT period in all the models estimated,66 that confirm the
64 In our sample, the variance of daily interest rate changes tends to be integrated. Using weekly data, 
the likelihood of finding integrated variances is reduced.
65 The model used for the UK was modified by replacing equation 5.6 with:
Ci,t A '  P i  Ci,t-1 &i,/•
66 We did not estimate a model for Canada because we did not have a sufficiently long data series for 
the period before IT.
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inferences from the visual inspection of the charts. The lower short term interest rate 
volatility after IT in the European countries was expected, for the arguments presented 
above regarding interest rate smoothing. But we also found a lower short term interest 
rate volatility in Australia and New Zealand, that cannot be explained by the transition 
from a fixed to a floating exchange rate. It seems under IT interest rates might be less 
volatile than under either discretionary or exchange rate targeting monetary policy 
strategies. The reason for the difference with the former could be that, as we already 
mentioned for the exchange rate, the adoption of IT provides market agents with a 
guideline that reduces uncertainty about future monetary policy.67
Moreover, the variance and mean level of inflation are strongly positively correlated; the 
coefficient of variation is nearly constant (see for example Chapter 4, subsection 4.2.1). 
Consequently if the adoption of IT, or other aspects of the conjuncture, help to stabilise 
the level of inflation at a lower mean level, then its variance can be expected to decline 
also. Such a decline in the volatility of inflation will help to reduce the variance of 
interest rate reactions. Causation is clearly two-way.
The main apparent changes in the behaviour of the instruments or operating targets are 
related to the short term volatility of financial market prices, interest and exchange 
rates.68 Some of the changes are probably associated with the change from fixed to 
floating exchange rates, and not to the adoption of IT directly, although it is questio­
nable whether we should consider these two events as completely distinct. The diffe­
rences, in this respect, between the discretionary and the IT strategies suggest that IT 
could be a key factor in providing stability to financial markets. Markets need a trans­
parent monetary policy, one they can anticipate and understand, and this increase in 
transparency is one of the main reasons behind the adoption of IT. If this is true, then 
IT may be the only feasible floating exchange rate strategy in some situations. In an 
economy where money demand is not sufficiently predictable to allow for money targe-
67 This topic is analysed extensively in Chapter 6.
68 We also looked at the behaviour of narrow and broad money aggregates, before and after the 
adoption of IT. Again, we could not find any significant change. These tests are not reported here, but 
may be obtained from the authors.
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ting and the credibility of a discretionary monetary policy is not high enough to satisfy 
financial markets, then the only options available are between an exchange rate target or 
floating exchange rates with IT. The timing of the adoption of IT in the UK, Sweden 
and Finland, right after the abandonment of fixed exchange rates, suggests that this was 
probably the case in these countries.
5.2.6 Communication with public and government
One major area of change initiated by the adoption of IT is the communication of central 
banks with the public and government. Under IT, the effects of central banks’ policy 
actions can only be observed after a long time, since monetary policy takes several 
quarters to influence inflation. Under other strategies, the existence of intermediate 
targets that reflect policy actions more quickly makes monitoring of central banks easier, 
but no such intermediate targets exist with IT. We claimed above that credibility and 
accountability concerns were the main forces driving the adoption of IT. For these 
reasons, IT demands that central banks develop new forms of communication, to trans­
mit clearly and precisely and to explain their policy actions to other agents. All the 
central banks in our sample improved the communication channels with the public and 
government, in recent years. Although some of the changes were not contemporary 
with the adoption of IT, they are all part of the same trend towards increased transpa­
rency and accountability. The main changes introduced by each central bank regarding 
communication are described in Table 5.8.
The public must know what policy actions the central bank is taking in order to have an 
impact on credibility, and they need to understand and believe those actions to be the 
appropriate ones to achieve the target. In order to achieve these goals, the central bank 
may use a set of different communication channels. First, a central bank can immedi­
ately and fully disclose policy changes, and the reasons for the change, through press 
releases issued at the precise moment the measures are taken. This is particularly 
important in those countries where there is no administratively set interest rate, and the
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Table 5.8
Australia
Canada
Finland
New
Zealand
Spain
Sweden
New communication channels
- “Semi-Annual Statement on Monetary Policy” introduced in May 1997; previously 
the “Quarterly Report on the Economy and Financial Markets” included a large 
section on inflation and extensive discussion of monetary policy changes
- press releases announcing changes in policy, explaining in detail the reasons for 
the change
- “Monetary Policy Report” introduced in May 1995, published twice a year
- publication of the Governor’s comments to the Board of Directors on “Economic 
and Financial Conditions and Monetary Policy” (after the following Board meeting)
- press releases announcing changes in policy
- regular m eetings of the Governor and Minister of Finance
- appearances by the Governor before committees of the House and Senate
- “outreach program”, under which members of the Board of Directors and senior 
Bank officials meet with groups of Canadians in all parts of the country
- quarterly article on policy with focus on inflation outlook in the monthly “Bank of 
Finland Bulletin” (in English) and in the quarterly “Markka & Talous” (in Finnish)
- press statement after policy changes
- more use of public speeches by the Governor to inform on monetary policy and 
inflation outlook
- “Monetary Policy Statement” introduced in April 1990, published twice a year
- quarterly “Economic Projections” (which include a monetary policy assessment 
section), published in the quarters between the ‘Monetary Policy Statement’
- occasional statements on unexpected developments that affect monetary policy
- public scrutiny of the Governor by Parliament’s Finance and Expenditure Com­
mittee
- extensive programme of private and public speaking engagements by the Governor 
to inform on and explain policy developments
- “Inflation Report” introduced in March 1995
- press releases to explain some policy changes
- Banco de Espana’s “Annual Report” and monthly “Economic Bulletin” improved 
to include more information on monetary policy
- appearances by the Governor before the Parliamentary Committee for Economic 
Affairs
- “Inflation Report” introduced in October 1993 (initially under the name “Inflation 
and Inflation Expectations in Sweden”), published quarterly
- public hearings before the Finance Committee of the Parliament
- more regular and public reviews of Central Bank’s actions, in speeches and lec­
tures by the Governor and staff
- “Inflation Report” introduced in February 1993, published quarterly
- formalisation of the regular monthly meetings between Governor and Chancellor, 
prior to May 1997, and since then of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
- publication of the minutes of the meeting (two weeks after following one, between 
April 1994 and May 1997, and one week after since May 1997)
- press notice after each policy change explaining the main reasons for the change
- Governor and other members of MPC appearances before the Treasury Select 
Committee
- more use of public speeches by Governor and Directors
- published open letter to the Chancellor from the MPC should inflation deviate 
more than 1% from central target.
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central bank acts mainly through intervention in money markets. For instance, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia immediately announces, through press releases, any change in 
its operating target range for the money market rate, instead of just signalling it through 
market interventions, as happened previously. The disclosure of this information re­
duces uncertainty about current policy, and may contribute to reduce instability in 
financial markets, besides allowing agents to form a more informed view of future 
inflation prospects. Even in the countries where the nature of the policy instrument 
implies an immediate disclosure of the change, the accompanying press release has an 
important role in explaining the reasons for the move. For instance, in the UK, changes 
in the main instrument, the money market dealings rate, have to be immediately dis­
closed, since it is an administratively set rate. Nevertheless, the press release is impor­
tant because it explains in some detail the reason for the change, and this justification 
may contribute to persuade the agents that the move is consistent with the inflation 
target, thus strengthening the credibility of monetary policy.
Another channel central banks may use to improve the credibility of their policy is 
regular monetary policy and inflation reports. These reports could take the form of a 
separate publication or they could be included in regular central bank bulletins. Most 
central banks in our sample (6 out of 7) preferred to introduce a separate publication, 
probably thinking that it would have a stronger impact on agents’ expectations, because 
a separate publication will receive more attention from the media than a bulletin article. 
Through these reports, the public can monitor and evaluate monetary policy with an 
inflation target. In some countries (e.g., Spain) the report is sent to Parliament, increa­
sing the transparency and political accountability of the central bank’s activities. The 
main role of the Reports is to make public the central bank’s inflation outlook and 
explain how this outlook was formed. The reports may also be used to provide a 
detailed justification of current monetary policy actions, and explain why these actions 
are consistent with the inflation target. Finally, the reports may be used to educate the 
public on the problems involved in the execution of monetary policy, and the importance 
of price stability.
We would expect, in a situation where the public (i) believe the central bank’s implicit
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objectives coincide with the inflation target, (ii) believe the model the central bank is 
using is adequate, and (iii) believe all available information is being used by the central 
bank, that the report would have a major impact on expectations. In fact, in the ideal 
situation described above, there is no reason why agents would not take official fore­
casts as their own inflation expectations. However, that is not what we observe, as we 
will see below, when we discuss the quality of official forecasts and their impact on 
expectations, which suggests that the public suspects that the central bank’s ‘secret’ 
objectives are different from the IT, or is sceptical about the technical abilities of the 
central bank’s staff, or believes that the Central bank has some private information that 
they are not disclosing.
The information disclosed in press releases and inflation reports may be complemented 
by regular speeches by the Governor and other senior officials. These speeches may 
play an important role in explaining policy decisions, or the importance of price stability, 
specially because they can address the particular concerns of specific audiences. For 
instance, the Governor of the RBNZ explained the implications of the New Zealand’s 
new policy strategy to exchange rate developments in a speech delivered to the Auck­
land Manufacturers’ Association, whose members had been expressing some concern 
about the need to have a ‘favourable’ exchange rate (Brash, 1992). These tactics have 
been pursued by some central banks in our sample (specially the RBNZ), who have 
increased significantly the number of contacts of Central Bank senior officials with the 
public, since the adoption of IT.
All this information disclosure improves, by itself, the accountability of the central bank. 
But democratic accountability could be enhanced by regular contacts with parliament 
and government. Being forced to explain their policies to democratically elected powers 
is an additional source of pressure that forces central banks to stick to targets, especially 
if penalties could be imposed on the central bank’s governor if the policy is not consis­
tent with the IT. This is the case in New Zealand, where the Governor can be dismissed 
if targets are not met, and inflation outcomes are closely monitored. When in June 1995 
underlying inflation overshot the target by 0.2 percentage points (and again in March 
1996, when the target was overshot by 0.1 percentage points), the Minister of Finance
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immediately called for an official report on the performance of the Governor from the 
non-executive Directors at the RBNZ Board.
Finally, communication channels can be powerful policy instruments. In certain cases 
the communication of future developments in inflation is an instrument of monetary 
policy in itself. For example, in New Zealand the financial markets almost invariably 
deliver the necessary monetary conditions as a reaction to the Central Bank’s comments 
on inflation outlook. These comments are the instrument the RBNZ has used most 
frequently; the settlement cash instrument was used only 3 times since 1991.69 In the 
UK, the Bank of England’s comments on the inflation outlook may have had the effect 
of putting pressure on the Chancellor, who prior to June 1997, had to decide on interest 
rate changes.70 In so far as financial markets believe that central banks are truly commit­
ted to their ITs, they can work out for themselves (using their own models) what inte­
rest rate adjustments may be necessary to meet the target, and hence shift the term 
structure of (forward) rates to reflect that view. Consequently monetary policy may 
seem to become more “boring” as policy adjustments more often validate prior expecta­
tions.
In general, if communication succeeds in shaping agents’ expectations it will give an 
important contribution to the final objective of controlling inflation, since inflation 
expectations play a key role in inflation developments. But agents will only be con­
vinced if the quality of the information is high, and the central bank is credible. The 
quality of central bank forecasts and the credibility of monetary policy are the topics of 
the following sections.
69 Mayes and Riches (1996, p. 8).
70 It has been argued by some commentators (for example, Svensson, 1997), that this is why the Bank 
of England’s “Inflation Report” is, by far, the more detailed of all the reports. Although all the reports 
have similar structures, the detail of information provided varies significantly, with some (e.g., Canada 
and New Zealand) relying more on non-technical text and charts (with very few tables), and others 
(e.g., UK) providing a more technical analysis and large amount of data. It could be argued this was a 
consequence of the incentives for writing the report, with the former being directed at influencing the 
expectations of the non-expert general public and the latter being directed at influencing the Chancel­
lor.
208 Chapter 5
5.3 Inflation Forecasting and Controllability
The IT strategy implies that an (explicit or implicit) inflation forecast is the intermediate 
target of policy. Svensson (1997, pp. 14-15) argues that the inflation forecast is an ideal 
intermediate target because it possesses a number of desirable characteristics:
- the inflation forecast is the variable that has the highest correlation with the policy 
objective (future inflation);
- the inflation forecast is controllable through changes in monetary conditions (and 
it is even more controllable than future inflation itself);
- the inflation forecast is easy to observe (and easier to observe than future infla­
tion).
Inflation forecasts have these characteristics virtually by definition, and we are not going 
to discuss whether inflation forecasts are better intermediate targets than other possible 
alternative intermediate target. In this section, we investigate whether inflation forecasts 
are intermediate targets good enough to deliver the policy outcomes implicit in the 
design of the IT. The fact that inflation forecasts have the highest correlation with 
future inflation, certainly does not imply that this correlation is 1, and not even that it is 
high enough to be consistent with staying within the target range. Inflation forecasts are 
not precise, and in subsection 5.3.1 we discuss whether they are sufficiently accurate as 
a guide to future outcomes to serve as an intermediate target in a policy directed at 
keeping inflation inside a narrow range. Not only are inflation forecasts inaccurate, but 
uncertainties about the timing and strength of monetary policy actions together with 
other limitations on their unfettered use, imply that such actions cannot generally be 
taken to bring such forecasts back to their desired central level wisely and quickly, i.e., 
that inflation forecasts, as well as current inflation, cannot be precisely controlled. 
These facts, as well as late shocks affecting inflation after it is too late for monetary 
policy to be sensibly used to offset them, given the lengthy lags in their normal opera­
tion, will cause inflation outcomes to deviate from any pre-set target, and in subsection
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5.3.2 we discuss whether monetary policy may be expected to keep inflation inside a 2-3 
p.p. wide band. In the remainder of this section, we compare the macroeconomic 
performance of IT countries with non-IT countries, to assess whether the IT strategy 
has delivered superior outcomes. Subsection 5.3.3 analyses the level and variability of 
inflation, while in subsection 5.3.4 we look at the speed and costs of the disinflation 
process.
5.3.1 Forecasting record
Inflation forecasts are central to the IT strategy: as described in subsection 5.2.3, the 
policy rule is defined in terms of an inflation forecast. Thus, an efficient IT policy 
strategy demands good inflation forecasts, i.e., forecasts implying low forecast errors. 
We tried to assess the quality of the forecasts made by some of the central banks in our 
sample. The only data available are for Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Table 5.9 
describes the forecast mean error and mean absolute error (MAE) for these 3 countries, 
over different periods of time, of the forecasts of inflation made 1 year before.
Table 5.9 Inflation forecast errors
Australia 
Mean MAE
New Zealand 
Mean MAE Mean
UK
MAE
1981/88 * -0.3 1.7 -0.6 2.1
1988/92 0.2 1.1 0.3 1.6
1993/96 0.2 0.5 -0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6
1994 0.5 0.5 -0.2 0.3 0.8 0.8
1995 -0.1 0.1 -0.7 0.7 0.3 0.4
1996 0.9 0.9 -1.0 1.0 0.1 0.5
* 1974/88 for New Zealand
Evidence from Table 5.9 suggests that the RBA and the RBNZ tended to underpredict 
inflation during the high inflation period of the 1980s, and to overpredict it during the 
deflationary period of the early 1990s. More recently, this tendency to overestimate 
inflationary pressures has continued to be verified in the RBA, but in the RBNZ it has 
been replaced by a slightly regular underestimation of the inflationary pressures. The
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mean absolute forecast error tends to be relatively large, even in the period of low and 
less volatile inflation, compared to the width of the target bands. Even if these central 
banks manage to keep forecast inflation exactly at the mid-point of the band, the error 
margins implicit in the target ranges (0.5 percentage points in Australia and 1.5 percen­
tage points in New Zealand and the UK) are not much larger than the MAE, which 
suggests that the probability of missing the target must be high. Early in our sample 
period forecasts tended to be less accurate. This is probably due to the higher levels of 
inflation, but it could also be the result of an improvement in the quality of forecasts, 
because of a learning process inherent in any period of transition between regimes.
The forecasts on Table 5.9 were prepared under the technical assumption of unchanged 
monetary policy. It could be argued then that the differences between the outcomes and 
the forecasts could be explained by the policy actions taken on the basis of these fore­
casts, and are not a consequence of forecasting inaccuracy. Although we accept this 
could explain part of the divergence, we believe that this problem has a small influence, 
and most of the divergence reflects forecasting inaccuracy. First, because monetary 
policy is supposed to act on inflation with a lag of at least 6 quarters, policy changes 
made after the forecast should not have a significant effect in the 4 quarters ahead 
forecasting period. In a study of inflation forecasts in Australia, over the period 1985- 
1994, Stevens and Debelle (1995, p. 89) adjust the inflation outcomes for the effects of 
policy changes; using their data, and comparing them with official forecasts, one still 
gets MAE of around 1.3 p.p., versus 1.8 p.p. before the adjustment. Second, evidence 
provided in the February 1996 Bank of England’s Inflation Report suggests private 
forecasts tend to be no better or even worse than the Bank’s forecasts. Data from the 
RBNZ also suggest that in New Zealand forecasts from the private sector are no better 
than the Bank’s. Stevens and Debelle’s data provide similar evidence: the official 
forecasts in Australia have MAE that are roughly equal to the ones of private forecasts 
(around 1.8 p.p.). Private forecasts should not have the drawback of assuming un­
changed policies, and the errors in their forecasts may be taken as evidence of the 
limitations of current forecasting technology.
The results suggest that the probability of the targets being missed is quite high, even if
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the forecast is kept always at the mid-point of the band, if the forecasting accuracy does 
not improve. Also, central banks tended to over estimate or under estimate inflation for 
quite long periods. Nevertheless, there are some encouraging signs. The quality of the 
forecasts seems to be improving over time, which could suggest that the initial errors 
were the result of a period of learning of how to operate in a new framework, and that 
in time forecasts may achieve an improved level of accuracy.
Forecasting inflation several quarters in advance is difficult. Central banks recognise 
that, either in their words (e.g., King, 1996, p.5) or their actions, since they do not apply 
the inflation target rule blindly and mechanically. As we have seen above, in practice 
there is not always a clear distinction between a discretionary policy and IT, since policy 
decisions are not based exclusively on inflation forecasts. The forecasting record of 
some of the central banks so far suggests that it is prudent to do so. In particular, the 
Bank of England emphasizes the probability distribution (in its now famous fan-chart) of 
its forecast for inflation and refuses to provide a single point estimate. Also note that 
the MPC tries to assess the varying balance of risk, so that the probability distribution is 
generally skewed which has the consequence that the mean, median and mode of the 
probability distribution all differ from each other.
5.3.2 Inflation controllability
Before the adoption of IT, the general opinion was that inflation could not be controlled 
easily or precisely, and the initial comments on the adoption of IT reflected this view. 
This was also the view among the central banks that adopted this strategy, and this was 
reflected on the adoption of ranges, instead of point targets, and on some clauses that 
determine the targets should not be met at every moment but should only hold on 
average. Past behaviour of inflation and simulation studies justified such caution and 
suggested that even 2 percentage points bands might well be too narrow.71
71 Freedman (1995a, p. 27) notes that empirical work undertaken at the Bank of Canada at the time of 
the IT adoption suggested bands wider than 2 p.p. should be used. Simulations for Australia (Stevens 
and Debelle, 1995) and the UK (Haldane and Salmon, 1995) also suggest that the optimal band width
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We tried to assess how controllable inflation is from the experience of the central banks 
in our sample, by comparing the targets that they had set with the inflation outcomes. 
The purpose of this exercise is to measure how easy it is for a central bank to set a 
target and achieve it, and not to measure the success of monetary policy. This is for 
several reasons; first, because in some countries the design of the IT does not require 
inflation to be inside the target range all the time, and thus missing the target in one 
quarter does not constitute a failure.72 Second, because some targets are not precise 
enough to determine objectively if a given outcome is a success; we had to make some 
assumptions that may be questioned.73 Finally, because some of the results include 
‘transition targets’ that may have a secondary status relative to the ‘final targets’.
Figure 5.3 plots quarterly data, from the first quarter of 1988 to the third quarter of 
1997, for the headline and underlying (where available) Consumer Price Inflation, as 
well as the inflation targets adopted by each central bank.74 The charts in Figure 5.3 
show that in most cases inflation was close to the target, although in some quarters it 
did not fell inside the target range. Table 5.10 quantifies the number of quarters the 
targets have been in force up to the third quarter of 1997, and in how many of those the 
targets have been missed. We interpret the results in Table 5.10 as evidence that the
should be higher than the width adopted.
72 For example, the Bank of Canada recognizes that the role of monetary policy is not to keep inflation 
permanently inside the target range, but to ensure that inflation returns to the range if  some shock 
pushes it outside. Other targets (e.g., New Zealand) are meant to hold at all times.
73 The first assumption refers to the definition of the Bank of Finland’s IT: it is not obvious what 
should be considered as ‘around 2%’. Given that the point of this subsection is to assess how easy it is 
to meet a range target of the usual 2-3% width, for Table 5.10 we assumed the Bank of Finland had a 
2% ±1.5% target The Banco de Espana set ‘transition targets’ for ‘early 1996’ (which we took to mean 
the first quarter average), and upper references of 3% for the ‘opening months of 1997’ (assumed to be 
the first quarter) and 2.5% ‘at the end of 1997’ (assumed to be the fourth quarter). For the 1997 
targets, the width of the band was assumed to be 2%. Finally, the RBNZ set ‘transition targets’ that 
were changed several times, and only refer to inflation in the 4th quarter of 1990,1991 and 1992. The 
assumptions regarding the change of targets are described in footnote 47, and the targets for the 1st, 
2nd and 3rd quarters of 1991 and 1992 assume a steady downward path for inflation.
74 Headline inflation data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics. The underlying 
inflation series for Australia, Canada and New Zealand were provided by the respective central banks, 
and the data for Finland’s underlying inflation were published in the Bank o f Finland Bulletin. The 
‘RPIX’ series for the UK was obtained from Datastream. Except for Australia and New Zealand, where 
the inflation data are released quarterly, the quarterly inflation was computed as the average of the 
monthly inflation rates. The thick solid line represents inflation measured by the index officially 
targeted, the thin dashed line represents the other measure of inflation, and the horizontal dotted lines 
represent the target limits.
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uncertainty surrounding inflation forecasting and the effects of monetary policy makes it 
difficult to set a 2 p.p. target range and achieve it. Only in Spain inflation was inside the 
band every quarter, but the number of observations is small. More data are available for 
the UK, where the targets have almost always been met, but there the width of the band 
was 3 p.p. until 1997:Q1.75 In Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden, the band 
seems to be too narrow, since inflation was outside the range for the official target 
almost half of the quarters.76 In New Zealand and in Canada, the inflation target is 
defined in terms of the headline CPI, but with some caveats, so that in practice the target 
is considered to be a measure of underlying inflation that extracts the influence of the 
caveats from headline inflation. Using these indices of underlying inflation, the likeli­
hood of meeting the pre-set targets increases, but remains relatively low, as shown at the 
bottom of Table 5.10.
Table 5.10 Inflation targets and inflation outcomes
Quarters with Quarters outside target range
target Number Percentage
OFFICIAL TARGETS
Australia 19 8 42%
Canada 23 10 43%
Finland 8 8 100%
New Zealand 28 14 50%
Spain 2 0 0%
Sweden 11 5 45%
UK 19 1 5%
UNDERLYING INFLATION
Canada 23 7 30%
New Zealand 28 11 39%
75 In the UK the only observed miss was marginal, and occurred in the only quarter when the band 
width was 1.5%. This happened in. 1997:Q2, the quarter corresponding to the end of the previous 
Parliament, when inflation should be below 2.5%, according to the initial IT. It turned out that average 
inflation for the quarter was 2.56%.
76 When analysing Table 5.10, it must be taken into consideration that in Australia the targets are 
supposed to hold on average. The average underlying inflation for the period 1993.Q1 to 1997:Q3 in 
Australia was 2.3%, which means that so far the Reserve Bank of Australia has been meeting their 
target Also, the Bank of Finland did not have an explicit band. Although the inflation outcomes 
would be outside a 3 p.p. band, it is a matter of judgement whether inflation outcomes in Finland were 
‘around 2%’. Anyhow, the mean absolute deviation from the 2% target for the period 1995:Q1 to 
1996:Q4 was 2.0 percentage points, which we interpret as evidence supporting our claim that ±1 p.p. 
bands are too narrow.
214 Chapter 5
It is still too early to make any definitive judgements, given the short experience in most 
of the countries, but the results so far suggest that the target ranges have been set too 
narrowly. In New Zealand and Canada, the countries where IT was first introduced, 
headline CPI (the formal target) was outside the set target range for almost 50% of the 
quarters. In Canada, all the target misses consisted of undershooting the transition path, 
and do not relate to the ‘final’ target.77 In New Zealand, most of the deviations from 
target can be explained by the exemption caveats or an unexpectedly early success in 
reducing inflation, that caused inflation to undershoot the ‘transition’ targets. Still, even 
if the Bank of Canada and RBNZ can claim that they were successful in reducing infla­
tion even faster than expected, these results raise two questions. First, although the 
results for New Zealand improve if we use underlying inflation, i.e., a measure of infla­
tion that controls for all the caveats in the Policy Target Agreement, it is questionable 
whether we should use this measure when analysing the controllability of the IT. After 
all, the target is set in terms of headline CPI, and that measure of inflation was signifi­
cantly outside the target for several quarters. If underlying inflation is the target, de 
facto,1* then it would probably be better, from the point of view of credibility, to set the 
formal target in terms of the underlying inflation index. Second, while it can reasonably 
be argued that given the prior history of high inflation in the countries in our sample, an 
undershooting of the transition path was a good outcome, not a bad one, from the point 
of view of controllability, this is still a sign that inflation was not accurately forecast, 
and hence easily controllable. If the central banks could have accurately forecast infla­
tion, then they would have set a steeper transition path, compatible with what they 
thought was the desirable outcome for inflation 79
77 ‘Final’ targets are the ones which correspond to the definition of ‘a low and stable level of inflation’ 
for each central bank. ‘Final’ targets are defined in opposition to ‘transition’ targets, which set a 
downward path for inflation. This does not mean that ‘final’ targets cannot be changed, as it happened 
in New Zealand in December 1996. These ‘final’ targets have been in force in New Zealand, since the 
first quarter of 1993 (19 data points available), in Finland and Sweden, since the first quarter of 1995 
(11 data points available), in Canada since the fourth quarter of 1995 (S data points available) and in 
the UK since the second quarter of 1997 (2 data points available). The Australian target is in force 
since 1993 (19 quarters), but if we take the target to be the average inflation, then only 1 data point is 
available.
78 As officials in the RBNZ claim it to be, and as it seems to be accepted by the public in New Zealand.
79 A related question is whether reactions to a breach in a final target range should be symmetrical. 
Will governments and public tend to accept undershooting, but not overshooting, of the target? In 
terms of final targets we do not have much evidence so far, but the reaction to the undershooting of the
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The results for some of the other countries (Australia, Spain and the UK) were more 
encouraging, with the targets being met so far.80 The fact that the targets in Australia 
and the UK (initially) were less ambitious (wider bands or average inflation) might have 
helped their better performance. Anyhow, even if the data are not rich enough to allow 
for definitive judgements, two conclusions may already be drawn. First, headline CPI is 
not as easily controllable as underlying CPI, a fact that puts into question the credibility 
of narrow targets set in terms of this index. The impact on expectations of establishing a 
target and missing it half of the time, even if you can justify the deviations using the 
caveats, is probably less than the impact of a target set in terms of a less transparent but 
more controllable index of underlying inflation. Second, as it is obvious, even underly­
ing inflation cannot be controlled perfectly, and some of the central banks in our sample 
have already missed the target for some quarters.
5.3.3 Inflation performance in IT and non-IT countries
If we accept the view that, given the prior history of high inflation in most of our sam­
ple, for many of the central banks it was more important to reduce inflation than to keep 
it inside a narrow range, the performance of the central banks in our sample could then 
be described as good. Average inflation after the adoption of IT was 2.3%, against 
6.0% in the period between 1987 and the adoption of IT. The average standard devia­
tion was also lower (1.2% against 2.4%), although the decrease in variability of inflation 
is due to the lower levels of inflation (the coefficient of variation has increased from 0.37 
to 0.58).
However, inflation performance in IT countries benefited from favourable international 
conditions. Tables 5.11 to 5.13 report the inflation outcomes in selected OECD coun­
transition paths suggest that this is a possibility.
80 The only missed observed in the UK was marginal. In Australia the target does not have to hold at 
all quarters, only on average, so formally there was not a failure to meet the target, although inflation 
was outside the target range for more than a third of the quarters. In Finland, the target does not define 
explicit bands, so one cannot claim it was missed, although the deviations from the 2% target are larger 
than would be compatible with a band 3 p.p. wide.
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tries compared to the outcomes in our sample.81 When making this type of compari­
sons, two main problems arise. The first problem is the choice of the period over which 
the exercise is going to be made. Somewhat subjectively, we decided to make the 
comparison over two sets of periods, 1980/89 versus 1990/97 and before IT (since 
1987) versus after IT. Since the first IT was introduced in 1990, the first periodicity 
compares the 1980s, a decade when the world did not know IT, with the 1990s, the 
decade of IT. The second periodicity tries to compare the inflation performance of each 
country (in a shorter period) before and after IT. Since four of the countries in our 
sample introduced IT near the end of 1992, for the non-IT countries the period before 
IT was taken to be 1987/92 and the period after IT, 1993/97.82
The second question, the choice of a comparable group, is always problematical. In 
order to obtain more robust results, we chose to select four (overlapping) control 
groups, according to different criteria, as follows:
- Group 1: the countries where average inflation for the period 1980/89 was within 
the range of average inflation in the IT countries (6.5-11.9%): Denmark, France, Ire­
land, Italy and Norway; this is a group of countries of similar inflation experiences in the 
1980s;
- Group 2: group 1 plus the US and Portugal, the two countries where average 
inflation in the period 1980/89 was, respectively, immediately below and above Group 1; 
this group was chosen to give Group 1 the same number of countries as in the IT group;
- Group 3: a group of countries chosen to have the same average inflation in the 
period 1987/92 as the IT countries before IT (6.0%): Italy, Norway, Portugal, Switzer­
land and the US; the reason for the choice of this group is the same as in group 1, but 
according to the before IT versus after IT periodicity;
- Group 4: a group of 7 countries that face similar economic environments as IT 
countries; this group is composed of Japan, the US, Norway and Denmark, France and 
Portugal, and Italy, that we subjectively chose to be the closest match to Australia, 
Canada, Finland and Sweden, Spain and New Zealand and the UK.
81 The data are quarterly consumer price inflation from the International Financial Statistics.
82 The data for 1997 do not include the fourth quarter.
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Table 5.11 reports the average inflation level in each of the periods considered, for these 
four groups as well as for our sample of IT countries. Also reported are t-statistics for 
two types of test. Test 1 compares the IT group with each control group, where the 
null hypothesis is that the control group and the IT group have the same average infla­
tion. Test 2 compares the group average in both periods, for a given group, and the null 
hypothesis is that the group average is the same in both periods.83 The data show that 
average inflation has fallen significantly in the IT countries, but it also fell in the non-IT 
countries. The results for test 1 show that average inflation in IT countries is not 
significantly different from any of the control groups, either before or after the adoption 
of IT. The inflation experience of the IT countries seems to be shared by all our control 
groups, and it is not a specificity of the adoption of IT. The only data that might sug­
gest IT countries are different refers to test 2. The significance level of the fall in 
inflation is generally higher than for the control groups, but this probably a consequence 
of the fact that the IT group is more homogeneous than the control groups.84
Table 5.11 Average inflation in selected OECD countries
Group average inflation Test 1 Test 2
80s 90s Before After 80s 90s Before After 90s After
IT 8.5 3.8 6.0 2.3 -6.5 -5.8
G1 8.6 2.8 4.0 2.3 -0.1 0.9 2.4 -0.1 -6.3 -2.6
G2 9.5 3.5 5.0 2.7 -0.6 -0.2 0.8 -0.8 -3.6 -2.2
G3 9.2 4.1 5.9 2.9 -0.3 -0.9 0.1 -1.1 -2.0 -2.1
G4 8.5 3.3 4.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.9 -0.4 -2.6 -2.0
After realising that IT did not have any significant impact in the level of inflation, we 
tested for differences in inflation uncertainty, measured by the standard deviation of 
quarterly inflation. Table 5.12 reports the results of those tests. Again there is no 
evidence the adoption of IT had a significant impact on inflation uncertainty. Inflation 
uncertainty decreased significantly in IT countries, but it also decreased in non-IT 
countries. Inflation uncertainty after IT is higher in IT countries than in the control
83 The ‘90s’ are compared with the ‘80s’ and the ‘after’ with the ‘before’ IT.
84 The standard deviation of inflation levels in the IT group is lower than in the control groups. The 
lower standard deviation implies that any test to the average inflation in the group will tend to have 
higher significance levels.
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groups (and significantly higher in one of the groups), but it was also higher before the 
adoption of IT.
Table 5.12 Inflation uncertainty in selected OECD countries
Average standard deviation  Test 1______  Test 2
80s 90s Before After 80s 90s Before After 90s After
IT 3.6 2.2 2.4 1.2 -2.9 -1.9
G1 4.7 0.9 1.1 0.7 -1.4 3.6 1.7 2.7 -4.9 -1.2
G2 4.9 1.3 1.2 0.7 -1.7 1.6 1.8 2.1 -4.4 -1.5
G3 4.3 1.9 1.5 1.0 -0.8 0.6 1.1 1.0 -2.1 -1.6
G4 4.2 1.4 1.3 0.8 -0.8 1.5 1.8 2.0 -3.5 -1.6
Finally, we tried to assess whether or not the lower standard deviation was a conse­
quence of the lower levels of inflation, by looking at the coefficient of variation, re­
ported in Table 5.13. Here the results are somewhat different for IT and non-IT coun­
tries: the coefficient of variation increased in the IT countries more than in all the 
control groups. Although inflation variability fell in absolute terms in all groups, it 
increased in relative terms, and this effect was felt more significantly in the IT countries. 
This different behaviour in the two sets of countries could be a direct consequence of 
the adoption of IT: since IT central banks are trying to keep inflation inside a narrow 
range, they will tend to force it up and down more frequently than the non-IT countries, 
that are content to let inflation drift and only react to large swings. However, this could 
also be a small sample result, not related to IT adoption.85
Table 5.13 Relative inflation variability in selected OECD countries
Average coefficient o f  variation  Test 1_________ Test 2
80s 90s Before After 80s 90s Before After 90s After
IT 0.43 0.69 0.37 0.58 3.1 2.1
G1 0.54 0.32 0.27 0.28 -1.6 4.0 1.1 3.2 -3.2 0.2
G2 0.53 0.36 0.25 0.27 -1.7 4.0 1.6 3.7 -2.8 0.4
G3 0.50 0.46 0.29 0.37 -1.2 2.1 0.8 1.6 -0.5 0.6
G4 0.56 0.43 0.31 0.40 -1.7 2.3 0.7 1.2 -1.2 0.6
85 The behaviour of the coefficient of variation in the individual countries suggests this result might be 
robust. Among IT countries, only in the UK did the coefficient of variation decrease after the adoption 
of IT. Among the OECD countries, the coefficient of variation decreased in 7 out of the 17 non-IT 
OECD countries.
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Inflation performance in IT and non-IT countries is very similar. The fall in the levels 
and variability of inflation can be observed in all control groups. The only difference 
relates to the coefficient of variation, that increased significantly more in the IT coun­
tries than in the non-IT countries. The fact that relative variability increased in the IT 
but not in the non-IT countries could mean that IT causes inflation to become more 
unstable in the short term. In order to keep inflation inside a narrow range, IT central 
banks may have to seek constantly to pull it up and down, whether non-IT central banks 
may let inflation drift. Perhaps, the target instability that was observed in money and 
exchange rate targets may also apply to IT.
5.3.4 Disinflation, growth and unemployment
Even if the final results in terms of the fall in inflation were similar in the IT and non-IT 
countries, this does not mean that the adoption of IT did not make a difference for the 
disinflation processes. Because the adoption of IT may generate expectations of lower 
future inflation, it might have facilitated the disinflation process, inducing faster and/or 
less costly (in terms of increased unemployment or output lost) disinflations.
We analysed disinflation episodes in IT and non-IT countries from 1981 :Q1 to 1997:Q1, 
and tried to assess whether disinflation under IT was easier than before, and/or easier 
than in other non-IT countries, by measuring the speed of disinflation, and the costs in 
terms of unemployment and output growth in each episode. Apart from the countries in 
our sample, we analysed disinflations in the 4 control groups considered in the previous 
subsection.86 Disinflation episodes were identified using a methodology similar to Ball 
(1994): each disinflation episode is a period when ‘trend’ inflation falls substantially.87
86 The quarterly data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics and OECD Main 
Economic Indicators and Quarterly National Accounts. The inflation data are the yearly changes in 
consumer prices from the IFS, the unemployment data are OECD standardised unemployment rates, 
and the GDP data are OECD standardised GDP volume indices (except for New Zealand, which were 
obtained from Datastream).
87 ‘Trend’ inflation is defined as a centered, nine-quarter moving average of actual inflation. To 
identify disinflation episodes, we identify ‘peaks’ and ‘troughs’ in trend inflation: a ‘peak’ is a quarter 
in which trend inflation is higher than in the previous four and the following four quarters, and a
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In each inflation episode we examined the disinflation rate and the cost in terms of 
unemployment and output. The rate of disinflation was computed as the average fall in 
inflation per quarter, measured in percentage points, between the quarters with the 
highest and the lowest inflation in each episode. Table 5.14 summarises the results for 
each IT country and for each of the four control groups considered, for the whole 
1981/97 sample and for 3 subsamples, for the periods 1981/89 (80s), 1990/97 (90s) and 
after the adoption of IT (77).88 With few exceptions, one episode in the 80s and another 
in the 90s were identified. The speed of disinflation in the 90s episode is lower than in 
the 80s episode across all countries (except for Sweden) and groups. In the 80s epi­
sode, the average speed of disinflation was similar in the IT and non-IT countries, but in 
the 90s it was significantly higher in IT countries, whatever the control group used. If 
we assume the 90s corresponds to the period of IT, then it would seem that IT was 
associated with a higher rate of disinflation. However, note that for some of the IT 
countries the 90s episode occurred (or at least started) before the adoption of IT (al­
though when we take only the period under IT the results are not significantly affected).
Table 5.14 Rate of disinflation in IT and non-IT countries
No. o f episodes Rate o f  disinflation (v.y./qtr.)
80s 90s IT 80s 90s IT  81-97
Australia 1 2 1 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.9
Canada 1 1 1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
Finland 1 1 # 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4
New Zealand 2 2 2 2.0 0.9 0.9 1.5
Spain 1 1 # 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.3
Sweden 1 2 1 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.5
UK 2 1 # 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0
IT 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.7
G1 1 1.2 0.7 0.2 0.5
G2 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.5
G3 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.3 0.5
G4 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.5
‘trough’ is defined by an analogous comparison. A disinflation episode is any period that starts at an 
inflation peak and ends at a trough with an yearly rate of inflation at least 2 percentage points lower 
than the peak. See Ball (1994) for a justification of the procedure.
88 Results for each individual episode and country are not presented here but may be obtained from the 
authors. The episodes under IT are included in the 90s group. Only for Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and Sweden can we identify a complete disinflation episode after IT. For Finland, Spain, and 
the UK the 90s episode ended under IT, but started before; in these cases, marked the data for the
90s are for the whole episode, but the data for IT are just for the period after IT.
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Disinflation processes are usually associated with increases in unemployment and lower 
output growth. By contributing to create lower inflation expectations, the adoption of 
IT could help to reduce the unemployment and growth costs of disinflation. For each of 
the inflation episodes identified using the methodology above, we computed sacrifice 
ratios in terms of unemployment and output. The ratio for unemployment was com­
puted as the increase in unemployment (Au) over the decrease in inflation (-Arc), bet­
ween the quarters with the highest and lowest inflation in each episode. Output lost due 
to a disinflation episode (X) was computed as the difference between potential and 
actual output growth over the same period, with potential output growth assumed to 
correspond to an yearly rate of growth equal to the average over the 1981/94 period, for 
each country. The sacrifice ratio in terms of output growth is the ratio between the 
output lost (X) and the decrease in inflation (-Arc). Table 5.15 summarises the results for 
the sacrifice ratios in terms of unemployment and output, for the same countries, 
groups, and periods used in the previous table.
Table 5.15 Sacrifice ratios in IT and non-IT countries
80s
Unemployment (AuZ-An) 
90s IT 81-97 80s
Output growth (X/-Atc) 
90s IT 81-97
Australia 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 -0.3 1.0 0.1 0.2
Canada 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Finland 0.1 2.0 0.9 0.9 -1.0 2.0 -2.6 0.2
NZ 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7 -0.9
Spain 0.4 1.4 -0.2 0.6 -0.3 1.2 0.0 0.1
Sweden 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.8 -0.2 -0.9 -0.4
UK 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.7 0.0 0.2
IT 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.4 -0.5 0.6 -0.6 -0.1
G1 0.2 0.7 0.3 -0.1 1.1 0.2
G2 0.1 0.5 0.2 -0.1 0.9 0.2
G3 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.9 0.2
G4 0.1 0.5 0.2 -0.1 1.5 0.4
In all countries (with the exception of Canada) and groups the sacrifice ratios are higher 
for the 90s episode. In terms of unemployment, the IT countries have ratios similar to 
Group 1, and above the other groups, either in the 80s or in the 90s. In terms of output, 
the sacrifice ratio is lower in the IT countries, but again this happens in both periods. If 
one takes only the period under IT instead of the 90s the performance of the IT coun­
tries improves; both ratios are lower than for any other group. Significance tests for the
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difference between the averages of the IT and the other groups (not presented here) 
show that the sacrifice ratio in terms of output (but not in terms of unemployment) is 
significantly lower under IT than in any other group. However, these results rely 
substantially on the data for Finland and the UK where the episode under IT is just part 
of a larger episode that started in early 1990. If one takes only the countries with a 
complete episode under IT, then the sacrifice ratios are not significantly different for the 
IT and other groups, although they are still lower. Even if one takes all the qualifica­
tions into account, the results on Table 5.15, although not conclusive, still suggest that 
the adoption of IT may have made the disinflation processes somewhat less costly, 
especially in terms of output growth lost.
The adoption of IT was associated with faster disinflation, at least relatively to disinfla­
tions in non-IT countries in the same period. It also seems that under IT the disinflation 
process is less costly, especially in terms of output lost, although the evidence is less 
conclusive in this issue. Thus, although the OECD countries with high inflation in the 
1980s managed to reduce it in the 1990s, whether they adopted IT or not, how they did 
it seems to depend on the monetary policy strategy. The adoption of IT might have 
helped the disinflation process.
To conclude this section, we must ask whether inflation is controllable to the point that 
we can expect inflation targets, with a 2-3 p.p. range, to be met if the central bank 
follows a sensible policy? It is too early to reach a conclusion, but it seems that it is not 
possible to control headline inflation, precisely or quickly. It is probably possible to 
control, on average and over a period of time, some measure of underlying inflation 
within a reasonable range,89 but this might come at the cost of an increase in the short 
term variability of inflation. If this lack of controllability is confirmed by future evi­
dence, then the positive effects on the credibility of monetary policy that IT is hoped to 
have, could even turn out to be of the opposite sign.
89 This is something of a tautology, because the measure of underlying inflation is designed to include 
only the inflationary pressures monetary policy can control.
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5.4. Credibility of the Inflation Target
One of the major objectives (if not the major) of the adoption of IT was to provide an 
anchor for inflation expectations. In this section we try to evaluate if this objective was 
achieved, based on data from household and business surveys, financial markets and 
wage settlements. Again the lack of data prevents us from reaching definitive conclu­
sions, but some tentative results can be extracted from the available information, al­
though one must not forget that expectations are affected by an array of factors of which 
the monetary policy strategy is just one; at the specific moment when IT was adopted, 
other factors (e.g., fiscal policy concerns or political instability) might have been affec­
ting expectations in a way that would conceal any (eventual) impact of the IT adoption. 
Also, in some countries (e.g., Canada, New Zealand) price stability was seen as being 
the objective of monetary policy even before the central bank announced an explicit IT, 
and this might have reduced the impact of the announcement. Nevertheless, in this latter 
case, since the aim of this chapter is to discuss the effect of publicly announcing an 
explicit IT, the lack of an announcement effect is still a sign that IT, as such, does not 
have an impact on credibility, at least not more than doing what many countries not 
included in our sample have done, that is adopting price stability as the objective for 
monetary policy.
5.4.1 Households’ and businesses’ inflation expectations
Figure 5.4 plots data of different surveys of inflation expectations. The surveys are of 
two types. In the first, used for the non-European countries and Sweden, individuals are 
asked which inflation rate they expect in the next 12 months. In the second, used for 
Finland, Spain and the UK, individuals are asked if they expect future inflation to be 
higher or lower than current inflation, and the results presented correspond to the 
difference between the number of the two responses. The vertical dashed line marks the
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moment of the adoption of IT and the horizontal dotted lines the inflation targets.90
The main conclusions that may be drawn from Figure 5.4 are that the announcement of 
IT does not seem to affect inflation expectations and that in some cases households and 
businesses do not find the targets fully credible. In Australia expectations were practi­
cally unchanged at about 4% from 1991 (before the adoption of IT) to 1996, and only 
recently they have started to converge to the 2-3% target. In Canada, the data corres­
pond to the expectations of professional forecasters, not to the expectations of the 
common non-expert household or business. These have been inside the target range 
most of the time, and might have been affected by the announcement. However, one 
cannot tell whether this is a consequence of the adoption of IT or just a good forecast of 
the actual inflation performance.91 In New Zealand, household expectations are still 
above the 0-3% target. The RBNZ survey, which covers households and businesses, 
tends to show lower inflation expectations, but even those lie outside the target range 
for some periods. Only in Sweden do households seem to find the IT credible: since the 
target was adopted, household inflation expectations were always inside the 1-3% target 
range (but had been at those levels even before IT). However, initially the target was
90 The expectations refer to the next 3 months for the business surveys, and to the next 12 months for 
the household surveys. The data sources and expectations series for Figure 5.4 are:
Australia: Westpac/IAESR inflation expectations survey (provided by Datastream)’,
Canada: Conference Board of Canada quarterly Survey of Forecasters (provided by the Bank of 
Canada);
Finland: Consumer survey of Statistics Finland; Business survey of the Confederation of Finnish 
Industry and Employers (published in Kuismanen and Spolander, 1995);
NZ: Marketscope survey of inflation expectations (households), Reserve Bank survey of expec­
tations of senior business leaders and other key opinion leaders (provided by the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand);
Spain: European Economy - Consumer opinion on economic and financial conditions; Ministerio
de Industria e Energia - Survey of manufacturing industry (provided by Banco de 
Espana);
Sweden: Statistics Sweden; National Institute of Economic Research (published in Inflation Re­
port, Sveriges Riksbank, December 1997)
UK: Confederation of British Industry monthly inquiry - expected prices of domestic orders
(provided by Datastream).
The dates in the charts correspond to the moment the surveys were made. The targets were shifted 
back 12 months so they refer to the same period as the expectations do.
91 The Bank of Canada’s Monetary Policy Report of May 1996 mentioned that 83 per cent of respon­
dents to the Conference Board business confidence survey expected inflation to be 2 per cent or less, 
which suggests that also among the business community the IT has (at least now) gained substantial 
credibility.
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not fully credible for industrial agents, whose expectations tended to lie outside the 
target range until recently. Finally, although the evidence for Finland, Spain and the UK 
is more difficult to interpret, it shows that inflation expectations were not significantly 
affected by the IT announcement. In the UK (and to a smaller extent in Finland) there 
was even an increase in inflation expectations, which suggests that also in these coun­
tries the target announcements were not fully credible.
This lack of relation between the announcement of IT and inflation expectations sug­
gests that the announcement of IT does not provide a credible anchor for inflation 
expectations: words without actions are not enough, as one would expect; it would be 
surprising to find that a central bank may earn credibility simply by setting a target. 
However, one would expect that words with actions should have an impact, and that the 
ability to follow a policy consistent with the target would build credibility: after some 
years of low inflation and some track record of meeting the targets, these should become 
credible, and expected inflation should be inside the target range. Figure 5.4 suggests 
that the targets are in general credible now, even though in some countries this only 
happened after several years of observed low inflation.
5.4.2 IT credibility in financial markets
Long term government bond yields
Figure 5.5 plots the redemption yield on long term government bonds,92 daily from 
1/1/1988 to 12/12/1997. The vertical line marks the date of the IT announcement. 
From the charts, we cannot find any significant impact of the IT announcement. In 
Finland, Sweden and the UK the announcement is associated with a fall in bond yields, 
but these were already falling before the announcement, and were subsequently rever­
92 The data in Figures 5.5 and 5.6 are indices of long term government bonds computed by Data- 
stream. The maturities of the bonds used on these indices differ slightly across countries: 10 years for 
New Zealand, 7 to 10 years for Australia, Sweden and the UK, 3 to 5 years for Canada, all maturities 
for Finland and Tong term’ for Spain.
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sed. The change in bond yields for these three countries is most likely associated with 
the adoption of a floating exchange rate (and subsequent depreciation of the currency) 
than with IT.
Figure 5.6 plots the same data, but only for a few months around the date of IT announ­
cement,93 so the specific effects of the announcement of IT may be easily identified. 
Finland, Sweden and the UK have similar patterns: a fall in bond yields on the day of the 
floating (particularly large in Sweden),94 followed by subsequent falls for several weeks 
that extend beyond the IT announcement. The only effect the IT announcement appears 
to have in these countries is to reinforce the decreasing trend in yields. In the weeks 
immediately before the announcement, yields seem to have stabilised (in Finland) or 
slightly increased (in Sweden and the UK), but start falling again immediately after the 
announcement. If this pattern is really a consequence of IT, this would mean that IT 
helped to provide credibility to the monetary policy of countries where it had been 
questioned by the abandonment of the previous policy strategy. However, this effect is 
exclusive of these countries, since it cannot be found in Canada, New Zealand or Spain.
Long bond yield differential to selected non-IT countries
Government bond markets are global markets, thus changes in bond yields might not be 
caused by domestic factors, but be related to international events. In order to eliminate 
the effect of international conditions on bond yields, we computed the differential in 
bond yields between the countries in our sample and some reference country, which we 
took to be the US for the non-European countries and Germany for the European 
countries.95 Figure 5.7 plots the monthly long bond yield differential, in percentage 
points. Apart from the fall in yields in Finland, Sweden and the UK we had already
93 Figure 5.6 does not include Australia, because we are not aware of a specific IT announcement date 
for this country.
94 In the day of the floating bond yields fell 123, 34, and 17 basis points, respectively, in Sweden, 
Finland, and the UK.
95 The differential was computed using Datastream long term government bond indices. Given the 
strong links between the UK and the US economies, we also computed the differential in bond yields in 
these two countries.
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identified (and had associated more with the floating exchange rate regime than with the 
adoption of IT), the remarkable feature of Figure 5.7 is the fall in the average yield 
differential in New Zealand from about 400 b.p. until the end of 1990, to about 150 b.p. 
from mid 1991 onwards. This dramatic change is not associated with the announcement 
of IT, since it occurred approximately one year after it, but it is contemporaneous with a 
large fall in inflation and the achievement of the first targets. Although it can be claimed 
that bond yields were only reacting to the fall in inflation, the size and the speed of the 
adjustment were probably increased by the achievement of the first inflation targets and 
its impact on monetary policy credibility.
Inflation expectations in bond markets
Changes in inflation expectations are just one of the many factors that determine bond 
yield changes. Comparing the yields in fixed rate and index-linked bonds allows a better 
measure of financial markets expectations about inflation to be computed. In some of 
the countries in our sample such measures of long term inflation expectations are avai­
lable. Figure 5.8 plots quarterly data for the bond market implied inflation rates for 
Australia, Canada, Sweden and the UK.96 The vertical dashed line marks the moment of 
the adoption of IT and the horizontal dotted lines the (medium term) inflation targets. 
The common pattern of Figure 5.8 is that inflation expectations are now consistent with 
the targets, even though at the time of the announcement the targets were not fully 
credible.
The implied inflation data could also be used the analyse the impact on expectations of
96 The data for Sweden and for the 2 years horizon in Canada are not computed from market yields, 
but are based on surveys of bond market investors. The series used in Figure 5.8 are:
Australia: difference between nominal and indexed 10 year bond yields, adjusted for an 8 month 
indexation lag (provided by the Reserve Bank of Australia);
Canada: differential between conventional and real return 30 year bond yields (calculated using 
the appropriate compound interest formula), Consensus Economics Inc. ’s “Consensus 
Forecasts 2 years ahead (average)” (published in the Bank of Canada’s Monetary Policy 
Report, May 1996);
Sweden: Aragon Fondkommission - Survey of bond investors’ inflation expectations (published in 
Inflation and inflation expectations in Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank);
UK: Bank of England’s estimated market expectations of inflation, based on 2 and 10 year
bond yields.
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the announcement of IT. Figure 5.9 plots 2 and 10 years implied inflation in the UK, 
daily from 17/6/92 to 31/12/92, a period that covers both the change in exchange rate 
regime and the adoption of IT. The implied inflation data for the UK reinforce the 
pattern we observed in the previous charts. Expectations were affected by the floating 
of the British pound, but not by the announcement of IT, although the announcement is 
associated with the stabilisation of the inflation expectations that had been increasing 
since the floating of the pound. This evidence supports our previous claim that IT 
helped to provide credibility to the monetary policy of countries where it had been 
questioned by the abandonment of the previous policy strategy.
IT  credibility
The evidence that long term government bond yields were affected by the announcement 
of an IT is scarce.97 Either in absolute terms or relative to the yield in Germany or the 
US, there was no significant change in long term government bond yields. There are 
only some (weak) signs that the adoption of IT may have contributed to the credibility 
of monetary policy in four countries. The evidence for the European countries is 
probably related to the exchange rate regime change, and in New Zealand the change 
was not contemporaneous with the adoption of IT, although it might be argued it was 
helped by the achievement of the IT targets. Data for bond market inflation expecta­
tions also reveal the relatively low initial credibility of the announcements: long term 
expected inflation was above the target ranges, and even in the shorter horizons of 2 
years expected inflation was not always inside the target ranges. However, recent data 
suggest that the targets may now be credible.
Whatever the measure of expectations used, a common feature among the countries in 
our sample is that inflation expectations were not significantly affected by the IT an­
nouncement, and the IT’s credibility remained low during the early stages of the adop-
97 In the UK, even though bond yields did not respond to the announcement of IT, there was an 
important reaction to the Chancellor’s May 1997 statement, granting more independence to the Bank of 
England. On that day, long nominal gilt yields immediately fell by 50 basis points QA p.p.) both 
absolutely and relative to the yields on indexed gilts.
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tion of the strategy. In most countries, there are some signs (e.g., medium term expec­
tations in Canada or bond yield differential in New Zealand) that early successes in 
meeting targets improved the credibility of monetary policy. However, the evidence is 
also consistent with a scenario where expectations formation is adaptive, and lower 
expected inflation is a consequence of the lower observed inflation, the adoption of IT 
having no effect whatsoever.
Most measures of long term expectations are now consistent with the targets, sugges­
ting that the IT has ‘political credibility’ as well as ‘operational credibility’. Note that 
agents could believe that under the current strategy the targets may be achieved 
(operational credibility), but could fear that the strategy was not going to be maintained 
(political credibility), and that future policy strategies would be more inflationary. In 
this situation, long term inflation expectations would be above the IT. The recent fall in 
these expectations may be associated with an increase in the political credibility of IT in 
countries where former opposition parties that gained power reaffirmed their commit­
ment to the IT framework (e.g., New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK).
5.4.3 Wage settlements
One of the major channels through which inflation expectations are supposed to affect 
actual inflation are wage settlements. We have no hard evidence of changes in the wage 
setting behaviour, specially because it is still to soon to have a sufficient long time series 
of wage agreements to make any form of quantified statement. We only have anecdotal 
evidence from several sources, including the central banks in the answer to our letter. 
Some of this evidence, reported in Table 5.16, suggests the IT may have had some effect 
in centralised wage bargaining, and that in some countries wage increases have been 
relatively low. These are encouraging signs, given the importance of wage cost increa­
ses in inflationary processes. However, it is still too early to tell whether these changes 
in wage settlements are a result of the credibility of the target, or just a consequence of 
the unfavourable conditions workers faced in labour markets in this period. The relati­
vely high levels of unemployment experienced in the early 1990s in all the countries in
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our sample are likely to have weakened the bargaining power of the workers in general, 
and the unions in particular. A definitive conclusion can be drawn only after we have 
observed some wage settlements reached under excess demand conditions in labour 
markets, although the evidence from New Zealand suggests that the IT might provide a 
good anchor for inflation expectations even under conditions more favourable to wor­
kers.
Table 5.16 Wage settlements
Australia “Accord” between unions and government refers to the IT
Canada some anecdotal evidence that negotiators pay more attention to IT
Finland two year centralised wage agreement (for 1996-98) provided very moderate pay in­
creases with a reference to the inflation target; after IT, initially there were no nominal 
wage increases because of ‘crisis consciousness’ but comparatively high wage increases 
were negotiated at branch level for 1995 
New unions recognised the implications of the IT; wage settlements have been remarkably
Zealand low in recent years (most in the 0-3% range, except for small categories of skilled stall),
and that despite the fact that unemployment fell from 10.9% in 1991 to 6.1% in 
December 1995
Spain wages have been bargained taking the IT as reference and wage settlements in 1995-97
were roughly in line with the IT (before 1994 wage increases were regularly above 
official inflation projections)
Sweden wage formation remains troublesome; despite the increased unemployment, wage
increases have been higher than in the rest of the world; the centralised bargaining 
process is presently turning out around 4 per cent annual increase in nominal wages, on 
top of a 6% increase in 1996, even at a rate of unemployment of 10%
UK wage settlements have been consistent with IT; wage growth has undershot current
inflation, and has been subdued even in the face of the tightening labour markets and 
falling unemployment in 1996/97
Households and businesses probably do not understand the implications of the adoption 
of an IT, and it is even likely that in some cases they were not immediately aware of 
such a change. It was not surprising, then, that we did not find any impact on survey 
data expectations of the announcement of an IT. But asset prices are supposed to 
reflect the actions of well informed agents, who should be able to assess the true mea­
ning of changes like the adoption of an IT, and we have only been able to find a few 
cases of a significant impact of the announcement of an IT on financial markets data. It 
seems that contrary to some central bankers and economists, market agents have initially 
believed that IT is not a substantially different policy strategy, or at least, that in practice 
nothing has really changed yet with the adoption of IT.
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5.5. Conclusions
In Scottish law, criminal cases do not have to be adjudged either guilty, or not guilty. There 
is a third category, unproven. Mainly because we have too few data on which to base our 
judgement, that, we believe, is for the time being the appropriate judgement. One needs a 
longer experience with IT for any significant differences in central bank behaviour to emerge, 
if they exist. There are some signs that IT might have had a positive impact, especially in the 
countries where it has been in force for a longer period (New Zealand and Canada), but most 
of these are country specific. Systematic patterns across all IT countries are hard to find.
The IT countries have been more successful than their central banks, or outside commenta­
tors, had initially expected in lowering, and then holding their inflation rates to the low 
desired mean levels. But then so equally were our various control groups. Both groups 
were helped in this by the international context, although the IT countries may have achieved 
low inflation faster and at a lower cost in terms of output growth. On the other hand, IT 
countries have missed their own targets on several occasions, which suggests that in order to 
IT be successful the target ranges should be wider than the usual 2 percentage point bands.98
Many of the apparent changes in operational characteristics among IT countries were the 
natural and self-evident results of shifting from an exchange rate target (Finland, Spain, 
Sweden, UK) to an inflation target (i.e., the exchange rate becomes more volatile, the 
interest rate less so). Apart from those changes, there are few signs of any significant shift in 
operating behaviour. It seems that the adoption of IT is instrumental in achieving stability in 
financial markets, since it is associated with lower exchange rate and interest rate volatility. 
On the other hand, we looked hard to see if there was any evidence of interest rates being 
adjusted earlier or in larger jumps (more aggressively) in response to prospective inflationary
98 This point received a lot of attention in New Zealand, the country with a longer experience in IT. In 
New Zealand there was in 1996 widespread criticism of the then current 2 p.p. bands, and several 
critics (including opposition parties) called for wider bands, which were introduced after their election.
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pressures. There are a few straws in the wind (notably in Canada) and several of the central 
banks concerned are aware that such a change in behaviour might be needed, if the deman­
ding targets are to continue to be kept. But the bulk of the evidence, so far, does not allow 
us to dismiss the null hypothesis of no significant change in operating behaviour.
We have, at several places in this chapter, drawn a distinction between those IT central banks 
whose target is jointly set with the government, and those where it is unilaterally set by the 
central bank itself Pace the Roll Report, we believe that the former, joint setting is likely to 
prove a far firmer bulwark against resurgent inflation. Consequently, we do see a greater 
likelihood of success in the Anglo-Saxon than in the continental European cases." Perhaps 
because of this differentiation, it is in the Anglo-Saxon countries that there are some signs of 
a credibility effect. For the rest (including the UK) it is not, once more, possible at the 
moment to dismiss the null hypothesis of no maintained effect.
If expectations and inflation outcomes are not significantly affected, is there anything 
really new in the IT strategy? The differences with an exchange rate target strategy are 
the obvious differences between operating in a fixed or in a floating exchange rate 
regime. There is no fundamental difference between monetary targeting and IT; money 
targeting is just IT when inflation forecasts are exclusively based on money aggregates. 
When money aggregates are not good predictors of future inflation, IT is a clearly 
superior strategy, and money targeting is not really an option. Where there is an option 
is between IT and a purely discretionary framework, compared to which IT has two 
main (positive) differences: the adoption of a quasi-formalized rule, that explicit states 
price stability as the only objective for monetary policy, and increased transparency and 
accountability. The evidence we gather suggests that the impact on credibility of the 
adoption of a policy rule is small, and limited to the short term.
The main difference is probably on the transparency and accountability side. The one
99 In Finland, Spain and Sweden because it is not clear how much the government is committed to the 
target; but in Finland and Spain the issue is likely to be overtaken by their participation in the Euro; and, 
perhaps, later also for Sweden and the UK So for the European countries the experiment with an IT regime 
maybeshoit-lived.
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field where there is clear evidence of a change in behaviour is in the nature of communica­
tions with both the public in general and government in particular. As documented earlier, 
such communication has generally become quicker, fuller and franker. In some instances 
some part of this shift towards greater transparency pre-dated the move to IT. Moreover 
this trend, towards more open communication, has been world-wide. Nevertheless we 
believe, (though such a qualitative issue is hard to test statistically) that such greater openness 
has gone further, faster in IT countries than in non-IT countries. This is one patent benefit of 
the regime change, even if elsewhere much remains unproven.
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Appendix 5.A:Inflation and Interest Rate Changes
The hypothesis tested in this appendix is whether the adoption of IT changed the timing 
of interest rate changes relative to observed inflation (see argument in main text). In 
order to test for Granger-causality between quarterly inflation and central bank control­
led interest rates,100 the following bivariate VAR was used
p t = a , + A (L)p t_l +B(L)rt_^  + e t
rt = a 2 +C(L)p t_l +D(L)rt_l + p t
where p t and rt are first differences of inflation and short-term interest rates,101 respec­
tively, and A(L), B(L), C(L) and D(L) are polynomials in the lag operator L, with four 
lags. F-tests on the parameters of B(L) and C(L) provide tests of Granger-causality 
from interest rates to inflation and from inflation to interest rates, respectively.
If the parameters in C(L) are jointly significant, then inflation Granger-causes interest 
rates, which may be interpreted as meaning that central banks react to past inflation, 
increasing interest rates only when the inflationary pressures are evident. The interpre­
tation of joint significance for the parameters in B(L), that is interest rates Granger- 
causing inflation, is less straightforward. The monetary policy transmission mechanism 
provides the theoretical economic causation from interest rates to inflation, with higher
100 The headline inflation and interest rates data are from the International Financial Statistics. The 
headline inflation series are the quarterly average of year-on-year consumer price inflation. The 
interest rates used were the average of the overnight money market rate for Australia, Canada, Finland 
and Sweden, the end of period discount rate for New Zealand (although New Zealand does not have a 
discount rate, this is the name the IES uses for the bank rate they provide) and Spain, and the end of 
period London clearing banks base rate, for the UK. The data for Sweden exclude the abnormally high 
interest rates of September 1992. The common assumption for all these rates is that they are deter­
mined by the central banks, and thus reflect accurately the monetary policy stance. We would prefer to 
use money market data in all countries, but sufficiently long series were not available. Tests over the 
sample periods for which data for both bank and market rates were available indicated the conclusions 
of this and other exercises on the chapter would be similar whatever the interest rate used. The 
underlying inflation series for Australia, Canada and New Zealand were provided by the respective 
central banks. The ‘RPDC series for the UK was obtained from Datastream, and for Finland underly­
ing inflation is the series Indicator of underlying inflation (1990=100)’, published in the Bank o f  
Finland Bulletin.
101 First differences were used because pretesting of the data indicated that for all countries in our 
sample, the quarterly inflation and interest rate series are 1(1). The use of error-correction models was 
ruled out because pretesting also indicated that inflation and interest rates are not cointegrated. Details 
of these tests can be obtained from the authors.
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interest rates today causing lower inflation in the future. However, if central banks react 
to expected future inflation, increasing interest rates when expected future inflation is 
higher, then the data would also show Granger-causation from interest rates to inflation, 
not related to the transmission mechanism.102 Our choice of lags in this exercise, makes 
the latter more likely to be the legitimate interpretation. The monetary policy lag is 
usually considered to be longer than four quarters, but it is likely that central banks react 
to expected inflation four quarters ahead, given the difficulties in forecasting. Also, the 
two interpretations have different implications for the signs of the coefficients, since the 
transmission mechanism interpretation suggests a negative relationship between interest 
rates and inflation, but the second interpretation implies a positive relationship. Thus, 
the signs of the coefficients in B(L) could provide some clue to which is the legitimate 
interpretation. If the hypothesis tested here is true, then before IT inflation would 
Granger-cause interest rates, but after IT interest rates would Granger-cause inflation. 
An additional problem of interpretation arises in the countries where the headline CPI 
includes interest rate related costs; there, interest rates could Granger-cause inflation 
just because they are one of the components of the CPI. To avoid this problem we used 
indices of underlying inflation where available, but since the underlying inflation series 
usually do not cover the period before IT, we report the results with the headline CPI 
also.
Table 5.17 summarises the significance levels of the Granger-causality tests performed, 
for the null hypothesis of non-causality.103 The tests were performed over two subsam­
ples of the period 1982:Q1 to 1997:Q3: the first subsample, corresponding to the period 
before IT, ran from 1982:Q1 to the quarter of the adoption of IT; the second subsample, 
corresponding to the period after IT, ran from the quarter following the adoption of IT 
to 1997:Q3. Note that the number of degrees of freedom involved in the estimation of
102 In general, time series that reflect forward-looking behaviour, such as financial asset prices, tend to 
Granger-cause many key economic time series. This does not mean that those series cause inflation or 
GNP to move up or down. Instead, the value of those series reflects the anticipated future movements 
in inflation or GNP. Granger-causality tests for such series may be useful for investigating whether 
markets (or central banks) are concerned with future inflation, but should not be used to infer a direc­
tion of economic causation. On the use of Granger-causality tests to assess forward-looking behaviour 
see Hamilton (1994), chapter 11.
103 Details of the estimation and the tests may be obtained from the authors.
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the VAR is small, especially for the ‘after IT’ model, and that tends to increase the 
significance levels of the tests. Thus, a high significance level should be interpreted as a 
signal that the data are not rich enough to allow for any conclusions, and not as a 
rejection of the causality hypothesis. On the other hand, a low significance level may be 
interpreted as a rejection of non-causality, i.e., one may accept the causality hypothesis.
Table 5.17 Granger-causality between interest rates and inflation
Granger causality from Inflation to Interest rates from Interest rates to Inflation
Before IT After IT Before IT After IT
Australia headline 35% 33% 5% 14%
underlying 97% 0%
Canada headline 44% 14% 77% 1%
underlying 88% 4%
Finland headline 99% 99% 73% 77%
underlying 86% 57%
New Zealand headline 1% 23% 41% 17%
underlying 36% 4%
Spain 104 18% 68% 47% 55%
Sweden 81% 39% 30% 69%
UK headline 46% 91% 6% 3%
underlying 53% 50% 30% 24%
Using the traditional significance levels, the results of the test suggest that after IT the 
central banks in the non-European countries have a forward-looking behaviour, al­
though the available information does not allow one to rule out that this behaviour 
existed even before IT. In Canada, the headline inflation data suggest that this was not 
the case: Granger-causality from interest rates to inflation is evident in both indices after 
IT, and it did not exist in headline inflation before IT. In Australia, the opposite occurs: 
Granger-causality from interest rates to inflation is evident in both indices before and 
after IT, suggesting that no change in behaviour occurred. Finally, in New Zealand 
there is only a non significant improvement in the only index that is available for both 
periods, in terms of Granger-causality from interest rates to inflation, although it seems 
that before IT the RBNZ had a backward-looking interest rate setting behaviour, that 
might have been abandoned.105 For the European countries there is no significant
104 In the case of Spain, the tests were performed using 2 lags, instead of 4, so that the model could be 
estimated over the ‘after IT’ period.
105 In all the cases interest rates were found to Granger-cause inflation, the significant coefficients in
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evidence of Granger-causality from interest rates to inflation or vice-versa, with the 
exception of the former for the RPI in the UK (before and after IT), which is likely to be 
due to the importance of interest-rate related costs in this index.
the B(L) polynomial were positive, supporting the view that this Granger-causality should be interpreted 
as central banks reacting to future expected inflation, and not as a consequence of the transmission 
mechanism.
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Appendix 5.B: Aggressiveness of Interest Rate Increases
Using monthly data on short-term interest rates from the International Financial Statis­
tics,106 we tried to assess whether after the adoption of IT the central banks in our 
sample raised interest rates more aggressively than before. Since under IT the argument 
for not smoothing interest rates seems to be stronger (see main text), one could expect 
that after the adoption of IT increases in interest rates would be larger and quicker than 
before. Figure 5.10 plots selected short-term interest rates for the countries in our 
sample. The vertical dashed lines indicate the date of the adoption of IT, the dotted 
lines the monthly rates, and the solid line is a ‘centered’ 12-month average, used to 
capture the ‘trend’ in interest rates.
Visually one cannot detect significant changes in the aggressiveness of interest rate 
increases after the adoption of IT. If interest rate changes were quicker, the interest rate 
curves would be steeper, but the slope of the curves does not seem to have changed 
significantly. The only apparent change seems to be in the magnitude of the changes, 
which seem to be smaller after IT. In order to provide quantified data that support these 
visual conclusions, the following table describes the average monthly rate of change, 
magnitude and duration of significant interest rate increase episodes in the period 
January 1977 to September 1997.107
106 The interest rates used were the same as in Appendix 5.A, just the frequency was changed from 
quarterly to monthly (see Appendix 5.A for details). We have reasons to believe that the data for 
Australia and New Zealand in late 1983, early 1984 are inaccurate, but used them in the absence of a 
better alternative. None of the results is significantly affected by this.
107 Interest rate increase episodes were selected using a methodology similar to Ball (1994). First, 
‘trend’ interest rate (the 12-month moving average) is used to identify ‘peaks’ and ‘troughs’. A peak is 
a month in which ‘trend’ interest rate is higher than in the previous six and the following six months; a 
trough is defined by an analogous comparison. An interest rate increase episode is any period that 
starts at an interest rate trough and ends at an interest rate peak, with the ‘trend’ rate more than 1 
percentage point higher than the trough. Then, the lowest and the highest monthly rates in each 
episode were used to compute the statistics in the table. The ‘duration’ is the number of months 
between the month with the lowest and the month with the highest rates, the ‘magnitude’ is the 
difference between the rates in these months, and the ‘monthly rate of increase’ is the ratio of the 
‘magnitude’ over the ‘duration’. Statistics for each episode are not provided here, but may be obtained 
from the authors.
Absolute and relative changes are both used to describe interest rate increases because there are 
large differences in the level of interest rates across the sample period, ranging in some cases from 5%
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The evidence in Table 5.18 suggests that the interest rate increase after IT was less 
aggressive than previous interest rate increases, either in terms of magnitude or rate of 
increase. For all the countries in our sample, both the magnitude and the rate of increase 
were smaller, either in absolute or relative terms, than the average of the increases 
before IT, with the exception of the rate of increase in Australia and Canada. However, 
the evidence on Table 5.18 should not be interpreted as suggesting the central banks in 
our sample became less aggressive after the adoption of IT, because the data are too 
scarce. One of the reasons why the interest rate increases were less aggressive was 
because the shocks they were counteracting were milder. The only episode of interest 
rate increases after IT was in 1994-95, when the inflationary shock and the interest rate 
increases worldwide were relatively mild by historical standards. If the 1994-95 infla­
tionary shock is assumed to be mild, then the rates of increase in Australia and Canada 
could be seen as more aggressive, since they are higher than the historical average.
Table 5.18 Episodes of interest rate increases
Avg. . , Avg. monthly rate o f
Number o f duration Avg. magnitude increase_____
episodes (months) Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
Australia before IT 3 24 9.4 117% 0.39 4.8%
after IT 1 6 2.8 60% 0.46 10.0%
Canada before IT 3 31 9.0 132% 0.32 4.6%
after IT 1 13 4.4 121% 0.34 9.3%
Finland before IT 4 12 6.1 63% 0.60 6.4%
after IT 1 16 1.3 28% 0.08 1.7%
New Zealand before IT 3 11 11.9 126% 1.17 10.6%
after IT 1 19 5.2 97% 0.27 5.1%
Spain before IT 5 15 13.0 164% 1.12 14.6%
after IT 1 6 1.9 25% 0.31 4.2%
Sweden before IT 4 24 8.4 122% 0.38 5.3%
after IT 1 13 2.0 28% 0.15 2.1%
UK before IT 3 17 8.0 116% 0.50 6.8%
after IT 1 6 1.5 29% 0.25 4.8%
All IT before IT 25 19 9.5 121% 0.66 8.0%
countries after IT 7 11 2.7 55% 0.27 5.3%
to 35%. The problem this large difference causes when comparing the size of different rate increases is 
whether we should consider an 3 p.p. increase from 5 to 8% or from 32 to 35% as being similar 
changes. The alternative is to consider as similar two 50% increases, be they from 5 to 7.5% or from 20 
to 30%. The impact on real interest rates suggests we use the former criterion, but we also present the 
latter to provide a measure of the relative change.
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Figure 5.1: Exchange rate daily absolute changes
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Figure 5.2: 3-month interest rate daily absolute changes
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Figure 5.3: Inflation targets and inflation outcomes
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Figure 5.4: Households’ and businesses’ inflation expectations 
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Figure 5.5: Long term government bond yield
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Figure 5.6. Long term government bond yield, around IT announcement
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Figure 5 .7: Long term government bond yield, differential to Germany or the US
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Figure 5.8: Bond market inflation expectations
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Figure 5.9: UK bond yield implied inflation
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Figure 5.10. Short term interest rates (monthly)
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Chapter 6
Monetary Policy Targets
and Instability in Financial Markets
Economists and central bankers have long debated the merits of alternative strategies for 
the conduct of monetary policy. One of the most widely researched features of these 
strategies is the question of whether monetary policy should be guided by stable rules, or 
central banks should be given the discretion to decide what is the optimal policy at each 
moment in time. The concept of a monetary policy rule is usually straightforward in the 
context of the theoretical models used in academic research, but it is less clear when it 
comes to practical application to the behaviour of actual central banks. There is consi­
derable agreement among economists that a policy rule need not be interpreted narrowly 
as entailing fixed settings for the policy instruments (Taylor, 1993). The most common 
assertion of the practical application of a policy rule is the announcement by a central 
bank of a quantified target for some variable, together with the commitment to achieve 
this target (McCallum, 1997, Laidler, 1996). Although other variables have been pro­
posed (e.g., nominal GDP, interest rates),1 in practice, only the inflation rate, a monetary
1 The concept of ‘policy target’ is being used here in the sense of an ‘intermediate’ or ‘final’ target, 
that the central bank sets for the medium term and commits to stick to it. It does not cover ‘operating 
targets’, which are frequently adjusted. Several central banks have used money market interest rates as 
‘operating targets’, but not as ‘policy targets’, in this sense.
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aggregate or the exchange rate have been used as policy targets 2
Should central banks announce quantitative targets, and if so, which of the above should 
they choose? This question has been the starting point of a large body of research in 
recent years. In the evaluation of monetary policy strategies, the most popular approach 
is to determine how well the various targets would perform in terms of yielding desirable 
values of postulated objective functions, with these pertaining primarily to root-mean- 
square deviations from desired values of variables such as inflation or real GDP relative 
to trend. The focus of these studies on inflation is a consequence of most central banks 
having price stability as their main policy objective. However, price stability is not the 
only objective of monetary policy. Central banks usually have a clear mission to secure 
stable financial systems, in addition to their macroeconomic objectives. The tension 
between the goals of macroeconomic and financial stability has been expressed by 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1992), in the context of the discussion around the design of 
the European Central Bank, in terms of the aphorism “A bank or a monetary policy 
rule?” More generally, many economists (namely Summers, 1991b, and Solow, 1982) 
have expressed doubts as to the compatibility of a strict monetary policy rule with central 
bank acceptance of lender-of-last-resort responsibilities.
The possibility of conflict between macro and microeconomic objectives suggests that 
the evaluation of alternative monetary policy targets will not be complete without an 
analysis of the implications of the adoption of a policy target to the stability of financial 
systems. The objective of this chapter is to provide a contribution to this discussion, by 
comparing the financial stability experienced under different monetary policy targets, 
using data for three financial assets (exchange rates, interest rates and stock prices) from 
a panel of 18 OECD countries, for the period 1972-1996. In this chapter, a stable 
financial market is defined as one with low risk and low uncertainty, with the definitions
2 The use of inflation targets has been reviewed in Chapter 5. Surveys of monetary and exchange rate 
targeting may be found in Goodhart (1989b), and Isard (1995), respectively. The issues involved in the 
choice of a monetary policy target are reviewed in Goodhart and Vinals (1994), McCallum (1997), 
Mishkin (1997), Cottarelli and Giannini (1997), and the survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York (1990).
Monetary policy targets and instability in financial markets 251
of risk and uncertainty following Meltzer (1986). According to his definition, risk refers 
to events with known distributions of outcomes, either because people may know the 
probability of the event or because they may classify events based on experience or 
subjective belief. Uncertainty refers to events for which the distribution of outcomes is 
unknown and the basis for classification is tenuous; the timing, or even the occurrence, 
of these events cannot be predicted reliably. Here, risk in a financial market is associated 
with short-term price volatility. The main form of uncertainty in financial markets refers 
to the so called ‘financial crises’, periods of abrupt and very large changes in asset prices.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 provides a brief review of the literature 
on empirical evaluation of alternative monetary policy strategies, and highlights the 
expected implications of the adoption of each policy target for financial stability. Section
6.2 discusses the actual policy targets used by central banks in OECD countries. Section
6.3 describes the data and methodology used in the two empirical exercises that consti­
tute the core of the chapter: the analysis of short-term volatility of financial asset prices 
using a GARCH framework, and the study of the likelihood of financial crises under each 
policy target. Section 6.4 presents the results of these studies, and concluding comments 
are provided in Section 6.5.
6.1 Evaluating Alternative Monetary Policy Targets
The empirical evaluation of alternative policy strategies usually consists of analysing the 
performance of the various targets in terms of the behaviour of key economic variables. 
One of the most common approaches is to base the analysis on stochastic simulation of 
econometric models. Recent examples are McCallum (1994), Feldstein and Stock
(1994), Haldane and Salmon (1995), Stevens and Debelle (1995), and the individual 
authors in Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993). Alternatively, one may analyse a country, 
or a period in time, that experienced different policy strategies, and observe the beha­
viour of the relevant economic variables under each strategy. Examples of time-series
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analysis of policy strategies are the studies of US monetary regimes in Meltzer (1986), 
the operating procedures of the Federal Reserve in Lastrapes (1989), and the exchange 
rate regime in the UK in Mills and Wood (1993). Cross-section analyses are the norm in 
empirical studies of central bank independence, such as Alesina and Summers (1993) and 
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991). Panel studies of the performance of a number 
of macroeconomic variables under different monetary policy regimes can be found in 
Bordo and Schwartz (1997) and Ghosh et al. (1995), the latter covering nominal ex­
change rate regimes only.
Most of these studies have focused on the behaviour of inflation and growth (or employ­
ment), although some them also analysed the implications of the policy strategy for the 
volatility of some financial variables, usually a (short- or long-term) interest rate and the 
exchange rate. The main exception is McCallum (1994), who focused on financial 
stability, and analysed the compatibility of a strict monetary policy rule with central bank 
acceptance of lender-of-last-resort responsibilities. He studied this problem in terms of 
whether it would be possible for the central bank to provide lender-of-last-resort assis­
tance through open-market operations with high-frequency smoothing of movements of 
a money market interest rate, and still be able to hit lower-frequency (e.g., quarterly 
average) intermediate money targets conforming to a monetary policy rule designed to 
yield macroeconomic stability. Using counterfactual simulations for the US economy, 
during two sample periods (1974-79 and 1988-91), of an empirically based weekly 
model of monetary base determination (consistent with a quarterly policy rule) together 
with a Federal Funds rate that entails weekly smoothing, he finds that quarterly base 
targets could be achieved rather accurately while practising some form of interest rate 
smoothing, although it still involved more interest rate volatility than had been experi­
enced in the US.
This chapter is concerned with the impact on financial stability of alternative monetary 
policy targets. The focus is on the four basic targeting strategies that central banks in 
OECD countries have used in the last thirty years: exchange rate targets (ET), money
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targets (MT), inflation targets (IT), and a strategy in which the central bank does not 
announce a target, that will be designated as discretion (DS).3 From the literature 
mentioned above, what are the expected implications of each of these alternative targets 
for the stability of financial markets? In most cases, the answer is not clear-cut. The 
results from stochastic simulation studies depend significantly on the nature of the shocks 
hitting the economy and/or on the model used in the analysis. Evidence from time-series 
analysis is country specific, and not prone to generalisations. The following paragraphs 
attempt to summarise the main results in the literature concerning the volatility of interest 
rates and exchange rates.
Under an ET, the authorities stabilise the exchange rate, at least if there are no significant 
problems of monetary control. Some authors (e.g., Mills and Wood, 1993) argue that 
intervention by the authorities can not eliminate volatility in the economy, only shift it 
from one market to another. If the central bank reduces exchange rate volatility by 
pursuing an ET, this volatility will show up in another market, most likely the money 
market: in order to keep the exchange rate stable, the central bank will have to manipu­
late short term interest rates more actively. However, the results in BHM (Bryant, 
Hooper, and Mann, 1993)4 suggest the opposite: short term interest rates are less volatile 
under ET than under any other strategy. The logic here is that under fixed exchange 
rates and free capital movements, domestic interest rates must follow interest rates in the 
anchor country. If interest rates are stable in this country, they will also be stable in the 
countries fixing their exchange rates to it.
3 If the central bank announces a target but it accepts misses on a discretionary basis, it will be 
classified as having announced a rule, but as a discretionary central bank in practice (because it is not 
committed to follow the target it set). See below for a discussion on the distinction between actual and 
announced targets.
4 The research in Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993) examines the stabilisation properties of four 
alternative monetary policy strategies, in eight different multicountry econometric models. The four 
strategies are exchange rate, monetary, and nominal GDP targeting, and a strategy in which the central 
bank targets the sum of real GDP growth and inflation. While the first two strategies have an obvious 
correspondence to the ones used in this chapter, and the third has no counterpart, the fourth strategy 
could be seen as a simplification of the behaviour of most central hanks in this sample that are classified 
as discretionary. For instance, Taylor (1993) claims that the US Federal Reserve (classified as a discre­
tionary central bank after 1986) implicitly follows such a rule. The BHM research did not cover pure 
inflation targeting.
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The ranking of the other strategies is not clear either, since it depends on the nature of 
the shocks affecting the economy. The results in BHM suggest that for domestic money 
demand shocks DS may produce better results than MT. The basic rationale for this 
result is similar to Poole’s (1970) argument: the optimal response to a money demand 
shock is to keep interest rates fixed, since in this case all markets but the money market 
will be isolated from the shock. This is possible under every strategy except MT, where 
the policy response will be to increase interest rates to reduce money demand to its 
original level.
For aggregate demand or aggregate supply shocks, the ranking is inverted: MT should 
lead to lower interest rate volatility than DS. For the case of an increase in the demand 
for goods, the rationale can be simplisticly described as follows.5 The increased demand 
for goods will imply an increased demand for money. Under MT, the policy response 
will be to raise interest rates, which will lower output and prices, but not enough to 
return them to their initial level; the final result will be an unchanged money demand, 
with higher interest rates, output and prices. Under the BHM strategy equivalent to DS 
(targeting real GDP plus inflation), output and prices must be restored back to their 
original levels; this would imply a larger interest rate increase than in the MT case, 
because under MT the adjustment is spread over three variables, while under DS it is 
concentrated on the policy instrument, interest rates.
The ranking of interest rate volatility under MT and DS will then depend on which type 
of shock is more likely in the economy. Haldane and Salmon (1995) found that for the 
type of shocks that hit the UK economy in the last 40 years, MT would deliver lower 
interest rate volatility than DS. However, the differences are small, and did not hold 
across all range of parameter values. Moreover, these results for DS are likely to be 
specific to the kind of formalised rule used in the BHM and Haldane and Salmon (1995) 
studies. More general definitions of DS could lead to lower interest rate volatility than 
MT. This could be the case, for example, if the central bank has a strong preference for 
interest rate smoothing. The lack of the constraint imposed by an announced target,
5 A more detailed theoretical analysis of the topic may be found in Henderson and McKibbin (1993).
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would give the authorities more freedom to implement the amount of interest rate 
smoothing they desire.
The BHM study did not include IT as a possible strategy, but Haldane and Salmon
(1995) did. They concluded that interest rate volatility is higher under IT than under any 
other strategy. Theoretically, interest rate volatility should be the same under IT and the 
strategy of a mixed real GDP and inflation targeting (which is the equivalent of DS in the 
two studies referenced above) for all type of shocks, except supply shocks. In the event 
of a negative supply shock, under IT interest rates will have to rise sufficiently to return 
inflation to its original level, while under DS the supply shock would be accommodated, 
possibly without any change in interest rates. The result in Haldane and Salmon (1995) 
thus suggests the UK economy is more susceptible to supply shocks.
The volatility of exchange rates should be lower under ET than under any other strategy, 
abstracting from problems of monetary control. Not surprisingly, this is what the re­
search in BHM has found. The ranking of the other strategies is less clear. Lastrapes 
(1989) found that in the US exchange rate volatility was higher during the MT period 
(1979-82), than in the previous and posterior DS periods. A strict MT implies endoge­
neity of interest rates and exchange rates, so these will tend to be more volatile under 
MT. However, this was not what the research in BHM found. As was explained above, 
in the BHM studies exchange rate volatility is positively associated with interest rate 
volatility. This implies that the ranking for exchange rate volatility is the same as for 
interest rate volatility, and the discussion in the preceding paragraphs applies. In most 
circumstances DS will be associated with higher exchange rate volatility than MT, and an 
extension of the results in Haldane and Salmon (1995) would suggest IT would be 
associated with higher exchange rate volatility than DS. However, the analysis in Chap­
ter 5 (subsection 5.2.4) suggests that exchange rate volatility should be lower under IT 
than under DS, since the existence of a clear target could reduce the uncertainty faced by 
market participants regarding the future stance of monetary policy.
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6.2 Monetary Policy Targets in OECD Countries
The discussion in Section 6.1 shows that the implications for financial stability of each 
policy target are not clear. The existing empirical literature only provides results that are 
model or country specific. One form of overcoming this problem is to analyse historical 
data from a panel that includes a sufficiently large number of countries, and a wide 
variety of strategies. This is the first contribution of this chapter. It covers the experi­
ence of 18 OECD countries,6 all the countries in the OECD with a sufficiently long 
history of ‘tolerably liberalised’ financial markets,7 for a period of 25 years, long enough 
to include all the strategies under analysis in this chapter.
The first step in the research is to identify the targets in use by each central bank at each 
moment in time. As in the rules and discretion problem, although in theory the distinc­
tion between the different targets is clear, it becomes less obvious when one has to 
classify the strategies followed by actual central banks. For example, some central banks 
do not announce any targets, even though policy decisions are based on one (and this 
may be widely recognised by private agents).8 Others announce a target, but policy 
decisions are not guided by that variable, or they may even announce more than one 
target. Because one of the rationales for adopting a target is its effect on (private sec­
tors’) expectations, it is important whether or not the target is announced. But talk is 
cheap, and announcing a target does not force the central bank to take policy actions 
consistent with its attainment. What determines policy outcomes is the target that drives 
policy decisions, not the announced one. Thus, both the actual and the announced 
targets are important, since both will have an effect on the outcome of the strategy, and
6 The countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the 
US.
7 The expression ‘tolerably liberalised’ is used here in the sense of a financial market that may be 
restricted by regulatory constraints, but these constraints are not enough to render prices meaningless. 
Note that not all countries in the sample fulfilled this condition throughout the whole sample period.
8 An example was the Austrian Central Bank, that before 1995 had an unpublished target for the 
schilling/DEM exchange rate.
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potentially on the stability of financial markets. This chapter analyses monetary policy 
strategies from both points of view. Appendix 6. A describes the policy targets used by 
the central banks in the sample, including the discussion of whether the announced target 
was the actual target.9 This appendix is the second contribution of this chapter: it 
provides a systematic and detailed classification of the monetary policy strategies used by 
OECD central banks since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system.10
The use of an exchange rate target does not imply that the exchange rate is fixed. 
Exchange rate targets are usually formulated in terms of a central parity, with associated 
fluctuation bands. As long as the width of the band is strictly positive, the exchange rate 
will not be fixed. Also, the central parity may be changed; in some ET strategies these 
changes follow a pre-announced schedule (e.g., crawling peg), while in others they occur 
in irregular occasions and amounts. Different widths of the fluctuation bands and diffe­
rent arrangements for changes in the central parity are likely to be associated with 
different levels of stability in financial markets, so this chapter considers several ET 
strategies independently. In particular, multilateral exchange rate agreements, like the 
Smithsonian agreement (BW), the European ‘snake’ (SK), and the ERM, are treated 
separately from unilateral exchange rate targets (XT). In addition, the original ERM 
arrangement (OR), with fluctuation bands of ±2.25% (±6% for some countries), is 
distinguished from the ERM with ‘wide bands’ (fluctuation margins of ±15%) that 
emerged after August 1993 (WR).11
9 Some of the sources of information used are official (e.g., central banks, IMF), others are not. It was 
assumed that the target described in the official sources was the announced one, and that the target 
described in the non-official sources was the actual target, when different. Some of latter descriptions 
might represent subjective ex-post opinions of the authors, but it was assumed that they represent the 
contemporaneous view of private market agents.
10 After the first draft of this chapter was completed, I become aware of Cottarelli and Giannini (1997), 
who also provide a systematic classification of monetary policy strategies. Their database covers a wider 
range of countries but is less detailed than the one in Appendix 6.A. As far as it was possible, the two 
databases were compared and no contradiction was found between the two.
11 The classification OR was also used when the actual target was an exchange rate peg with the DEM 
or the ECU, even if the country did not participate formally in the ERM mechanism (e.g., Austria).
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6.3 Data and Methodology
The goal of the chapter is to study the stability of financial markets under different 
monetaiy policy targets. The analysis covers the concept of stability from the point of 
view of low risk and low uncertainty. Risk is defined as short-term price volatility, and 
its analysis is based on a GARCH-type model, using monthly data, described in subsec­
tion 6.3.2. Uncertainty is associated with the occurrence of financial crises, when asset 
prices change suddenly and by very large amounts. The study of this kind of instability is 
important because the economic impact of these crises tends to be higher than the 
consequences of a higher average volatility. For instance, derivatives prices are less 
likely to account for financial crises, that tend to be unexpected, than for higher average 
volatility, and thus those crises may cause large losses (and gains) for institutions trading 
in these markets, that may lead to the failure of some of them. Subsection 6.3.3 des­
cribes the methodology used in the study of financial crises.
6.3.1 Data
For the GARCH analysis, the financial asset prices series are monthly data for the period 
1972:1-1996:12, obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics and OECD 
historical databases. The sample starts after the end of the Bretton-Woods regime, 
because previously the countries in the sample had their choice of monetary policy 
strategy seriously restricted by the constraints imposed by the regime.12 The exchange 
rate data are IF  S's nominal effective exchange rate indices. Bilateral exchange rates are 
influenced by factors originating in the two countries involved, and the use of effective
12 Note that before 1971 the US, as the anchor country, and Canada, during the periods when the 
Canadian dollar was floating (before May 1962 and after May 1970), were able to pursue independent 
monetaiy policies. Also, exchange controls and limited capital mobility allowed for considerable 
discretion on domestic policies, even for the other countries. Nevertheless, the policy strategy was 
basically set by the regime’s constraints.
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exchange rate indices reduces the influence of external elements in the analysis. Domes­
tic factors, like the monetary policy targets analysed in this chapter, are more closely 
related to the effective exchange rate than to any bilateral exchange rate, which also 
depends on other factors unrelated to domestic conditions, like, for example, the strategy 
adopted by the central bank of the other country.13 On the other hand, variations in the 
effective exchange rate are the best measure of foreign exchange market risk faced by 
domestic agents, which is the focus of this chapter, given that they represent an average 
of the variability of individual currencies, weighted by their importance to domestic 
agents. Interest rates are money market call rates, and the share price data are market 
indices. The full description of the data may be found in Appendix 6.B.
The study of uncertainty in financial markets was based on the same monthly data used in 
the GARCH analysis, complemented by analogue series of daily data that allowed for the 
construction of daily and weekly price changes. The sample period was the same as in 
the previous exercise, and the data were obtained from Datastream. The exchange rate 
data are mainly the Bank of England’s trade weighted currency movement indices (see 
Appendix 6.B for a more precise description of the data). The interest rate data are (2 
days notice) euro-currency rates in London, when available, or some short-term inter­
bank or treasury bill rate, in the other cases. Share price data are Datastream national 
stock price indices.
6.3.2 Financial markets’ risk
Financial market risk was measured by the short term volatility of financial asset prices, 
modelled in a GARCH framework. The first stage of the analysis consisted in a prelimi­
nary statistical treatment of the monthly data. In a GARCH model, any price change 
contributes to higher volatility. However, not all price changes represent short term risk,
13 Since effective exchange rate indices are weighted averages of changes in individual currencies, they 
are not immune to external factors, in particular those influencing the currencies with the larger weights 
in the index. However, their influence is smaller than in any bilateral exchange rate.
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which is the concept one is toying to measure. To give an extreme example, there is no 
risk if a currency is depreciating at a constant rate of 3 %  per month, but this would 
translate in an unconditional volatility of 3 %  in the GARCH framework. In order to 
avoid this problem, (the log of) exchange rates and share prices were previously de­
trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.14 Then, the asset price change in period t for 
country i, cih was computed as the first difference of the (de-trended) log of the asset 
prices, p jh
Cit =(Pit~Pi,t-l) x  1 0 0  6.1
corresponding to the (continuously compounded) percentage short term change in the 
asset price. Finally, ARMA models were fitted to the cit series, and their residuals used 
as the basic asset price variable, r„.15
The second stage consisted of modelling r,t as a GARCH(1,1) process, following a 
substantial body of literature that has described the behaviour of foreign exchange rates 
under Bollerslev’s (1986) GARCH framework.16 The model used in this exercise as­
sumes that for each country the rit series follows a GARCH(1,1) process, and the cons­
tant term of the conditional variance includes a country-specific and a monetary policy 
target-specific term, with the latter assumed to be the same across countries. The full 
model is
ru = « + « ; <  6 2
6u i Vt-i ~ D (0 , h„) 6.3
6.4
where D  is a conditional density function, 3™* is a variable taking the value 1 if country i 
uses target m in period t, and fih ah /?„ yu and <jT are parameters to be estimated.17 Each
14 The problems caused by the existence of a trend in prices are less severe for the interest rate series, so 
these were not de-trended.
15 In the case of the share price model, the rit series was constructed as the residuals from a transfer 
function that included a dummy variable for the October 1987 crash. All the subsequent GARCH 
analysis will therefore not include the effects of this crash.
16 For references on applications of the GARCH framework to financial prices see Bollerslev, Chou, 
and Kroner (1992).
17 For the conditional variance in equation 6.4 to be well defined, a, (5 and y(l+<f>) must be all positive. 
In some models, some of the /?, estimates were found to be negative. When this was the case, the
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parameter (jT measures the percentage increase in volatility associated with the use of 
target m, relative to the base target. The model in equations 6.2 to 6.4 is estimated by 
quasi-maximum likelihood (QML). Although financial asset prices tend to exhibit a 
higher degree of leptokurtosis than that induced by a normal D, the QML estimates 
obtained by maximising the conditional normal likelihood function are consistent and 
asymptotically normal (see Bollerslev, Engle and Nelson, 1994). The large number of 
observations involved in the estimation (300 periods x 18 countries) provides the justifi­
cation for the use of asymptotic results, and tests on restrictions on the (j> parameter 
vector can thus be carried out using conventional likelihood ratio statistics.
6.3.3 Uncertainty in financial markets
In this chapter, uncertainty in financial markets is associated with the occurrence of 
‘financial crises’, periods of abrupt and very large changes (positive or negative) in asset 
prices, so large and abrupt that its occurrence is highly unlikely and potentially disruptive 
of the stability of the financial system. Obviously, the first stage in this analysis is the 
identification of these financial crises. The basic idea at this stage is to consider as a 
financial crisis any price change that is ‘very large’ relative to the past history of price 
changes for that asset, as measured by the ratio of the forecast error of a rolling ARMA 
model over its standard deviation. Since the change has to be ‘abrupt’, price changes 
were measured over relatively short periods, using monthly, weekly and daily data.18
conditional variance was alternatively modelled as following an ARCH(1) process, i.e., the parameter 
was restricted to zero. Also, the model is covariance stationary only if a,+#<7. For some countries, 
this condition was not verified initially. Estimates of a,+/?,>/ are sometimes caused by the existence in 
the sample of very large outliers, like those caused by point devaluations. Accounting for those observa­
tions using dummy variables in equation 6.4, usually provides estimates of a ,+ #  that are smaller than 1. 
This solution was used in some of the models estimated.
18 Even though large asset price changes occurring gradually over the medium term may have a serious 
impact on the economy, they are less likely to cause significant disruption in financial markets. Finan­
cial institutions tend to hold liabilities with shorter maturities than their assets. Abrupt changes in asset 
prices (occurring in less than a couple of weeks) may cause a mismatch between the cost of the liabilities 
and the return on the assets, serious enough to lead to the collapse of the institution. If the change in 
asset prices occurs over the medium term, financial institutions can gradually adjust their portfolios, 
such that the mismatch between the cost of the liabilities and the return on the assets does not reach 
dangerous levels. This is why the analysis is based in daily and weekly changes, and extended to
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The basic asset price variable in this exercise was the (continuously compounded) per­
centage short term change in the asset price, riu measured by the first difference of the 
log of the asset price, Piu multiplied by 100,
rIt -(logPn - logPiit.j) x 100 6.5
ARMA models, chosen according to the Schwarz criterion, were then fitted to each of 
the Tj series. Subsequently, rolling ARMA models were estimated using data for the 
previous 2 years (3 years for the monthly data), and a forecast based on the estimated 
model, f ih was computed for each period. The indicator used to identify financial crises, 
TFlt, was computed as the ratio of the forecast given by the rolling ARMA model and its 
standard deviation
TFit = f t/standard deviation (flt) 6.6
If the indicator TFlt was larger than 5.0, 6.3 or 8.3 (for the monthly, weekly and daily 
data, respectively), it would identify a crisis in financial market i in period t 19 When two 
or more very large price changes were identified inside two consecutive calendar months 
(irrespectively of whether these were identified using monthly, weekly or daily data), it 
was assumed that these refer to the same financial crisis.20
Having identified the financial crises in the first stage, the second stage consists on the 
analysis of the relationship between the occurrence of a crisis and the policy target the 
central bank was using when the crisis erupted, using a logit model of the type21
monthly changes to capture those changes that extend for more than a week but not much longer.
19 These values were chosen such that the total number of crises identified in the sample would be 
around 90, which corresponds roughly to the occurrence of a crisis every 5 years in each country.
20 This restriction results from the nature of the monthly data used, that does not permit the separation 
of two crises occurring in consecutive calendar months, when using monthly data. The IFF  s nominal 
effective exchange rates are computed using the average exchange rate for each calendar month. This 
implies that the exchange rate change from month t to month t+1 is affected by any event occurring in 
the period from the first day of month t to the last day of month t+1. I.e., if a crisis is identified in 
month t+1 from monthly data, this could have happened at any time in the calendar months t and t+1.
21 The logit model was preferred to the probit model because the logistic distribution has fatter tails 
than the normal distribution, and thus is more appropriate to describe the data under analysis. Neverthe­
less, estimates of probit models were also calculated, and it was found that all the qualitative results were 
similar to the ones presented here (details of the estimations may be obtained from the author). Both 
models produce similar results when the estimated probabilities are close to 50%, but the results may 
differ widely across models when the estimated probabilities are very large or very small (Greene, 1993,
Monetary policy targets and instability in financial markets 263
CR« = i r+ 'L A J s : 6.7
where CRit is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a crisis occurs in country i in period 
t, ST^ are variables taking the value 1 if country i follows strategy m in period t, /and Pm 
are parameters to be estimated, and l() denotes the logistic distribution. This model was 
estimated independently for each of the 3 types of financial assets under analysis 
(exchange rates, interest rates and share prices), using a quarterly periodicity.22
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Short term volatility in a GARCH framework
Table 6.1 presents the results from the estimation of the GARCH model in equations 6.2 
to 6.4, using exchange rates and the announced policy targets. The top panel shows the 
estimates for the policy target parameters in equation 6.4 (#T), which are common across 
countries, and the bottom panel shows the remaining parameters, which are country- 
specific. The estimates for the country-specific parameters in equation 6.4 denote 
substantial differences in the volatility process. The average volatility (measured by the 
unconditional volatility under the base strategy, UVsm) varies from 0.16 in Canada to 
1.43 in Australia. The degree of persistence in volatility (measured by a,+p,) also varies 
substantially, from very low levels of persistence in Sweden (0.15) to very high levels in 
Australia (0.99). These large differences between volatility processes justify the use of 
country-specific parameters in equation 6.4, as estimation of a single set of volatility
p. 638). In this exercise the estimated probabilities were small, but still the results were similar with 
both models.
22 The choice of a quarterly periodicity is a consequence of the procedure used, that does not identify 
two crises occurring on two consecutive calendar months. This rules out the use of a monthly periodi­
city. Note that much care was taken to ensure that the occurrence of a crisis was associated with the 
target in place when the crisis started.
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Table 6.1 GARCH model for exchange rates, with announced targets
Monetary policy target parameters ( ft1)
M T IT DS X T OR WR SK
4.213 4.711 4.332 0.720 0.500 0.328 1.792
(0.727) (0.990) (0.783) (0.277) (0.231) (0.255) (0.468)
Country specific parameters
Ui Y a, 0i  _ UVBWi (Xi+fi
Austria -0.010 0.100 0.448 0.181 0.448
(0.029) (0.019) (0.075)
Australia -0.046 0.010 0.054 0.939 1.429 0.993
(0.121) (0.004) (0.022) (0.025)
Belgium -0.008 0.146 0.478 0.105 0.350 0.583
(0.036) (0.040) (0.057) (0.113)
Canada 0.003 0.126 0.199 0.030 0.163 0.229
(0.050) (0.048) (0.099) (0.289)
Denmark 0.001 0.281 0.224 0.362 0.224
(0.040) (0.046) (0.057)
France -0.030 0.047 0.209 0.689 0.461 0.898
(0.037) (0.017) (0.052) (0.067)
Germany -0.028 0.051 0.135 0.593 0.188 0.728
(0.055) (0.022) (0.052) (0.132)
Ireland 0.052 0.158 0.089 0.570 0.463 0.659
(0.054) (0.051) (0.041) (0.100)
Italy 0.021 0.126 0.154 0.425 0.299 0.579
(0.044) (0.032) (0.057) (0.095)
Japan -0.034 0.662 0.189 0.816 0.189
(0.122) (0.112) (0.096)
Netherlands -0.016 0.196 0.144 0.062 0.247 0.206
(0.038) (0.106) (0.065) (0.451)
New Zealand 0.127 0.145 0.387 0.411 0.718 0.798
(0.084) (0.046) (0.105) (0.078)
Norway -0.004 0.109 0.097 0.530 0.292 0.627
(0.052) (0.084) (0.038) (0.323)
Spain 0.157 0.506 0.507 1.026 0.507
(0.071) (0.070) (0.112)
Sweden 0.107 0.203 0.143 0.009 0.239 0.152
(0.042) (0.043) (0.099) (0.161)
Switzerland 0.018 0.152 0.221 0.362 0.365 0.583
(0.070) (0.065) (0.094) (0.204)
UK 0.063 0.173 0.266 0.444 0.597 0.710
(0.080) (0.053) (0.060) (0.093)
US 0.045 0.207 0.017 0.562 0.492 0.579
(0.091) (0.056) (0.054) (0.131)
IR IT NZ SD
Devaluation 13.764 52.661 25.500 56.077
dummies (9.221) (72.805) (20.774) (71.912)
Notes: The table presents the estimated parameters of the model in equations 6.2 to 6.4. Figures in parenthesis are standard er­
rors. UVBm is the estimated unconditional volatility for country i, under the base strategy, BW.
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parameters for the pooled exchange rates would be likely to deliver meaningless esti­
mates. Note that, conversely, almost all of the mean returns (//, in equation 6.2) are 
close to zero. These two broad patterns (substantial differences in the volatility pro­
cesses and ^  close to zero) are extensive to all the GARCH models estimated.23
Table 6.2 presents the estimates for the policy target parameters in equation 6.4, using 
exchange rate, interest rate and share price data, and both the actual and the announced 
monetary policy targets.24 The base strategy set in the interest rate and the share price 
models was discretion, but for the exchange rate models BW was used instead. BW has 
much lower exchange rate volatility than the other strategies, and not using BW as the 
base could lead to negative parameters so large that they would imply negative estimated 
variance. The estimates in Table 6.2, and the tests in Table 6.3, show that there are 
significant differences across policy targets in the short term price volatility of the three 
financial assets, including, surprisingly, share prices. There are no important differences 
between the results obtained with the announced targets, and the ones from the models 
using the actual targets. Nevertheless, the models with actual targets tend to have 
likelihood ratio statistics of higher magnitudes, denoting more significant differences in 
volatility across strategies. This suggests that for the volatility of financial assets it is 
more important what central banks do, than what they say. As it was extensively docu­
mented before (e.g., in Chapter 5), it is unlikely that announcements alone affect signifi­
cantly the behaviour of private agents, and thus, what should be relevant for the beha­
viour of financial variables is the actual strategy followed by central banks. For this 
reason, all the subsequent analysis will focus on the models with actual targets.
23 The country-specific parameters are essential to produce precise estimates of the model, but in 
themselves are of minor importance to this study. For this reason, and to save space, for the other 
models, only the policy target parameters are presented. The estimates of the country-specific parame­
ters are not reproduced here, but may be obtained from the author.
24 The exchange rate had to be modelled as an ARCH(1) process, instead of GARCH(1,1), for the cases 
of Austria, Denmark, Japan, and Spain, and dummies accounting for specific point devaluations had to 
be used for Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, and Sweden. In the interest rate model a dummy had to be used 
for a specific event in Sweden. Finally, share prices were modelled as ARCH(l) for the cases of 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and the US.
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Table 6.2 GARCH models - estimates of monetary policy target parameters
Model Exchange rates Interest rates Share prices
Target Announced Actual Announced Actual Announced Actual
Discretion 4.332 4.855
(0.783) (0.871)
Money 4.213 4.521 1.396 -0.434 -0.037 -0.143
(0.727) (0.750) (0.274) (0.094) (0.076) (0.076)
Inflation 4.711 3.284 -0.589 -0.638 -0.669 -0.634
(0.990) (0.712) (0.099) (0.092) (0.051) (0.051)
XT 0.720 0.418 2.014 1.316 -0.093 -0.019
(0.277) (0.220) (0.428) (0.237) (0.114) (0.110)
ERM 0.500 0.458 0.170 0.106 -0.269 -0.294
(0.231) (0.227) (0.145) (0.109) (0.081) (0.078)
Wide ERM 0.328 1.059 0.564 0.647 -0.598 -0.476
(0.255) (0.465) (0.215) (0.125) (0.065) (0.085)
Snake 1.792 1.505 12.337 10.460 -0.157 -0.027
(0.468) (0.421) (2.075) (1.371) (0.108) (0.127)
BW 24.740 2.142 0.047 0.051
(4.446) (0.321) (0.171) (0.169)
Notes: The table presents estimates for the policy target parameters of the model in equations 6.2 to 6.4. The models estimated 
also included a full set of country specific parameters, as in Table 6.1, but these are not presented here to save space. Full results 
may be obtained from the author. Figures in parenthesis are standard errors.
In the exchange rates model, all the coefficients are positive, denoting that the base 
strategy BW is the one with lower exchange rate volatility. As expected, volatility is 
lower under exchange rate targeting (ET) strategies. Since under these strategies the 
main goal of the central bank is to stabilise the exchange rate, any other result would 
only be possible if there were serious shortcomings in the capacity to implement mone­
tary policy. However, there are also significant differences (at least at the 10% level) in 
exchange rate volatility among strategies inside the two main groups, ET and non-ET, as 
the results for joint tests 1 and 2 in Table 6.3 demonstrate. Apart from BW, the ET 
strategies with lowest volatility levels are unilateral exchange rate targets (XT), and the 
‘original’ ERM (OR), both with volatility about 40% higher than BW, followed by the 
‘wide band’ ERM (WR), and the European ‘snake’ (SK), which has volatility 180% 
higher than under BW. This ranking could be explained by the width of the fluctuation 
bands in each of the strategies: the wider the bands, the higher the exchange rate volati­
lity.25
25 XT includes a wide range of exchange rate targeting arrangements, with many different band widths. 
Nevertheless, the large majority of the arrangements had bands similar to the ones in OR (±2.25% for 
the core currencies), and much smaller than the ±15% of WR The bands in SK were also narrow, but
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The non-ET strategies are associated with exchange rate volatility more than 300% 
higher than under BW, with inflation targeting (IT) being associated with the lowest 
volatility in this group, followed by money targeting (MT) and discretion (with almost 
500% more volatility than BW). This results seems to contradict the previous findings of 
Haldane and Salmon (1995), and to some extent Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993), but 
the rankings are not clear in their work (see Section 6.1), nor in Table 6.3: the null in test 
1 (no difference among non-ET strategies) is only rejected at the 10% significance level.
Table 6,3 GARCH models - hypothesis tests on policy targets
Exchange rates Interest rates Share prices
Announced Actual Announced Actual Announced Actual
Tests on individual parameters: y(l)
d C/J II o 25.24 35.71
MT = 0 104.28 121.80 39.95 6.08 0.07 0.61
IT = 0 16.22 21.01 4.55 10.60 21.55 22.91
XT = 0 0.41 4.67 29.52 55.20 0.05 0.05
OR = 0 3.80 4.21 0.01 0.41 2.12 2.15
WR = 0 0.98 0.01 1.30 8.38 11.76 7.63
oIIWin 9.24 7.60 105.42 135.56 1.41 0.01
BW = 0 347.45 178.02 0.29 0.24
Joint tests
1. No difference among non-exchange rate targeting (ET) strategies
X<2) 1.12 4.76 42.08 16.26 23.44 24.49
2. No difference among non-ET strategies and no difference among ERM and X T  strategies
X(4) 1.26 10.07 57.36 47.27 35.81 24.80
3. Significance o f  the model (all <jT=0)
X(7) 114.96 136.76 316.08 377.47 37.17 35.71
Notes: The table presents the likelihood ratio statistics for the restrictions described. The unrestricted regression corresponds to 
the models with all policy target variables, partially presented in Table 6.2. Full results for the restricted models may be obtained 
from the author. The critical values for the likelihood ratio statistics at the 5% (10%) level are 3.84 (2.71), S.99 (4.61), 9.49 
(7.78), and 14.07 (12.02), for 1, 2, 4 and 7 degrees of freedom, respectively. The title of each joint test describes the null hy­
pothesis. Test 1 is performed by imposing the restriction MT=IT=DS in the exchange rate models, and the restriction MT=IT=0 
in the other models. Test 2 adds the restriction XT=OR=WR to the restrictions in test 1.
the frequency of the realignments rendered the bands meaningless.
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The main conclusion from the estimation of the interest rate model is that ET strategies 
have higher interest rate volatility than non-ET strategies. The coefficients for ET 
strategies are all positive, showing that these strategies have higher volatility than discre­
tion (the base strategy), while IT and MT have lower volatility. These differences, which 
are significant in almost all the cases, suggest that there is a trade-off between exchange 
rate and interest rate volatility: if central banks want to stabilise the exchange rate, they 
have to accept less stable interest rates. This would support the Mills and Wood (1993) 
argument that central bank intervention can not eliminate volatility, only shift it from one 
market to the other.
However, it seems that there is no trade-off inside the two main groups of strategies. 
Among the ET strategies, OR has both low exchange rate and low interest rate volatility. 
This might be explained by the fact that in countries committed to the ERM discipline, 
monetary policy is constrained by the behaviour of the Bundesbank, one of the most 
notorious interest rate smoothers.26 A similar result is found for the non-ET strategies, 
which have the same ranking for exchange rate and interest rate volatility. Again, this is 
likely to be caused by different patterns of interest rate smoothing.27 The policy lag (the 
period between the use of the instrument and its effect on the target) is shorter under MT 
than under IT. This implies that in the event of a shock, the adjustment needs to be more 
rapid and vigorous under MT, because IT allows for gradual adjustments, and thus 
interest rate smoothing. The higher volatility under discretion is probably associated 
with the increased uncertainty caused by the lack of a clear medium-term reference for 
monetary policy, such as that provided by the adoption of a policy target.
The results for share prices also reveal surprisingly significant differences among policy 
targets. However, the differences do not seem to be associated with the exchange rate 
regime, as it was the case in the previous models: tests 1 and 2 have high likelihood ratio 
statistics relatively to test 3, suggesting that the differences inside the main groups (ET
26 Goodhart (1996) provides evidence on the interest rate smoothing behaviour of some central banks, 
including the Bundesbank.
27 With free capital movements, stable interest rates should be associated with stable exchange rates, as 
explained in Section 6.1. This is also consistent with the results in Chapter 2, Section 2.3, where it was 
shown that news about interest rates have a substantial impact on exchange rate volatility.
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and non-ET) are more important than the differences between the groups. The strategies 
with higher volatility are BW and discretion, and the ones with (significantly) lower 
volatility are IT and WR. The low volatility for IT and WR could be a sign that stock 
markets tend to be less volatile when monetary policy is clearly aimed at price stability.28
6.4.2 Financial crises
Table 6.4 presents the financial crises identified using the procedure described in subsec­
tion 6.3.3, in the foreign exchange markets, money markets and stock exchanges. In the 
foreign exchange market a total of 97 crises were identified, with Germany and the 
Netherlands being the countries with fewest crises (only one in each, both in 1973 in the 
early stages of the generalised floating) and New Zealand and the US the countries with 
most crises (9 and 11, respectively, all of them occurring before the end of 1985). In the 
money market, the total number of crises identified was 86, ranging from 1 in New 
Zealand and Norway (both in the 1990’s) to 8 in the UK (all in the 1970’s). Finally, 55 
crises in the stock markets were identified, ranging from 0 in Sweden to 12 in Austria.29 
Sixteen out of these 55 crises correspond to the crash of October 1987 (the procedure 
used identified a crisis in this period in every country in the sample except for Sweden 
and Italy). Since this crash is unlikely to be associated with the policy strategy in use in 
each of the central banks in the sample,30 the analysis was conducted both including and 
excluding the October 1987 observations.
28 Price stability is the overriding objective of monetary policy in Germany, the anchor country in the 
ERM, and was one of the criteria to participate in the European Monetaiy Union. For these reasons, 
price stability may be seen as the main policy objective under the WR strategy, especially because the 
exchange rate does not seem to impose a major constraint, given the wide bands of the arrangement.
29 The number of crises identified in the Austrian stock market is abnormally large (the second country 
with most crisis in the stock market is Ireland, with 5). It is unlikely that this result arises from some 
data deficiency, since these crises are identified both by the monthly and the daily data, which are from 
different sources. I am not aware of any reason that justifies this result. Since this is a relatively large 
proportion of the total number of crisis identified, the logit model was also estimated without these 
observations (see Table 6.7).
30 In almost every country in the sample, the October 1987 crisis represented the repercussion on the 
domestic market of the international crash. If this crash is associated with monetaiy policy, it should be, 
one might assume, only with the US policy, where the crash appears to have originated, and not with 
other countries’ policies.
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Table 6.4 Crises in financial markets
Foreign exchange market Money market Stock market
Country # Dates # Dates # Dates
Austria 4 73:07, 73:12,78:11, 
88:09
7 73:10, 78:05, 80:04, 
90:01, 92:04, 93:08, 
94:04
12 85:02, 85:08, 85:11, 
86:04, 87:02, 87:07, 
87:10, 89:10, 90:01, 
90:08, 91:01, 91:08
Australia 7 72:12,73:09,74:09, 
76:11, 83:03, 85:02, 
93:12
2 82:12, 83:12 2 73:09, 87:10
Belgium 4 74:02, 81:12, 82:02, 
83:03
5 79:02, 81:03, 81:08, 
81:10, 83:03
4 73:12,81:06, 81:12, 
87:10
Canada 2 76:11, 86:02 6 79:10, 80:02, 80:04, 
80:12, 92:09, 92:11
3 80:03, 82:11, 87:10
Denmark 3 72:09, 79:11, 93:08 7 75:08, 86:12, 87:09, 
89:10, 92:11, 93:02, 
93:08
3 74:11, 80:07, 87:10
France 7 72:08, 76:03,78:03, 
81:08,81:10, 82:06, 
83:03
6 79:01, 81:06, 82:03, 
82:06, 82:10, 83:03
2 75:01, 87:10
Germany 1 73:06 6 73:03, 80:12, 81:02, 
81:09, 86:12, 90:12
4 80:02,87:10, 89:10, 
91:08
Ireland 7 72:07, 73:07, 76:03, 
76:09, 83:03, 86:08, 
93:02
5 86:02, 86:07, 92:09, 
92:11, 93:01
5 73:12,74:10, 75:01, 
87:10, 89:10
Italy 8 73:01, 73:06, 74:01, 
74:10, 76:01, 85:07, 
92:09, 95:03
4 72:12, 76:03, 80:07, 
81:06
2 77:06, 81:07
Japan 3 73:02, 74:01, 80:05 4 78:08, 78:11, 80:06, 
95:09
4 87:10, 90:04, 90:10. 
92:08
Netherl. 1 73:10 5 72:03, 72:05, 72:10, 
76:08, 78:09
1 87:10
NZ 9 73:02, 73:05, 73:09, 
74:09, 75:08,79:06, 
83:03, 84:07, 85:12
1 93:01 1 87:11
Norway 5 72:06, 78:02, 82:08, 
86:05, 92:11
1 95:12 3 87:10,89:10, 90:12
Spain 8 72:01,73:08, 74:02, 
76:02, 77:07, 82:12, 
92:09, 93:05
5 92:09, 92:12, 93:05, 
93:07, 93:11
2 80:04, 87:10
Sweden 8 73:12,74:04, 75:07, 
77:04, 77:08, 81:09, 
82:10, 92:11
5 73:07, 74:01, 90:02, 
91:12, 92:09
0
Switzer. 4 73:02,74:02,78:01, 
78:10
3 78:10, 79:06,81:06 3 87:10, 89:10, 91:08
UK 5 72:07, 73:07, 76:03, 
76:10, 92:09
8 73:04, 73:08, 74:02, 
76:03, 76:06, 77:02, 
77:08, 78:04
2 75:01, 87:10
US 11 72:06, 73:02, 73:07, 
73:11,74:01,78:01, 
78:11, 80:05, 82:06, 
85:03, 85:09
6 73:07, 79:10, 80:02, 
80:04, 85:12, 86:12
2 73:07, 87:10
Total 97 86 55
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The logit models explaining the likelihood of crises as a function of the policy target 
adopted by the central bank when the crisis was declared (equation 6.7) were estimated 
using, alternatively, the actual and the announced targets, and in both cases ‘discretion’ 
was set as the base strategy.31 Table 6.5 presents the estimates of the logit parameters, 
while Table 6.6 provides some statistical analysis of the results. As in the previous 
subsection, the significance levels tend to be higher for the model with actual policy 
targets, and thus the discussion will focus on these models.
Table 6.5 Policy targets and financial crises - estimates of logit models
Model Exchange rates Interest rates Share prices
Target Announced Actual Announced Actual Announced Actual
Y -2.951 -2.527 -3.534 -2.848 -3.580 -3.514
-10.77 -12.64 -9.85 -12.38 -10.59 -12.00
P (MT) -0.199 -0.578 0.712 -0.039 0.184 -0.094
-0.55 -1.67 1.73 -0.11 0.43 -0.20
P (IT) -1.730 -2.483 -0.031 -1.051 -1.497
-1.66 -2.43 -0.04 -1.68 -1.43
P (XT) 0.497 -0.189 0.211 -0.275 0.886 0.755
1.44 -0.66 0.45 -0.81 2.16 2.10
P (OR) -0.093 -0.820 0.940 -0.019 -0.014 -0.129
-0.25 -2.31 2.28 -0.06 -0.03 -0.29
P(WR) -1.323
-1.28
P (SK) 0.577 0.046 0.848 0.148 -0.661 -0.621
1.42 0.12 1.71 0.34 -0.84 -0.81
P (BW) 1.566 1.141 0.356 -0.330
3.50 2.81 0.44 -0.44
Notes: The table presents the estimates of the parameters in the logit model given by equation 6.7, using ‘discretion’ as the base 
strategy. The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a crisis in the financial market (named in the heading 
of the column) of country i=l to 18 occurred in quarter t=1972:l to 1996:4. The explanatory variables are alternatively, the an­
nounced or the actual policy targets. Values in italics are t-statistics; at the 3% (10%) level, the critical value for the t-statistics is 
1.96 (1.67). Since the estimation procedure does not converge when the dependent variable always takes the value 0 when one of 
the explanatory variables takes the value 1, some models had to be estimated without the observations corresponding to the targets 
that fulfilled this condition.
The model for the foreign exchange market is highly significant, showing that there are 
significant differences in the probability of an exchange rate crisis associated with diffe­
rent policy targets. These differences are not just a consequence of differences between 
the two main groups of strategies, ET and non-ET, as may be inferred from the rejection
31 I.e., l(y) is the estimated probability that a crisis will occur under discretion, while 1(7+Pm) (m* 
discretion) is the estimated probability that a crisis will occur when the central bank is using target m.
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of the null hypotheses in the joint tests 1 and 2, and from the rejection of some of the 
tests of equality of coefficients, in Table 6.6. Exchange rate crises are least likely to of 
the null hypotheses in the joint tests 1 and 2, and from the rejection of some of the
Table 6.6 Statistical inference from logit models of targets and crises
Exchange rates Interest rates Share prices
Announced Actual Announced Actual Announced Actual
Predicted probabilities
Discretion 0.050 0.074 0.028 0.055 0.027 0.029
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Money 0.041 0.043 0.056 0.053 0.032 0.026
(0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
Inflation 0.009 0.007 0.028 0.020 0 0.007
(0.009) (0.007) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007)
XT 0.079 0.062 0.035 0.042 0.063 0.060
(0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
ERM 0.045 0.034 0.070 0.054 0.027 0.026
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008)
Wide ERM 0 0.021 0 0 0 0
(0.021)
Snake 0.085 0.071 0.064 0.063 0.014 0.016
(0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.010) (0.011)
BW 0.200 0.200 0.040 0.040 0 0
(0.057) (0.057) (0.028) (0.028)
Joint tests
1. No difference among non--exchange rate targeting (ET) strategies
%Q) 2.8 7.9 3.9 2.9 2.1
2. No difference among non--ET strategies and no difference among ERM and XT strategies
x() X(3) = 6.1 X(4)=11.8 X(3) = 7.8 X(3) = 3.4 X(2) = 5.4 X(3) = 7.0
3. Significance o f the model (all J3(m)=0)
5C() X(6) = 27.1 X(7) = 32.2 X(6) = 10.0 X(6) = 5.0 X(4) = 10.0 X(5)=14.8
Tests o f equality o f  coefficients (rejections o f  the null)
5% MB,IB,BX MB,IB,BX xo MX,XS,XO MX, IX,
BO,BS,MX BO,BW,BS XO
MS,DCIS DUS
10% XO,OS MI,XO,OS IS xs
Notes: the results in this table are based on the estimated logit models presented in Table 6.5. ‘Predicted probabilities’ are given 
by l(y) for ‘discretion’, and l(y+J3(m)) for the other targets, where 1(.) is the logistic distribution. Figures in parenthesis are stan­
dard errors for the predicted probabilities. At the 5% (10%) level, the critical value for the %2 statistics are 5.99 (4.61), 7.82 
(6.25), 9.49 (7.78), 11.07 (9.24), 12.59 (10.64) and 14.07 (12.02), for 2 to 7 degrees of freedom, respectively. The lines for the 
‘test of equality of coefficients’ present target pairs (identified by the first letter of each target) for which the null of the two coef­
ficients being equal was rejected at the significance level displayed in the first columa The title of each joint test describes the 
null hypothesis. Test 1 is performed by imposing the restriction PQAT)=f3(IT)=0. Test 2 adds to the restriction in test 1, the res­
triction P(XF)=P(EF)= P(WF).
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tests of equality of coefficients, in Table 6.6. Exchange rate crises are least likely to 
occur under IT, followed by WR, OR, MT, XT, DS, SK and BW. The higher likelihood 
of crisis under BW (the Smithsonian agreement) was expected, since the data period for 
this strategy corresponds to the collapse of the Bretton-Woods regime, when crises in 
the foreign exchange markets were frequent.
Perhaps more interesting is the significantly lower likelihood of a crisis under IT. With a 
credible inflation target there is less uncertainty on the future direction of monetary 
policy, and thus less uncertainty regarding exchange rates, reducing the potential for 
exchange rate crises. Another interesting result is that, contrary to what happened with 
short term volatility, there is no clear ranking between ET and non-ET strategies. The 
former tend to have higher likelihood of crises, consistent with the common view that 
they are more prone to speculative attacks, but, for instance, the ERM strategies have 
lower volatility than MT or discretion. It would seem that the strong discipline of a 
multilateral arrangement could be a better deterrent to speculation than the (soft) do­
mestic constraint of a money target.
The likelihood of a crisis occurring in the money markets or in the stock exchanges does 
not seem to be related to the policy target. None of the logit models estimated using the 
data for interest rate crisis are significant. The stock market models seem to be signifi­
cant, but this is just a consequence of the large number of stock market crises in Austria, 
that causes XT to have a significantly higher likelihood of crisis. If  one excludes the 
Austrian observations, and accounts for the effect of the October 1987 crash, the signifi­
cance of all the target variables disappears, either individually or jointly, as may be seen 
in Table 6.7.
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Table 6.7 Stock exchange crises, excluding October 1987 and Austria
Parameter
Logit model 
Announced Actual
Predicted probabilities 
Target Announced Actual
Y -4.080 -3.743 Discretion 0.016 0.023
-9.02 -10.86 (0.003) (0.003)
P(MT) 0.404 -0.268 Money 0.025 0.018
0.75 -0.49 (0.007) (0.007)
P (IT) -1.268 Inflation 0.007
-1.19 (0.007)
P (XT) 0.346 0.034 XR 0.023 0.024
0.55 0.07 (0.010) (0.009)
P (OR) -0.228 -0.692 ERM 0.013 0.012
-0.37 -1.18 (0.006) (0.006)
P (SK) -0.161 -0.392 Snake 0.014 0.016
-0.19 -0.49 (0.010) (0.011)
P (D87) 6.066 6.081 Oct. 87 0.879 0.912
7.63 7.61 (0.089) (0.068)
Hypothesis tests
1. No difference among non-ET strategies 2. (1) and no difference among X T  and ERM
X(2) 1.5 x O X(2) =1.4 X(3) = 3.0
3. Significance o f  the model 4. Significance o f target variables (exc.D87)
X(5)=101.9 %(6)= 105.7 all P(m)=0 X(4) = 2.0 X(5) = 3.1
5. Tests o f  equality o f  coefficients (exc. D87) : no rejections of null
Notes: See Tables 6.5 and 6.6. D87 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 in 1987:4.
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter examined the differences in instability in the foreign exchange, money, and 
stock markets, associated with the use of alternative monetary policy targets, based on 
data from a panel of 18 OECD countries, for the period 1972-1996. The investigation 
was centered on the analysis of short-term volatility of financial asset prices, and on the 
study of the likelihood of financial crises under different policy targets.
The main conclusion to be drawn is that the choice of monetary policy strategy will 
significantly affect stability in financial markets. Both short term price volatility of
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financial assets, and the likelihood of crises in foreign exchange markets, differ signifi­
cantly when central banks are using alternative policy targets. The evidence provided in 
this chapter suggests that there is a trade-off between stabilising interest rates or stabili­
sing exchange rates: central banks that have chosen to target exchange rates faced higher 
interest rate volatility.
Some strategies appear to be unambiguously preferable from the financial stability 
perspective. Among the exchange rate targeting strategies, the strict discipline of a 
multilateral arrangement, with narrow fluctuation bands such as the original ERM, seems 
to be associated with lower interest and exchange rate volatility. On the other side, 
inflation targeting seems to be the floating exchange rate strategy that delivers lowest 
volatility in financial markets. Since the use of inflation targets also reduces the likeli­
hood of crises in the foreign exchange market (relative to any other strategy), the evi­
dence in this chapter suggests that a central bank concerned with financial stability 
should adopt this strategy.
Financial stability ranks high on the list of concerns of the typical central bank, but it is 
seldom on top of that list. It is more likely that the monetary policy strategy will be 
chosen according to its effect on inflation (and employment) than on financial stability. 
Nevertheless, existing research on this area suggests that no strategy clearly outperforms 
the others. If the effects of different strategies on macroeconomic variables do not differ 
significantly, the choice should be made on the basis of their impact on financial stability. 
The evidence provided in this chapter could provide pertinent guidelines for those 
situations.
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Appendix 6.A: Monetary Policy Targets in Selected OECD Countries
This appendix lists the monetary policy targets used by the central banks in this sample of 
OECD countries, during the period 1972-96. Additionally, it also includes information 
regarding the existence of exchange controls. Unmarked text describes the official target 
announced by the central bank. Text in square brackets refers to the actual (unofficial) 
target, as described in the sources consulted. Each policy strategy period starts in the 
beginning of the ‘start date’ (i.e., if the start date is ‘1985’ the period is assumed to start 
on 1/1/85), and ends immediately before the beginning of the ‘start date’ of the following 
period. In each period, the policy target is classified with a 2 letter code. The first letter 
refers to the officially announced target, and the second letter to the actual (unofficial) 
target. The letter code is as follows:
b - multilateral exchange rate target, ‘Smithsonian* agreement; 
d - discretionary policy, with no explicit policy target;
0 - multilateral exchange rate target, original ERM (before August 1993);
1 - inflation target; 
m - monetary target;
s - multilateral exchange rate target, European ‘snake’; 
w - multilateral exchange rate target, ‘wide’ ERM (after August 1993); 
x - unilateral exchange rate target.
Start date Code Comments
AUSTRALIA 
1971, Dec 18 xx
1974, Sep 25 
1976, Nov 29
1983, Dec 12
1986
1993
xx
md
md
dd
ii
USD peg; par value changed 23/12/72, 12/2/73, 9/9/73; exchange controls 
for capital account transactions; 
effective XR peg; constant trade-weighted exchange rate index; 
fixed XR target abandoned for managed floating; M targets (or
‘conditional projections’) adopted [but these were never elevated to the 
centre piece of monetary policy]; 
managed floating ends; exchange controls end;
M targets abandoned; no intermediate targets adopted (discretion);
IT adopted.
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AUSTRIA
1971, Aug 15 XX USD peg abandoned; CB pledged to ‘maintain XR stability against main 
European currencies, especially of the large industrialised neighbours’ 
[implicit DEM peg]; exchange controls for current and capital account 
transactions;
1973,Jul 1 XX exchange controls for current account transactions end;
1981 XX [implicit DEM peg becomes more restrictive, with smaller XR fluctuations 
allowed]
1991, Nov 4 XX exchange controls end;
1995, Jan 9 wo ERM membership.
BELGIUM
1971, Dec 18 bb Smithsonian agreement; narrower margins of fluctuation (1%) with Dutch 
guilder; ‘official’ market only for current account transactions; no ex­
change controls in the ‘free’ market;
1972, Apr 24 ss Snake participation;
1979, Mar 13 00 ERM membership;
1990, Jun 1 00 [implicit DEM peg];
1993, Aug 2 wo ERM margins widened to 15% [but implicit DEM peg maintained].
CANADA
1970, May 31 dx floating XR [but the authorities main concern was XR stability]; 
no exchange controls;
1975, Nov 6 mm M targets announced;
1978, 4th qrt mx [worries about monetarism; M targets continue to be announced, but XR 
stabilisation becomes the main concern; implicit effective XR peg];
1982, Nov dx M targets formally abandoned; no intermediate target adopted;
1984, 2nd qrt dd [implicit effective XR peg abandoned];
1988, Jan di price stability becomes primary objective;
1991, Feb 26 ii IT adopted.
DENMARK
1971, Dec 18 bb Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for capital account transactions;
1972, May 1 ss Snake participation;
1972, Jun 23 bb Snake participation abandoned;
1972, Oct 10 ss Snake participation rejoined;
1979, Mar 13 00 ERM membership;
1988, Oct 1 00 exchange controls end;
1993, Aug 2 ww ERM margins widened to 15%.
FRANCE
1971, Dec 18 bb Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for capital account transactions;
1972, May 1 sd Snake participation [but policy was discretionary, geared towards domestic 
objectives, with equilibrium assured by XR adjustments];
1974, Jan 19 dd Snake participation abandoned;
1975,Jul10 sd Snake participation rejoined [but policy remained discretionary];
1976, Mar 15 mm Snake participation abandoned; M2 target announced;
1979, Mar 13 od ERM membership [M2 targets retained, but these were frequently missed; 
policy was discretionary, with XR stability defended through capital 
controls and frequent parity adjustments];
1984, 4th qtr 00 [XR stability becomes primary concern; program of gradual financial 
deregulation and liberalisation of exchange controls];
1990, Jan 1 00 exchange controls end;
1993, Aug 2 ww ERM margins widened to 15%.
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GERMANY
1971, Dec 18 bb
1973, Mar 19 dm
1974, Dec mm
IRELAND
1971, Dec 18 XX
1978, Dec 18 dx
1979, Mar 13 0 0
1992, Dec 31 0 0
1993, Aug 2 wo
ITALY
1971, Dec 18 bb
1972, May 1 sd
1973, Feb 12 dd
1974, Mar 22 md
1979, Mar 13 od
1982, Feb 1 od
1984 om
1987 0 0
1990, May 14 0 0
1992, Sep 17 mw
1996, Nov 24 ww
JAPAN
1971, Dec 18 bb
1973, Feb 12 dd
1975, Jul dm
1978, Jul mm
1980, Dec mm
1990 dx
NETHERLANDS
1971, Dec 18 bb
1972, Apr 24 ss
1977, Sep 1 ss
Smithsonian agreement; no exchange controls;
USD peg abandoned; Snake participation [but participation in European 
XR agreements was never a binding constraint for German monetary 
policy]; [M targeting attempted, but not announced];
M target announced.
1:1 parity with GBP; exchange controls for capital account transactions; 
GBP parity formally abandoned [but maintained in practice];
ERM membership; 
exchange controls end;
ERM margins widened to 15% [but policy is still aimed at maintaining the 
DEM peg].
Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for capital account transactions;
Snake participation [but interest rate policy was not consistent with XR 
commitments; instead the CB resorted to capital controls and a 2-tier 
XR system];
Snake participation abandoned;
exchange controls for current account transactions introduced; Total 
Domestic Credit expansion adopted as intermediate target [under pres­
sure from the IMF; in practice, targets were not observed];
ERM membership [but interest rate policy was still inconsistent with XR 
commitments; it is arguable whether ERM membership was a serious 
constraint on policy];
exchange controls for current account transactions end;
M2 target adopted [but TDC target not abandoned; conflict with XR target 
settled with the imposition of capital controls];
[policy aimed first and foremost at maintaining XR stability; M2 targets 
not abandoned, but were not pursued rigidly];
exchange controls end;
ERM participation suspended; M2 becomes intermediate target [but XR is 
also monitored closely];
ERM participation resumed.
Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for capital account transactions;
USD peg abandoned [no explicit policy target adopted];
[M2 used as intermediate target, but not announced];
M2 ‘forecasts’ announced [these were not ‘targets’, but represented the 
movements in M2 the CB was willing to accept];
exchange controls end;
[CB allowed for increased variability of M growth]; no intermediate 
targets; CB pays attention to international financial conditions and the 
maintenance of an adequate XR.
Smithsonian agreement; narrower margins of fluctuation (1%) with 
Belgium franc; exchange controls for capital account transactions; 
Snake participation; 
exchange controls end;
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1979, Mar 13 oo 
1984 oo
1993, Aug 2 oo
NEWZEALAND
1971, Dec 18 bb
1973, Jul 9 XX
1979, Jun XX
1982, Jun 22 XX
1984, Nov 21 XX
1985, Mar 4 dd
1988, Jun 1 di
1990, Feb 1 ii
NORWAY
1971, Dec 18 bb
1972, May 23 ss
1978, Dec 12 XX
1990, Oct 19 xo
1992, Dec 10 dx
1994, Jan 14 dx
SPAIN
1971, Dec 18 bb
1974, Jan 22 dm
1977, May 2 mm
1984 m x
1989, Jun 19 00
1992, Jul 1 00
1993, Aug 2 ww
1995, Jan 1 ii
SWEDEN
1971, Dec 18 bb
1973, Mar 19 ss
1977, Aug 29 XX
1991, May 17 xo
1992, Nov 19 dd
1993,Jan 15 ii
ERM membership;
[unpublished DEM target of 1.12/1.13 NLG/DEM];
ERM margins widened to 15%, but not for the NLG/DEM [unpublished 
DEM target is not affected].
Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for current and capital account 
transactions;
effective XR fixed peg adopted; exchange controls for current account 
transactions end; 
effective XR crawling peg adopted; 
effective XR fixed peg adopted; 
exchange controls end;
effective XR peg abandoned [no explicit target adopted; checklist approach 
in conducting monetary policy]; 
price stability becomes primary objective;
IT adopted.
Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for capital account transactions; 
Snake participation;
end of Snake participation; effective XR peg adopted;
ECU peg, with fluctuation bands of ±2.25%;
ECU peg abandoned; policy aimed at a broadly stable XR; 
exchange controls end.
Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for current and capital account 
transactions;
USD peg abandoned; [explicit use of M3 intermediate target, but targets 
are not made public];
exchange controls for current account transactions end; M3 targets 
announced;
change to liquid assets targeting [importance of M targets gradually 
downgraded; concern for XR gradually increasing; initially concern was 
for effective XR (1984-85), then for index of EEC countries’ XR (1986- 
87), finally for DEM/ESP (1988-89)];
ERM membership, with fluctuation margins of ±6% [liquid assets targets 
were not abandoned, but XR target took precedence] ;
exchange controls end;
ERM margins widened to 15%;
IT adopted.
Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for capital account transactions; 
Snake participation;
Snake participation abandoned; effective XR peg adopted;
ECU peg adopted, with fluctuation margins of ±1.5%;
ECU peg abandoned; no target adopted; 
exchange controls end (Jan 1); IT adopted.
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SWITZERLAND
1971, Dec 18 bb Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for capital account transactions;
1973, Jan 23 dd USD peg abandoned;
1975 m m Ml target adopted [but the XR is an important concern, and in periods of 
large pressures in forex markets, the XR goal may take precedence over 
the M target];
1978, Oct 1 XX DEM target announced, Ml target suspended;
1979, Jun 25 XX [return to M targeting, but not announced; XR concerns still dominate 
policy];
1980 mx return to announced M targets, but target changed to MO [XR concerns 
still dominate policy];
1982, Jan 3 m m [return to domestic concerns; importance of XR downgraded];
1986, Oct 1 mm exchange controls end;
1988, Jan 6 md definition of M0 changed [M target followed less rigidly];
1991 di M0 target for 1991 not announced; CB emphasises the XR oriented nature 
of policy, but refrained from defining targets; policy set to be consistent 
with 1% inflation rate [implicit IT].
UNITED KINGDOM
1971, Dec 18 bb Smithsonian agreement; exchange controls for capital account transactions;
1972, Jun 23 dd USD peg abandoned [discretionary policy]; [Snake participation from 
1/5/72 to 23/6/72];
1973,4th qtr dm [informal M3 target adopted];
1976, July md M target announced [under IMF pressure; targets were not taken as a 
serious constraint on policy, and were consistently overshot];
1979, June 12 mm [new government more committed to £M3 targets];
1979, Oct m m exchange controls end;
1982, Mar md £M3 target de-emphasised; targets for Ml and PSL2 also adopted 
[discretionary policy in practice];
1985 dd £M3 target suspended;
1987, Mar dx [unpublished DEM target adopted];
1988, Mar dd [unpublished DEM target abandoned];
1990, Oct 8 00 ERM membership, with fluctuation margins of ±6%;
1992, Sep 17 ii ERM membership abandoned; IT adopted (Oct 8).
UNITED STATES
1971, Dec 18 bb Smithsonian agreement; no exchange controls; [discretionary policy 
oriented to domestic conditions, based on Fed Funds rate targeting; 
weekly money targets were more ‘forecasts’ than ‘targets’ (desired)];
1973, Feb 12 dd major currencies abandon peg to USD; [M targets become real objectives, 
instead of mere forecasts];
1975, April md Ml target announced [targets were quarterly revised and frequently 
overshot; policy still based on Fed Funds rate targeting];
1979, Oct 6 mm non borrowed reserves targeting announced; [greater weight on M targets];
1982, Oct md borrowed reserves targeting [M targets de-emphasised];
1986 dd [abandon of M targets; concern for financial asset prices].
Sources: General: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, OECD 
Economic Surveys, Bemanke and Mishkin (1992), Goodhart and Vifials (1994); Australia: Stevens and 
Debelle (1995); Canada: Freedman (1995a), Howitt (1993); France: Melitz (1993); Germany: Bemanke 
and Mihov (1997), Clarida and Gertler (1996), Kloten (1992), Neumann and von Hagen (1993), von 
Hagen (1995); Italy: Spinelli and Tirelli (1993), Visco (1995); Japan: Ichimura (1993), Tamura (1992); 
New Zealand: Fischer (1995); Spain: Ayuso andEscriva (1997); Sweden: Svensson (1995); Switzerland: 
Wasserfallen and Kursteiner (1994); UK: Artis and Lewis (1991), Bowen (1995b), Goodhart (1992a), 
Minford (1993); US: Mayer (1992), Meulendyke (1990).
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Appendix 6.B: Financial Asset Prices Data
MONTHLY DATA 
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE:
Source: International Financial Statistics, Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Index NADJ (line NEUF). 
Sample: 1972:1/1996:12, except: Australia (1979:1/1996:12); New Zealand (1979:1/1996:12).
MONEY MARKET INTEREST RATE:
Source: International Financial Statistics, Money Market Call Rate (line 60B), except: Canada (IFS, 
Treasury Bill rate, line 60C); Ireland (OECD, Interest Rate on Call Money, end period); New Zea­
land (OECD, 90 Day Bank Bill Rate); Spain (OECD, Interest Rate on Call Money, end period); 
Switzerland (Datastream, Interest Rate on 3 Month Swiss Franc Deposits in London, end period); 
UK (OECD, Overnight Interbank Min).
Sample: 1972:1/1996:12, except: Spain (73:6/96:12); New Zealand (73:12/96:12).
SHARE PRICES:
Source: International Financial Statistics, Share Prices (line 62), except: Denmark (IFS, Share Prices: 
Industrial, line 62A); Germany (OECD, Share Price Index, CD AX, monthly average).
Sample: 1972:1/1996:12, except: Australia (1979:1/1996:12); New Zealand (1979:1/1996:12).
DAILY DATA
EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RA TE:
Source: Bank of England's trade weighted currency movement indices, rebased at 1990=100.
Sample: 1975:1:1/1996:12:31.
32Identification of exchange rate crisis during the 1972-74 period was based on USD exchange rates: 
Source: WM/Reuters closing spot rates.
Sample: 1972:1:1/1974:12:31.
MONEY MARKET INTEREST RATE:
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, US: euro­
currency interest rates, London, 2 days notice; Sample: 1975:1:1/1996:12:31, except: Belgium 
(78:6:1/96:12:31); Denmark (85:6:1/96:12:31); Italy (78:6:1/96:12:31); Japan (77:6:1/96:12:31). 
Austria: 1 month VIBOR, middle rate (72:3:15/88:12:31); Overnight VIBOR, offered rate 
(89:1:1/96:31:12).
Australia: 3 month treasury bill, middle rate (80:12:31/96:12:31).
Ireland: Eire money overnight, middle rate (84:1:20/96:12:31).
New Zealand: 1 month interbank, middle rate (86:4:1/96:12:31).
Norway: deposit middle rate (93:5:4/96:12:31).
Spain: interbank weighted average overnight, middle rate (88:9:1/96:12:31).
Sweden: 270 day treasury bill, middle rate (89:4:25/96:12:31).
SHARE PRICES:
Source: Datastream Global Indices - stock prices - national.
Sample: 1973:1:1/1996:12:31, except: New Zealand (1988:1:1/1996:12:31); Norway
(1980:1:1/1996:12:31); Spain (1987:3:1/1996:12:31); Sweden (1982:1:1/1996:12:31).
32 The decision on whether to assign an identified crisis to the domestic currency or the USD was based 
on the following criteria: if a crisis was identified simultaneously in more than 5 countries, this was 
assumed to be an USD crisis; if the number of countries involved was 5 or less, this was assumed to be a 
crisis of the domestic currencies involved.
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Conclusions 
and Suggestions for Further Work
There is no well established explanation of what determines exchange rate movements, 
even though a large body of literature in applied economics has been dedicated to this 
theme. One of the most productive lines of research in this field has been concentrated 
on the relationship between exchange rates and monetary policy. The collection of 
studies contained in the previous chapters contributes to this area by providing a number 
of examinations of the effects of monetary policy on the behaviour of exchange rates. 
The main topics covered are the effect of monetary policy and other macroeconomic 
announcements on exchange rates, the objectives of monetary policy, and the use of 
targets in its implementation. In this concluding chapter the results of the preceding 
studies are summarised and directions for further work are indicated.
The main implication of the evidence provided in the previous chapters is that monetary 
policy is an important determinant of exchange rate behaviour. It was shown that, 
directly and indirectly, the actions of central banks significantly affect the mean, as well 
as the variance, of nominal exchange rates: ‘news’ about key interest rates have a strong 
impact on the level and volatility of exchange rates; the reaction of exchange rates to 
macroeconomic news is a function of the anticipated policy reaction by the monetary
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authorities; and the choice of monetary policy target affects the volatility of the exchange 
rate, and the likelihood of crises in the foreign exchange market. Thus, monetary policy 
may be an important source of risk to world investors, and central banks should be 
concerned with minimising this risk when designing the policy strategy. In many ins­
tances throughout this thesis, it was shown that central banks can alter the effect of their 
policy decisions on exchange rates by the appropriate choice of some features of their 
strategy.
Furthermore, the link between monetary policy and exchange rates is two way. Mone­
tary policy is a determinant of exchange rates, but is also constrained by exchange rate 
concerns. For instance, the nominal exchange rate regime is one of the most important 
elements of the monetary policy strategy, but many times this choice is imposed on the 
central bank, and on these cases it is usually dictated by concerns other than the effi­
ciency of monetary policy. Some central banks have been forced to give foreign ex­
change guarantees, or to maintain unrealistic exchange rates to protect special economic 
interests, which hampered their ability to conduct monetary policy.
The recent availability of good databases of high frequency exchange rates induced a 
large number of empirical studies that explored the properties of these data. Chapters 2 
and 3 belong to this strand of literature. Using a three year span of DEM/USD exchange 
rate quotes sampled at a five minute frequency, they investigate the impact on exchange 
rates of monetary policy signals and macroeconomic announcements. The first of these 
exercises is described in Chapter 2, which analyses monetary policy signals from the 
German Bundesbank and the US Federal Reserve. Results indicate that ‘news’ about 
monetary policy have a strong impact on exchange rates: large and significant changes in 
the exchange rate level and increases in its volatility were found to be associated with 
some specific information releases regarding German and US monetary policy. Chapter 
3 examined announcements of German and US macroeconomic data, and found that 
macroeconomic ‘news’ have a strong and quick impact, with the exchange rate reflecting 
the anticipated policy reaction by the monetary authorities to the piece of news just 
released.
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Monetary policy signals and macroeconomic news from Germany and the US were all 
found to have a significant impact on exchange rates, but the nature of these effects 
differed substantially. First, news from Germany tended to have a smaller impact than 
news from the US: the estimated exchange rate change caused by German ‘news’ was, 
on average, half of that for the US. Second, the effect of news varies across time: the 
same piece of news might have a different impact on the exchange rate at different 
moments in time, in some cases even implying opposite reactions. Third, the exchange 
rate reaction differs according to how the information reaches the market: exchange rates 
adjust faster when the news are released through scheduled announcements, or when 
policy signals are revealed through official statements (instead of open-market opera­
tions). Finally, the impact of macroeconomic ‘news’ is quantitatively smaller than the 
impact of monetary policy signals, and the overall effect of macroeconomic news on 
lower frequency exchange rate changes decays quite rapidly towards insignificance: the 
average exchange rate change caused by the most significant macroeconomic news is less 
than a quarter of that of policy signals; and the significance of the coefficients on macro- 
economic news tended to disappear after a couple of hours, while the effects of policy 
news could usually still be felt after 12 hours.
The larger impact of monetary policy news, the fact that the markets’ reaction to macro- 
economic news seems to be driven by their interpretation of the central bank’s reactions, 
and the fact that in Chapter 3 it was found that the effect of German macroeconomic 
news depends on the proximity to the next Bundesbank council meeting, all indicate that 
the monetary authorities’ actions are one of the main factors driving exchange rates. 
This suggests that an interesting extension of the analysis above could be to study the 
effects on the high frequency behaviour of exchange rates of other central banks’ actions, 
in particular interventions in the foreign exchange market. In the dataset used in Chap­
ters 2 and 3, several episodes of direct intervention in foreign exchange markets by the 
Fed adnd other central banks could be identified, and an analysis of those episodes might 
deliver relevant results. Other possible extensions would be the analysis of the impact of 
statements by central bank officials, or the effects of other types of public information 
(e.g., political news). Finally, there is the obvious extension of these studies to other
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exchange rates, countries, and data periods, since the results were obtained for a specific 
sample. It would be interesting to examine the robustness of some of the results when 
the analysis is extended to other currencies, notably whether the dominant effect of US 
news is general, and whether it even affects cross-rates between currencies other than the 
USD.
Most of the research on monetary policy focus on the experience of central banks in 
larger and more advanced economies, facing fully developed financial markets. Yet, this 
is just a subset of the universe of central banks, and not even a representative one. 
Central banks in developing countries conduct monetary policy in an environment 
substantially different from that faced by central banks in more developed economies, as 
the evidence in Chapter 4 demonstrates. This chapter examined the monetary policy 
framework in a sample of 44 developing countries, and detected that there is a general 
acceptance of the benefits of price stability as the primary central bank objective. Never­
theless, the results suggest that in developing countries central banks give a lower 
priority to price stability than it is usually the case in more advanced economies. The 
weakness of other public administration institutions forces the government to rely on the 
central bank to pursue other objectives: central banks are expected to provide govern­
ments the revenue they cannot collect through the tax system, and to perform a range of 
quasi-fiscal activities, like providing implicit subsidies through credit or foreign exchange 
guarantees, or imposing restrictions on the financial system that will benefit the govern­
ment; they are also expected to preserve the stability of the financial system. A central 
bank that is obliged to carry out a wide range of quasi-fiscal activities can hardly aspire 
to the same degree of independence from government as one which has not been re­
quired to assume such activities, and this lack of independence will jeopardise their 
ability to maintain price stability, as the results show.
The evidence in Chapter 4 emphasizes that central banks may have multiple objectives, 
and this has to be considered when designing a strategy for monetary policy. The analy­
sis of a policy strategy should not be conducted exclusively in the light of its effects on 
inflation. This principle permeates the last two studies in this thesis. Chapter 5 provides
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an detailed analysis of the experience of seven countries that have adopted a monetary 
policy strategy based on inflation targeting. The chapter examines the inflation experi­
ence of these countries, but it also investigates several other aspects of central bank 
behaviour that may have been affected by the adoption of this strategy. Chapter 6 
compares the performance of alternative monetary policy targets, from the point of view 
of financial stability, based on data on exchange rates, interest rates, and stock prices, 
from a panel of 18 OECD countries for the period 1972-96.
The study in Chapter 5 could not provide a definitive conclusion on whether the adop­
tion of inflation targets had a significant impact on the behaviour of central banks. There 
are some signs of a positive impact, especially in the countries where it has been in force for 
a longer period (New Zealand and Canada), but most of these are country specific. The only 
area where there is clear evidence of a change in behaviour is in the nature of communications 
of central banks with both the public in general and government in particular, where there is a 
visible increase in transparency and accountability. Inflation targeting countries have 
been successful in lowering inflation, and then keeping it low, but then so equally were other 
OECD countries. The only advantage inflation targeting countries might have had was to 
achieve low inflation faster and at a lower cost in terms of output growth. On the other hand, 
inflation targeting countries have missed their own targets on several occasions, which 
suggests that the target ranges used might be too narrow.
Some of the evidence in Chapter 5 suggested that the adoption of inflation targets might have 
been instrumental in achieving increased stability in financial markets. A more detailed and 
extended analysis of this question in Chapter 6 confirmed that the use of inflation targets is 
associated with more stable financial markets. This chapter compared the degree of 
financial stability associated with different targeting strategies, and found that the choice 
of monetary policy strategy will significantly affect stability in financial markets. Both 
short term price volatility of financial assets, and the likelihood of crises in foreign 
exchange markets, differ significantly when central banks are using alternative policy 
targets. Results suggest the existence of a trade-off between stabilising interest rates or 
stabilising exchange rates, but they also indicate some strategies that appear to be prefe-
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rable from the financial stability point of view, such as inflation targeting and multilateral 
exchange rate targeting arrangements with strong discipline (as the original ERM).
The research in Chapters 5 and 6 contributes to the extensive literature on the evaluation 
of monetary policy strategies. Although the existing work already covers many issues in 
this area, there are some possible extensions of the analysis in these chapters. First, the 
study in Chapter 5 should be revisited in some years, when a longer experience with 
inflation targeting is available. The analysis of the adoption of inflation targets was based 
on a small set of countries, and covered a short period of time, and this might have been 
one of the reasons why we could find few significant effects. Second, one of the sub­
products of the analysis in Chapter 6 was the creation of a database of monetary policy 
strategies in OECD countries. This database, together with the database in Cottarelli and 
Giannini (1997), could be used to extend the analysis in Chapter 5 to other monetary 
policy strategies. One could examine differences in inflation performance, and in the 
credibility of polices, under alternative policy targets. This will be the focus of our future 
work.
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